People v Baldwin
Annotate this CaseDecided on October 23, 2013
Supreme Court, Queens County
The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff,
against
Monique Baldwin, MICHAEL MOTTA a/k/a "WHITE MIKE", WILLIAM THOMAS and JAMAL WOODFORD, Defendants.
2210/2012
Attorneys:
Steve Banks, Esq.
The Legal Aid Society
By: Juliette-Noor Haji, Esq.For Defendant Monique Baldwin
Judah Maltz, Esq.
For Defendant Michael Motta
Michael C. Anastasiou, Esq.
For Defendant William Thomas
Wyatt N. Gibbons, Esq.
For Defendant Jamal Woodford
Honorable Richard A. Brown
District AttorneyBy: ADA Mark Misorek
For the People
Charles S. Lopresto, J.
An indictment has been filed accusing the defendants Monique Baldwin, Michael Motta, William Thomas and Jamal Woodford of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree (PL § 265.02[3]). On September 30, 2013, this Court conducted a Mapp Hearing to determine whether physical evidence should be suppressed. After the close of the hearing, and on the record, decision was reserved.
To sustain their burden of proof the People called Police Officer Michael Johnston, Shield No. 28795. Officer Johnston is employed by the New York City Police Department, assigned to the 100th Precinct. The defendant presented no evidence. Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On June 28, 2012 at 10:30 p.m. Officer Michael Johnston, who was in plain clothes, was driving with Sergeant Beamer in an unmarked police car on anti-crime routine patrol when they received a radio transmission indicating that there was a 911 call indicating that a male had been shot at 321 Beach 47th Street, an address within the confines of the 100th Precinct, and further indicated that a brown or gray minivanwith a flat tire had been seen fleeing the shooting. Officer Johnston had no description of the passengers in the van and had no license plate number. Officer Johnston and Sergeant Beamer canvassed the neighborhood within the confines of the 100th Precinct looking for the van. Traffic was light.
At 11:50 p.m., Officer Johnston, who was traveling westbound on Burchell Avenue heading towards Beach 72nd Street, observed a gray-silver Astro van from about one to two blocks away traveling northbound on Beach 72nd Street. Upon seeing the vehicle, Officer Johnston decided to stop the van. After the van passed his vehicle, he activated his vehicle's lights and sirens to effectuate the stop. No traffic violations were observed by Officer Johnston. The police stopped the Astro van when it reached Almeda Avenue, a distance of twenty-five (25) blocks from the shooting. The van stopped in the middle of the street.
Both Officer Johnston and Sergeant Beamer approached the van on the driver's side with their guns drawn. Officer Johnston also had a lighted flashlight. Jamal Woodford was seated in the driver's seat and Monique Baldwin was seated in the right front passenger's seat. Upon reaching the driver's side window which was rolled down, and while his gun was still drawn, Officer Johnston asked the driver for his license and registration and the officer reviewed those documents. After seeing the driver's license, Officer Johnston observed three spent blue shell casings in the middle of the dashboard close to the windshield and holstered his gun. There was a partition behind the front seat and Officer Johnston could not see what was behind the partition in the back of the van or whether there were any others in the back. The officers called for back-up. Thereafter, Officer [*2]Johnston ordered Jamal Woodford and Monique Baldwin out of the vehicle at gunpoint and had them wait at the police car.
Ten to fifteen minutes after stopping the van, Officer Johnston then went to the rear of the Astro van and opened the unlocked rear doors to search the back area of the van. He observed two other individuals in the back. The back area was messy, with clothing and open containers on the floor. Michael Motta, who was known to the officer, was seated on a sofa chair and William Thomas was lying on the floor next to the sofa chair. Officer Johnston ordered these two individuals out of the van. When Michael Motta stood up, Officer Johnston heard something fall from the chair he had just been sitting in. After the individuals were out of the back area of the van, Officer Johnston lifted up the chair and recovered a 9 millimeter unloaded pistol.
Back-up had arrived and Michael Motta and William Thomas were searched once outside the van. Thereafter, Officer Johnston recovered the three empty shell casings from the dashboard and recovered another spent shell casing on the floor of the front passenger area. The defendants were arrested at 12:19 a.m.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Defendants submit that as a result of a lack of reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and the resulting unlawful arrest, all evidence flowing from that arrest must be suppressed.
