Tkaczyk v 337 E. 62nd LLC

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

Tkaczyk v 337 E. 62nd LLC 2015 NY Slip Op 31522(U) August 11, 2015 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: 160264/2013 Judge: Cynthia S. Kern Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various state and local government websites. These include the New York State Unified Court System's E-Courts Service, and the Bronx County Clerk's office. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. [* 1] SUPREME COURT OF THE STA TE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK: Part 55 ---------------------------------------------------------------------X STANISLAW TKACZYK, Index No. 160264/2013 Plaintiff, DECISION/ORDER -against- 337 EAST 62ND LLC, Defendant. ---------------------------------------------------------------------X 337 EAST 62ND LLC, Third-Party Plaintiff, -against- GATEWAY DEMOLITION CORP., Third-Party Defendant. ---------------------------------------------------------------------X HON. CYNTHIA KERN, J.S.C. Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of this motion for: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Papers "Numbered Notice of Motion and Affidavits Annexed .................................. .. Affidavits in Opposition ....................................................... .. Replying Affidavits ..................................................................... . Exhibits ..................................................................................... . 2 3 4 Plaintiff commenced the instant action to recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained during the performance of demolition work. Third-party defendant Gateway ; Demolition Corp. ("Gateway"), plaintiffs employer, now moves for an ~rder: (I) pursuant to· CPLR § 7503(a) compelling arbitration of the third-party action; and (2) pursuant to CPLR § 7503(a) staying the third-party action pending arbitration; or (3) pursuant to CPLR § 603 severing the third-party action. For the reasons set forth below, Gateway's motion is denied. [* 2] The relevant facts are as follows. Defendant/third-party plaintiff 33 7 East 62"d LLC ("337 East") is the owner of the premises located at 337 East 62"d Street, New York, New York (the "Premises"). On or about November 27, 2012, plaintiff, an employee of third-party defendant Gateway, was performing demolition work at the Premises on behalf of Gateway when he was allegedly injured. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that he sustained serious injuries when he was caused to slip and fall on steps with a foreign substance. Based on his alleged injuries, plaintiff commenced the instant action asserting, inter alia, a claim for negligence against the Premises owner 33 7 East. Thereafter, on or about March 28, 2014, 337 East commenced a third-party action against Gateway alleging claims for contractual indemnification, common law indemnification and breach of contract. 337 East's contractual indemnification and breach of contract claims are based on an agreement between 33 7 East and Gateway entered into on or about February 23, 2012 (the "Agreement"). Gateway now moves for an order compelling arbitration of the third-party action pursuant to the Agreement's arbitration provision. 337 East opposes the motion on the ground that Gateway waived its right to arbitration by actively participating in the present action. Thus, the dispositive issue for the court on this motion is whether or not Gateway waived its right to arbitration. New York has a "long and strong public policy favoring arbitration." Stark v. Mo/ad Sptiz DeSantis & Stark. P.C., 9 N.Y.3d 59, 66 (2007). Indeed, on a motion to compel arbitration, "[i]fthe court concludes that the parties made a valid agreement to arbitrate, that the dispute sought to be arbitrated falls within its scope, and that there has been compliance with any agreed on conditions precedent to arbitration, judicial inquiry is at an end (absent any issue as to bar by limitation of time) and the parties should be directed to proceed to arbitration." Maller of 2 [* 3] County of Rockland, 51 N.Y.2d 1, 8 (1980). Nonetheless, "like contract rights generally, a right to arbitration may be modified, waived or abandoned." Stark, 9 N.Y.3d at 66 (quoting Sherrill v. Grayco Bldrs., 64 N.Y.2d 261, 273 (1985)). Accordingly, "a litigant may not compel arbitration when its use of the courts is clearly inconsistent with its later claim that the parties were obligated to settle their differences by arbitration." Id. (citations an internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court of Appeals has stated: The crucial question ... is what degree of participating by the defendant in the action will create a waiver ofa right to stay the action. In the absence of unreasonable delay, so long as the defendant's actions are consistent with an assertion of the right to arbitrate, there is no waiver. However, where the defendant's participation in the lawsuit manifests an affirmative acceptance of the judicial forum, with whatever advantages it may offer in the particular case, his actions are then inconsistent with the later claim that only the arbitral forum is satisfactory. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In the present case, Gateway's motion to compel arbitration is denied as Gateway has waived its right to arbitrate based on its participation in the present lawsuit,. which manifests an affirmative acceptance of the judicial forum. When the third-party action was commenced, approximately a year ago, Gateway did not move to compel arbitration pursuant to the Agreement. Rather, Gateway: (I) filed an answer without asserting any affirmative defenses raising the issue of arbitration; (2) entered into no less than five discovery conference orders; and (2) actively participated in discovery, including the deposition of the plaintiff and defendant. These actions clearly constitute a manifestation of an acceptance of the judicial forum. Thus, Gateway cannot now seek to compel arbitration. To the extent Gateway contends that it did not waive its right to compel arbitration as its motion to compel did not become ripe until the June 2, 2015 deposition of337 East's managing 3 [* 4] member, such contention is without merit. Gateway argues that it was ~:ot until 337 East's managing member testified on June 2, 2015, that it was he who negotiated, reviewed and executed the Agreement, that the Agreement was authenticated and rendered into admissible form that Gateway was able to rely on the provision contained therein. However, this argument has no basis. As a party to the Agreement, one of Gateway's own members could have properly authenticated the Agreement to provide the basis for a motion to compel.: Indeed, Gateway presents no authority to support its contention that 337 East's managing member's deposition 'I was necessary. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Gateway's motion to compel arbitration is denied. Additionally, since the court has determined that Gateway has waived its right to arbitration, the remainder of Gateway's motion seeking to stay or sever the third-party action pending the outcome of the arbitration must also be denied. This constitutes the decision and order of the ' court. Enter: ~~ - -~1.s~.c. CYNTHIA S. KERN J.S.C 4

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.