Charles v Walker

Annotate this Case
[*1] Charles v Walker 2015 NY Slip Op 51007(U) Decided on July 7, 2015 Civil Court Of The City Of New York, New York County Kraus, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on July 7, 2015
Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County

Marlene Charles and Goldston Charles, Petitioner-Landlord

against

Natalie Walker 63 Morningside Avenue, Apt 3N New York, NY 10027, Respondent-Occupant Theodore Small "JOHN DOE" and "JANE DOE" Respondents-Undertenants



L & T 54564/15


SCOTT & LIBURD
Attorneys for Petitioner
By: Marjorie A. Liburd, Esq.
305 Broadway, 9th Floor
New York, New York 10007
212.822.1435

NATALIE WALKER
Respondent, pro se
63 Morningside Avenue, Apt 3N
New York, New York 10027
Sabrina B. Kraus, J.

BACKGROUND

This summary holdover proceeding was commenced by MARLENE CHARLES (Charles) and GOLDSTON CHARLES (Collectively "Petitioners") against NATALIE WALKER (Respondent) seeking to recover possession of 63 Morningside Avenue, Apt. 3N, New York, NY 10027 (Subject Premises) based on the allegation that Respondent entered possession pursuant to an oral agreement as a month to month tenant, and that Respondent's monthly tenancy had been terminated by a thirty day notice.



[*2]PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioners issued a Thirty Day Notice of Termination dated December 8, 2014,

terminating Respondent's tenancy as of January 31, 2015. The petition is dated February 13, 2015. On, March 3, 2015, the initial return date, the proceeding was adjourned to March 30, 2015, for Respondent to obtain counsel. Respondent did not obtain counsel, but filed an answer on March 24, 2015, asserting inter alia that because the subject building is an Housing Development Fund Corporation (HDFC), Respondent was not subject to eviction without cause beyond the expiration of the term, and that Petitioners did not own the Subject Premises and lack standing to maintain the proceeding. Respondent also asserted a counterclaim for renovations done to the Subject Premises.

On May 19, 2015, the proceeding was assigned to Part R for trial, the trial commenced, and concluded on May 22, 2015, and the court reserved decision.



FINDINGS OF FACT

63 Morningside Avenue HDFC is the owner of the Subject Building pursuant to a deed dated June 11th, 2001, from The City of New York, through Department of Housing and Preservation (HPD) for the Subject Building (Ex 1). The Subject Building is properly registered as a multiple dwelling (Ex 2).

The last shareholder of record for the Subject Premises was Louis Rountree (Rountree), pursuant to a stock certificate issued November 29, 2001, by 63 Morningside Avenue HDFC (Ex 3), and a proprietary lease executed on the same date. Rountree died on March 20, 2004 (Ex 5). Charlotte Roberson (Roberson) was issued "Letters of Administration with Limitations" for Rountree's estate, by Surrogate's Court (Ex 5). On January 11, 2006, Roberson allegedly transferred the interest of the estate in the Subject Premises to Petitioners (Ex 3). This transfer was never approved by the Board and there is no corresponding assignment of the proprietary lease by the Board. The only documentary evidence submitted related to the transfer was the Stock certificate, no closing documents or other evidence of sale were provided.

The Respondent moved into the Subject Premises in March 2012. Respondent had paid $6000, at that time, to Omar Charles (Omar), for three months rent at a rate of $2000.00 per month. The parties never executed a written lease, although Respondent testified she signed a lease, but it was never countersigned and she never received a copy of the document she signed.

The Subject Premises is a three bedroom apartment in an HDFC building.

Charles testified at trial. Charles asserted the following in her testimony.Charles took possession of the Subject Premises in 2006. From 2006 forward, Charles rented out rooms in the Subject Premises to various individuals. There are a total of ten units in the Subject Building, eight of these units are occupied by shareholders. Charles currently lives in apartment 4N in the Subject Building. The monthly maintenance for the Subject Premises is $627.50 per month. Respondent never paid rent directly to the HDFC, and as of 2012, the HDFC had no bank account due to outstanding liens against the building.

Damon Johnson (Johnson) also testified for Petitioner. Johnson is a shareholder, resides in apartment 5N and has been on the Board on and off since 2001. Johnson testified that Charles has owned the Subject Premises since 2006. In March 2012, Johnson was to have witnessed a lease signing by Respondent for the Subject Premises between Omar and Respondent. However no lease was executed on that date, and Johnson left the meeting.