The People have the burden in the first instance of going forward to show the legality of the police conduct. The burden of proof, however, remains with the defendants to show by a preponderance of the evidence that their constitutional rights were violated (People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361[1971]). "Implicit in this concept is that the testimony offered by the People in first presenting their case must be credible" (People v Quinones, 61 AD2d 765, 766 [1st Dept 1978], citing People v Berrios, 28 NY2d at 368 [1971]) If it is determined at the suppression hearing that the testimony of the police officer is unworthy of belief, then the People have not met their burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence and the motion to suppress should be granted (Berrios at 369). It is well settled that "a search may not be justified by its avails alone" (People v Sobotker, 43 NY2d 559, 565 [1978]; see also Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471, 484, [1963]).
A warrantless stop of an automobile and the detention of its occupants is a seizure within the meaning of the State and Federal Constitutions (NY Const, art I, § 12; US Const 4th Amend; CPL § 140.50; People v Sobotker, 43 NY2d 559; People v Hicks, 68 NY2d 234 [1986]). In order to be lawful, a stop of an automobile must be founded upon a reasonable suspicion that the car's occupants had been, are then, or are about to be engaged in criminal conduct (People v May, 81 NY2d 725 [1992]; People v Sobotker, supra; People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413 [1975]). An automobile stop is distinguishable from the common-law right of inquiry of a pedestrian as the "common-law power to inquire does not include the right to unlawfully seize" (People v Cantor, 36 NY2d 106, 114 [1975]; see generally, CPL § 140.50 [1]; People v Garcia, 20 NY3d 317 [2012]; People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210 [1976]). Thus, except for routine checks to enforce automobile regulations or where a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic law is observed, absent reasonable [*3]suspicion, the stopping of an automobile by the police constitutes an impermissible seizure (People v Sobotker at 563; People v Ingle, at 418).
"Reasonable suspicion is the quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious [person] under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand" (People v Cantor, 36 NY2d at 112-113). To justify the intrusion, an automobile stop other than for a traffic violation, must not be the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity (People v Ingle, at 420;People v Davenport, 92 AD3d 689, 690 [2d Dept 2012]). A vague or unparticularized "hunch" will not survive the reasonable suspicion standard and justify detention (People v Taveras, 155 AD2d 131, 135 [1st Dept. 1990]). In this respect, general descriptions are insufficient to supply reasonable suspicion to stop and detain a defendant (see eg, People v Stewart, 41 NY2d 65 [1976]). It is enough if the stop is based upon "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion" (Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 21 [1968]). The determination of whether the circumstances of a particular case rise to the level of reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of law and fact (People v Roque, 99 NY2d 50 [2002]).
Here, a finding that the stop of the van was lawful is contingent upon a finding that the police had "specific and articulable facts" justifying the stop (Terry v Ohio, 392 US at 21).
The factors most often considered when making a determination of reasonable suspicion in the context of a car stop are (1) the degree of the specificity of the description of the vehicle and its occupants and (2) the spatial and the temporal nexus between the location of the car and the location of the crime (1-5 New York Search & Seizure § 5.02). The greater the specificity to each of these two factors, the more easily the reasonable suspicion standard is met (People v Bolden,AD3d2013 NYSlip Op 6179 [4th Dept 2013][Description included make, model, color, damage to vehicle, a general description of passengers and the car was stopped within twenty minutes]; People v Argyris, 99 AD3d 808 [2d Dept 2012][Description included model and license plate number and vehicle seen in close geographical and temporal proximity to the scene of the crime]; People v Davis, 79 AD3d 1267 [3rd Dept 2010][Description included make, model, color and the car was stopped minutes later]; People v Fleming, 65 AD3d 702, 703 [2d Dept 2009][Description included license plate number and was stopped shortly after a robbery at a nearby location]; People v Schwing, 14 AD3d 867 [3d Dept 2005][Description included specific and detailed information about the driver, and included the model, color and license plate and the car was stopped a few blocks from the crime scene]; People