Morgan Webster Manor, LLC v McCann
Annotate this CaseDecided on October 28, 2013
Just Ct of the Town of Webster, Monroe County
Morgan Webster Manor, LLC, Petitioner,
against
Nicole McCann, Respondent.
13100006
Duwaine Bascoe, Esq. of Counsel to Woods Oviatt Gilman LLP, for the Petitioner.
Nicole McCann, Respondent, Pro Se.
Thomas J. DiSalvo, J.
History of the Case.
Thomas J. DiSalvo, J. The respondent entered into a lease relative to an apartment at
42 Webster Manor Drive, Apt. 7, in the Town of Webster on April 16, 2013. The petitioner
served the respondent with a "Three (3) Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit and Surrender
Possession of Premises" dated August 13, 2013. The petitioner filed a Notice of Petition and
Petition with the court on October 1, 2013. The matter was returnable in court on October 8,
2013 at 9:30 A.M. An affidavit of Service was filed with the court which attested to service by
"nail and mail". Nevertheless, the respondent duly appeared in court at the appointed date and
time. The petition alleged the non-payment of rent for the months of July, August, September,
October, plus a rent credit refund, late fees, disbursements and attorneys fees totaling $2,185.00
plus an October per diem. At that time the respondent indicated her disagreement with the
[*2]
amount allegedly owed to the petitioner. She also indicated that she was no longer living in the
apartment in question. The matter was set down for a hearing on October 25, 2013.
Facts of the Case.
On the date of the hearing the petitioner presented one witness, to wit: Matthew Ward,
the regional property manager of the petitioner. He testified to the existence of the lease and the
amount owed to date on said lease. The respondent then took the stand and, after having been
sworn, testified by narrative as to her defenses to the amount demanded. She testified that she
moved into the apartment on April 19, 2013. She further testified that she was constantly
harassed by a fellow tenant in her building. She admitted under cross examination as to being
in arrears for rent through August. However, she testified to having moved out of the apartment
on August 17, 2013, after receiving the "Three (3) Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit and Surrender
Possession of Premises" on August 13, 2013. She testified to having returned the keys to the
petitioner's drop box upon vacating the premises. She therefore argued that she did not owe any
rent for September or October. On cross-examination she testified to leaving a table and desk in
the apartment. There was no testimony that she ever demanded return of that property. In fact it
was the respondent's testimony that she did not wish to retain those items. The petitioner's
position was, that since the said table and chairs were in the apartment at the time the action was
commenced, the respondent was still in possession of the apartment.
Issue Presented.
Was there a landlord/tenant relationship existing at the commencement of the action
herein?
Legal Analysis. [*3]
The petitioner presented no evidence that would show that the respondent resided in the
premises after August 17, 2013. Nor did the petitioner contest receipt of respondent's keys to
the apartment. The respondent credibly testified to having vacated the apartment on August 17,
2013 and to turning in her keys to the apartment to the petitioner. Petitioner's argument that the
table and chairs that remained in the apartment constituted the continuation of the
landlord/tenant relationship is without merit. The fact that the table and chairs remained in the
apartment for about a month and half without any demand for their return by the respondent
evidenced an intent to abandon said items of personal property. (See Henryka vs. Amalgamated
Warbasse House, Inc., 34 Misc 3d 157(A) 2012 NY Slip Op. 50421[U], *2). Return of
respondent's keys to the apartment to the petitioner via its drop box evidenced an intention to
vacate the premises.
Conclusions of Law.
Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law Section 711 requires that in order for a
Summary Proceeding action to lie, the respondent must be in possession of the premises at the
time of commencement of the action. In this case the evidence is overwhelming that the
respondent had not resided in the apartment in question for approximately six weeks at the time
the action was commenced. As a result, the petition herein is dismissed. This constitutes the
decision and order of this court.
Dated: October 28, 2013
Webster, New York
__________________________________
Hon. Thomas J. DiSalvo
Webster Town Justice
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