Omar also testified for Petitioner. Omar testified that he lived in the Subject Premises from 2000 until sometime in 2014. Omar testified that he made an agreement with Respondent [*3]to rent her two of the bedrooms in the Subject Premises. Omar met with Respondent at the Subject Premises to sign a lease. The lease was going to be between Omar and Respondent. Omar stated he was taking these actions on behalf of his mother. Omar and Respondent never came to terms and never signed a lease. Omar testified that he lived in the Subject Premises with Respondent for approximately two weeks, and that after that period Respondent locked him out of the Subject Premises. Omar's testimony lacked credibility, and was inconsistent. The court does not credit Omar's testimony.

Theodore Small (Small) testified for Respondent. Small testified that Charles was his former supervisor, and a few years ago Charles told Small she was looking to rent the Subject Premises, which she stated was an empty apartment in the building , to "young non-white people." Charles told Small if he knew anybody who was interested, he should have them contact her. Small put Respondent in touch with Charles. Small was with Respondent when she first took possession in March 2012. Small testified that the Subject Premises was a "wreck" and that there were no appliances in place. Small has never lived in the Subject Premises.

Respondent also testified. Respondent stated she spoke with Charles several times before renting the Subject Premises. Respondent testified that she was supposed to pay $24,000 for a twelve month rental. Respondent paid $6000 on moving in with a corporate check, issued from Walker Sinclair Visuals, Inc.. Respondent testified that Charles asked her for an additional $2000 later in March 2012, because the hot water and heat in the building had been turned off and that she paid it. Omar never resided with Respondent in the Subject Premises. Respondent testified that the rent was later reduced to $1500 per month, and that she was asked to pay utilities. Respondent stated that she paid $8000, in March 2012, to Charles.

Respondent submitted checks in evidence showing a total of $50,000 in payments to Charles for rent for the Subject Premises for a period covering a period from March 2012 through March 2014 (Ex F). Respondent made additional payments to Charles for various bills for utilities (EX G).

DISCUSSION

Paragraph one of the petition asserts that Petitioners are the "Landlords" of the Subject Premises, are the persons lawfully entitled to possession, and are authorized to institute and maintain the proceeding pursuant to RPAPL § 721(1), as landlord or lessor. Petitioners failed to establish these allegations at trial, by a preponderance of credible evidence. While Petitioners did establish that Respondent entered into possession pursuant to an agreement between Omar, on behalf of Charles, and Respondent, Petitioners have failed to establish that they had authority to lease the Subject Premises to Respondent in the first place (Redhead v Henry 160 Misc 2d 546), or that they have a right to possession of the Subject Premises.

The alleged transfer from Roberson to Petitioners was not valid absent approval by the HDFC, which was never established. "Only the HDFC can confer the possessory interest sufficient for Petitioner to obtain standing to commence [a] proceeding (Williams v Williams, 46 Misc 3d 1201(A), citing Newell Funding LLC v Tatum, 24 Misc 3d 597)."

Charles testified that she is a member of the Board, and the Board has monthly meetings, with the last election being held in 2013. The Court found this testimony lacked credibility, and was unsubstantiated by any documentary evidence such as Minutes of the Board meetings or proof of the Board approval of the transfer. Charles' testimony was also contradicted by [*4]Respondent's witness, Jaciata Lashley (Lashley). Lashley was a resident of the building, prior to the conversion to a cooperative, and functioned as the first President of the HDFC. Lashley credibly testified that there is currently no Board in place that is recognized by the shareholders. Lashley also stated the Board never approved the sale or transfer of shares from Rountree's estate to Petitioners. Lashley testified that Petitioners' son began occupying the Subject Premises, after the death of Rountree, and renting out rooms, and collecting rents. Charles was acting as a self imposed de facto President, collecting random amounts of money from shareholders and tenants to try and keep the electricity on and hot water functioning.

Petitioners' actions in unilaterally assigning themselves a second cooperative apartment in this HDFC to rent out for their own personal profit are contrary to underlying objective of HDFCs, which is to provide housing to low income families. Petitioners are not be permitted to live in one HDFC apartment and rent out another for profit [Williams v Williams 46 Misc 3d 1201(A); see also Ex. 4, Sect. 5.03].

The proprietary lease (Ex 4, Sec 5.05) sets forth specific criteria for the assignment, which was not adhered to by Petitioners' or Rountree's estate. As Petitioners have failed to establish they have a possessory interest in the Subject Premises they lack standing to maintain this proceeding (Newell Funding LLC v Tatum 24 Misc 3d 597).



CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that Petitioners failed to establish their prima facie case by a preponderance of credible evidence, and the petition herein is dismissed.

Respondent's counterclaim is denied without prejudice, as it raises claims for reimbursement outside the jurisdiction of this Court, and no evidence was presented on this claim at trial.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.



Dated: New York, New York

July 7, 2015

__________________



Sabrina B. Kraus, JHC

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.