v Coleman, 5 AD3d 956 [3d Dept 2004][Description included specifics about the vehicle and its license plate number]; People v Bond, 227 AD2d 412 [2d Dept 1996][ Vehicle and its occupants closely matched the description and the vehicle was in fairly close physical and temporal proximity to the crime]; People v Marley, 201 AD2d 925 [4th Dept 1994][Description included the make, model and color of the vehicle and the car was stopped fifteen minutes and one-half to three-quarters of a mile from the scene]; People v Bhoje, 275 AD2d 419 [2d Dept 2000][Vehicle and passengers matched description given and the vehicle was stopped in temporal and physical proximity to the crime]; People v Flanagan, 224 AD2d 633 [2d Dept 1996][Description of the vehicle used during a robbery matched vehicle defendant was driving and car was stopped fifteen minutes later and eight blocks away]; People v Maye, 206 AD2d 755 [3rd [*4]Dept 1994][Description included information about the type of vehicle and a partial identification of the license plate number and stopped shortly after receiving the radio transmission in the vicinity of the crime scene]; People v Mills, 198 AD2d 236 [2d Dept 1993][Description included the make, model, and color of a vehicle and described its occupants and stopped in close temporal and spatial proximity]; People v Torres, 145 AD2d 664 [2d Dept 1988][Description included the make, color and body damage of the car and was stopped soon after and twenty to twenty-five blocks from the crime scene]; People v Wade, 143 AD2d 703 [2d Dept 1988]; [Description included the number, race and gender of the passengers and the make, color, model, year and type of wheels on the vehicle which was located in close proximity to the scene of the robbery shortly after the crime]; and People v Reid, 135 AD2d 753 [2d Dept 1987][Description of van and driver given and the van was stopped in close proximity in time and place to the commission of the crime]).
While there is no clearly defined standard as to what constitutes "close temporal and geographical proximity" to a crime, generally reasonable suspicion has been found where, in addition to the description of the vehicle, the stop is within minutes and within blocks from the scene of the crime (People v Jogie, 51 AD3d 1038 [2d Dept 2008] [Two and a half blocks and five minutes]; People v Van Every, 1 AD3d 977 [4th Dept 2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 602 [2004][Ten to fifteen minutes]; People v Berry, 306 AD2d 623 [3d Dept 2003][Four minutes]; People v Devorce, 293 AD2d 550 [2d Dept 2002][Moments after the incident]; People v Soler, 268 AD2d 376 [1st Dept 2000] [Twenty minutes and one half mile]; People v Coon, 212 AD2d 1009 [4th Dept 1995][Minutes and one block away]; People v Davis, 202 AD2d 989 [4th Dept 1994][Less than one minute and less than one mile]; People v Marley, 201 AD2d 925 [4th Dept 1994]) [Fifteen minutes and one-half to three-quarters of a mile]; People v Willsey, 198 AD2d 911 [4th Dept 1993][Fifteen minutes and less than one half mile]; People v Ochsner, 159 AD2d 435 [1st Dept 1990][Two to three minutes]).
Certain other circumstances like light traffic may require less detailed information about the vehicle but in order to justify a stop there still needs to be close temporal and geographic proximity to the occurrence of the crime (People v Young, 68 AD3d 1761 [4th Dept 2009][Light traffic, description of vehicle and proximity to crime scene]; People v Van Every, 1 AD3d 977 [4th Dept 2003][Light traffic, make and color of vehicle stopped within ten to fifteen minutes]; People v Berry, 306 AD2d 623 [3rd Dept 2003][Vehicle traffic was very light, description included the make and model of the car, the race of the passengers and was stopped four minutes and a few blocks from the crime]; People v Sanchez, 216 AD2d 207 [1st Dept 1995][Van described was white or silver and vehicle stopped was light blue but the crime occurred recently and blocks away]; People v Brooks, 125 AD2d 481 [2d Dept 1986][Only type of vehicle i.e. van and its color were described but it was stopped five minutes and one and a half miles from crime]).
Conversely, when the description of the vehicle is very detailed, reasonable suspicion has been found even where the stop of the vehicle is not in close temporal or geographic proximity to the crime (People v Vitiello, 285 AD2d 480 [2d Dept 2001][Description and name of gunman, description of van, one hour later]; People v Glaze, 255 AD2d 932 [4th Dept 1998][U-Haul Truck one mile from the crime scene stopped forty minutes later];People v Bianchi, 208 AD2d 551 [2d [*5]Dept 1994], affd 85 NY2d 1022 [1995][Description of age and race of occupants, the make and model of the vehicle including that it was a hatchback, eight miles and one hour and ten minutes later]; People v Henry, 150 AD2d 797 [2d Dept 1989][license plate number, description of perpetrators, three days later]).
