Wadsworth Condos LLC v Dollinger Gonski & Grossman

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Wadsworth Condos LLC v Dollinger Gonski & Grossman 2013 NY Slip Op 30149(U) January 22, 2013 Sup Ct, New York County Docket Number: 600899/2009 Judge: Louis B. York Republished from New York State Unified Court System's E-Courts Service. Search E-Courts (http://www.nycourts.gov/ecourts) for any additional information on this case. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. SCANNEDON 112812013 [* 1] + SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY 4 s c;. PRESENT: t PART ~ L.J Justice - Index Number 600899/2009 WADSWORTH CONDOS INDEX NO. vs MOTION DATE DOLLINGER GONSKI SEQUENCE NUMBER 003 MOTION SEQ.NO. SUMMARY JUDGMENT I , were read on this motion tolfor The following papers, numbered Ito Notice of MotionlOrder to Show Cause Answering Affidavits - Affidavits - Exhibits IN d d . I No@). I No(+ - Exhibits Replying Affidavits Upon the foregoing papers, it is ordered that this motion is Dated: /,/22/,3 ......................................................... ".,"....."". 1 CASE DISPOSED I ~iDEN~EQ CHECK as APPP.QPR!P.TE: ......................... ~~~?~~~~ IS: GRAXTED I. CHECK ONE: 2. ~" u 3. CHECK IF APPROPRIATE: ................................................. SETTLE ORDER 1.1DO NOT POST f&@SITION ~~~~~~~ GRANTED IN PART. r P* If** I ~ 7 OTHER 0SUBMIT ORDER FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT u REFERENCE [* 2] SLJPREME COURT OF TIIE S rATE 0 ; 1 NEW YOKE; COUN I Y O F NEW YORK: PART 2 ________________________________________--------------------------------X WADSWORTH CONDOS LLC, individually and derivatively on behalf of WADSWORTH CONDOS, LLC and 43 PARK OWNERS GKOUP, 1LC as the Owners, as Tenants-In-Coninion, of Rcal Property located at One Wadsworth I crrace,New York, New York, Plaintiffs, Index No.: 600899/2009 - against- 1301,LINC;ER GONSKI & GROSSMAN, MATTIIEW DOI,I,INGER, EM DESIGN GI<OUI , INC., MICHAEL EVANS, SOLOMON ROSENZWEIG, PE P.C., SOLOMON ROSENZWEIG, YUSUF M. PATEI+ and JOHN DOES 1- S , said names being fictitious, intended to be other Building Profkssionals who liavc worked on the Real Property locatcd at Onc Wadswor Terrace, Ncw York, New York, D elend ants. YORK, .J., Wadsworth Condos, LLC (Wadsworth), brings this action for lcgal malpractice, individually, on behalf of itsclf, and derivatively, on behalf of itself and 43 Park Owners Group, LLC (43 Park). Motion sequence numbers 003, 004, and 005, arc consolidatcd for disposition. 111 motion sequence 003, dcfcndants Dollinger, Gonski, & Grossman (the Dollinger law firm) and Matthew Dollinger (Dollinger), move, pursuant to CPLK 32 12, for an order granting suimiliary j iidgmerit and arguc that tlicy did not commit legal malpractice in an underlying action regarding a construction project. In inotioii sequence 004, dcfeiidants Solomon Roscnzweig, PE P.C. (SRPE), Solomon Roscnzweig (Rosenzwcig), and Yusuf M. Patel (Patel), move, pursuant to CPLR 321 1 (a) (7), to dismiss the complaint for h i l u r e to stale a cause of action, and altcrnativcly MOVC, pursuant to 1 [* 3] C:PI,R 321 2, for an ordcr granting summary judgmcnt. SWE, Rozenswcig, and Pate1 also move for sanctions, attorneys fees, and for the costs of making this niotion. In motion sequcnce 005, defendants Michacl Even (Even) s/h/a Michael Evans and EM Design Group P.C. (EM) dida EM Dcsign Group, lnc., move, pursuant to CP[,R 3212, for an order granting them summary judgment. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Wadsworth is a company formed by the real estatc developmcnt group, The Bobker Group (Bobker), in ordcr to commence a condominium construction project located at One Wadsworth Terrace in Ncw York City (the premises). Hobker was founded by Joe Bobker, an architect and real estate developer. Eli Hobker serves as a nianaging member of the company. On Deceiiibcr 9,2004, Bobker acquired the prcniises for $2,000,000. Aftcr acquiring the property, Joe Bobkcr met with Perry I.4 tikelniari (Finkelman), the principal of Arncrican Development Group (ADG), a real estate development company which engages in construction management. Finkelman and his partncr, Mark Engel (Engel), president and CEO of Lmgsam Property Serviccs Corp., are the managing Inernbers of 43 Park Owners Group, LLC (43 Park). Pursuant to a management agreement entered into on July 6,2005, Wadsworth and 43 Park became tenants in corniinon of the preiniscs (together, the tenancy in conmon). 