200 Holdings LLC v Revander

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[*1] 200 Holdings LLC v Revander 2013 NY Slip Op 51938(U) Decided on September 13, 2013 Civil Court Of The City Of New York, Bronx County Vargas, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on September 13, 2013
Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County

200 Holdings LLC, Petitioner-Landlord,

against

Sherita Revander, Respondent-Tenant.



L & T 027661/2012

Javier E. Vargas, J.



Upon the foregoing papers and for the following reasons, the motion by Respondent-Tenant Sherita Revander ("Tenant"), for, inter alia, vacatur of the judgment of possession and warrant of eviction, is denied in part and granted in part.

By Petition dated May 9, 2012, Petitioner-Landlord 200 Holdings LLC ("Landlord") commenced the instant nonpayment summary proceeding seeking payment of rent arrears in the [*2]amount of $2,358.35 related to premises located at 200 Davidson Avenue, Apartment 4B, in the Bronx, New York, which are subject to the Rent Stabilization Laws of 1969, and duly registered with the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal. Tenant resides at the subject premises with her five children. Since February 2012, Tenant has been the recipient of benefits under the Family Eviction Prevention Supplement ("FEPS") program of the New York City Human Resources Administration, whereby Public Assistance has been authorized to pay $1,050 each month directly to Landlord for Tenant's rent. Prior to commencement of this proceeding, Landlord had asked Tenant to become current with her rent arrears, but without success.

On the first court appearance of June 4, 2012, Landlord and Tenant entered into a Stipulation of Settlement consenting to the issuance of a final judgment of possession and rent arrears of $3,656.80 against her, which was all the rent due through June 2012. Tenant, who appeared pro se, was fully allocuted by the Court on her agreement and further stipulated that there were "No repairs" needed in the apartment. My predecessor judge, Judge Susan Avery, entered a Final Judgment of Possession and $3,656.80 on June 4, 2012, and a Warrant of Eviction was subsequently issued. A notice of eviction was served resulting in Tenant filing her first Order to Show Cause returnable on August 2, 2012, at which date, Landlord consented to a stay of the execution of the warrant until August 17, 2012, for her to pay $5,782.70 then owed. Unable to pay, Tenant then filed her second order to show cause returnable August 30, 2012, but she failed to appear and the motion was denied.

It was discovered during the proceedings that Tenant fell into arrears when FEPS failed to make several payments in 2012. Upon Tenant being alerted of the error, she promptly requested, and secured, the back payments from FEPS. However, Public Assistance then erroneously considered the reissuance of those payments as an additional rent arrears grant and, as a result, has lowered Tenant's monthly benefits by $130 each month as a recoupment. This reduction had made it very difficult for Tenant to pay her share of the rent on an ongoing basis.

Subsequently, Tenant filed her third order to show cause, which was heard on October 15, 2012, when Tenant signed a stipulation of settlement agreeing to pay $2,025.60 with execution of the warrant stayed until October 31, 2012. After falling behind again, she filed her fourth order to show cause resulting in a stipulation staying execution of the warrant until February 8, 2013 for her payment of $2,245.95 plus February's rent. Her fifth order to show cause extended her time to pay $773.45, and execution of the warrant, until February 28, 2013. Landlord served Tenant with another notice of eviction. She then filed her sixth order to show cause returnable on April 5, 2013, when she signed a stipulation giving her more time to pay the $2,595.35 then owed. Upon her failure to pay once again, Landlord served a notice of eviction upon Tenant. June 3, 2013 was the return date of Tenant's seventh order to show cause and she signed a stipulation extending the stay of the execution of the warrant until June 30, 2013 for her payment of $3,248.07. Another notice of eviction was served upon Tenant following her failure to become current. Tenant then obtained counsel from the Legal Aid Society, Bronx Neighborhood Office.

With her eighth Order to Show Cause returnable August 5, 2013, Tenant now moves for the vacatur of the Final Judgment of Possession and warrant of eviction as well as all the seven Stipulations of Settlement previously entered into, and for leave to amend her Answer pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) adding a breach of the warranty of habitability defense, or, in the alternative, Tenant moves for a further extension of the stay of the execution of the warrant for her to [*3]become current with her arrears. Tenant argues that at the time she signed those prior Stipulations without the assistance of counsel, she was unaware of the allegedly meritorious defense of the warranty of habitability under Real Property Law § 235(b), available to her to defeat Landlord's claims, or to obtain an abatement of her rent. Specifically, Tenant claims that her apartment was in need of serious and numerous repairs, including: a hole in the wall of her daughter's bedroom, which renders it unusable; defective fire escape window; mold and mildew surrounding bedroom windows; a broken dishwasher; mold throughout the kitchen; roach infestation; and peeling bathroom paint.

In opposition to the motion, Landlord argues that Tenant's motion should be denied because she entered into the Stipulations freely, knowingly and voluntarily, and never mentioned the need for any repairs to her apartment. Since she entered into seven separate Stipulations, Landlord maintains that she should not be permitted to disavow all those properly allocuted and court-approved Stipulations. This Court agrees.

