Amani v City of New York

[*1] Amani v City of New York 2015 NY Slip Op 51859(U) Decided on December 16, 2015 Supreme Court, New York County Kotler, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on December 16, 2015
Supreme Court, New York County

Shahrukh Amani

against

The City of New York and DET. JOHN SANTIAGO, SHIELD NO. 00331



100619/12
Lynn R. Kotler, J.

This action arises from plaintiff's alleged false arrest. Defendants The City of New York (the "City") and Detective John Santiago move for summary judgment as to plaintiff's claim and to dismiss plaintiff's causes of action arising under state law for failure to comply with GML §§ 50-e, 50-i and to dismiss plain-tiff's 42 USC § 1983 claims for failure to state a cause of action (CPLR §§ 3212, 3211[a][7]). Plaintiff maintains that the only claims he has brought are pursuant 42 USC § 1983 and otherwise opposes the mo-tion. The court's decision follows.

The facts are largely undisputed. Plaintiff, a taxi cab driver, was arrested by Detective Santiago on March 31, 2011 for violating VTL § 600[2][a], leaving the scene of an accident. The accident involved a collision between a taxi cab and a motorcycle on March 22, 2011 in front of 242 Mulberry Street, New York, New York. While the taxi cab fled the scene, the motorcyclist called 911 and identified the taxi cab that struck him as being cab number "6L39." On March 24, 2011, Detective Santiago was assigned to in-vestigate this hit and run. Detective Santiago spoke to the motorcyclist on March 25, 2011. Detective San-tiago prepared a DD5, or a follow-up investigative report, thereafter, wherein he wrote that the offending taxi cab's number was "6L39."

Meanwhile, twenty minutes after he spoke to the motorcyclist, Detective Santiago contacted the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission ("TLC"), and requested the driver information for taxi cab bearing number "6A39". In response, on March 30, 2011, the TLC gave Detective Santiago plaintiff's in-formation, since plaintiff was operating taxi cab bearing number "6A39." Detective Santiago called plain-tiff that day, identified himself as a detective, asked several questions, and ultimately demanded that plain-tiff meet him at the 5th Precinct.

On March 31, 2011, plaintiff appeared at the 5th Precinct. Plaintiff claims that he was held in a small interrogation room for over an hour, where he was repeatedly questioned. Plaintiff denied being involved in a hit and run, denied hitting a motorcyclist on March 22, 2011, and even brought written GPS printouts and a Driver Trip Log from his employer, VeriFone Transportation Systems, along with credit card receipts evidencing his whereabouts on the date in question. Ultimately, plaintiff was arrested. He was arraigned the following day and his case was adjourned to June 30, 2011. On the second court date, plaintiff met with the assigned assistant district attorney with his private attorney. According to plaintiff, the ADA lis-tened to the 911 call, reviewed plaintiff's trip records, and agreed to move to dismiss the criminal charges against plaintiff in the interest of justice.

Detective Santiago testified as follows during his deposition:

Q.My question is: Did you have enough information before you actually hadhim sitting in a chair across from you to arrest [plaintiff]?A.Yes.Q.And as he was sitting there before you asked him any questions, were yougoing to arrest him?A.Yes.Q.So at that point no matter what he told you, in your own mind as the policeofficer, you were going to arrest him for this complaint?A.Yes.Q.So if he said wasn't there or it wasn't me, that wouldn't have mattered?A.Unless he had obviously, you know — no, it was enough information tomake the arrest, yeah.Q.Then what was the reason to question him?A.Everybody get's — I mean, you don't have — I mean, based on the informa-tion you would like to question, but not everybody has to get questioned.Q.Well, you claim you had a license plate number —A.Ah-huh.Q.— you had a victim —A.Ah-huh.Q.— and a witness —A.Ah-huh.Q.— and in your head enough to arrest him. Why didn't you just go to hishouse and arrest him?A.I can't answer that question.

It is further undisputed that Detective Santiago arrived at the 5th Precinct in 2011 after having been transferred from Bronx Narcotics following an investigation involving another police officer. Plaintiff's counsel further argues that the training Detective Santiago received as a detective in Bronx Narcotics was insufficient to be a detective at the 5th Precinct because there is "a significant difference in the way investi-gations [are] conducted from narcotics to an actual detective squad." Further, it is un disputed that Detective Santiago only investigated one other taxi-related case prior to investigating the taxi in this hit and run.

Since there is no dispute that plaintiff has only asserted Section 1983 claims against the City and De-tective Santiago, individually, the court will only address the parties' arguments as to these claims. Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot establish municipal liability against the City and as to Detective Santiago, there was probable cause for the arrest and alternatively that Detective Santiago is entitled to qualified Im-munity. Plaintiff contends that the moving papers are defective since the annexed deposition transcripts are not sworn to, that defendants otherwise failed to meet their burden of proof with evidence in admissible form and that that there is, at least, a triable issue of fact as to whether Detective Santiago had probable cause to arrest plaintiff. Plaintiff further maintains that Detective Santiago is not protected by qualified im-munity.

