Medley v Medley
Annotate this CaseDecided on November 30, 2011
Supreme Court, Queens County
Claudette Medley, Plaintiff,
against
Maurice Medley, Defendant.
20556/2007
Barry M. Lasky, Esq., of Counsel
Stephen Bilkis & Associates
Attorneys for Plaintiff
595 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410
Garden City, NY 11530
David B. Calender, Esq., of Counsel
Vivia L. Joseph, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
38-50 Bell Blvd., Suite D
Bayside, NY 11361
Pam Jackman-Brown, J.
This is an action was commenced August 2007 for absolute divorce by Plaintiff, Claudette Medley, against Defendant, Maurice Medley. A divorce was granted in favor of Defendant after inquest on the grounds of constructive abandonment. There are no children of the marriage and none are expected. A trial was held on the ancillary issues of equitable distribution and counsel fees.
BACKGROUND
The parties were married in a civil ceremony on March 5, 1997, after a brief courtship. At the time of the marriage, Plaintiff was in the United States with temporary legal status and Defendant was an American citizen. Prior to the marriage, each party resided in and owned their own home. Plaintiff's home, 141-15 255th Street, Queens, NY (hereinafter "255 Street property"), was jointly owned with a friend and Defendant is the sole owner of 130-60 221st Street, Queens, NY (hereinafter "221 Street property"). The parties agree that they lived together at 130-33 221st Street, Queens, NY (hereinafter "130-33 Street property"), from March 2005 until July 7, 2007. The parties' living arrangements [*2]between March 1997 and 2005 are disputed and is the core issue at trial. Both parties engaged in real estate investments. Plaintiff as a real estate sales agent and owned real estate businesses. Defendant bought and sold investment properties. Except for one joint ownership, all their investments, businesses were conducted separately by each.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiff migrated to the United States in 1988 under a temporary Visa with a work permit. She is employed in administration at a Hospital. In 1994, Plaintiff purchased the 255 Street property, jointly with a friend. Her friend and co-owner subsequently deceased and the one half share was inherited by her friend's daughter. Upon the death of Plaintiff's friend, the mortgage insurance paid off the mortgage on the 255 Street property. Plaintiff later refinanced said property by herself and solely kept the undisclosed proceeds. It is unclear how Plaintiff, solely, refinanced the joint ownership 255 Street property. The daughter did testify that she was aware the property was refinanced; however, no documents were executed by the daughter nor did she receive any of the undisclosed proceeds.
In or about October 1995, Plaintiff first met Defendant, a KeySpan employee, when he made a service call to repair her boiler. Approximately one year later, late 1996, the parties met again when Defendant was on another service call to repair Plaintiff neighbor's boiler. After this second meeting, Plaintiff and Defendant began dating. After three months of dating, in early 1997, Plaintiff showed Defendant a letter from Immigration and Naturalization Service (hereinafter "INS") informing Plaintiff that her Visa status had expired. The parties ensued in a conversation on how to change Plaintiff's status or whether Plaintiff will leave the United States to, what Plaintiff classified as, "her father's farm". After this conversation, the parties immediately planned the wedding. The day before the marriage, at Plaintiff's residence, the parties discussed drafting a pre-nuptial agreement. Plaintiff wrote a handwritten document. The document entitled, Prenuptial Agreement between Maurice Medley and Claudette as of 3/3/97,' states "that neither party would take any legal action to seek the other's assets". The agreement, though not acknowledged, is signed by both parties and dated March 4, 1997. One day later, the parties were married, March 5, 1997.
The disputed testimony surrounds whether the parties resided together from the date of marriage until March 2005. However, it is undisputed that the parties resided together from March 2005 until July 2007 at the 130-33 Street property. Both sides produced witnesses to demonstrate their living arrangements. The Court finds all the witnesses incredible or irrelevant since the testimony fails to sufficiently show a continuum of living together to form a reasonable pattern that one could reasonably conclude as "living together". The testimony shows that the parties had a scattered pattern of an emotional life, on and off at the 225 Street property although they made some public appearance together. There is no evidence to show that Plaintiff lived at the 221 Street property or 130-33 Street property prior to March 2005.