43 Park acquired a 20% undivided interest in the preniises and Wadsworth retained the remaining 80%. The agrccment provides, among other things, that Finkelman is responsiblc for all constructionrclatcd activities associated with the project. Before Bobker acquired tlic premises, it retained architect Karl Fischer (Fischer) for arcliitcctural scrvices for the condominium construction project. Following the conmencement of construction at the premises, a portion o f a retaining wall at the site was dcmolished. Shortly thereafter, a "stop work order" was issued by the New Ynrk City Department of Buildings (DOB), because it was alleged that thc New York City Ikpartment of Transportation (DOT) owncd the dcmolislicd retaining wall. Dollinger, an aitorney, maintains that his firm was 2 [* 4] contacted by the tenancy in corninon to review documents, including the survey and deed of the premises, in order to dctermine who owned the wall. Dollinger contiiiucd to represent the tenancy in common during negotiations with the DOT regarding the retaining wall. The DOT, which Dollinger contends owned the wall, agreed to permit the tcnancy in common to demolish the above-grade portion ofthe wall, as long as the tenancy in common assumcd responsibility for the iiiaintenance and stability of the area upon which the rctaining wall existed. The tenancy in coniimon was to obtain a pcrformancc bond in the amount of $300,000, and enter into an agrccinent with the adjoining property owner, MauerBach. Dollinger maintains that, on January 5 , 2007, hc met with Joe Bobker, Eli Bobker, and Finkelman, regarding the coninicnccment of a potential lawsuit concerning the wall against Wadsworth s title insurers, Conmonwcaltli Land Title Insurance Company and Chicago Title lmirancc Comnpany, 43 Park s title insurcr, Stewart Title Insurance Company, <andFischer, the architect. Ilollinger contends that hc discusscd with his clients how Fischer s plans ignored the existence of the retaining wall and that the title insurance policies failed to insurc a right of acccss to the premises. Although Dollinger maintains that Joc Bobkcr bclicvcd that Fischer could be named as a potential dcfcndaiit at a later date, Joe Bobker agreed that the title insurance companies were to be notified of the claims. On October 30, 2007, the Dollinger defendants sent Eli Robkcr a draft of the summons and complaint in connection with the underlying action against the title insurancc coinpanics and Fischer. Hi Hobker respondcd that he tliouglit Fischer should be not named as a dcfcndaiit. On October 3 1,2007, an agreement [or the maintenance and construction of the retaining wall was executed by Wadsworth, 43 Park and the DOT, howcvcr construction was delayed due to difficulties i n obtaining a maintcnancc bond. Dollinger maintains that, at or about this time, Wadsworth cntcred into discussions with 43 Park regarding a possible purchase of Wadsworth s interest of the premises. On November 30, 2007, a draft of a contract of salc was made 3 [* 5] regarding a proposed sale of Wadsworth io 43 Park, and a further draft was made on January 1, 2008. Despite the discussions aiid the proposed agreements, the sale of Wadsworth's intcrest of the prcmises was never finalized. On August 27, 2008, Dollingcr filed the underlying action, 43 Park Ow12ers. Cmup, f,K, Wudsworth Condos, LLC and Inwood Equities Groul3, Inc. v C,'anzmonwealth Lund Title Itisurance Coniyuny, C'hicugo Title InsLirarzce Conipmy, S1ew~ai-l Titlc Innszirunce Company; crnd Knrl Fischer. (Index No.: 06 136-2008), in Nassau County. The lawsuit named Fischer as one of thc delendants. Doll inger contends that Wadsworth cxplicitly agrccd to tlie underlying action, and refcreiiced the action in its negotiations concerning thc sale or its interests to 43 Park. On September 10,2008, Joe Robker sent an email to llollinger, stating that the lawsuit had to be withdrawn bccause it was filed without Bobkcr's "consent, input, review valid retainer agreements, waivcr of conflict issues, etc." (Dollinger Aff., cx.15). On November 10, 2008, Joe Bobker scnt an eiiiail to Dollinger stating that "[yjou are not authorized to represent tlie TIC (tenancy in common) interests. Please cease-and-dcsist immediately and notify all parties accordingly." (13olhger, Aff., f l l S ) . 