Leone v State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.
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Leone v State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. 2013 NY Slip Op 32156(U) September 4, 2013 Supreme Court, Suffolk County Docket Number: 10-36871 Judge: Hector LaSalle Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various state and local government websites. These include the New York State Unified Court System's E-Courts Service, and the Bronx County Clerk's office. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. [* 1] INDEX NO. 10-36871 CAL NO. 12-02005CO SHORT FORM ORDER SUPREME COURT - STATE OF NEW YORK I.A.S. PART 48 - SUFFOLK COUNTY PRESENT: Hon. MOTION DATE 3-5-13 ADJ. DATE 5- 14-13 Mot. Seq. # 001 - MD HECTOR D. LaSALLE Justice of the Supreme Court Plaintiffs, - against - i JOHN E. LANDER, ESQ. Attorney for Plaintiffs 484 West Main Street Babylon, New York 11702 SARETSKY KATZ DRANOFF & GLASS, L.L.P. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, - - Attorney Defendant 475 Park Avenue South, 26'h Floor New York, New York 10016 Upon the following papers numbered 1 to 42 read on this motion for summary iudament ;Notice of Motion/ Order ; Answering Affidavits and to Show Cause and supporting papers 1 - 26 ;Notice of Cross Motion and supporting papers supporting papers 27 - 33 ; Replying Affidavits and supporting papers 34 - 38 ; Other memoranda of law, 39 - 40,41 - 42 ; ( ' ) it is, ORDERED that the motion by defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint in this breach of contract action is denied. This breach of contract action involves a casualty loss arising from water damage at the premises owned by plaintiffs located at 34 Alpine Way, Huntington Station, New York on January 15,2010. On November 29,2009, plaintiffs purchased a homeowners insurance policy from defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company. After the January 2010 loss, plaintiffs filed a claim with State Farm for the loss sustained in the amount of $175,000. The complaint alleges that State Farm breached its contract with plaintiffs by denying the claim and that State Farm was unjustly enriched by the premiums paid to it by plaintiffs. [* 2] Leone v State Farm Index No. 10-36871 Page No. 2 State Farm now moves for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs complaint against it on the ground that the policy it issued expressly excludes coverage for claims involving water damage arising from frozen pipes under circumstances where the property is vacant and the insureds fail to use reasonable care to maintain heat. State Farm further argues that plaintiffs did not reside at the subject property on January 15,20 10, and thus, the insured property does not qualify as their residence premises under the policy. In support of the motion, State Farm submits, among other things, copies of the pleadings, transcripts of the parties deposition testimony, the homeowner s insurance policy issued to plaintiffs, and affidavits of Kristine Menendez and Paul Angelides. Plaintiffs oppose the motion arguing that triable issues of fact exist as to whether the subject property was their residence pursuant to the insurance policy, and whether they maintained reasonable heat at the property. In opposition, plaintiffs submit inter alia an affidavit of Donald Leone and a transcript of his examination before trial. The homeowner s insurance policy at issue states, in relevant part, as follows: COVERAGE A - DWELLING 1 . Dwelling. We cover the dwelling used principally as a private residence on the residence premises shown in the Declarations. *** SECTION 1- LOSSES INSURED We insure for accidental direct physical loss to the property described in Coverage A, except as provided in Section 1- Losses Not Insured. SECTION 1- LOSSES NOT INSURED 1 . We do not insure for any loss to the property described in Coverage A which consists of, or is directly and immediately caused by, one or more of the perils listed in items a through n below, regardless of whether the loss occurs suddenly or gradually, involves isolated or widespread damage, arises from natural or external forces, or occurs as a result of any combination of these: *** b. freezing of plumbing, heating, air conditioning or automatic fire protective sprinkler system or of a household appliance or by discharge, leakage or overflow from within the system or appliance caused by freezing. This exclusion applies only while the dwelling is vacant, unoccupied or being constructed. This exclusion does not apply if you have used reasonable care to: [* 3] Leone v State Farm Index No. 10-36871 Page No. 3 ( I ) Maintain