People v Culleton

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People v Culleton 2018 NY Slip Op 33556(U) March 19, 2018 County Court, Westchester County Docket Number: 17-0726 Judge: Anne E. Minihan Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. [* 1] i FILED AND ENTERED COUNTY COURT: STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER ON j·J.6·· 2018 ------------------------------------------------------------------)( WESTCHESTER THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK -againstDECISION & ORDER Indictment No.: 17-0726 SEAN CULLETON, Defendant. ------------------------------------------------------------------)( MINIHAN, J. Defendant, SEAN CULLETON, having been indicted on or about December 19, 2017 with Driving While Intoxicated Per Se, as a felony (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [2]); Driving While Intoxicated, as a felony (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3 ]); and Speeding (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 [d]). In response thereto, the People have filed an Affirmation in Opposition together with a Memorandum of Law. Upon consideration of these papers, the stenographic transcript of the grand jury minutes and the Consent Discovery Order entered in this case, this court disposes of this motion as follows: 'f\LED A. MOTION for DISCOVERY, DISCLOSURE and INSPECTION CPL ARTICLE 240 The parties have entered into a stipulation by way of a Consent Discovery Order consenti the enumerated discovery in this case. Defendant's motion for discovery is granted to the extent provided for in Criminal Procedure Law Article 240. If there any further items discoverable pu suant to Criminal Procedure Law Article 240 which have not been provided to defendant pursuant to the Consent Discovery Order, they are to be provided forthwith. As to the defendant's demand for exculpatory material, the People have acknowledged their continuing duty to disclose exculpatory material at the earliest possible date upon its discovery (see Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 [1963]; Giglio v United States, 405 US 150 [1972]). The People have also acknowledged their duty to comply with People v Rosario, (9 NY2d 286 [1961]). In the event that the People are or become aware of any material which is arguably exculpatory and they are not willing to consent to its disclosure to the defendant, they are directed to immediately disclose such material to the Court to permit an in camera inspection and determination as to whether such must be disclosed to the defendant. Defendant's motion for a further Bill of Particulars is denied. The Bill of Particulars set forth in the Consent Discovery Order provided to the defendant has adequately informed the defendant of the substance of his alleged conduct and in all respects complies with CPL 200.95. [* 2] Except to the extent that the defendant's applictttion has been specifically granted herein, it is otherwise denied as seeking material or information beyond the scope of discovery (see People v Colavito, 87 NY2d 423 [1996]; Matter of Brown v Grosso, 285 AD2d 642 [2d Dept 2001]; Matter of Brown v Appelman, 241AD2d279 [2d Dept 1998]; Matter of Catterson v Jones, 229 AD2d 435 [2d Dept 1996]; Matter of Catterson v Rohl, 202 AD2d 420 [2d Dept 1994]). B. MOTION to INSPECT, DISMISS and/or REDUCE CPL ARTICLE 190 The court grants the defendant's motion to the limited extent that the court has conducted, with the consent of the People, an in camera inspection of the stenographic transcription of the grand jury proceedings. Upon such review, the court finds no basis upon which to grant defendant's application to dismiss or reduce the indictment. Defendant's request to dismiss the indictment in the interests of justice is denied. The indictment contains a plain and concise factual statement in each count which, without allegations of an evidentiary nature, asserts facts supporting every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof with sufficient precision as to clearly apprise the defendant of the conduct which is the subject of the indictment (CPL 200.50). The indictment charges each and every element of the crimes, and alleges that the defendant committed the acts which constitute the crimes at a specified place during a specified time period and, therefore, is sufficient on its face (People v Cohen, 52 NY2d 584 [1981]; People v Iannone, 45 NY2d 589 [1978]). The grand jury was properly instructed (see People v Cal bud, 49 NY2d 389 [1980]; People v Valles, 62 NY2d 36 [1984]; People v Burch, 108 AD3d 679 [2d Dept 2013]). The evidence presented, if accepted as true, is legally sufficient to establish every element of each offense charged (CPL 210.30[2]). "Courts assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before a grand jury must evaluate whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted--and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence--would warrant conviction" (People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2002]). Legally sufficient evidence means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof (CPL 70.10[1]; see People v Flowers, 138 AD3d 1138, 1139 [2d Dept 2016]). "In the context of a Grand Jury proceeding, legal sufficiency means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, not proof beyond a reasonable doubf' (People v Jessup, 90 AD3d 782, 783 [2d Dept 2011]). "The reviewing court's inquiry is limited to whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flow from those facts supply proof of every element of the charged crimes, and whether the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference. That other, innocent inferences could possibly be drawn from those facts is irrelevant to the sufficiency inquiry as long as the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference" (People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 526 [1998]). Additionally, the minutes reveal a quorum of the grand jurors was present during the presentation of evidence, that the Assistant District Attorney properly instructed the grand jury on the law, and only permitted those grand jurors who heard all the evidence to vote the matter. 