0 1March 1 23, 2009, Wadswoith coinrnciiced the instant action,'alleging causes of action against the Dollinger law fiimi and Dollinger, for legal malpractice for cornnieiicing the undcrlying lawsuit. 111their opposition to this motion, Wadsworth appears to bc adding allegations that the Ilollinger defendants committed legal malpractice when they sided with 43 Park and assisted the architccture and enginecr dercndants in a plan to convcrt the project from a condominium to a rental building. Furthermore, the opposi tioii to the niotion appears to allege that Dollinger failed to advisc Wadsworth to apply lor a permit to dcmolish the wall, and did not obtain a waiver of conllict of interest by representing the interests oP both 43 Park and Wadswoith simultaneously. However, Dollinger maintains that these legal theories are new and were not incorporated into Wadxworth's complaint. Wadsworth also allegcs other causes of action, including ncgligence, breach of contract, 4 [* 6] fraud, and aiding and abetting fraud, against the architects, Even and EM, and the engineers, SRPE, Kosenzweig, and Patcl. Wadsworth maintains, in its opposition papers, that these arcliitccts and engineers were hired by 43 Park and transformed tlie plans for the prcmiscs from a condominium to a rental building, without thc approval of the tenancy in conunon. Wadsworth maintains that tlic dcfendants were all aware that tlic prcrniscs was owned by a tenancy in coniiiioii and did not seek its approval before comnencing work. DISCUSSION Defendants maintain that Wadsworth does not have standing to bring this derivative action because Wadsworth's objective in filing this lawsuit is to vindicate its own rights as an individual corporation, and not to act on bclialf of tlie rights of the tenancy in common. The Court of Appeals has held that "[w]hether a person seeking relief is a proper party to request an adjudication is an aspect of justiciability which, when challenged, must be considered at the outsct of any litigation." Society of Plustics Indus., Inc. v C'ozin/y oj'Sufidk, 77 NY2d 761 , 769 (1 991) (citations omitted). "Standing is thus a thresliold determination that allows a litigant access to the courts to adjudicate the merits of a particular dispute that otherwisc satisfies the otlicr justiciability criteria." Rohcrts v Health & Hosps. Cuip., 87 AD3d 3 1 1 , 3 1 8 ( I st Dcpt 201 1). Hcre, the complaint alleges that the tenancy in coii~non negatively impacted by the was actions of 43 Park. Specifically, Wadsworth alleges that 43 Park violated the terms of the management agreement, which govcriied tlie tenancy in common, by unilaterally changing tlie scopc and purpose of the project froiii a condominium to a rental building, and by hiring professionals without its consent. Wadsworth maintains that each of the building professional defendants worked solely at tlic direction of43 Park, without the consent of Wadsworth, and were paid on behalf ofthe tenancy in common. As Wadswoi-tli bas set f'ortli various allegations in the complaint which demonstrate how 5 [* 7] the tenancy in common was allegedly impacted by 43 Park's actions, which were made without the consent of' Wadsworth and were in violation of the management agrcement, Wadsworth meets its burden and demonstratcs that the derivative suit is necessary to represciit tlie interests of the tenancy in common. Dollingcr and the llollinger law firm contend that summary judgment must be granted in their fiivor bccaiise Wadsworth fails to demonstrate that they coimiitted legal malpractice. 