People v Ackridge
Annotate this CaseDecided on June 12, 2017
City Court of Mount Vernon, Westchester County
The People of the State of New York,
against
Ronald Ackridge, Defendant.
14-1469
Westchester County District Attorney
Mount Vernon Branch
Mr. Ronald Ackridge
Pro-Se Defendant
Saad Siddiqui, Esq.
Stand-by Counsel for Defendant
81 Pondfield Road, Suite D-333
Bronxville, New York 10708
Adrian N. Armstrong, J.
The pro-se defendant stands charged with the offense of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree, pursuant to PL § 220.03, and now moves pursuant to CPL § 30.30(1)(a) to dismiss the accusatory instrument on speedy trial grounds.
In general, the People must be ready for trial within six months for felony cases, 90 days for cases in which the most serious charge is a class A misdemeanor, 60 days for cases in which the most serious charge is a class B misdemeanor, and 30 days for cases in which only a violation is charged (CPL § 30.30[(1]). As in this case, where a felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an information or a misdemeanor complaint, CPL § 30.30(5)(c) provides that:
...the period applicable for the purposes of subdivision one must be the period applicable to the charges in the new accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the filing of such new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of such period and the period of time, excluding the periods provided in subdivision four, already elapsed from the date of the filing of the [*2]felony complaint to the date of the filing of the new accusatory instrument exceeds six months, the period applicable to the charges in the felony complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new accusatory instrument had not been filed.In other words, the People must be ready for trial within 90 days from the filing of the new accusatory instrument or six months from the filing of the felony complaint, whichever is earlier. People v. Cooper, 98 NY2d 541 (2002); People v. Guirola, 51 Misc 3d 13 (App Term, 2d Dept., 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016). Simply stated, if the aggregate amount of time charged to the People with regards to the felony complaint plus the Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 (1) readiness period associated with the most serious charge in the new accusatory instrument is greater than, in this case, six months (184 days), then the applicable Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 (1) period remains six months measured from when the defendant was arraigned (People v Cooper, 98 NY2d 541, n1 [2002]). In this case, the criminal action was commenced on July 26, 2014, by the filing of the felony complaint. Thus, the six-month period in which the People were required to announce their readiness for trial amounts to 184 days.
In order to satisfy his or her initial burden, the defendant must demonstrate that the People failed to declare their readiness within the statutorily prescribed time period. People v. Luperon, 85 NY2d 71 (1995). Once the defendant meets his or her initial
burden, the onus is upon the People to establish sufficient excludable delay to withstand dismissal. People v. Santos, 68 NY2d 859 (1986); People v. Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333 (1980). "Whether the People have satisfied [their 30.30] obligation is generally determined by computing the time elapsed between the filing of the first accusatory instrument and the People's declaration of readiness, subtracting any periods of delay that are excludable under the terms of the statute and then adding to the result any postreadiness periods of delay that are actually attributable to the People and are ineligible for an exclusion." People v. Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 208 (1992).
Upon review of the submissions of the parties, a review of the available transcribed stenographic minutes and a review of the official court file, the Court makes the following findings.
On July 26, 2014, the defendant was arraigned on a felony complaint before this Court. This Court did not have jurisdiction to set bail and defendant was remanded since he had five prior felony convictions (see CPL § 530.20[2][a]). On that date, defendant requested a felony hearing for July 31, 2014. The People concede the five days from July 27, 2014 to July 31,2014 are chargeable to the People.
On July 31, 2014, the defendant was released pursuant to CPL § 180.80, and the case was adjourned to August 27, 2014. The defendant claims that the action was adjourned for the People to conduct a felony hearing, and to provide defendant with a lab report. The People contend that the defendant requested an all purpose adjournment. Minutes for the July 31, 2014 appearance were not available to the parties, however, the court file indicates the defendant was released pursuant to 180.80, and that the defendant requested an adjournment. This Court finds that this time period is excludable as the defendant requested the adjournment (CPL § 30.30[4][b]).
On August 27, 2014, the brief record reflects that the defendant asked if there was a lab report, and the People stated "no", and the case was adjourned to October 1, 2014 for a lab only felony hearing. The People filed the lab report on the adjourned date. The thirty five days from August 27, 2014 to [*3]October 1, 2014 will be chargeable to the People.
On or about September 7, 2014 the defendant was taken into custody on a parole violation, resulting from this instant arrest on July 25, 2014. The People knew of defendant's whereabout and a Bring Back Order was submitted to the Westchester County Jail and the defendant was produced on October 1, 2014. On that date the lab report was filed and his attorney working with the Legal Aid Society was relieved as a result of a conflict, and Mr. Ayoub, an 18B attorney was assigned. At the defendant's request, the case was adjourned to October 8, 2014. This time period is excludable.
On October 8, 2014 the defendant was not produced from the Westchester County Jail and the case was adjourned to October 16, 2014. No explanation from the People is stated in their opposition to the defendant's motion. Therefore, eight days are chargeable to the People.
On October 16, 2014, the defendant demanded a felony hearing. The People requested that the hearing be scheduled for November 10, 2014. The People concede these twenty six days are chargeable to the People.
On November 10, 2014, the defendant executed a Superior Court Information form waiving his right to a speedy trial pursuant to CPL § 30.30 until such time as the defendant rejected a superior court plea.
