People v Casaccia

[*1] People v Casaccia 2016 NY Slip Op 51259(U) Decided on August 31, 2016 City Court Of Rochester, Monroe County Yacknin, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on August 31, 2016
City Court of Rochester, Monroe County

People of the State of New York, Plaintiff,

against

Michael Casaccia, Defendant.



16-05408



For Plaintiff:

Sandra Doorley, Monroe County District Attorney

(Hillary M. Levitt, Assistant District Attorney, of counsel)

For Defendant:

EastonThompson Kasperek Shiffrin LLP

(Danielle C. Wild, Esq., of counsel)
Ellen M. Yacknin, J.

BACKGROUND

Defendant Michael Casaccia is charged with obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and resisting arrest. These criminal charges arose when defendant allegedly attempted to prevent emergency medical technicians from treating defendant's daughter who was in the technicians' ambulance.

A pre-trial hearing was held on August 5, 2016 to determine whether the police had probable cause to detain or arrest defendant and whether the statements that defendant made to the police were made knowingly, willingly, and intelligently. Rochester Police Sergeant Kevin Leckinger testified for the People. Defendant presented no evidence. Based on the credible evidence, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

While in his patrol car on May 23, 2016 at about 5:00 p.m., Sergeant Kevin Leckinger responded to a police broadcast for police assistance requested by a Rural Metro ambulance crew near 384 East Avenue in Rochester, New York. According to the dispatch, the crew needed immediate help because an ambulance patient was fighting with crew members.

When he arrived at the scene, Sergeant Leckinger saw an ambulance with its back door open. Inside the ambulance were two ambulance medical technicians and a patient on the gurney. An unidentified woman and defendant were standing outside the open back door of the [*2]ambulance. Defendant appeared to be leaning into the ambulance.

As Sergeant Leckinger exited his patrol car and started to walk towards the ambulance, one of the EMTs in the ambulance yelled at the Sergeant to arrest defendant, the man who was leaning into the ambulance, immediately. Defendant turned around to face Sergeant Leckinger, who continued to approach the ambulance. At that point, Sergeant Leckinger ordered defendant to turn around again and to put his hands behind his back. Defendant said, "No," and refused to put his hands behind his back. Sergeant Leckinger told defendant he was going to detain defendant and repeated his command, and defendant repeated his refusal to put his hands behind his back. Sergeant Leckinger then used physical force to take defendant into custody.

Sergeant Leckinger testified that he believed it was necessary to detain defendant when he arrived to diffuse a potentially volatile situation while he conducted an investigation. According to Sergeant Leckinger, when defendant refused to comply with his order to put his hands behind his back, defendant also obstructed his own ability to conduct his official duties.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

At a pretrial evidence suppression hearing, the People have the initial burden of producing evidence that defendant's detention and arrest were lawful, but the defendant then has the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the police conduct was unlawful. See People v. Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367 (1971); People v. Lazcano, 66 AD3d 1474, 1475 (4th Dep't 2009), lv. denied 13 NY3d 940 (2010). The People contend that defendant's detention was lawful because it was necessary to prevent a potential disturbance and to enable the police to conduct an investigation. Defendant maintains that there was no legitimate basis to detain him, let alone to arrest him.

To evaluate the lawfulness of a police officer's actions, " the court must determine whether the action taken was justified in its inception and at every subsequent stage of the encounter.'" People v. Finch, 137 AD3d 1653, 1654 (4th Dep't 2016), quoting People v. Nicodemus, 247 AD2d 833, 835 (4th Dep't), lv. denied 92 NY2d 858 (1998). As explained in People v. DeBour, 40 NY2d 210, 215 (1976) and its progeny, a police officer's forcible stop and detention of an individual requires a reasonable suspicion that the particular individual was involved in a felony or misdemeanor. See People v. Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 498 (2006).

There is no dispute that Sergeant Leckinger attempted to forcibly detain defendant when he ordered defendant to turn around and put his hands behind his back so that he could handcuff defendant. See People v. Finch, 137 AD3d at 1654 (defendant's vehicle effectively seized when police blocked it with police vehicle); People v. Williams, 136 AD3d 1280, 1282 (4th Dep't), lv. denied 27 NY3d 1141 (2016) (defendant effectively seized when police officer ordered him to show his hands and lie down on the ground). When he did so, the Sergeant had only three pieces of information. First, he had heard police broadcast stating that the EMTs requested police assistance because a patient was fighting. Second, upon his arrival at the scene, he saw defendant standing outside and leaning into the ambulance. Third, he heard one of the EMTs tell him to arrest defendant.

Generally, a police radio call considered in conjunction with other confirmatory police observations "may . . . collectively, although not independently, support a reasonable suspicion justifying intrusive police action." People v. Benjamin, 51 NY2d 267, 270 (1980). See People v. Williams, 136 AD3d at 1282-83. In this case, however, the totality of the information known to [*3]Sergeant Leckinger when he attempted to detain defendant was entirely insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in a felony or misdemeanor.

Before he arrived at the scene, the Sergeant had heard only that a patient was involved in a fight. Upon his arrival, he saw a patient and the EMTs in the ambulance, and a man and woman standing outside the ambulance. He did not observe the patient, defendant, the woman, the EMTs, or anyone else engaged in a fight. He did not hear the patient, defendant, the woman, the EMTs, or anyone else engaged in fighting words. In other words, Sergeant Leckinger's initial observations at the scene were not congruent with the radio call concerning a belligerent patient.

