Alissa S. v Manhattanville Coll.
Annotate this CaseDecided on August 6, 2013
Supreme Court, Westchester County
Alissa S., Plaintiff,
against
Manhattanville College, Defendant.
50497/13
Phillip C. Landrigan, Esq.
McCarthy Fingar LLP
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
11 Martine Avenue
White Plains, New York 10606-1934
By NYSCEF
Greg Riolo, Esq.
Jackson Lewis LLP
Attorneys for the Defendant
One North Broadway
White Plains, New York 10601
By NYSCEF
Francesca E. Connolly, J.
The following documents were read in connection with the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint:
Defendant's Notice of Motion, Affirmation, Exhibit1-3
Defendant's Memorandum of Law4
Plaintiff's Affirmation in Opposition to Motion, Exhibits5-9
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law10
Defendant's Affirmation in Support11
Defendant's Reply Memorandum of Law12 [*2]
The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant Manhattanville College (hereinafter "the College") by filing a summons and complaint dated January 11, 2013, alleging breach of contract under the College's Code of Conduct and intentional infliction of emotional distress in connection with the College's outrageous and continuing abuse of the process established by the Code of Conduct, which has prevented her from obtaining a degree in early childhood education.
In lieu of answering the complaint, the College has filed the within motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (2), (5), and (7) upon the grounds that the facts alleged in the complaint fail to state a cognizable cause of action and are time-barred by the relevant statute of limitations. The College contends that the breach of contract claim fails to state a cause of action in that it seeks to overturn academic and administrative decisions made by the College, which claim is properly asserted pursuant to article 78 of the CPLR and not as a plenary breach of contract claim. Since the action was filed outside the relevant statute of limitations of four-months for an Article 78 proceeding, the College contends that the breach of contract cause of action should be dismissed. With regard to the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the College maintains that the allegations in the complaint do not rise to the level of "outrageous," which is required to state such a claim, and that any allegations of intentional infliction of emotional distress that occurred outside the one-year limitations period are time-barred. The plaintiff opposes the motion on the ground that the causes of action alleged in the complaint were adequately and timely pled to withstand the College's pre-answer motion to dismiss.
PROCEDURAL/FACTUAL BACKGROUND
From January 2008 through January 11, 2012, the plaintiff was a matriculated student in the College's School of Education pursuing a Masters of Arts in Teaching with a specialty in Early Childhood Education. The Masters of Arts in teaching is typically a three-year program and, based on the date of her enrollment, the plaintiff was scheduled to complete the program requirements in May 2011. In the Spring 2011 semester, the plaintiff was enrolled in the College's Student Teaching Seminar, which required students to attend a weekly seminar meeting and complete a 12-week supervised teaching placement at a local school. Successful completion of the course is a mandatory pre-requisite to earning a Masters of Arts in Teaching.
On or about April 4, 2011, the College's Associate Dean for Graduate Advising sent the plaintiff a letter informing her that, due to her continuing unprofessional and inappropriate behavior in school settings during student teaching and her inadequate teaching skills, she was being removed from student teaching and the course and would receive a grade of "F." The letter further informed the plaintiff that she had shown a pattern of behavior denoting unprofessional dispositions, and consequently, she was no longer allowed to register for any further education courses at the College.
In May 2012, after appealing her failing grade and resulting expulsion to the College's Graduate Academic Standards Committee, the plaintiff's appeal was upheld and she was granted a conditional re-enrollment in the Student Teaching Seminar in the Fall 2011 semester. However, the Associate Dean for Graduate Advising recommended that the plaintiff complete her remaining [*3]program requirements in the Fall 2011 semester, but that she student teach in the Spring of 2012.
Notwithstanding the College's recommendation, the plaintiff re-enrolled in the Student Teaching Seminar in the Fall of 2011, and was subsequently assigned to a supervised position at a local school.
