People v Brooks

Annotate this Case
[*1] People v Brooks 2013 NY Slip Op 52261(U) Decided on September 3, 2013 Supreme Court, New York County Wittner, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law ยง 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on September 3, 2013
Supreme Court, New York County

The People of the State of New York,

against

Nicholas Brooks, DEFENDANT.



6074/10



For the People: Cyrus Vance Jr.,District Attorney, New York County (Joel Seidemann of counsel)

For Defense: Jeffrey Hoffman

Bonnie G. Wittner, J.



On July 11, 2013, defendant Nicholas Brooks was convicted, following a jury trial before

me, of Murder in the Second Degree. The victim was defendant's girlfriend, Sylvie Cachay, who

he strangled and drowned in a bathtub. Defendant now moves, pursuant to CPL 330.30(2) to set aside the verdict based on "both juror and prosecutorial misconduct." (Letter motion of Jeffrey Hoffman, dated August 21, 2013). In deciding the motion I rely on: letter and attachments of A.D.A. Joel Seidemann, dated August 19, 2013; letter of Jeffrey Hoffman, dated August 21, 2013; Affirmation and attachments of Joel Seidemann, dated August 28, 2013 and accompanying Memorandum of Law; Affirmation of Jeffrey C. Hoffman, dated August 30, 2013.

The motion is based on the People's receipt, on August 7, 2013, of an email from one of their trial witnesses recounting the fact that after the verdict a juror had contacted her and they met for drinks. At the meeting, the juror told the witness that on June 29-30, 2013, which was during the trial, her ex boyfriend visited her, they had an argument and he kicked her. Her injuries were minor, she did not seek medical attention nor did she mention it to her fellow jurors or notify the court.The email also said that the juror told the witness that "she realized Sylvie had come into her life for a reason..." Juror Affidavit ("Juror Aff.") at para. 17.

After receiving the email, the People contacted the juror informing her that she had no obligation to speak to them. On August 12, 2013, she voluntarily met with the People and gave a [*2]statement which is contained in her affidavit, signed on August 15, 2013. When I returned from vacation on August 19, 2013, the People applied for a protective order sealing the affidavit, which I signed, and the affidavit and August 19 Seidemann letter were immediately served on the defense. In the affidavit the juror stated, "Nothing transpired [that] had any effect on my ability to follow the Court's instructions to keep an open mind and base my decision solely upon the evidence that I heard and on Judge Wittner's legal instructions." Juror Aff. at para. 7. She stated that she discussed the incident with alternate jurors on July 9, 2013 but did not discuss it with the deliberating jurors. She also swore that the incident had no effect on her performance of her duties as a juror and that she did not bring it to the court's attention because "this incident had no effect on my role as a juror." (Juror Aff. at para. 7). The juror explained that her remark about Sylvie coming into her life for a reason "reflected a realization I came to about dying young whether due to a car accident or a crime: That we need to live life to its fullest and not complain about little things..." . Finally, the juror reiterated that throughout the trial and deliberations she kept an open mind and reached a verdict by "reviewing the evidence presented and applying my conclusions to Judge Wittner's legal instructions." (Juror Aff. at paras. 20,21).

Pursuant to CPL 330.30(2), a verdict may be set aside on motion of the defendant when: 2. [D] uring the trial there occurred, out of the presence of the court, improper conduct by a juror, or improper conduct by another person in relation to a juror, which may have affected a substantial right of the defendant and which was not known to the defendant prior to the rendition of the verdict."

The moving papers must contain sworn allegations of all the facts essential to support the motion. The motion may be denied if such allegations are not made or if no legal ground is alleged which would provide a basis for the motion. CPL 330.30 (e)( i and ii). Indeed, to prevail on such a motion, " defendant must not only prove misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence... but he must also show that it created a substantial risk of prejudice.' [citations omitted]." People v Brown, 278 AD2d 920 (4th Dept. 2000).Here, defendant's unsworn letter motion does not allege a legal ground to vacate the verdict or contain sworn allegations of fact supporting such a ground. Accordingly, there is no basis for a hearing and the motion is denied.

Of course, "[g]enerally a jury verdict may not be impeached by probes into the jury's deliberative process..." after the fact. People v Muragh, 94 NY2d 569, 573. (2000) nor does every misstep by a juror rise to the level of misconduct creating such a risk of prejudice that a new trial is required. Improper conduct or influence, as set forth in CPL 330.30(2), provides a narrow exception to this proposition when there is also a showing of "prejudice to a substantial right" of the defendant. People v Rivera, 304 AD2d 841 (2nd Dept. 2003). Similarly, if the court becomes aware during trial that a juror has engaged in substantial misconduct or is grossly unqualified to serve it must dismiss the juror and substitute an alternate.CPL 270.35.

Whether during or after trial, relief would be warranted if a juror harbored an undisclosed racial or ethnic bias or engaged in substantial misconduct. For example, in People v Rodriguez, 71 NY2d 214 (1988), a new trial was ordered because, during the course of a trial, a juror informed the trial judge that the juror's bias against dark skinned Hispanics was "affecting her ability to make a decision on guilt or innocence." Under the circumstances of that case, it [*3]became "...obvious that [the] particular juror possesse[d] a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict' [citations omitted]." Id. at 219; Similarly, in, People v Rivera, 304 AD2d 841, a statement by a juror made before verdict that "I know that n...r is guilty" warranted a new trial]; accord, People v Estella, 68 AD3d 1155 (3rd Dept. 2009)[juror's postverdict statement that he had based his decision to convict on race requires new trial].

In contrast, in People v Hernandez, 107 AD3d 504 (1st Dept. 2013), defense counsel learned after the verdict convicting defendant of rape, that a juror knew someone who had been the victim of a rape that "had shared some material similarities with this case." The juror had not revealed this information during voir dire. In affirming the denial of a motion to set aside the verdict without holding a hearing the First Department noted that, "the juror's apparently inadvertent omission did not affect a substantial right, and does not provide grounds for reversal."It also held that "defendant was not entitled to a hearing based on expressions of hope that a hearing might reveal the essential facts' [to support the motion] (People v Johnson, 54 AD3d 636 (2008), lv denied 11 NY3d 898 [2008]) ." People v Hernandez, 107 AD3d 504.In Johnson, the defendant attempted to impeach the verdict by presenting an affidavit from a juror who claimed that a fellow juror had accused him of racial bias. The motion to set aside the verdict in Johnson was properly denied without a hearing.

Here, there is no suggestion of outside influence on a juror or of improper conduct by the juror. She did not violate any court order during the trial or conceal any information during voir dire. Her meeting with alternate jurors did not involve any discussions of the case whatsoever nor was she under an obligation to report the ex-boyfriend altercation to the Court as it had no effect on her ability to be an impartial juror. In addition, the defense's attempts to create a factual basis for the motion are based on speculation and do not warrant a hearing. Finally, the email from the witness on which the defense relies is refuted by the juror, is unsworn, and does not raise a legal issue which would warrant a new trial.

Defendant has not set forth a factual or legal basis to vacate the verdict. The motion is denied without a hearing.

Dated: September 3, 2013

New York, New York

______________________________

BONNIE G. WITTNER, J.S.C.

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.