Richardson v 49 Terrace Corp.

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Richardson v 49 Terrace Corp. 2013 NY Slip Op 32060(U) September 3, 2013 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: 102962/12 Judge: Doris Ling-Cohan Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various state and local government websites. These include the New York State Unified Court System's E-Courts Service, and the Bronx and Westchester County Clerks' offices. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. [* 1] SCANNED ON 91512013 eck one: FINAL DI REFERENCE 0 SUBMIT ORDER/ JUDC. G. [* 2] i A SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK CouNrrY OF NEW YORK: PART 36 --________------------------------------x CURTIS RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, Index No.: 102962/12 -against49 TERRACE CORPORATION, a New York Corporation, DORIS L I N G - C O W , J.: The court is in receipt of the Appellate Term decision issued in the underlying landlord-tenant proceeding (New York County Index Number L&T 92?85/10), and, sua sponte, issues the below See 49 Terrace Corp. V . R i c h a r d s o n , 2 0 1 3 NY Slip Op decision. 51306(U) (App Term, First Dept, Au st 9, 2013). Prior t o t h e commencenienL: of t h i s case, in which plaintiff/tenant Richardson seeks, inter alia, a declaratory judgment on a claim of succession rights, defendant/l sumnary holdover proceeding, lord 49 Terrace commenced a in the Landlord-tenant part of the Civil Court, entitled 49 T e r r a c e C o r p . v C u r t i s R i c h a r d s o n , index number L & T 92485/10 ("Civil Court proceeding"). Such holdover proceeding was premised on the f a c t t h a t Richardson was a licensee, with a license that expired. 002, Ex. e. Motion sequence number Richardson defended the housing c o u r t proceeding, 1 [* 3] A represented by counsel, alleging succession rights to the apartmefir arid t h a t 49 Terrace breached the warranty of habitability. Id. a t Ex. D. In t h e Civil Court proceeding, tenant Richardson moved to dismiss, which was denied on December 27, 2011. Motion, Ex. F. ID. such d e f i i a l , t h e court stated that Richardson's claim to succession r i g h t s could not be d e c i d e d 01-1 the papers, that 49 Terrace's acceptance of rent from Richardson was not determinative of succession rights, and that there were triable issues of f a c t concerning the succession issue. The C i v i l C o u r t decision also ordered Richardson to continue to p a y use and occupancy, as provided by a so-ordered stipulation entered into by t h e parties. Id.; Ex. E. Thereafter, by order dated March 13, 2012, Richardson's answer to the summary proceeding was stricken, based on his failure to t e n d e r ongoing u s e and occfipancy, pursuant to Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law ( R P A P L ) § 745. Motion, Ex. H. A trial was held, at which it was determined t h a t Richardson was, indeed, a licensee with an e x p i r e d license, based, i n t e r alia, upon he s t r i k i n g of t h e answer, and the landlord was awarded possession of the subject apartment. Notion, Ex. H. Richardson moved to reargue, which motion was denied on June 12, 2012. Motion, Ex. J - Richardson noticed an a p p e a l of the March 1 3 , 2 [* 4] 2012 decision in the summary proceeding, in which his answer was stricken. Motion, Ex. K. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , by decision/order dated August 9, 2013, the Appellate Term, First Deparcment reversed the March 13, 2012 Civil Court: decision, which had granted the landlord's motion to s t r i k e tenant Richardson's answer, reinstated tenant Richardson's answer and remanded t-he matter t o t h e C i v i l Court, f o r further proceedings on the holdover petition. See 49 Terrace Corp. V . R i c h a r d s o n , 2 0 1 3 NY Slip Op 51306(U) (App Term, F i r s t Depr, August 9, 2013). Thus, consistent with the August 9, 2013 decision/order by the Appellate Term, First Department, the tzrirhin action, in which tenant Richardson seeks both a declaratory judgment that h e is entitled to succession rights to the s u b j e c t apartment and that 49 Terrace breached the w a r r a n t y of habitability i s dismissed, without prejudice to p u r s u e such defenses in t h e contest of the Civil C o u r t h o l d o v e r proceeding, w h i c h was commenced, prior to the plaintiff's commencement of ~ h e within action. As stated by the Appellate Division, First Department in Brecker v . 