People v Crooks

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People v Crooks 2017 NY Slip Op 33045(U) December 12, 2017 County Court, Westchester County Docket Number: 17-0702-01 Judge: Anne E. Minihan Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. [* 1] FILED AND ENTERED COUNTY COURT: STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER ON'/)-JY 2017 -------~-----------------·-----------------------------------------X WESTCHESTER THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ·-againstDECISION & ORDER Indictment No.: 17-0702-01 ALEXANDER CROOKS, ANTWAN HALL, and XAVIER HUTCHERSON, Defendants. ----------------------------------------------------~-------------X MINIHAN, J. Defendant, ALEXANDER CROOKS, having been indicted on or about September 7, 2017, for the crimes of Robbery in the Second Degree (Penal Law§ 160~10 [1]), Grand Larceny in the Fourth Degree_ (Penal Law§ 155.30 [5]), and Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Third Degree (Penal Law§ 165.50) has filed an omnibus motion consisting of a Notice of Motion and an Affirmation in Support thereof. In response thereto, the ~eople have filed an Affirmation in Opposition together with· c;i. Memorandum of Law. By the same indictment , defendant and co-defendant ANTWAN HALL are charged with acting in concert to commit Burglary in the Second_ Degree (Penal Law§ 140.25 [2]) and Robbery in the Second Degree (Penal Law§ 160.10 [1]). ANTWAN HALL is charged individually with Burglary in the Second Degree (Penal Law§ 140.25 [2]) and Grand Larceny in the Third Degree (Penal Law§ 155.35 [1]) while XAVIER HUTCHERSON is charged individually with Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Third Degree (Penal Law§ 165.50). ~consideration of these papers, the stenographic transcript of the grandjury minutes Jan& lth£~nt Discovery Order entered in this case, this Court disposes of this motion as ~ follows: ~C 1 5 2017 MOTION to INSPECT, DISMISS and/or REDUCE TIMOTHY C. IDONI COUNTY CLERK . CPL ARTICLE 190 r:' l I I, COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER The court grants the defendant's motion to the limited extent that the court has conducted, with the consent of the People, an in camera inspection of the stenographic transcription of the Grand Jury proceedings. Upon such review, the court finds no basis upon which to grant defendant's application to dismiss or reduce the indictment. Defendant's request to dismiss the indictment in the interests of justice is denied. The defendant has cited no persuasive or compelling factor, consideration or circumstances under CPL 210 .40 warranting dismissal of this indictment. In reaching a decision on the motion, the court has examined the factors listed in CPL 210.40, which include, in relevant part, the seriousness and circumstances of the offense; the extent ofharm·caused by the offense; the [* 2] evidence of guilt; the history, character and condition of the defendant; any exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement personnel; the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence authorized for the charged offenses; the potential impact of a dismissal on public confidence in the judicial system; the potential impact of dismissal upon the safety and welfare of the community; and other relevant facts suggesting that a conviction would not serve a useful purpose. Having done so, the court has discerned no compelling factor, consideration or circumstance which clearly demonstrates that further prosecution or conviction of the defendant would constitute or result in injustice. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss in the ' interest of justice is denied. The indictment contains a plain and concise factual statement in each count which, without allegations of an evidentiary nature, asserts facts supporting every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof with sufficient precision as to clearly apprise the defendant of the conduct which is the subject of the indictment (CPL 200.50). The indictment charges each and every element of the crimes, and alleges that the defendant committed the acts which constitute the crimes at a specified place during a specified time period and, therefore, is sufficient on its face (People v Cohen, 52 NY2d 584 [1981]; People v Iannone, 45 NY2d 589 [1978]). The grandjury was properly instructed (see People v Ca/bud, 49 NY2d 389 [1980]; People v Valles, 62 NY2d 36 [1984]; People v Burch, 108 AD3d 679 [2d Dept 2013]). The evidence presented, if accepted as true, is legally sufficient to establish every element of each offense charged (CPL 210.30[2]). "Courts assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before a grand jury must evaluate whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted--and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence--would warrant conviction" (People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2002]). Legally sufficient evidence means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof (CPL 70.10[1]; see People v Flowers, 138 AD3d 1138, 1139 [2d Dept 2016]). "In the context of a Grand Jury proceeding, legal suffidency means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt" (People v Jessup, 90 AD3d 782, 783 [2d Dept 2011]). "The reviewing court's inquiry is limited to whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flow from those facts supply proof of every element of the charged crimes, and whether the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference. That other, innocent inferences could possibly be drawn from those facts is irrelevant to the sufficiency inquiry as long as the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference" (People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 526 [1998]). Additionally, the minutes reveal a quorum of the grand jurors was present during the presentation of evidence, that the Assistant District Attorney properly instructed the grand jury on the. law, and only permitted those grand jurors who heard all the evidence to vote the matter. A review of the minutes also reveals that accomplice testimony is not relevant so no instruction with regard to accomplice liability was warranted however the Grand Jury was properly instructed as to accomplice liability with regard to the video taped statement evidence (People v Burch, 108 AD3d 679 [2d Dept 2013]). 