Nor can the EMT's command to arrest defendant be construed as an independent observation by a trained police officer. To the contrary, the EMT's directive provided no facts at all that a police officer could evaluate to assess whether there was a reasonable basis to believe that defendant had engaged or was engaging in criminal activity.

The circumstances leading to defendant's detention here are similar to the circumstances leading to defendant's detention in People v. Tucker, 141 AD3d 748 (3rd Dep't 2016). In Tucker, the police arrived at the scene in response to a 911 call for unspecified police assistance. When they arrived, the police saw a man struggling with a woman over a purse. After the man and woman were separated, a police officer attempted to question the woman to determine what was happening. When she refused to respond, the police officer attempted to handcuff her, stating, "You are going to be detained until I can figure out what's happening here." The woman struggled and injured two officers as she was being handcuffed, and was subsequently charged with assault in the second degree.

As in this case, the police officer in Tucker never observed the defendant "engage in any criminal activity or any suspicious conduct that could have given rise to a reasonable suspicion that she had committed or was about to commit a crime." People v. Tucker, 141 AD3d at 746-47. As in this case, there was no evidence that the police felt threatened or endangered by defendant's behavior. For these reasons, the Tucker Court held that there was:

no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences [upon which the police officer could have] possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion of criminality necessary to forcibly detain defendant.

People v. Tucker, 141 AD3d at 747. For similar reasons, and for the reasons discussed above, Sergeant Leckinger lacked the reasonable suspicion of criminality necessary to forcibly detain defendant when he did so. Accordingly, any evidence that the police seized or observed as a result of defendant's unlawful detention, including defendant's statements to the police, must be suppressed. See People v. Layou, 71 AD3d 1382, 1383-84 (4th Dep't 2010).

Given defendant's unlawful detention, the resisting arrest charge lodged against him must be dismissed. Under NY Penal Law §205.30, the crime of resisting arrest can occur only if a defendant attempts to prevent a police officer "from effecting an authorized arrest." The Record in this case is devoid of any evidence that Sergeant Leckinger was attempting to place defendant under arrest defendant when he attempted to handcuff defendant. To the contrary, the Sergeant testified repeatedly that he was merely attempting to effect a detention of defendant, which, under DeBour, is a legal status one level less intrusive than an arrest. See People v. Moore, 6 NY3d at 498. In the absence of an arrest, there can be no crime of resisting arrest.

The resisting arrest charged must be dismissed even if the officer's attempt to handcuff [*4]defendant were to be construed as an arrest. As the Fourth Department has stressed, "the crime of resisting arrest does not occur if the arrest is illegal or unlawful." People v. Perez, 47 AD3d 1192, 1193 (4th Dep't 2008), quoting People v. Stevenson, 31 NY2d 108, 111 (1972). See People v. Peacock, 68 NY2d 675, 676 (1986). Because the officer's attempt to handcuff defendant was unlawful, any actions taken by defendant to resist being handcuffed do not amount to the crime of resisting arrest. See People v. Tucker, 141 AD3d at 747 (defendant's subsequent conduct in assaulting the police officer who was attempting to arrest her cannot validate a police encounter that was not justified at its inception); People v. Layou, 71 AD3d at 1384.[FN1]

Defendant additionally moves this Court to suppress all the statements and trial testimony made by eyewitnesses of defendant's alleged attempt to prevent the emergency medical technicians from performing their official duties. However, contrary to his assertion, such eyewitness statements and testimony were not obtained as a direct consequence of defendant's unlawful detention. To the contrary, any eyewitness observations of defendant's alleged conduct were made prior to, and not as a result of, defendant's detention. Accordingly, such observations and eyewitness statements were "neither an exploitation nor the product of the initial illegal detention, and [were] sufficiently attenuated from the initial detention so as to make [their] suppression unnecessary." People v. Johnson, 102 AD2d 616, 627 (4th Dep't), lv. denied 63 NY2d 776 (1984). See People v. Buchanan, 136 AD3d 1293, 1294 (4th Dep't), lv. denied 27 NY3d 1129 (2016); People v. Brown, 215 AD2d 333, 333-34 (1st Dep't 1995).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the People have failed to show that the police had a reasonable suspicion to detain defendant, let alone probable cause to arrest defendant, when the police took defendant into custody. Accordingly, defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized or observed after the police officer took defendant into custody is granted, and the resisting arrest charge lodged against him is dismissed.

Defendant's further motion to suppress eyewitnesses' statements and testimony regarding their observations prior to defendant's detention is denied.

Dated: August 31, 2016

Hon. Ellen M. Yacknin Footnotes

Footnote 1:Sergeant Leckinger testified that when he ultimately used force to detain defendant, defendant was under arrest "for preventing the EMTs from performing their duties, and then at this point also he was preventing me from performing my official duties as well." Insofar as the OGA charge against defendant was based on his interactions with Sergeant Leckinger as well as his alleged interactions with the EMTs, such an OGA charge would not lie for the same reasons that the resisting arrest charge does not lie. See People v. Perez, 47 AD3d 1192, 1193-94 (4th Dep't 2008); People v. Lupinacci, 191 AD2d 589 (4th Dep't 1993).