'I'he Court of Appeals has held that "[iln order to establish a prima facie case of legal malpractice, a plaintiff inust deliionstrate that the plaintilT would havc succeeded on the merits of tlic v underlying action but for the attorney's ncgligence." D m ~ j s Klein, 88 NY2d 1008, 1009-1010 (1996); see d s o Coas/crlBrouclwuy Assacs. v. Ruphuel, 298 AD2d 186, 186 (1 st Dept 2002) (holding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate the causal coiinection between the alleged malpractice and the loss whicli was sustained). I n the complaint, Wadsworth contends that Dollinger and the Dollinger law Iirm conimitted legal malpractice wlicn they filed tlie lawsuit against Fischer. Wadsworth maintains that prior to the commencernent of' [he action, Joe and Eli Bobker specifically instructed the Dollinger defendants to not name Fischer, Karl Fisclicr Architecture, PI ,LC, and Karl Fischer Design, lnc. as defcndants. Wadsworth argues that the Ilollinger delendatits intentionally ignored the instructions and proceeded to Iile and scrve the summons and complaint. Wadsworth submits both the deposition testimony arid an affidavit from Joe Bobker which discusscs the allegations of' legal malpractice. Along with improperly naming the Fischer defendants in the underlying action, Joe Hobker states that the Ihllinger defendants subjected the tenancy in cotmion to litigation p o s i h n s which it had no control of and which created substantial cxpenses. Specifically, Joe Robker maintains that Ilolljnger failed to advise Wadswoi-th of' the full implications of coiiirnenciiig an action against the title insurancc companies. Joc Robker testified that Dollingcr: "lockcd us into positions with stipulations and depositions that we were unaware 6 [* 8] of and weren't given a chance to even allend or know about until after the fact . . . refused to give us access to our flies when we asked them. He refused to even acknowledge that we wcre his client. He corresponded with our partners in the TIC (tenancy in conmion) behind our back. He assisted them in the destruction of our project by being aware of and knowing that the plans have changed." (Joe Bobker 9/22/11 EBT, at 21 1). Wadswortli argues that negotiations with the DOT and for the retaining wall accumulated unneeded lcgal fees, and did not require the extensive ncgotiations into which Dollinger entered. Joe Bobker maintains that if Dollingcr had presented the alternative plan of complying with the could have been able to li ¬l the "stop permit rcquireinents of the DOB, the tenancy in ~oiiinion work ordcr" and continuc the project at the premises. Joe Robker contends that thc delay in the continuation of the pro-ject resulted in the loss of financing and damages, including the loss of a construction loan, mortgage payments, equity infusions, legal fecs, architectural lees, and carrying costs. He alleges that Dollinger's representation of43 Park, and his failurc to advise 43 Park to obtain Wadsworth's consent, as dictated by tlic management agrccmcnt, created conflicts with the interests of the tenancy in col~Illo11. Dollingcr contends that Wadswoi-th cannot set forth a cause of action for lcgal malpractice because Bobker knew about thc conmencement of the action against Fischer, authorizcd it, and only objccted to it after it was already coninicnccd. Dollinger maintains that both Joe and Eli Bobker objected to the suit against Fischer only becausc of thc breakdown of negotiations between 43 Park concerning thc sale of Wadsworth's interest in the prcniiscs. Dollingcr argues that .Joe Bobker admitted in his testimony that his reluctance to name Fischer was based upon a disagrccincnt concerning litigation strategy. Ilollinger further argues thal the legal fees which wcre accuinulated in the underlying action, would liave been incurred regardless of any a l l e g d misconduct; that lengthy ncgotiations were needed for the issues rcgarding the retaining wall; and that thcrc is no evidence that Wadsworth ob*jcctcdto the 7 [* 9] disbursements of legal fees when they wcrc bcing niadc. Sumiiiary judgment is a drastic remedy which is granted only when the party seeking suinmary judgmciit has established that there are no triable issues of fact. Andm v Yomeroy, 35 NY2d 361, 364 (1974). The burden