It is well settled that a stipulation of settlement between parties on a pending proceeding is a binding contract enforceable by the court and, as such, they are favored and "will not be lightly cast aside" (Hallock v New York, 64 NY2d 224, 230 [1984]; see Matter of Galasso, 35 NY2d 319, 321 [1974]). Only where there is a legally sufficient cause to invalidate a contractual obligation, such as where it is manifestly unfair to one party because of the other's overreaching or where its terms are unconscionable or constitute fraud, collusion, mistake or accident, will a party be relieved from the consequences of the bargain struck with the stipulation (see Matter of Matinzi v Joy, 60 NY2d 835, 386 [1983]; Barzin v Barzin, 158 AD2d 769, 770 [1990], lv dismissed 77 NY2d 834 [1991]; Bussing v Caligiuri, 65 AD2d 764 [1978]). More than mere allegations are required, however, since stipulations of settlement serve the interests of efficient dispute resolution, the proper management of court calendars and the integrity of the litigation process (see Hallock, supra, at 231), this is a fortiori in Housing Court summary proceedings.

Applying the foregoing principles to the matter at bar, Tenant has failed to demonstrate any sufficient cause to invalidate any of the Stipulations of Settlement or, much less, vacate the Final Judgment and warrant of eviction. In this long-standing "summary" proceeding, Tenant has filed no less than eight orders to show cause spanning a period of over one year, all of which sought extensions of time for her to pay the rent arrears. One of the orders to show cause was denied for her failure to appear, but six others were disposed in her favor via Stipulations of Settlement executed by both Tenant and Landlord, allocuted and approved by the Court. Other than saying that she was unrepresented at those proceedings, Tenant points to no coercion, threats or any other improper conduct by Landlord's attorneys when entering into the Stipulations. Indeed, although she appeared pro se, it is undisputed that she conferenced the case each time with the Court Attorney, who reviewed and explained the terms to her (see FD-HFZ W. 44th LP v Wilson, 11 Misc 3d 134[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 50455[U] [AT 1st 2006]). Housing Court Attorneys routinely ask tenants about their defenses, including whether repairs are needed. She could have raised the need for repairs at any of those conferences, but apparently never did.

Moreover, it is also undisputed that the Court oversaw the settlement proceeding, reviewed the Stipulations, formally allocuted the Tenant on her understanding of the agreements, and ultimately gave its imprimatur and approval to the agreements. On its face, the Stipulations' "uncomplex and unremarkable terms represented an equitable and balanced surrender of interests" and there is nothing unduly harsh or unjust about the stipulated provisions, "which, if proved, would implicate the stipulations' validity" (Poplar Realty v Po, 3 Misc 3d 22, 24 [AT 1st [*4]2003]). To the contrary, Tenant was granted time-and-again more time to pay the significant, accumulated arrears (see FD-HFZ W. 44th LP v Wilson, 11 Misc 3d at 134[A]). In accordance with the foregoing as well as the strong public policy favoring enforcement of settlements, this Court finds no grounds to relieve Tenant from the consequences of the bargained for Stipulations.

Nor has Tenant sufficiently established an entitlement for leave to amend her Answer at this late stage of the proceedings. Tenant is essentially seeking to amend her Answer to assert a warranty of habitability claim in order to obtain rent abatements. Although leave to amend pleadings should be liberally granted pursuant to CPLR 3025(b), it is within the court's discretion to grant the same. Under the extant circumstances, Landlord would be prejudiced by the addition of this defense so late in the proceeding since there already has been a Final Judgment, which has been reaffirmed by Tenant and Landlord on no less than seven separate occasions, and which this Court is declining to vacate. Tellingly, in none of Tenant's seven orders to show cause was there ever a mention of any repairs required in Tenant's apartment and, in fact, in the first Stipulation of Settlement executed by the parties on June 4, 2012, Tenant specifically agreed that "no repairs" were needed in her apartment. Tenant has failed to state with particularity in her Proposed Answer when the disrepairs developed. It is possible, however, that the need for repairs arose after the commencement of these proceedings which has been pending for over a year. Indeed, the nature of the disrepairs mentioned in Tenant's papers appear to be of recent vintage. As such, Landlord is hereby directed to make the abovementioned repairs, if not already completed, within 30 days from any access date given by Tenant as agreed upon between the parties.

These conclusions notwithstanding, insofar as Tenant is alternatively requesting an extension to pay her rent arrears, the same is granted since she has shown "good cause" under RPAPL 749(3), in that she needs additional time to secure funds from governmental or nonprofit agencies (see Harvey 1390 LLC v Bodenheim, 96 AD3d 664 [2012]; Pomeroy Co. v Thompson, 5 Misc 3d 51, 52 [AT 1st 2004]; Parkchester Apts. Co. v Heim, 158 Misc 2d 982, 983 [AT 1st 1993]). In fact, Tenant, who lives in a rent-stabilized apartment, has been diligently trying to secure funds to pay the amount owed to Landlord and is currently awaiting a final determination by the Chelsea Relief Fund on a rent arrears grant as well as the issuance of a $1,000 grant from the Coalition for the Homeless. Accordingly, Tenant's motion is granted only to the extent that the stay of execution of the warrant of eviction is further stayed until October 15, 2013 for Tenant to pay all the arrears owed thru September 2013 of $4,898.85, plus October rent.

The matter is adjourned to October 21, 2013 at 9:30 a.m. for all purposes. The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

E N T E R:

Dated: Bronx, New York

September 13, 2013 J.H.C.

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