Circumstances are insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion when the description of a vehicle or perpetrators is too general and the temporal and geographic proximity too remote (People v Brooks, 266 AD2d 864 [4th Dept 1999]; People v Crump, 217 AD2d 902 [4th Dept 1995]).
The testimony of Officer Johnston cannot be credited as it was at times confusing and at times self-contradictory. Officer Johnston testified that at 10:30 pm he received a radio run indicating that a shooting had taken place on Beach 47th Street and a "gray Astro van" was seen fleeing the scene and that he did not have any more information about the vehicle other than that it had a flat tire. He then stated that the radio run gave the make of the vehicle as an "Astro van." Thereafter, when confronted with the Sprint Report, he testified that the radio run actually only described a "brown or gray mini-van," then said it was described as a "brown or gray van." Later, he again testified that the radio run described a "gray Astro van" and then he testified that it was a "brown van." Officer Johnston testified that traffic was light and that at 11:45 p.m. he was traveling westbound when he saw the gray Astro van traveling northbound from one or two blocks away. He testified that after he saw the van and it passed him heading further north, he made a U-turn to follow it and then stopped it at 11:50 p.m. on Beach 72nd Street and Almeda Avenue.
Officer Johnston testified that once the vehicle was stopped, he and Sergeant Beamer approached the van on the driver's side with their guns drawn and he testified that he had a lighted flashlight. Upon reaching the driver's side window, Officer Johnston testified at first that as soon as he got to the driver's side window, he saw shell casings and holstered his gun. Later he testified that he first asked for the driver's license and information, reviewed the information the driver gave him and then after reviewing the license, he observed the shell casings. He then testified as he first did that he observed the shell casings once he walked up to the driver's side window. Officer Johnston testified that he ordered the driver and passenger out of the van at gunpoint.
As to the recovery of the gun, Officer Johnston testified that when Michael Motta got off the chair and exited the van, he heard something fall and recovered the gun on the chair. Later he testified that he heard something fall to the ground and he lifted up the chair and found the gun. He then acknowledged that in his Grand Jury testimony, he testified that he flipped the chair over and then heard something fall and then he observed the gun.
Based on the generalized description of the vehicle, no description of passengers, and the remoteness in time and location from the scene of the shooting, the People have not demonstrated that the stop of the vehicle was founded upon reasonable suspicion (CPL § 140.50; People v May, 81 NY2d 725 [1992]; People v Hicks, 68 NY2d 234 [1986]; People v Sobotker, 43 NY2d 559 [1978]; People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413 [1975]; People v Cantor, 36 NY2d 106 [1975]). Moreover, [*6]the testimony of the arresting Police Officer was not credible as a matter of law because it was contradicted by the Sprint Report which did not include the make of the vehicle and because it contained multiple factual inconsistencies about the sequence of events from the time the officer saw the van to when he recovered the gun (see, e.g., People v Lebron, 184 AD2d 784[2d Dept 1992]; People v Nunez, 126 AD2d 576,[2d Dept 1987]; People v Miller, 121 AD2d 335 [1st Dept 1986]; People v Garafolo, 44 AD2d 86 [2d Dept 1974]; People v Ananaba, 25 Misc 3d 1242(A) [Sup Ct Qns County 2009]). Even if the make of the vehicle had been included in the Sprint report, given that more that one hour and twenty minutes had elapsed since the shooting, given that the van was stopped more than one mile away from the shooting and given that there was an absence of a detailed description of the passengers, still there would not have been sufficient facts to establish reasonable suspicion (People v Brooks, 266 AD2d 864 [4th Dept 1999]; People v Crump, 217 AD2d 902 [4th Dept 1995]). While an officer may be sincere in his sentiment regarding the commission of a crime, that is nevertheless insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion (People v Sobotker, 43 NY2d at 564).
In light of the self-contradictory testimony and the finding that reasonable suspicion was lacking, it is this Court's finding that the stop of the vehicle was not justified and the defendants' motions to suppress physical evidence recovered from the vehicle are granted.
The foregoing constitutes the order, opinion and decision of this Court.
Dated: October 23, 2013_______________________
Charles S. Lopresto
J.S.C.
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