People v O'Connor

[*1] People v O'Connor 2013 NY Slip Op 51712(U) Decided on October 15, 2013 District Court Of Suffolk County, First District Ford, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on October 15, 2013
District Court of Suffolk County, First District

People of the State of New York,

against

John P. O'Connor, Defendant.



2012SU056347



For the Defendant: Rachit Anand for Robert C. Mitchell, Legal Aid Society of Suffolk County

Central Islip, NY

For the People:A.D.A. Brooke J. Breen for Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney of the County of Suffolk Central Islip, NY

William G. Ford, J.

The defendant is charged with reckless driving (V & L §1212) and moves for omnibus relief. The Court will address the defendant's demands ad seriatim.

I)Dismissal pursuant to CPL 170.30(1)(e) and 30.30(1)(c) -

The defendant's motion to dismiss the within information charging reckless driving is granted based upon a violation of his statutory speedy trial rights. The long form information sub judice charges that, on or about November 30, 2011, the defendant operated a motor vehicle westbound on Route 25A at Echo Avenue, Mount Sinai, NY and did "disregard a legally installed, unobstructed steady red traffic signal at a speed of approximately 65 M.P.H. in a 45 M.P.H. zone, causing a motor vehicle crash which did cause serious physical injury to another motorist." The defendant was originally charged, inter alia, with reckless driving via a simplified traffic information under docket number 2011SU-059275S. By order of this Court dated September 21, 2012, all simplified traffic informations under the original docket were dismissed pursuant to CPL 100.25(2) for failure to supply timely supporting depositions. As such, the simplified traffic information charging reckless driving was rendered insufficient. (CPL 100.40(2)).

Pursuant to CPL 30.30(1)(c), the People were required to make an effective statement of their readiness for trial within 60 days of the commencement date of the within [*2]criminal action, taking into account all excludable time periods. It has been held that there can be only one criminal action for each set of charges against a defendant. (See People v. Sinistaj, 67 NY2d 236 [1986]). A criminal action includes the filing of all further accusatory instruments directly derived from the initial one and, if more than one accusatory instrument is filed in the course of a criminal action, the action commences when the first of the instruments is filed. (See People v. Silas, 1 Misc 3d 209 [District Ct., Nassau Co. 2003]; CPL 1.20(16)(b), (17)). As such, the commencement date of this criminal action for CPL 30.30 purposes relates back to the January 31, 2012 filing date of the original simplified informations.

Under the present docket, the People filed a long form information on October 10, 2012 and then filed a superseding long form information on December 19, 2012. The file contains a purported readiness statement dated October 17, 2012. In their opposition to the instant motion, the People "rely on the accusatory instrument as initially filed with the Court on October 10, 2012" (People's Affirmation in Opposition, ¶11) and argue that it was in fact

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sufficient, disputing the Court's multiple "People to cure" markings pertaining to the original information. Said argument is unavailing. Initially, the Court notes that the October 10, 2012 information is deemed dismissed upon the defendant's arraignment on the superseding information. (See CPL 100.50(1)). Furthermore, the original information and its supporting depositions clearly failed to identify the defendant, was thus insufficient and would not have supported an effective statement of readiness.

The defendant having met his initial burden on a CPL 30.30 motion (see People v. Goode, 87 NY2d 1045 [1996]), the burden of proving that certain time periods should be excluded falls upon the People. (See People v. Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333 [1980]). Thus, as the People's purported readiness announcement on the original information was a nullity, the time period until their December 19, 2012 readiness announcement must be counted for CPL 30.30 purposes, absent any proof of excludable time. The People have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating such excludable time herein. The period of time running from October 10, 2012 and December 19, 2012 is itself sufficient to exceed the statutory speedy trial mandate herein and, thus, the Defendant's CPL 30.30 motion must be granted. Upon issuance of the accompanying order, the Court shall furnish the defendant with notice pursuant to 22 NYCRR §200.40.

By reason of the foregoing, the Court need not reach the defendant's motion to dismiss in the interests of justice based upon the filing of a long form information following a dismissal of charges pursuant to CPL 100.25(2). [*3]

October 15, 2013

J. D. C.