Yensor, LLC. v Lankry
Annotate this CaseDecided on June 20, 2017
Civil Court of the City of New York, Richmond County
Yensor, LLC., Petitioner,
against
Prosper Lankry, d/b/a PROSPER LANKRY DESIGN, Respondent.
L & T50042/17
Attorney for Petitioner
Philip J. Mattina , Esq
334 Forest Avenue
Staten island, NY 10301
Attorneys for Respondent
Duskin & Crowe, Esq
1688 Victory Boulevard
Staten Island, NY 10314
Philip S. Straniere, J.
Petitioner, Yensor LLC, commenced this commercial summary proceeding against the respondent, Prosper Lankry d/b/a Prosper Lankry Design, alleging the respondent remained in possession of the premises 477-479 Jersey Street, Staten Island, New York, after the lease term had expired. Both sides are represented by counsel.
The parties have agreed that the only issue is whether the lease term has expired and have submitted affidavits and exhibits in that regard. If it has, the action is timely. If the lease has not expired, then respondent's tenancy is still in effect.
Remember when you were a kid and your grandfather or some other adult would ask you "how many fingers do you have?" You would answer "10" and then proudly count them off. Only to have gramps say he had "eleven" and count down "10-9-8-7-6" on one hand and then hold up his other hand and say "6 and 5 more makes 11." Well this case presents a similar issue.
Respondent entered into possession of the premises pursuant to a written lease dated January 1, 2012 between petitioner's predecessor in interest, 477-479 Jersey Street LLC, and respondent. Petitioner went into title pursuant to a deed dated December 17, 2014. The preamble of the lease recites that the lease is "for the term of two (2) years." However, the paragraph [*2]marked "Term" provides:
a. The term of the lease shall commence on January 1, 2012 (the "Commencement Date") and shall terminate on December 31, 2014 (the "Expiration Date").
b. An optional 2 years[sic] extension of the lease from January 1, 2015 (the "Commencement Date") and shall terminate on December 31, 2017 (the "Expiration Date").
A careful reading of the above paragraph discloses that rather than creating a two-year term for both the lease and the extension period, the calendar calculation of the paragraph establishes two three-year time periods. For those of you reading this who do not have the ability to check with Siri or Alexa, the court will set out the calculation.
Original Lease Term:
January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2012Year One
January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2013Year Two
January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2014Year Three
Extension Lease Term:
January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2015Year One
January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2016Year Two
January 1, 2017 to December 31, 2017Year Three
A year is defined in General Construction Law §57 and it accepts the premise that in the Gregorian Calendar, the one currently in use in Western Civilization, a year has 365 days and begins on January 1 and ends on December 31. Applying either a Lunar Calendar year or a Martian Calendar year still does not make the 1095-day period in each lease term two years instead of three. Perhaps the person drafting the lease had just seen the musical, "Sideshow" and was confused by the song "One and One Equals Three" when writing this section.
The common-law rule of interpretation is that any ambiguity in a document is presumed against the drafter. Although the petitioner did not draft the original lease, when it purchased the property, it assumed all the rights and obligations of the seller as the original landlord. Petitioner is bound by the terms.
The fact that the lease contains commencement dates and termination dates, means that the language of that paragraph controls over a general reference to a number of years elsewhere in the document. This section setting forth the start and end date is not ambiguous. It may be calculated with certainty and controls the relationship between the parties.
There was a prior summary proceeding brought by petitioner in January 2015 (L & T No.50170/15) in which petitioner alleged that the respondent remained in possession of the premises after the termination of the lease. In that proceeding, the respondent prevailed on a motion to dismiss the petition alleging that the respondent had exercised its right to extend the lease and therefore was not a holdover tenant. The court found that the respondent had properly exercised its option and therefore was entitled to remain in possession. In that petition, the petitioner conceded that the original lease term expired on December 31, 2014 thereby making it a three-year term and not a two-year term. Petitioner cannot now claim that the labeling of the [*3]original term as two-years when it concedes it was three years was not a mistake while the term in extension period is two years even though it too covers three calendar years.
Based on the foregoing, petitioner's cause of action is dismissed. The respondent's lease term has not expired. The respondent remains in possession pursuant to the terms of a valid lease which expires on December 31, 2017.
The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the court.
Dated: June 20, 2017
Staten Island, NY
HON. PHILIP S. STRANIERE
Judge, Civil Court
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