2 [* 3] , Based upon the in camera review, since this co.vrt does not find release of the grand jury minutes or any portion thereof necessary to assist it in making any determinations and as the defendant has not set forth a compelling or particularized need for the production of the grand jury minutes, defendant's application for a copy of the grand jury minutes is denied (People v Jang, 17 AD3d 693 [2d Dept 2005]; CPL 190.25[4][a]). C. MOTION to SUPPRESS NOTICED STATEMENTS This branch of the defendant's motion seeking to suppress statements on the grounds that they were unconstitutionally obtained is granted to the extent that a Huntley hearing shall be held prior to trial to determine whether any statements allegedly made by the defendant, which have been noticed by the People pursuant to CPL 710.30 (l)(a), were involuntarily made by the defendant within the meaning of CPL 60.45 (see CPL 710.20(3); CPL 710.60[3][b]; People v Weaver, 49 NY2d 1012 [1980]), obtained in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and/or obtained in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights (see Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200 [1979]). D. MOTION to SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE Defendant moves to suppress any evidence obtained as a result of the arrest, search and seizure of evidence including any chemical test that was performed on him. Specifically, defendant moves for suppression of the results of the chemical test. This branch of the defendant's motion is granted solely to the extent of conducting a Mapp hearing prior to trial to determine the propriety of any search resulting in the seizure of evidence (see Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 [1961]) including the results of the chemical test to determine, inter alia, whether the defendant expressly consented to the chemical test (see eg, People v Atkins, 85 NY2d 1007, 1008 [1995]; People v Gore, 117 AD3d 845 [2d Dept 2014]) and/or that it was administered in accord with VTL §1194 (2)(a) (see People v Atkins, 85 NY2d 1007, 1008 [1995]). Notably, the two hour limit set forth in VTL §1194(2)(a)(l) has no application where a defendant expressly and voluntarily consents to a test as opposed to where a defendant is deemed to have consented (People v Elysee, 12 NY3d 100, 105 [2009]). In the event the court finds that the defendant was deemed to have consented, the court win then consider whether the two hour statutory criteria as set forth in VTL § 1194(2)(a)( 1) was followed. The hearing will also address whether any evidence was obtained in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights (see Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200 [1979]). Defendant's motion to suppress law enforcement observations of his car on a public highway including the utilization of the DMV database to check his license plate number is summarily denied since a driver does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the license plate number itself or the DMV database information associated with a license plate number (see People v Weaver, 12 NY3d 433 [2009]; People v Bushey, 29 NY3d 158 [2017]). Defendant's motion to preclude electronic evidence not produced in the consent discovery order is summarily denied as the People conform that no electronic recordings or videotapes related to the arrest were recorded. 3 [* 4] E. MOTION for SANDOVAL and VENTIMIGLIA HEARINGS Defendant has moved for a pre-trial hearing to permit the trial court to determine the extent, if at all, to which the People may inquire into the defendant's prior criminal convictions, prior uncharged criminal, vicious or immoral conduct. The People have consented to a Sandoval hearing. Accordingly, it is ordered that immediately prior to trial a hearing shall be conducted pursuant to People v Sandoval (34 NY2d 371 [1974]). At said hearing, the People shall be required to notify the defendant of all specific instances of her criminal, prior uncharged criminal, vicious or immoral conduct of which they have knowledge and which they intend to use in an attempt to impeach the defendant's credibility if she elects to testify at trial (CPL 240.43). At the hearing, the defendant shall bear the burden of identifying any instances of her prior misconduct that he submits the People should not be permitted to use to impeach her credibility. The defendant shall be required to identify the basis of his belief that each event or incident may be unduly prejudicial to his ability to testify as a witness on his own behalf (see People v Matthews, 68 NY2d 118 [1986); People v Malphurs, 111AD2d266 [2d Dept 1985]). To the extent defendant's application is for a hearing pursuant to People v Ventimiglia (52 NY2d 350 [1981]), it is denied since the People have not indicated an intention to use evidence of any prior bad act or uncharged crimes of the defendant during its case in chief (see People v Molineaux, 168 NY2d 264 [1901]). If the People move to introduce such evidence, the defendant may renew this aspect of his motion. The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision and order of this court. Dated: TO: White Plains, New York March ' / , 2018 HON. ANTHONY A. SCARPINO, JR. District Attorney, Westchester County 111 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard White Plains, New York 10601 By: Mathew John, Esq. Assistant District Attorney Rocco D' Agostino, Esq. Attorney for Defendant Culleton 445 Hamilton Avenue, Suite 607 White Plains, New York 10601 4

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