On or about October 18, 2011, the Associate Dean for Graduate Advising informed the plaintiff that, based upon feedback from the College's Chair of the Early Childhood Development Program and her assigned school, the plaintiff was being removed from the Student Teaching Seminar and would receive a grade of "F" for the course. The plaintiff was also advised that the College's policies only permit a student to repeat the Seminar once, and therefore, she would not be allowed to continue in the Masters of Arts in Teaching program and would not be recommended for teacher certification. The College offered the plaintiff the opportunity to complete a Masters of Education Studies in lieu of a Masters of Arts in Teaching. To complete this alternative program, the plaintiff was not required to complete any additional classes, and would retain the opportunity to apply for a teaching certification through an "individual evaluation."
Once again, the plaintiff appealed the College's determination. On January 10, 2012, the Graduate Academic Standards Committee held a hearing to consider the October 2011 appeal. In a decision dated January 11, 2012, the Committee offered the plaintiff the opportunity to complete the Student Teaching Seminar in an urban multi-cultural setting during the Spring 2012 semester and potentially earn a Masters of Arts in Teaching. Conversely, the plaintiff was reminded of the option offered by the College to earn a Masters of Education Studies and apply for a teacher certification through an "individual evaluation." The College also advised the plaintiff of her right to appeal from the determination and the procedures to follow. The plaintiff was notified of the determination on her appeal by letter sent from the Associate Dean dated January 11, 2012.
Under the grievances and appeals procedure of the Dispositions policy of the College's School of Education Code of Conduct, Section II, paragraph (3), the plaintiff had the right to appeal from the determination made by the Graduate Academic Standards Committee to the Dean. However, the appeals procedure states that the appeal is to be made in writing within five days of receipt of the communication from the Associate Dean.
Plaintiff contends that she timely appealed the Committee's January 11, 2012 determination on January 18, 2012, but has not yet received a response to her appeal. The plaintiff has failed to submit any documentary proof to establish that she appealed from the January 11, 2012 determination. However, the plaintiff's counsel sent four letters/e-mails to the College dated August 23, 2012, September 17, 2012, September 21, 2012, and November 9, 2012, wherein the plaintiff requested that the College address her appeal. The College denies that the plaintiff filed an appeal.
The plaintiff has not been a matriculated student at the College since January 2012.
One year later, by filing a summons and complaint dated January 11, 2013, the plaintiff [*4]commenced this action against the College, alleging breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon its failure to follow the "Dispositions" policy set forth in its Code of Conduct, in that the College failed to first identify, notify, document, and then address plaintiff's alleged lack of professional dispositions, which led to her termination from the Student Teaching Seminar; failed to report instances of unprofessional behavior or conduct to the Associate Dean; and failed to address plaintiff's alleged January 18, 2012 appeal. In her complaint, the plaintiff seeks an order and judgment reinstating her to the College, directing the College to issue her a Masters of Arts in Teaching with a specialty in Early Childhood Education, and awarding her monetary damages in an amount not less than $100,000.00 to compensate her for physical injury, mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, and emotional injury, plus costs and attorneys' fees.
In lieu of answering the complaint, the College has filed the within motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (2), (5), and (7) upon the grounds that the facts alleged in the complaint fail to state a cognizable cause of action and are time-barred by the relevant statute of limitations. The plaintiff opposes the motion, relying upon four letters/e-mails sent by her counsel to the College dated August 23, 2012, September 17, 2012, September 21, 2012, and November 9, 2012, wherein the plaintiff requested that the College address her appeal.
ANALYSIS/DISCUSSION
Motion to Dismiss Standard
On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211, for purposes of deciding the procedural staging of the controversy, "the pleading is to be given a liberal construction, the allegations contained within it are assumed to be true and the plaintiff is to be afforded every favorable inference" (Simkin v Blank, 19 NY3d 46, 52 [2012]; Maas v Cornell University, 94 NY2d 87, 91 [1999]). "If the plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the allegations, the complaint may not be dismissed" (Marchionni v Drexler, 22 AD3d 814 [2d Dept 2005]). "However, allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions as well as factual claims flatly contradicted by documentary evidence are not entitled to any such consideration,' nor to that arguendo advantage" (Maas v Cornell University, 94 NY2d at 91).