heat in the building; or (2) Shut off the water supply and drain the system and appliances of water. At his examination before trial, plaintiff Donald Leone testified that at the time of the incident, he was living at a house located on 1790 Front Street in East Meadow, New York. He stated that he and his wife purchased the suhject property in 2006, and that they intended to renovate it and make it their primary residence. He explained that the renovation project was long, as they were doing work room-by-room. He stated that he and his wife would stay overnight at the subject property several times during the renovations, and that there were contractors there all the time. He testified that they had started the process of moving furniture into the subject property and that they stayed there as much as time permitted. He hrther testified that the temperature in the house was kept at 65 degrees to 68 degrees and that the heat was always on. Kristine Menendez states in her affidavit that she was the claims representative from State Farm assigned to the subject matter and that she conducted an inspection of the subject property on January 19, 2010 with another State Farm employee and Donald Leone. She states that Mr. Leone explained to her that water damage occurred on January 15, 2010 due to a pipe freezing in the upstairs master bathroom. She states that she observed extensive water damage throughout the property. She also states that there were no beds in any of the bedrooms, that all the closets were empty, and that there were only a few items of furniture such as two sofas wrapped in plastic and a table with chairs in the kitchen. Based on her observations and the expert report of Angelides, she determined that the house was unoccupied at the time of the loss. Paul Angelides, a licensed engineer, states that he was retained by State Farm to investigate and determine the cause of property damage to the subject property. He states that during an inspection of the subject property, he found the broken shower valve and determined that there was no manufacturing or 1 installation defects 01 it. He states that the fracturing of the plastic shower valve cap is consistent with freeze damage as a result of a failure to maintain adequate heat within the building during a period of subfreezing weather. Mr. Angelides states that based on the weather data from Farmingdale, New York collected by the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, the outdoor temperatures were below freezing consistently during the period prior to and including the day of the loss. He states that based on a calculation to determine if adequate heat was maintained within the building, and the amount of fuel plaintiff had delivered to the property, there is a compelling case that adequate heat was not maintained in the building. He further states that a review of the electric utility bills also reveals very low electric consumption, which js consistent with a building that is unoccupied. He concludes that the broken shower valve and the resulting interior water damage occurred because the valve froze and burst due to inadequate heat within the building. On a motion for summary judgment the movant bears the initial burden and must tender evidence sufficient to eliminate all material issues of fact (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Cfr.,64 NY2d 85 1,487 NYS2d 3 16 [1985]). Once the movant meets this burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to demonstrate that there are material issues of fact; however, mere conclusions and unsubstantiated allegations iy are insufficient to raise any triable issues of fact (see Zuckerman v Ct of New York, 49 NY2d 557,427 NYS2d 595 [ 19801;Perez v Grace Episcopal Church, 6 AD3d 596,774 NYS2d 785 [2d Dept 20041). The [* 4] Leone v State Farm Index No. 10-36871 Page No. 4 court s function is to determine whether issues of fact exist, not to resolve issues of fact or to determine matters of credibility; therefore, in determining the motion for summary judgment, the facts alleged by the opposing party and all inferences that may be drawn are to be accepted as true (see Roth v Barreto, 289 AD2d 557,735 NYS2d 197 [2d Dept 20011; O Neill v Fishkill, 134 AD2d 487,521 NYS2d 272 [2d Dept 19871). Generally, it is the insured s burden to establish coverage and the insurer s burden to prove the applicability of an exclusion (see Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v Allstate Ins. Co., 98 NY2d 208,746 NYS2d 622 [2002]; Rhodes v Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 67 AD3d 881, 892 NYS2d 403 [2d Dept 20091; Barkan v New York Schools Ins. Reciprocal, 