Wayne Health Care DeMay Living Ctr. v Estate of Gaudio
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Wayne Health Care DeMay Living Ctr. v Estate of Gaudio 2016 NY Slip Op 31571(U) August 16, 2016 Supreme Court, Wayne County Docket Number: 69124/2014 Judge: John B. Nesbitt Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various state and local government websites. These include the New York State Unified Court System's E-Courts Service, and the Bronx County Clerk's office. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. [* 1] STATE OF NEW YORK SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF WAYNE WAYNE HEALTH CARE DEMAY LIVING CENTER, Plaintiff -vs- Index o. 69124 ESTATE OF TONI GAUDIO and RALPH GAUDIO, Defendants. APPEARANCES: UNDERBERG & KESSLER, ESQ. (Jillian K. Farrar, Esq., of counsel) Attorneys for the Plaintiff PHlLIPPONE LAW OFFICES (James V. Philippone, Esq., of counsel) Attorneys for Defendant, Ralph Gaudio MEMORANDUM - DECISION John B. Nesbitt, J. Plaintiff, Wayne Health Care DeMay Living Center (herein the "Dej ay Center") moves for summary judgment against the defendants upon its complaint seeking amone;>' judgment for services ft provided to Toni Gaudio, now deceased. The Estate of Toni Gaudio, a defendant in this action, does not oppose the motion; therefore, the motion is granted with respect to defendant is the deceased' s husband, Ralph Gaudio. Plaintiff seeks recove defendant. The co- against the husband based upon both express and quasi-contract theories. The relevant facts are uncomplicated and largely undisputed. Mr. Gaudio, now 69 years old, married the deceased, Toni Gaudio, in 199 1, and resided with her in the Cij of Rochester until her health required that she receive in-patient care. In January of 2007, M s. Gaudio suffered a debilitating heart attack and was admitted to Rochester General Hospital, where she remained a patient for several months. The hospital then recommended that she be transferred to a residential [* 2] facility geared to her present condition and the type of care she would need f the future. One of the options presented by the hospital was the DeMay Center in the Village of N~wark, Wayne County. 1 Mr. Gaudio originally admitted his wife to the DeMay Center on July 19, 2007. She was discharged to the former Park Ridge nursing facility on September I 0, 2007, but readmitted to the DeMay I Center on October 23, 2007. From that date until her death on July 9, 2009, ~most one year and nine months later, Mrs. Gaudio received nursing home and health care serviceJ at the DeMay Center, which provided her with necessary food, shelter, medical treatment, and custodial care. The DeMay Center brings this action for the unpaid amounts due for these services nol totaling $125,725.20 with interest. In conjunction with the admissions to the DeMay Center, Mr. audio signed certain agreements, four in total. With regard to each of his wife's two admissions to DeMay, Mr. Gaudio signed what is called a Signatory Agreement and a Resident Admission Agrfement. DeMay claims that "Ralph Gaudio is not personally liable to DeMay under the Resident Ajdmission Agreements, but is liable to Plaintiff pursuant to the Signatory Agreements and the d<>ctrine of necessaries" (Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in response to Defendants' Surreply in 0 position to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment at p.2). The first five paragraphs of the two Signatory Agreements signed by Mr. Gaudio are identical. 2 1. Signator shall assist the Resident in fulfilling his or her responsibilities under the resident admission agreement. 2. Signator shall cooperate with DeMay in obtaining par ent from the Resident's funds for all of Resident's charges. 3. Signator agrees that Resident's assets, income, Medicar and insurance benefits and other resources will be used to timely pay all of Residept's charges. 4. Signator shall make payment to the facil ity of all charges, fees and expenses, payments for physician visits and all properly authorized additional charges and rate increases from the Resident's assets, income, Medicare and insurance benefits and other resources. 1 The DeMay Center provides long-term care to individuals with comi and chronic health lex conditions. 2 The first Signatory Agreement was signed by Mr. Gaudio on Septe ber 21, 2007, and the second on October 28, 2007. 2 [* 3] 5. If Resident becomes eligible in the future for Medicaid b nefits, Signator shall promptly and timely initiate and complete an application for M dicaid benefits. DeMay shall assist Signator in completing the Medicaid application process. Either at the outset of her admission or not long thereafter, the cost of Mrs. Gaudio' s residency at the DeMay Center was paid through the Medicaid program. At ome point, that ceased because the Monroe County Department of Social Services, the agency resp nsible for determining eligibility, did not receive certain information requested from and within the knowledge of Mr. Gaudio, i.e. specifics about his military pension. It was Mr. Gaudio's continuing contractual responsibility to complete the application for Medicaid benefits and b aintain a completed application at times of recertification. The Court recognizes Mr. Gaudio's c~aim that he relied upon counsel for this purpose and that communications directed to him from DeMay and the County were r not received by him because