Casanas v Carlei Group, LLC

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Casanas v Carlei Group, LLC 2012 NY Slip Op 33071(U) December 20, 2012 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: 101057/12 Judge: Donna M. Mills Republished from New York State Unified Court System's E-Courts Service. Search E-Courts (http://www.nycourts.gov/ecourts) for any additional information on this case. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. . . . ANNED ON 11212013 .. . [* 1] I SIJPIIEME COURT O F I PRESENT : ~ . . . . . . _ -. . . PETE]? I ,4S ANALS niid ELIZAIUBTH CIASA -agai11st - Y THE C Al<L,El GK0T.JP. LLC and KIC. I IAl CASANAS, r)cfcnda11~s. oowwXERlCsQ I hefollowing papers, nirmberecl 1 to Notice o l MotiodOrder to Show C ause-AiGdavits- I lxlii bits.. .. swering Aflidavils- I txhibits R cpl lying A ffi davitsCXOS S-M 0 N : F10 J YES . . - ~ N0 Upoii the loregoing papers, it is orclcrcd that this motion II>ECIIII>EII> ACCOIWANCE WITH A ITACII 1 4 O R I I K I Z . IN 11 Daicd: Check one: L . . FlNAI, I)ISPOSITION NON-l;INhL DISI- OSI TION [* 2] - against- Defendants The Carlei Group, LLC ( Carlei ) and Richard M. Casanas ( Casanas ) (collectively, Defendants ) move for an order: (a) pursuant to CPLR 321 1 (a)(7), dismissing the complaint as against Casanas personally; (b) pursuant to CPLR 6501 and/or 6514(b), canceling the June 11, 2012 notice of pendency (the NOP ) filed against the premises located at 73 West 82 ld Street (the Premises ); ( c) pursuant to CPLR 31 03(a), issuing a protective order striking Plaintiffs First Request for Production of Documents, or, in the alternative, limiting, conditioning or regulating same; (d) pursuant to CPLR 2304, 3101 (a)(4)and/or 3103(a), quashing the Notice to Take Deposition/Judicial Subpoena served upon non-party Aledia P Casanas; (e) pursuant to Rule 130 of the Rules of the Chief Administrator, awarding Defendants costs and sanctions. Plaintiffs, Peter Casanas and Elizabeth Casanas cross move for an order pursuant to CPLR 3124 compelling Defendants to respond to plaintiffs First Request for Production of Documents dated April 6, 2012. Plaintiffs allege, in sum, that they hold a 100-year lease for Apartments 3W and 3C in the Premises, and that, as a result, they seek a declaratory judgment to the effect that Plaintiffs are lessees in the Premises. The filing of this action was precipitated by a [* 3] notice to quit served on the plaintiffs. In the notice to quit, defendant Richard Casanas, the manager of defendant Carlei Group, LLC, asserted that plaintiffs occupied the Apartments as licensees of the prior owner and caused defendant Carlei Group LLC to announce that the license was revoked. Plaintiffs claim to have executed a 100 year lease with the prior owner, Aleida Realty Corp. by Carlos and Aleida P. Casanas, the parents of Peter Casanas (Plaintiff) and of Richard Casanas (Defendant). In their answer to the complaint, defendants Richard Casanas and Carlei Group, LLC claim that the plaintiffs lease is a forgery. The lease bears the signature of plaintiffs, Peter and Elizabeth Casanas, and of non-parties Carlos Casanas and Aleida Casanas. Carlos Casanas is deceased, but Aleida P. Casanas is available to testify regarding execution of the Lease. A declaratory judgment serves a legitimate purpose only when all interested persons who might be affected by the enforcement of rights and legal relations are . parties (Matter ofJ,_T_Assocs. v Hudson Riv.--Black,uBiv.Regulatinq Disi., 175 AD2d 438, 440). Since this declaratory judgment action seeks to determine whether plaintiffs are lessees in the premises, defendant Richard Casanas as the manager of The Carlei Group, cannot be said to be uninterested in the outcome, and perhaps a necessary party (see, CPLR 1001 [a]). Plaintiffs filed a NOP against the premises on June 1I , 2012, and defendants now seek to cancel it. CPLR 6501 provides in pertinent part: A notice of pendency may be filed in any action in a court of the state in which the judgment demanded would affect the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of, real property. As the Court of Appeals has stated, The usual object of filing a notice of lis pendens is to [* 4] protect some right, title or interest claimed by a plaintiff in the lands of a defendant which might be lost under the recording acts in event of a transfer of the subject property by the defendant to a purchaser for value and without notice of the claim (Braunston v. Anchoraqe Woods, 10 N.Y.2d 302, 305). ( Rose