then shifts to the motion's opponent to "present evidentiary facts in adniissiblc form sufficient to raise a genuine, triable issue of fact." Mazurek v Melropolitun Mziseirm ufiirl, 27 AD3d 227, 228 (1 sl Dept 2006). "In considering a sutiiiiiaiy judgment motion, evidcncc should be analyzed in the light most favor-ablcto the party opposing the motion." Murtin v Briggs, 235 AD2d 192, 196 (1 st Dept 1997). "On a motion for suiniiiary judgment the court is not to dctcrminc credibility, but whether therc exists a factual issue, or if-arguably thcrc is a genuine issue of I'act.'' S .I. Cupelin Assocs., fnc. v Globe Mfi. Corp., 34 NY2d 338, 341 (1 974); see l'sihngios v Stc.!vropoulos, 269 AD2d 295,296 (1 st Dept 2000) (holding that issues of credibility should be left for resolution by the trier of fact). Here, there is a clear dispute raised by the testimony of Joe Bobker and Bollingcr. WliiIc Dollinger slates that tlic litigation against F'ischer was authorized, Joe Bobker disagrees, and states that this litigation was not authorized, and that Dollinger was specifically told not to comnience the litigation against Fischer. There also remains qucstions of fact as to wliethcr Dollinger's work for 43 Park conflictcd with the interests of the tenancy in common and the management agreement, and whether Dollinger did or did not contribute to delays in tlic litigation which rcsulted in damages. Therefore, bccause h e r e are issues regrading the credibility oi'the witnesses, as well as issues of fact regarding Dollinger's work, Dollinger and the Dollinger law h i ' s motion for summary .judgement must be dciiicd. In motion scquciice numbers 004 and 005, Even, EM) SRPE, Rosenzwcig, and Patcl, move for sumimary judgement. Even, EM, SRPE, Rosenzweig, aiid Patel demonstrate, through aflidavits aiid deposition testimony, that they wcrc coiitractcd to provide services for the premises by reprcseiitatives ol' 43 Park, that they performed the requested services, that they 8 [* 10] were paid for the services, and that they were not made awarc that any other person or entity s permission was requircd in order for them to work at tlnc premises. Furthermore, although Wadsworth maintailis that the managing agreement between itself and 43 Park required Wadsworth, as a tenant in common, to approve of the eiigiiiccr and architects, there is no evidence that these defendants were made aware of such agrccment. Even and his design group, EM, were retained by Finkelman to provide architectural scrvices through an oral agreement. Even tcstified that when EM worked on thc premises, he was only in contact with Finkclxman; that Wadsworth did not provide instructions or request that jt be consulted for the design for tlic premises; and that Wadsworth did not contact Even until aftcr the architectural drawings fbi- the prcmiscs were completed. Even believed Finkelman, who was in charge of construction at the premises, had the authority to dircct hiin to provide the architectural serviccs. SRPE, Rosenzweig, and Patel also submit affidavits and deposition testimony which discuss their work on the project. Rosenzweig testified that, 011 May 3 1, 2006, Finkelman hired SRPE to provide engineering services at the premises. liosenzweig maintains that SRPE was authorizcd to drail and filc plans with the DOB; that it was SIIPE s understanding that Finkelman was authorizcd to hire SRPE for the project; that SRPE completed work and submitted invoices to Finkelnian; and that SKPE received payment lor its work. Koscnzweig states in < naffidavit a dated March 28, 201 2, that he believed that Finkclnian was a controlling officer of the pro-ject, and that he was nevcr provided with any documcntation indicating, or was otherwise made awarc that SRPE needed any other person s or entity s consent to perform work on the prqject. (Rosenzweig Affidavit, 7 10). With rcgardb to defendant Patel, Patel submits an affidavit which states that, on February 1 , 2008, Gary Griggs (Griggs) of ADG liircd him to provide engineering scrviccs in connection with the construction project for the premises, including the dcsign of the mechanical, electrical, plumbing, and fire