of problems with the US Mail and use of an lcorrect phone number. Yet, Mr. Gaudio did not take any action on his own to contact either DeMay,. the County to inquire whether the application on behalf of his wife was complete so to enable a f~vorable determination. In the end, it was his responsibility to ensure that the requisite information as in the possession of the County, not his lawyer' s or DeMay's. By failing in this responsibility Mr. Gaudio breached section 5 of the Signatory Agreement, and is liable for the claimed amount $ 125,725.50 - due the DeMay Center. Accordingly, the Court grants the plaintiffs motion for SU111Illlary judgment upon the I cause of action alleging breach of contract . The Court further grants summary judgment to plaintiff upon its cauye of action based upon the doctrine of necessaries. This doctrine derives from the ancient commtn law principle that a husband has the duty and obligation to support his wife and children "in conformity with his means ..." (Medical Business Associates, Inc. v. Steiner, 183 A.D.3d 86, 91 (3rc1 Dcp't 1992]). 3 In New York, Garlock v. Garlock (279 N.Y. 3 37 [ 1939]) represents the principl 's modem provenance. That case involved local industrialist, Olin J. Garlock, founder of Garlock P eking Company in the Wayne County community of Palmyra, whose many peculiarities providJd story fodder for his 3 "The necessaries doctrine is not a self-sufficient rule of law; rather i arises from a husband broader common-law duty to support his wife" (see, Note, The Unnecessary Doctrine ofNecessaries, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1767, 1770 [1984]). 3 [* 4] physician and good friend, Dr. C.C. Nesbitt, grandfather of the undersigned OJ., as he was known to his friends, entered into an agreement with his wife, Pauline, agreeing to pl y her $15,000 annually for her lifetime. This agreement was made "[w]ithout any thought or idea of separation" and at a time when "the parties were most happily married" (id. at 339) After a few ears, and dissipation of marital bliss, 0. J. stopped paying Pauline and she sued him for breach of~ontract. Special Tenn ruled as a matter oflaw for 0 .J. dismissing Pauline' s action. A divided Fourth Department reversed, finding the contract enforceable (Garlock v. Garlock, 255 App. Div. 88 [41h Dep' t 1938]. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding the contract void as cdntrary to public policy. Said the Court: "By reason of the marriage relation there is imposed on the h sband the duty to support and maintain his wife in conformity with his condition and station in life. Marriage is frequently referred to as a contract entered into by the f>arties, but it is more than a contract; it is a relationship established according to l~w, with certain duties and responsibilities arising out of it which the law itself imposes. The marriage establishes a status which it is the policy of the State to maint~in. Out of this relationship, and not by reason of any terms of the marriage contract, the duty rests upon the husband to support his v..ife and his family, not merely to keep them from the poor house, but to support them in accordance with his station anf osition in life .. .The duty ofthe husband ... as maner of policy and as an obligation i posed by law, cannot be contracted away.... Section 51 of the Domestic Relations aw enacts that a husband cannot contract to alter or dissolve the marriage or to reli ve the husband from his liability to support his wife . . . . This contract is void for the reason that it violates this provision which continues 'ts what has always been the policy of the law regarding marriage and~ incidents. If this be a valid contract it must work both ways; both parties must b bound by it. In this instance the parties, apparently living in affluence, have made pie provision for the support of the wife; but suppose we turn it about, and the husband was trying to enforce such a contract, where the amount provided for the wife was trivial in comparison with his income. Out of the goodness of her heart and in reliance upon his good nature she may have signed such a contract of her own free will, and yet no court would hold her bound by it, especially if she became in need ill.rough sickness or other misfortune" (id. at 340-341) I Now, of course, in this case, we are not dealing with an action by the late Mrs. Gaudio against her husband seeking financial support either to keep her out of the ounty "poor house" or for a standard ofliving commensurate with his "station and position in life." 1re strong public policy enunciated in Garlock, however, animates and informs the derivative common law doctrine of 4 [* 5] necessaries, upon which the DeMay Center relies in addition to its breach o contract claim. Under this doctrine, a spouse is liable to third parties who supply certain goods r services to the other spouse (see generally, 46 N.Y. Jur.2d, Domestic Relations §§954 [2007, a supplemented]). Such liability is based upon a theory of quasi-contract - an obligation implied in l,w - rather than implied in fact. 4 However anachronistic may be some aspects of the doctrine's origins, most courts continue to recognize and apply the doctrine. In North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, Inc. v. Harris (354 S.E.2d 471, 474 [N.C. 1987]), the North Carolina Supreme Court noted that "[t]he doctrine has historically served