v. Montt Assets, Inc., 250 A.D.2d 451 [Ist Dept 19981.)The courts have long required strict compliance with the statutory procedural requirements for the filing of a notice of pendency. (5303 Realty Corp. v. 0 & Y Equity Corp., 64 N.Y.2d 313, 320 [1984].)Thus, [tlhe powerful impact that this device has on the alienability of property, when conjoined with the facility with which it may be obtained, calls for its narrow application to only those lawsuits directly affecting title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of, real property. (5303 Realty Corp., 64 N.Y.2d at 315-316; -Furniture, Inc. v. Loew s Theatres & Realtv Corp., 131 Misc.2d 517, 519 [Bronx County 19861, affd no opinion 129 A.D.2d 1018 [1987].) On a motion to cancel, the court is essentially limited to reviewing the pleading to ascertain whether the action falls within the scope of CPLR 6501 ( 5303 ReaItv Corp., 64 N.Y.2d at 320.) In determining whether to cancel the notice of pendency in the instant case, the issue before the court is thus whether plaintiffs complaint demands a judgment that would affect the title to, or the possession, use, or enjoyment of, real property. ( See CPLR 6501; Robert Fianqk Hair Desiqn Inst. v. C o n c o u ~ Props. Co., 130 A.D.2d 564 [2d Dept 19871.) Clearly, the complaint does address plaintiffs ability to enjoy the use of the real property in question. Defendants also seek to strike or h i t plaintiffs document demands. CPLR 31 01 (a) provides that [tlhere shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in f the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless o the burden of proof. The phrase [* 5] material and necessary should be interpreted liberally, and the test is one of usefulness and reason (Kooper v Koopgy, 74 AD3d 6, 10 [2010]). Unlimited disclosure, however, is not required (see Spohn-Konen,-y _Town Brookhaven, 74 of AD3d 1049 [201 O]), and the rules provide that the court may issue a protective order denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating the use of any disclosure device to prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice to any person or the courts (CPLR 3103 [a]). In opposition to defendants motion, plaintiff withdraws demands 11, 17 and 25. The supervision of disclosure and the setting of reasonable terms and conditions therefor rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and, absent an improvident exercise of that discretion, its determination will not be disturbed (Lollv v Brookdale, Univ. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 45 AD3d 537, 537 [2007]). This Court finds that the demands with the exception of 21 and 22 are material and necessary in the prosecution of this action and should be responded to by defendants. Defendants also seek to quash the Notice to Take Deposition upon non-party Aledia P Casanas. The First Department has held that [a] subpoena will be quashed ... where the material requested is utterly irrelevant to any proper inquiry. General Electric Co. v. -RJ-bfn., 184 A.D.2d 391, 392 (1st Dept 1992). Here, the testimony which plaintiffs seek to obtain from the non-parties is relevant to the underlying action as it will potentially discuss the non-parties observations from the purported execution of the Lease, and since the testimony can only be provided by those individuals that attended the signing of the Lease, the defendants motion to quash the subpoena, is denied. Accordingly it is ORDERED that defendants motion to dismiss the complaint against Richard [* 6] Casanas is denied; and it is further ORDERED that defendants motion canceling the notice of pendency filed against the premises is denied; and it is further ORDERED that defendants motion for a protective order striking Plaintiffs First Request for Production of Documents, dated April 6, 2012, is granted to the limited extent of striking demands 21 and 22; and it is further ORDERED that defendants motion quashing the notice to take Deposition is denied; and it is further ORDERED that plaintiffs motion to compel defendants to respond to plaintiffs First Request for Production of Documents IS granted to the limited extent of directing defendants to respond to the demand with the exception of the demands that were withdrawn and demands 21 and 22; and it is further ORDERED that defendants are directed to respond to the plaintiffs First Request for Production of Documents within twenty Order with notice of entry. receiving a copy of this

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