Discussion

On a motion for summary judgment, the proponent bears the initial burden of setting forth evidentiary facts to prove a prima facie case that would entitle it to judgment in its favor, without the need for a trial (CPLR 3212; Winegrad v. NYU Medical Center, 64 NY2d 851 [1985]; Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). If the proponent fails to make out its prima facie case for summary judgment, however, then its motion must be denied, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Ayotte v. Gervasio, 81 NY2d 1062 [1993]).

Granting a motion for summary judgment is the functional equivalent of a trial, therefore it is a drastic rem-edy that should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue (Rotuba Extruders v. Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223 [1977]). The court's function on these motions is limited to "issue find-ing," not "issue determination" (Sillman v. Twentieth Century Fox Film, 3 NY2d 395 [1957]).

At the outset, the court rejects plaintiff's argument that the deposition transcripts are not in admissible form. Plaintiff does not claim that they contain any errors or were otherwise altered, therefore, the court will overlook this technical defect in the interest of judicial economy.

It is clear that plaintiff's Section 1983 claim against the City must be dismissed. A municipality cannot be held liable under 42 USC § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior (Elie v. City of New York, 92 AD3d 716 [2d Dept 2012] citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 US 658, 691 [1978]). Municipal liability for the violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights may be imposed only by es-tablishing "a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional depri-vation" (Canton v. Harris, 489 US 378, 385 [1996]; see Monell, supra at 694). In order to assert a cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 against a municipality, "the action that is alleged to be unconstitu-tional must implement[ ] or execute [ ] a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers" (Monell, 436 US at 690) or have occurred because of a practice "so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law" (Monell, 436 US at 691; see also Maio v. Kralik, 70 AD3d 1, 10—11 [2d Dept 2009]).

At best, plaintiff's claim against the City is an improper training claim. Under certain circumstances, a municipality's failure to train can be the basis for liability under § 1983 (Holland v. City of Poughkeepsie, 90 AD3d 841, 848 [2d Dept 2011] citing Canton v. Harris, supra at 387; see also Manti v. New York City Transit Authority, 165 AD2d 373, 379-380 [1st Dept 1991]). However, "[o]nly where a municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city policy or custom' that is actionable under § 1983" (id). Here, there are insufficient facts to establish that the City should and/or could have trained Detective Santiago not to make the mistake he made here and/or not to arrest plaintiff based upon the results of his investigation. Further, there is no proof that the City's failure to train, as such, was the re-sult of deliberate indifference. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim against the City must be dismissed.

However, the court must deny the motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's claims against Detective Santiago. Here, defendants have not met their burden, which was to establish that Detective Santiago was entitled to qualified immunity or that there was probable cause for plaintiff's arrest. "A government of-ficial performing a discretionary function is entitled to qualified immunity provided his or her conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known" (Liu v. New York City Police Dept., 216 AD2d 67 [1st Dept 1995] citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 US 635 [1987]). Here, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether it was objectively reasonable for Detective [*2]Santiago to believe that plaintiff's arrest was lawful. Detective Santiago made a mistake when he called TLC for the identity of the taxi cab driver involved in the underlying hit-and-run when he gave TLC the incorrect cab number. This mistake could have been rectified at various points during Detective Santiago's investigation, but was not. When Detective Santiago called plaintiff, and interrogated him at the precinct, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that it was unreasonable for Detective Santiago to arrest plaintiff in light of plaintiff's statements, his GPS and other records that he had with him, and the undisputed fact that plaintiff was not the driver of taxi cab bearing number 6L39.

The court rejects defendants' contention that they have proven that police officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether there was probable cause here. Defendants have not established this through admissible evidence, such as an affidavit from a police officer, or even an affidavit from Detective Santiago himself.

Defendants have also failed to establish probable cause for plaintiff's arrest. Probable cause is a com-plete defense to an action for false arrest and false imprisonment (see Morel v. Crimaldi, 683 NYS2d 22 [1st Dept 1998]. CPL § 140.10 [1] provides that "a police officer may arrest a person for: [b] a crime when he has reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed such crime, whether in his presence or otherwise." Reasonable cause is further defined at CPL § 70.10 [2] as follows:

"Reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense" exists when evidence or information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely that such offense was committed and that such person committed it. Except as otherwise pro-vided for in this chapter, such apparently reliable evidence may include or consist of hearsay.

For the reasons already stated herein, defendants have failed to establish probable cause for plaintiff's arrest. Indeed, Detective Santiago admitted in his own deposition that he didn't need to question plaintiff before he had enough information to arrest him. The only information that Detective Santiago actually had was an identification from a witness and the fact that plaintiff operated a taxi cab. Even if Detective Santiago had not made the mistake with the taxi cab numbers, the complainant could have read those numbers wrong or could be otherwise mistaken. On this record, defendants have not met their burden. It follows that defendants are not entitled to dismissal for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211[a][7], as well.

Accordingly, defendants' motion is granted only to the extent that plaintiff's claims against the City are severed and dismissed.

Conclusion

In accordance herewith, it is hereby:

ORDERED that defendants' motion is granted only to the extent that plaintiff's claims [*3]against the City are severed and dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that defendants' motion is otherwise denied.

Any requested relief not expressly addressed herein has nonetheless been considered and is hereby expressly rejected and this constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: December 16, 2015

New York, New York

So Ordered:

Hon. Lynn R. Kotler, J.S.C.