Breach of Contract
In her complaint, the plaintiff does not reference any express contractual source or specific enforceable promise, but contends that the College's Code of Conduct forms the basis for implying an agreement between them, which the College breached by failing to follow its own procedures. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the College violated the "Dispositions" policy of its Code of Conduct by failing to report to the Associate Dean or other appropriate Department Chair any instance of unprofessional behavior by the plaintiff. For the alleged breach, the plaintiff invokes the "diploma by estoppel" doctrine in seeking the extreme remedy of a judicial award of a specific academic diploma—a Masters of Arts in Teaching with a specialty in Early Childhood Education (see generally Olsson v Board of Higher Ed., 49 NY2d 408, 416 [1980]). For the reasons discussed [*5]here, the Court determines that a CPLR article 78 proceeding is the appropriate procedural vehicle for judicial review of the plaintiff's grievances, not a plenary action predicated on a breach of contract cause of action. Moreover, since the plaintiff commenced this action beyond the four-month statute of limitations period for a CPLR article 78 proceeding, the plaintiff's first cause of action is dismissed as being time-barred.
When a student is admitted to an academic institution, an implied contract arises between the institution and the student "such that if (the student) complies with the terms prescribed by the (institution), he [or she] will obtain the degree which he [or she] sought' " (Olsson v Board of Higher Ed., 49 NY2d at 414). Nevertheless, New York courts have been consistently reluctant to intervene in controversies involving academic standards (id.). This reluctance is founded upon sound considerations of public policy, which recognize "that the administrative decisions of educational institutions involve the exercise of highly specialized professional judgment and these institutions are, for the most part, better suited to make relatively final decisions concerning wholly internal matters" (Maas v Cornell University, 94 NY2d at 92). "This jurisprudential guidepost stems from the belief that these institutions are peculiarly capable of making the decisions which are appropriate and necessary to their continued existence'" (id., quoting Gertler v Goodgold, 107 AD2d 481, 485 [1st Dept 1985]). Since determinations concerning a student's qualifications "rest in most cases upon the subjective professional judgment of trained educators, the courts have quite properly exercised the utmost restraint in applying traditional legal rules to disputes within the academic community" (Olsson v Board of Higher Ed., 49 NY2d at 413).
In Olsson v Board of Higher Ed., the Court of Appeals explained the reasoning behind the strong public policy of judicial restraint in matters involving disputes within the academic community, including institutional assessments of a student's academic performance: "When an educational institution issues a diploma to one of its students, it is, in effect, certifying to society that the student possesses all of the knowledge and skills that are required by his chosen discipline. In order for society to be able to have complete confidence in the credentials dispensed by academic institutions, however, it is essential that the decisions surrounding the issuance of these credentials be left to the sound judgment of the professional educators who monitor the progress of their students on a regular basis. Indeed, the value of these credentials from the point of view of society would be seriously undermined if the courts were to abandon their long-standing practice of restraint in this area and instead began to utilize traditional equitable estoppel principles as a basis for requiring institutions to confer diplomas upon those who have been deemed to be unqualified" (49 NY2d at 413).