several beneficial functions. Among these are "the encouragement df health-care providers and facil ities to provide needed medical attention to married persons and ie recognition that the marriage involves shared wealth, expenses, rights and duties" (id. at 4 74, quoJed in Medical Business Associates v. Steiner, 183 A.D.3d 86, 94 [2"d Dep't 1992]). Although not reaching the issue whether to continue the common-law rule, the Court of Appeals in Litchman v Gro$sbard (73 N.Y.2d 792 [ 1988]) noted that two of its Judges would have reached the issue, with Judgf Hancock opining that the doctrine "reflect(s] the modem view of the marriage as an economic partnbrship" and encourages the extension of credit to non-working or non-monied spouses (id. at 795).11udge Hancock's view was adopted by the Appellate Division, Third Department in Our Lady of ourdes Mem. Hosp. v. Frey(152 A.D.2d 73 [3 1d Dep't 1989], and followed by the Second Department in Medical Business Associates v. Steiner, supra at 96 ("We are persuaded that retaining the common-law rule and applying it in a gender neutral fashion would encourage the extension of cred ·t to dependent spouses who, in an individual capacity, might lack the ability to purchase necessitie or to obtain adequate medical care."). The necessaries doctrine , therefore, exists today as a rule of law consistent with modem public policy and the view of marriage as economic partnership, an just not some ancient relic of the common-law continued by weight of judicial inertia, awaiting certain abrogation. The doctrine of necessaries "deals with the liability of a spouse in ~uasi-contract to a third party for necessaries furnished to the other spouse .... To be distinguished ~\om the implied in law obligation [informing the doctrine ofnecessaries] is the situation in which one spouse had pennitted the other spouse to act for him of her in dealing with tradespeople. From such conduct a contract to pay for the goods may be implied, but it would be immaterial in an action on such an implied in fact contract whether the items were necessaries, Wanamaker v. Weaver, 176 N.Y. 75, 68 N.E. 135 (1903)." 28 NY PJl 4:4, at 155 (2016) 4 5 [* 6] That said, however, liability under the necessaries doctrine " has n ver been automatic or unrestricted" (Professional Orthopedic & Sports v. Pittore, 36 Misc.3d 1219(A), at 3 [Poughkeepsie City Court 2012J; Ellenville Regional Hosp. v. Mendez, 21 Misc.3d 1131 (~), at 1 [ Poughkeepsie City Court 2008] [both cases citing Medical Business Assoc. v. Stein, 1831.D.2d 86, 96 [2"d Dep't 1992]). "Under the traditional doctrine, a creditor seeking to recover from a husband necessaries furnished to a wife has the burden of proving that the necessaries were furnished on the credit of the husband, although a presumption on 1 that point does exist. In addition, the doctrine alsCI holds a husband legally respon~·hle for medical expenses of his wife only insofar as they are commensurate w th his means" (citations omitted) (Our Lady of Lourdes Mem. Hosp. v. Frey (15 A.D.2d 73, 75 [3rd Dep't 1989]); see also Medical Business Assoc. v. Stein, 183 A. .2d 86, 97-98 [2nd Dep't 1992]). I In both Frey and Stein, the courts found an issue of fact whether the medical providers relied upon I the credit of one spouse in extending services to the other, and if so, an is ue of fact whether the spouse whose credit was relied upon had the ability or means to satisfy the debt. In this case, the DeMay Center argues that there are no issues of facJ'whether it relied upon Mr. Gaudio's credit in extending services to his wife, and, if S0 whether he 7 ~as the means to satisfy the concomitant obligation. In its view, the record amply establishes those facts as a matter of law, warranting this Court granting its motion for summary judgment Such a motion requires a court to determine whether a cause of action or defonse requires a trial before it can e sustained or rejected (CPLR §3212[b]). A trial is required where there are disputed issues of faI to be resolved before a cause of action or defense can be determined meritorious or not (Siegel, N w York Practice §278, AT 438 [3rd ed. 1999]). If the facts necessary to sustain or reject a cause of a tion or defense are not in dispute, a court must rule thereon as a matter of law, granting summary judgment on the merits (id. At 439). lfsuch facts are in dispute, summary judgment must be denied, and the action submitted to plenary trial. Of course, in deciding these issues, judges are reminded tha summary judgment is a "drastic remedy and should not be granted where there is any doubt as to he existence of triable issues" (Dal Construction Corp. v. of New York, l 08 A.D.2d 892, 894 [2"d ep't 1985]). Upon review of the record in this motion, which is extensive, the Court agrees with plaintiff DeMay Center that it is entitled to summary judgment upon its cause ofaction seeking recovery upon 6 [* 7] the necessaries doctrine. Accordingly, the Court grants judgment to plaintiffagainst defendant Ralph Gaudio for the demanded sums based upon the causes of action alleging cbntract breach and the necessaries doctrine. Counsel for the plaintiff shall submit a proposed Order and Judgment upon notice to defendants' counsel. Dated: August 16, 2016 Lyons, New York '" -.:..:.. I ~ .. I ~ ~l: >-<=xz"' om ~ -- 'O • ~ 7 o no oc: c:z ;._ -< -< -.. ~ C"l 0 c: =-
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