and protection systems. Patel testified that his h i , YMP, completed the 9 [* 11] engineering work, submitted invoices to ADG, and received payment. Patel believes that Griggs was authorized to hire liini for the work, aiid maintains that hc was not provided with any docurncntation which indicated that YMP needed any other person's or entity's consent to perform work on the project. (Patel Affidavit, 7 9). In opposition to the defendants' motions for sun-uiiaryjudgmcnt, Wadsworth maintains that Evans, EM, Rosenzweig, SRPE, and Patel, were not authorized to represent the tenancy in comiion when they coiiiincnced work for tlic prcmiscs; that they werc aware that the premises was owned by a tcnaiicy in conirnon aiid should havc notified Wadsworth of their work; and that Wadsworth's consent was required regarding the retention of professionals. I I owever, Wadsworth does not cite any agreement, authority, or case law which discusses that thesc defendants had a duty or legal responsibility to notily Wadsworth of their work at the prcmiscs. Furthermore, while Wadsworth alleges causes of action against the defendants for negligence, breach of contract, fraud, and aiding and abetting, Wadsworth fails to deiiionstratc that thcse dcfcndants can be held liable for any of the causes of action. For example, in order to set forth a prima facic casc of ncgligcncc, a plaintiff must demonstrate, "the existcnce of a duty on defcndant's part as to plaintiff; (2) a breach ofthis duty; and (3) itisjury to the plaintiff as a result thereof." Akins v GZcns FdZs CifySchool Dist., 53 NY2d 325, 333 (198 I). Herc, although Wadswortli allcgcs that the defendants were negligent, Wadsworth fails to provide any authority or casc law, beyond speculation, which might show that a duty was owed by the defendants to alert the co-tenant in common of their work. The del'endants werc all hired by representatives of43 Park arid testified that they bclievcd that the hiring party had authorization to hire them on behall of the tenancy in corntnon. Furthermore, while allcgations of professional negligence require prool that there was a departure from the accepted standards and practices, Wadsworth has not provided any expert disclosurc and does not discuss the appropriate standard of care f'or each professional. See Travelers Indcrn. Ch. v Zq$f Design,60 AD3d 453,455 (1st Dept 2009) ("a claim ormalpractice against a professional 10 [* 12] cngineer requircs expert testimony to establish a viable cause of action"). Wadsworth also alleges a cause of action of breach of contract against Even, EM, Rosenzwcig, SRPE and Patel. In order to sct forth a cause of action for breach of contract, plaintiff must dcmonstrale the cxistcnce 01 a contract, the claimant's performance under the contract, the dcfcndant's breach of that contract, aiid resulting damages. See Pirlmelto Purhcrs, L.P. v AJW Q~~ul@ed Partners, LI,C, 83 AD3d 804, 806 (2d Ihpt 201 1). Wadsworth fails to demonstrate that Even, EM, Rosenzweig, SRPE or Patel breached a contract. The tcstimony demonstrates that thc defendants contracted with a representative of the tenaiicy in common; that there was no contract entcrcd with Wadsworth; that the defendants performed their services; and that tlicy were paid for the services. With regards to Wadsworth's allegations that Even, EM, Koscnzweig, SWG, and Palel conimitted fraud, or aided and abcttcd fraud, Wadsworth again fails to specily how the defendants committed these causcs of action. In order to set forth a cause of action for fraud, a plaintif1 must prove a niisrcpresentation of a matcrial fact which was hlse and known to be false by defendant, made for tlie purposes of inducing the other party to rely upon it, justifiable reliancc ofthe othcr party on the misrepresentation and injury. See Ross v Louise W s A5'l?rvs., ie Inc., 8 NY3d 478,488 (2007). When allegiiig a cause of action for aiding and abetting, the plaintiff must demonstratc the existence of an undcrlying fraud, knowledge of the fraud on the part of the aiding and abetting party, and substantial assistance by the aiding and abetting party in achieving the fraud. See Stanfield OjJshorc Leverugcd Assels, Ltd. v M t o n i n Ljfe Ins. erpltn Co., 64 AD3d 472,476 (1 st Dept 2009). Here, Wadsworth fails to specify, with detail, what fraudulent activity occurred. Wadsworth does not specify what induceniciits were made by defendants, and fails to explain how Wadsworth rclied on any misrcpresenlatioIis. Wadsworth also does not present any evidcnce, which dernonstratcs that a Gduciary or independent duty was owcd by tlie defendants to the tenancy in common. 