"Unlike disciplinary actions taken against a student . . . institutional assessments of a student's academic performance, whether in the form of particular grades received or actions taken because a student has been judged to be scholastically deficient, necessarily involve academic determinations requiring the special expertise of educators" (Susan M. v New York Law School, 76 NY2d 241, 245 [1990]). Claims directed at core academic determinations are not properly styled [*6]as breach of contract or tort causes of action (Keles v Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York, 74 AD3d 435, 436 [1st Dept 2010] ["whether plaintiff's GPA was sufficient for him to continue as a teaching assistant, which subjects were properly included in his qualifying exam, whether an exam question reflected the course work, whether he was correctly determined to have failed a particular test, and whether the university improperly delayed in awarding him a degree," are claims not cognizable in a breach of contract action]; Rafman v Brooklyn College of City University of New York, 212 AD2d 795 [2d Dept 1995] [dismissal of graduate student from masters of science program in speech pathology for failing a practicum twice, was considered a dismissal based upon an academic evaluation]; Sofair v State University of New York Upstate Medical Center College of Medicine, 44 NY2d 475 [1978] [student's dismissal from medical school for failure "to demonstrate sufficient clinical aptitude for the practice of medicine" was considered a dismissal for academic, as opposed to disciplinary reasons]).
Notwithstanding this strong public policy of judicial restraint in disputes involving academic standards, "the decisions of educators are [not] completely immune from judicial scrutiny . . . and courts will intervene if an institution exercises its discretion in an arbitrary or irrational fashion" (Olsson v Board of Higher Ed., 49 NY2d at 413-414). Judicial review of an educational institution's determination concerning a student's academic performance "is limited to the question of whether the challenged determination was arbitrary and capricious, irrational, made in bad faith or contrary to Constitution or statute" (Susan M. v New York Law School, 76 NY2d at 246; Tedeschi v Wagner College, 49 NY2d 652, 658 [1980]). CPLR article 78 is the appropriate vehicle for a student to challenge academic determinations because these proceedings "ensure that the over-all integrity of the educational institution is maintained and, therefore, protect more than just the individual's right[s]" (Maas v Cornell University, 94 NY2d at 92).
Here, the plaintiff has commenced this breach of contract action against the College, challenging its determination to remove the plaintiff from the student teaching seminar with a failing grade and expel her from continuing in the Masters of Arts in Teaching program. The plaintiff was given two chances to complete the student teaching seminar, and the College's determination was made only after considering feedback from the plaintiff's assigned schools and the College's Chair of the Early Childhood Development Program. In addition, after removing her from the program, the College offered the plaintiff two options to complete her Masters degree— complete the Student Teaching Seminar in an urban multi-cultural setting during the Spring 2012 semester and potentially earn a Masters of Arts in Teaching, or earn a Masters of Education Studies and apply for a teacher certification through an "individual evaluation." The plaintiff never accepted either option and, instead, chose to pursue further review of the determination to the Dean through the College's appeals procedures, and by seeking judicial review through this breach of contract action. As a remedy, the plaintiff seeks an order and judgment reinstating her to the College, and directing the College to issue her a Masters of Arts in Teaching with a specialty in Early Childhood Education.
Although the plaintiff has commenced this plenary action sounding in breach of contract, the proper procedural vehicle to seek judicial review of an academic decision is through a CPLR article 78 proceeding, where the question would be limited to whether the College's determination was [*7]"arbitrary and capricious, irrational, made in bad faith or contrary to Constitution or statute" (see Susan M. v New York Law School, 76 NY2d at 246). "[T]he judicial awarding of an academic diploma is an extreme remedy which should be reserved for the most egregious of circumstances . . . [and] the courts should shun the diploma by estoppel' doctrine whenever there is some question as to whether the student seeking relief has actually demonstrated his competence in accordance with the standards devised by the appropriate school authorities" (Olsson v Board of Higher Ed., 49 NY2d at 415). Had the plaintiff commenced a timely CPLR article 78 proceeding, her claims would, nevertheless, fail under the appropriate standards of review. Under the circumstances presented here, requiring the College to award the plaintiff a Masters of Arts in Teaching with a specialty in Early Childhood Education degree "on equitable estoppel grounds would be a disservice to society, since the credential would not represent the college's considered judgment that the [plaintiff] possessed the requisite qualifications" (id. at 414).