295 C e n t . P a r k W . , Inc., (71 AD3d 564 [I ' Dept ZOlO]), in dismissing a Supreme Court declaratory j u d g m e n t action commenced by a t e n a n t with respect t o a succession r i g h t l s claim, " [ w ] h e n no o t h e x a c t i o n or pxoceeding i s p e n d i n g in C i v i l Coux't, a tenant may commence an action in Supreme C o u r t seeking declaration of succession r i g h t 3 [* 5] t o a r e n t - r e g u l a t e d a p a r t m e n t . . .however, C i v i l Court i s t h e s t r o n g l y p r e f e r r e d forum f o x resolving l a n d l o r d - t e n a n t d i s p u t e s . . . O n c e a summary proceeding has been commenced i n C i v i l Court w h e r e complete r e l i e f can be af ¬orded to the tenant, there i s no f u r t h e r b a s i s for invoking the equitable jurisdiction of Supreme C o u r t . . . ". ( c i t a t i o n s omikted, emphasis s u p p l i e d ) . was comnencecf b y p l a i n t i f f / t e n a n t , Here, t h e w i t h i n a c t i o n o n l y a f t e r h i 5 a n s w e r was s t r u c k i n t h e C i v i l C o u r t h o l d o v e r p r o c e e d i n g , w h i c h was commenced a g a i n s t h i m b y h i s l a n d l o r d . A s u c h C i v i l Court s p r o c e e d i n g a n d t e n a n t R i c h a r d s o n ' s a n s w e r h a v e been r e i n s t a t e d , t h e r e i s no b a s i s f o r this a c t i o n t o c o n t i n u e . ' I t is n o t e d t h a t t h e p r e v i o u s l y commenced summary h o l d o v e r p r o c e e d i n g b y 4 9 T e r r a c e , i n v o l v e s t h e v e r y same issues p e n d i n g before t h i s c o u r t , n a m e l y w h e t h e r t e n a n t C u r t i s R i c h a r d s o n h a s a n y l e g a l r i g h t s t o the subject a p a r t m e n t . Moreover, it i s noted t h a t i c would b e a waste of j u d i c i a l r e s o u r c e s , r e s o u r c e s of t h e p a r t i e s , a n d c o u l d result i n i n c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t s , t o a l l o w t h e w i t h i n i s s u e s t o be p u r s u e d i n two s e p a r a t e f o r u m s . Based on t h e a b o v e , ' i t is T h e c o u r t n o t e s t h a t , w h i l e d e f e n d a n t 4 9 Terrace h a s moved t o d i s m i s s this c a s e (Motion S e q u e n c e Number OOZ), a r g u i n g rrhat: i t i s b a r r e d b y collateral estoppel a n d res j u d i c a t a , t h i s c o u r t need n o t r e a c h s u c h issues a n d t h e y a r e deemed moor ( b y s e p a r a t e o r d e r ) , a s dismissal i s warranted b a s e d upon t h e August 9, 2013 r u l i n g by t h e A p p e l l a t e Term, F i r s t Department. [* 6] ORDERED t h a t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e A u g u s t 9 , 2013 d e c i s i o n / o r d e r by t h e A p p e l l a t e Term, F i r s t Department (49 Terrace Corp. V. R i c h a r d s o n , 2 0 1 3 NY S l i p O p 5 1 3 0 6 [ U ] [App Term, First D e p t , A u g u s t 8 , 2 0 1 3 1 , t h i s c o u r t , s u a s p o n t e , d i s m i s s e s t h e c o m p l a i n t , w i t h o u t costs a n d w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o p l a i n t i f f C u r t i s Richardson p u r s u i n g h i s s u c c e s s i o n r i g h t s claim and breach o f w a r r a n t y of h a b i t a b i l i t y c l a i m , i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e previously commenced summary h o l d o v e r p r o c e e d i n g , w h i c h h a s been r e i n s t a t e d , b y order d a t e d August 9 , 2 0 1 3 of t h e A p p e l l a t e T e r m , F i r s t : Department; and it i s f u r t h e r ORDERED t h a t , upon p r o o f of s e r v i c e of a copy of t h i s o r d e r w i t h n o t i c e of e n t r y , t h e C l e r k i s d i r e c t e d t o e n t e r judgment o f d i s m i s s a l , w i t h o u t costs; a n d i t i s f u r t h e r O R D E R E D t h a t w i t h i n 30 days of e n t r y of t h i s o r d e r , d e f e n d a n t s h a l l s e r v e a c o p y upon p l a i n t i f f w i t h n o t i c e of e n t r y . NEW YORK CoUNw CLERK'S OFR::t \ D i s r r l i s s \ R i c h a r d s o n . revised a f t e r a p p d i v decision august 2013.wpd

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