On or about April 21, 2015, the defendant rejected the proposed Superior Court Information plea and this matter was returned to this Court. The People did not produce the defendant in this Court until July 15, 2015. On July 15, 2015, the People served and filed a misdemeanor information. The defendant then requested an adjournment to August 11, 2015. While the People concede that eighty seven days are chargeable to them, this Court correctly calculates eighty five days chargeable to the People from April 21, 2015 to July 15, 2015.
On August 11, 2015 the case was adjourned at the defendant's request to September 2, 2015. On September 2, 2015 the case was adjourned at the defendant's request to September 17, 2015. These time periods are excludable.
On September 17, 2015 defense counsel was relieved and Ms. Permutt was assigned to represent the defendant. The case was adjourned to October 9, 2015. This time period is excludable.
On October 7, 2015 the defendant was taken into custody, by Parole Officer Gaynor at the New Rochelle Parole Office. On that date, defendant alleges that he informed P.O. Gaynor that he was due in Mt. Vernon City Court on October 9, 2015. On October 9, 2015 the defendant was not produced in this Court and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. On or about November 27, 2015 the defendant was transferred to Downstate Correctional Facility to finish up the parole violation. On December 5, 2015 the defendant was discharged form Downstate Correctional Facility, at which time the Mount Vernon Police Department executed the bench warrant that was issued in this Court on October 9, 2015. On December 5, 2015 defendant appeared in this Court and informed the Court that he was in custody since October 7, 2015. The case was adjourned to December 7, 2015 and defendant voluntarily appeared in this Court with his assigned attorney.
The defendant maintains that the delay to produce him in court from October 9, 2015 through December 5, 2015 should be chargeable to the People since they have failed to show that they exercised due diligence to locate him during that period. The People did not dispute defendant's factual assertions concerning defendant's whereabouts during the contested period.
It is clearly established that if the defendant is in custody on another matter, then the People must show due diligence (People v Knight, 163 AD2d 583 [2d Dept. 1990][holding that "entire period of delay which was attributable to People's failure to produce defendant from prison was not excludable under speedy trial rule"]); People v Williams, 40 Misc 3d 1233A[Sup. Ct. Bronx County 2013][an adjournment may be excluded if the People exercise due diligence to locate and attempt to produce a defendant detained within the same jurisdiction"]). Here, the defendant was not at a location unknown to the People since he was under the control of the authorities in the same jurisdiction for at least forty-five days before being transferred to a state facility for eight days. The Court agrees with the defendant that the People had an obligation to exercise diligence in executing the October 9, 2015 bench warrant. The People failed to address what actions if any were taken after the bench warrant was issued, therefore the delay of fifty-seven days between issuance of bench warrant for defendant's arrest and date efforts to execute warrant were initiated are charged to the People.
On January 13, 2016 and January 22, 2016 the case was adjourned at the defendant's request to proceed pro-se. The case was adjourned to March 4, 2016. This time period is excludable.
On March 4, 2016 the defendant failed to appear and his attorney informed the court that the defendant was [*4]in custody in the Westchester County Jail on a new arrest. The case was adjourned to March 23, 2016 and the defendant was produced. On that date the defendant again requested to proceed pro-se and the case was adjourned to April 8, 2016 for a hearing to determine whether the defendant would be allowed to proceed pro-se. This time period is excludable.
On April 8, 2016 after an extensive colloquy with the defendant, the Court found that the defendant's right to counsel was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived and allowed him to proceed pro-se. The Court also appointed 18B attorney Mr. Siddiqui as stand-by counsel for the defendant. The case was adjourned to May 19, 2016 at defendant's request to file an omnibus motion. The Court rendered a decision on June 21, 2016. This period during which the motions were pending is excluded.
On June 27, 2016, the defendant filed a motion to reargue this Court's determination denying his motion to dismiss. On February 21, 2017, this Court granted defendant's pro-se motion to reargue and dismissed the misdemeanor information and reinstated the felony complaint. Delays due to motion practice are excludable. Therefore, the period time from June 27, 2016 to February 21, 207 are excludable.
On April 10, 2017, the People filed a superseding misdemeanor information and announced their readiness for trial. Defendant was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. Defendant requested May 1, 2017, for a hearing on his speedy trial claims. On May 1, 2017, the defendant served and filed the instant motion. A speedy trial hearing was scheduled for May 22, 2017. As Defendant requested these adjournments, or joined in the application, this time period is excluded.
As stated above, this Court charges the People with five days from July 27, 2014 to July 31, 2014. This Court charges the People with thirty- five days from August 27, 2014 to October 1, 2014. This Court charges the People with eight days from October 8, 2014 to October 16, 2-014. This Court charges the People with twenty- six days from October 16, 2014 to November 10, 2014. This Court charges the People with eighty- five days from April 21, 2015 to July 15, 2015. This Court charges the People with fifty-seven days from October 9, 2015 through December 5, 2015. In sum, there is a total of two hundred sixteen days of includable time. The People have therefore exceeded the statutorily prescribed time of six months or 184 days.
Accordingly, the motion by defendant to dismiss the accusatory instrument on speedy trial grounds is granted.
This constitutes the decision and order of this Court.
Dated: June 12, 2017
Mount Vernon, New York
__________________________
HON. ADRIAN N. ARMSTRONG
City Court Judge of Mount Vernon
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