11 [* 13] Wadsworth also requests a permanent inj iinction against Evan, EM, SPRE, Kosenzweig and Patel from working on the prqject at the premises. For a perillanent injunction to be granted there must be a "violation of a riglit presently occurring, or threatened and imminent . .. that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law . . . that serious and irrcparablc injury will result il'thc iiijunction is not granted; and .. . that thc equities are balanced in the plaintiffs hvor." Elow v S'venniizpcn, 58 AD3d 674, 675 (26 Dept 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Herc, Wndsworth fails to discuss in its opposition papers the necessity for an injunction. Furthermore, the record does not indicate that work is ongoing on the prqject or :it the premises, and Wadsworth fails lo dciiionstrate that there will be an irreparable injury to the project, absent the granting of an injunction. Wadsworth also argues that Even, EM, SPRE, Rosenzweig and Patel were unjustly enriched lor their work at the premises. 'I'he Appellate Division, First Departmenl, has held that a cause of action lor unjust eiirichnient requires that a plaintiff denionstrate that "a bciiefit was bcstowed . . . by plaintiffs and that defendants will obtain such benefit without adequately compensating plaintiffs thercfor . . . .I' Murphy 11 317-319 Second Realty. LJL', 95 AD3d 443, '446 (1 st Dept 2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, the defendants complcted their professional services for 43 Park and were paid for their work. 'Therefore, because it reinains unclear what bciicfit the defkndants received, other than payment f'or thcir work, which they were hired by 43 Park or its rcpresentations to cornpletc, this cause of action fails. In coiiclusion, Evan, EM, SPRE, Roseiuwcig and Patel demonstrate that the caiises of action which Wadsworth has asscrted against tlicm are not supported by the record. Therefore, because tliexe delendants makc a prima facie sliowing of entitlement to judgment 3s a matter of law by prescntiiig sufficient evidcnce to cliiiiinatc any iiiatcrial issues of fact, and becausc Wadsworth fails to raise a triable issue offact, surnmary judgment must be granted. See Mcizurck, 27 AJI3d at 228. Finally, although SRPE, Rosenzweig, arid Patel contend that they are entitled to sanctions and attoriicys fees, the court declincs to award such relief. 12 [* 14] CONCLUSION and ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that defendants Dollinger, Gonski, Rr. Grossman and Matthew Dollingcr, Esq.'s motion (sequence 003) for summary judgement is denied; and it is further ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment by defendants Solomon Rosenzweig, P.E. P.C., Solomon Rosenzweig, aid Yusuf M. Pntel (sequence 004), is granted and the cornplaint is dismissed as to these defcndants with costs and disbursements to these defendants as taxed by the Clerk upon submission of an appropriate bill of costs; and it is further ORDERbX that the branch of defendants' motion seeking sanctions and attorneys fces, is denied; and it is I'urtlier OK DERED that the motioii for sunimary judgment by defendants Michael Even s/Wa Michael Evans and EM Design Group P.C. s/h/a EM Design Group, Inc. (sequence 005), is granted and the complaint is dismissed as l o these dcfendmts with costs and disburscriienls to these dcfcndaiits as taxed by the Clcrk upon submission of an appropriate bill of costs; and it is fi1rtbcr ORDERED that tlic action is severcd and continued against the remaining defendants; and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to entcr judgment accordingly.

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