2 [* 3] Based upon the in camera review, since this court does not find release of the grand jury minutes or any portion thereof necessary to assist it in making any dete~inations and as the defendant has not set forth a compelling or particularized need for the production of the grand jury minutes, defendat}t' s application for a copy of the grand jury minutes is denied ·(People v Jang, 17 AD3d 693 [2~ Dept 2005]; CPL 190.25[4][a]). B. MOTION to SUPPRESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY CPL 710 Defendant's motion is granted to the limited extent of conducting a hearing prior to trial to determine whether tl;te identifying witness had a sufficient prior familiarity with the defendant as to render them impervious to police suggestion (People v Rodriguez, 79 NY 2d 445 [1992]). In the event the Court finds that there was not a sufficient prior familiarity with the defendant on the part of the witness, the Court will then consider whether or not the noticed identifications were unduly suggestive (United States v Wade, 388 US 218 [1967]). Specifically, the Court shall determine whether the identifications were so improperly suggestive as to taint any in-court identification. In the event the identifications are found to be unduly suggestive, the Court shall then go on to consider-whether the People have proven by clear and convincing evidence that an independent source exists for such witness' proposed in-court identification. C. MOTION to SUPPRESS NOTICED STATEMENTS This branch of the defendant's motion seeking to suppress statements on the grounds that they were unconstitutionally obtained is granted to the extent that a Huntley hearing shall be held prior to trial to determine whether any statements allegedly made by the defendant, which have been noticed by the People pursuant to CPL 710.30 (l)(a), were involuntarily made by the defendant within the· meaning of CPL 60.45 (see CPL 710.20(3); CPL 710.60[3][b]; People v . Weaver, 49 NY2d 1012 [1980]), obtained in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and/or obtained in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights (see Dunaway v New York,-442 US 200 [1979]). 3 [* 4] . D. MOTION for a SEVERANCE The defendant moves for a severance from his co-defendants. When charges against co-defendants are properly joined in a single indictment, motions for separate trials are addressed to the discretion of the trial court (see Pe_ople v Mahboubian, 74 NY2d 174, 183 [1989]). When such a mqtion is made, "severance is compelled where the core of each defense is in irreconcilable conflict with the other and where there is a significant danger, as both defenses are portr~yed to the trial court, that the conflict alone would lead the jury to infer defendant's guilt" (People v Mahboubian, 74 NY2d at 184). Inasmuch as the defenses asserted by the defendant and the co-defendants are not in irreconcilable conflict with each other such that there is a danger that the conflict alone would lead ajury to infer the defendant's guilt, his motion to sever is denied (see People v Terry, 78 AD3d 1207 [2d Dept 20 IO]). The defendant was properly joined in the same indictment (CPL 200.40[1]). The Court may, however, for good cause shown order that defendant be tried separately. Good cause includes a showing that defendant would be "unduly prejudiced by a joint trial" (CPL 200.40[1]). Further, where the proof against all defendants is supplied by the same evidence, "only the most cogent reasons warrant a severance"(People v Bornholdt, 33 NY2d 75, 87 [1973]; People v Kevin Watts, 159 AD2d 740 [2d Dept 1990]). And," ... a strong public policy favorsjoinder, because it expedites the judicial process, reduces court congestion, and avoids the necessity of· recalling witnesses ... " (People v Mahboubian, 74 NY2d 174, 183 [1989]). Defendant's motion to sever on the ground that there would potentially be prejudice arising from a Sandoval ruling is denied as premature, with leave to renew after a Sandoval ruling, and upon a showing that a joint trial will result in unfair prejudice to him and substantially impair his defense. This court must determine whether the co-defendants' statements are admissible and if so; if it is possible to redact the co-defendants' statements and whether the codefendants will be testifying at trial. Accordingly, the defendant's motion for a severance is denied as premature, with leave to renew upon a determination of the admissibility of codefendants' alleged statements, and upon- a showing that a joint trial will result in unfair prejudice to her and substantially impair her defense. Notably, a limiting instruction at trial would properly direct the jury to separately consider the proof as to each crime charged, thereby eliminating any prejudice to the defendant (see People v Veeny, 215 AD2d 605 [2d Dept 1995]). The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision and order of this Cou Dated: White Plains, New York Decembe.:2 , 2017 Honora le Anne E. Minihan Westchester County Court Judge 4

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