65 AD3d 1061,886 NYS2d 414 [2d Dept 20091). In order to establish an exclusion, the insurer must demonstrate that the exclusion relied upon is stated in clear and unmistakable language, is subject to no other reasonable interpretation, and applies in the particular case (Continental Cas. Co. v Rapid-American Corp., 80 NY2d 640,652,593 NYS2d 966 [ 19931; see Seabord Sur. Co. v Gillette Co., 64 NY2d 304,486 NYS2d 873 [ 19841; Guishard v General Security Ins. Co., 32 AD3d 528, 820 NYS2d 645 [2d Dept 20061). To be enforceable, any exclusions from coverage must be f clear and specific and any ambiguities will be construed most strongly against the insurer (see Matter o New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v Ward, 38 AD3d 898,833 NYS2d 182 [2d Dept 20071; Guachichulca v Laszlo N. Tauber & Assoc. LLC, 37 AD3d 760,83 1 NYS2d 234 [2d Dept 20071). Furthermore, the standard for determining residency for purposes of insurance coverage requires something more than temporary or physical presence and requires at least some degree of permanence and intention to remain (New York Cent. Mut. FireIns. Co. v Kowalski, 195 AD2d 940, 941, 600 N.Y.S.2d 977 [3d Dept 19931; see Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Paolicelli, 303 AD2d 633,756 NYS2d 653 [2d Dept 20031). The issue of residency is a question of fact to be determined at a hearing (see Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Bonifacio, 69 AD3d 864,892 NYS2d 555 [2d Dept 20101; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Nicoletti, 1 1 AD3d 702, 784 NYS2d 128 [2d Dept 20041; Hollunder v Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 60 A.D2d 380,401 NYS2d 336 [4th Dept 19781). Here, plaintiffs both testified during their examinations before trial that they would go to the subject property very often, that they stayed there overnight several times, and that they were in the process of moving into the property. Thus, an issue of fact exists as to whether plaintiffs presence in the house, coupled with their intent to eventually move into the subject property, is sufficient to satisfy the insurance policy srequirements (see Dean v Tower Ins. Co. ofN.Y., 19 NY3d 704,955 NYS2d 817 [2012]; cJ: Vela v Tower Ins. Co. ofN*Y., 83 AD3d 1050,921 NYS2d 325 [2d Dept 201 I]). While State Farm contends that its claims representative observed very little furniture in the subject property, courts have held that a householder need not necessarily have conventional or, indeed, any furniture in a house to occupy it, as his or her presence for sleeping, eating and working purposes can literally constitute occupancy (see Dean v Tower Ins. Co. of N. Y., supra; Page v Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 15 AD2d 306,223 NYS2d 573 [3d Dept 19621; see also Perrotta v MiddlesexMut. Ins. Co., 37 AD2d 783, 783, 325 NYS2d 251 [2d Dept 19711). State Farm also asserts that the exclusion applies as the subject property was being constructed at the time of the loss. However, the term being constructed is not defined in the insurance policy. While it is undisputed that the subject property was under renovation at the time of the loss, the language used in the contract renders it susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation (see Brad H. v Ct oflvew iy York, 17 NY3d 180,928 NYS2d 221 [2011]; Evans v FamousMusic Corp., 1 NY3d 452,775 NYS2d 757 [* 5] Leone v State Farm Index No. 10-36871 Page No. 5 [2004]). It is unclear whether the undefined term being constructed in the contract encompasses any and all types of renovation work done to the property, as well as construction of the property. When the language of a contract is ambiguous, its construction presents a question of fact that may not be resolved by the court on a motion for summary judgment (see County of Orange v Carrier Corp., 57 AD3d 601,869 LLP NYS2d 2 1 1 [2nd Dept 20081; Yerushalmi & ASSOC., v Westland Overseas Corp., 2 1 AD3d 1098,803 NYS2d 620 [2d Dept 20051; DePasquale v Daniel Realty Assoc., 304 AD2d 6 13,757 NYS2d 477 [2d Dept 20031). Finally, a question of fact exists as to whether plaintiffs used reasonable care to maintain heat in the subject property, as both plaintiffs testified that the heat was always on in the house, and Mr. Leone specifically testified that the temperature of the house remained at 65 degrees to 68 degrees at all times. Accordingly, State Farm s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it is denied. The foregoing constitutes the Order of this Court. Dated: September 4,2013 Riverhead, NY H ~ NHECTOR D. LASALLE, J.S.C. . FINAL DISPOSITION X NON-FINAL DISPOSITION
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