Had the plaintiff's action been procedurally styled as a CPLR article 78 proceeding, the plaintiff's claims would, in any event, be deemed time-barred by the four-month statute of limitations applicable to such proceedings (see Keles v Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York, 74 AD3d at 436; CPLR 217 [1]). The statute of limitations for such a proceeding would have been four months from the time the College's determination became final and binding upon the plaintiff (id.). "A challenged determination is final and binding when it has its impact' upon the petitioner who is thereby aggrieved" and, therefore, the four-month limitation period commenced to run, on the date the plaintiff was notified of the College's decision (see Edmead v McGuire, 67 NY2d 714 [1986]). Here, the statute of limitations began to run on January 11, 2012, the date the College notified the plaintiff of its decision on the October 2011 appeal. Since the plaintiff did not commence the within action until January 11, 2013, her claims are indeed time-barred.
The plaintiff contends that the statute of limitations is tolled because the College's January 11, 2012 determination is not final and she is awaiting a decision on her appeal from that decision, which ended the plaintiff's matriculation at the College as a graduate student. While the College disputes that the plaintiff ever filed an appeal, for the purposes of deciding the College's motion to dismiss, this Court will assume the plaintiff's allegations are true and afford her every favorable inference (see generally Simkin v Blank, 19 NY3d at 52; Maas v Cornell University, 94 NY2d at 91).
Where a grievance procedure is mandatory, the statute of limitations will be tolled, however, no tolling will occur where the procedure employed is voluntary (Bargstedt v Cornell University, 304 AD2d 1035 [3d Dept 2003]; see generally Matter of Queensborough Community College v State Human Rights Appeal Board, 41 NY2d 926 [1977] ). Here, the student's right to use the grievance procedures set forth in the College's Code of Conduct speaks in terms of "the student should bring the matter in writing to the attention of the appropriate department chair" and "the student may appeal," indicating that the grievance procedure is voluntary, not mandatory, and therefore, the statute of limitations is not tolled (see generally id.). Nor can the plaintiff's subsequent correspondence to the College about the status of her alleged appeal serve to recommence the statutory period (Aranoff v Fordham University, 171 AD2d 434, 435 [1st Dept 1991] ["[p]etitioner's [*8]subsequent correspondence with the University and his formal attempts to regain admission to the Doctoral Program, in 1985, 1988 and 1989, did not toll or recommence the statutory period").
Based upon the foregoing, the Court determines that the plaintiff's claims "implicate the type of academic . . . decisions reviewable only in a timely-commenced proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (Risley v Rubin, 272 AD2d 198 [1st Dept 2000]). Since the plaintiff commenced this action beyond the four-month statute of limitations period for such proceedings, the plaintiff's first cause of action is dismissed as time-barred.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
A claim sounding in intentional infliction of emotional distress "has four elements: (i) extreme and outrageous conduct; (ii) intent to cause, or disregard of a substantial probability of causing, severe emotional distress; (iii) a causal connection between the conduct and injury; and (iv) severe emotional distress" (Howell v New York Post Co., Inc., 81 NY2d 115, 121 [1993]). "The first element—outrageous conduct—serves the dual function of filtering out petty and trivial complaints that do not belong in court, and assuring that plaintiff's claim of severe emotional distress is genuine. . . . In practice, courts have tended to focus on the outrageousness element, the one most susceptible to determination as a matter of law" (id.). Liability for this intentional tort "has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community" (id. at 122).
In her complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the College's "unfounded and factually baseless October 2011 Decision to remove Plaintiff from her student placement in breach of its obligations and duties under the Code of Conduct, and [the College's] continuing breach of its duties to hear and decide Plaintiff's January 18, 2012 Appeal constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct" (see paragraph 45 of the complaint). Even if accepted as true, the plaintiff's complaint fails to allege any conduct that rises to the level necessary to satisfy the rigorous test for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is dismissed.
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) and (7) is granted; and it is further
ORDERED, that all other relief requested and not decided herein is denied.
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
[*9]
Dated: White Plains, New York
August 6, 2013
____________________________________
Hon. Francesca E. Connolly, J.S.C.
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