There are no prior marriages between the parties. Plaintiff has one child, not of the marriage, who resided with Plaintiff and one other family member. There is no document placed into evidence to show that the parties filed joint tax returns or commingled their incomes and bank accounts. Although no tax records were placed into evidence, as Plaintiff claimed joint filing, she contradicted her testimony by acknowledging that as of 2003 she filed as head of household. Plaintiff filed as head of household to show diminished income so that her son could [*3]receive financial aid and a scholarship from the private school he attended in New Jersey. The tuition for the school was approximately $28,000.00 to $30,000.00 annually. As a result of Plaintiff's tax filing and the financial application she misrepresented to the school, her son obtained the scholarship and she paid $2,400.00 annually as a single parent.
Plaintiff obtained a Bachelor of Arts degree from York College in 2004. From 1997 through 2005, she earned approximately $30,000.00 annually from Memorial Sloan Kettering. In 2005, her salary increased to $50,000.00.
Plaintiff obtained her real estate license in 1997 and began real estate sales. She worked with Coldwell Bankers and then with Classic Real Estate Services. In 2006, she incorporated City Home Corporation as a sole proprietor and operator holding 200 shares. This corporation was dissolved on or about 2010. In 2008, Plaintiff worked as a real estate agent with Remax South Shore. At the time of trial, Plaintiff continued to work as a real estate agent for Remax South Shore while also being employed at the hospital. She also sold insurance policies. In addition to Plaintiff's earnings from the hospital, she earned additional income ranging through 2010 fromas high as $50,000.00 to low as $2,000.00. Consistent with the document signed on March 4, 2005, Plaintiff kept her income separate and apart from Defendant and some of this income was not disclosed prior to the commencement of this case.
In 1999, the property located 1166 Dean Street, Brooklyn, New York (hereinafter "Dean Street property") was purchased for $125,000.00. Defendant made the down payment of $10,000.00. The Dean Street property is an income producing property and Defendant was responsible for the mortgage and carrying charges.
In 2001, the property located at 6931 DeCosta Avenue, Arverne, New York (hereinafter "DeCosta property") was purchased for approximately $125,000.00, with a mortgage of approximately $105,000.00. The down payment was made by Defendant from his 401K. Plaintiff appeared with Defendant at the closing but did not sign any documents nor was her name on the deed or mortgage. All documents regarding this property was sent to Defendant at the 221st Street property. Defendant made all the mortgage and carrying charges payments.
In 2004, the parties purchased a property in Laurelton, New York (hereinafter "Laurelton property"), for approximately $300,000.00. Although only Defendant's name was on the mortgage, both Plaintiff and Defendant's names were on the deed. The parties held the property for one year and eventually sold this property for approximately $360,000.00. The proceeds were divided and Plaintiff received a share of $10,000.00.
In 2005, the 130-33 221st Street property was purchased for approximately $330,000.00 with Defendant making the down payment of $33,000.00. Plaintiff purchased the furniture and made some payments to the utilities bills while Defendant made all mortgage payments. Plaintiff did not put her name on the deed or mortgage to enable her son to continue receiving the scholarship from the private secondary school in New Jersey. Plaintiff's contribution to this property consisted of paying some utility bills and buying furnishing from the home while Defendant's contribution was the mortgage payments and carrying charges except the utility bills.
All income received from the properties were kept and used by Defendant towards the mortgages and carrying charges on the properties. Although there was a marriage on paper, the parties communication and financial partnership was non existent. Plaintiff's incomes were either not disclosed or shared. Defendant's income although known was not shared. [*4]
Although each party claims a different understanding of what was this marriage, the credible evidence shows that the parties lived their lives in a manner consistent with the written document they signed in March 1997. Each engaged in separate investment ventures, buying and selling investment properties and kept all their incomes separate from each other. Of note, Plaintiff did not disclose any of her real estate investment income prior to trial to Defendant although she claims entitlement to Defendant's. Defendant does not claim any entitlement to Plaintiff's income, investments or license claiming this was the intent of the parties.
Although Plaintiff would like this court to believe she treated Defendant as the "King of the Castle" which this Court does not dispute except to the extend that there was no credible evidence to determine a true meaning of those terms. Throughout the marriage, there is no credible evidence that the parties spent any significant time together but rather maintained a separate business lifestyle. At most the parties had a sparse emotional life but it was impacted by a clear separate financial life. What contribution Plaintiff made to the investment property purchased with Defendant's funds is unproven since the record is devoid of any documents to support Plaintiff's claim except her testimony.
In this case, there are several innuendoes of the purpose and true meaning of the parties nuptial. Their arrangement was a sparse emotional life with no financial partnership. For an approximate ten year marriage, the parties lived together for a total of two years and four months just prior to filing of this action. There is evidence that Plaintiff filed deceptive and misrepresented legal school documents and tax returns. Although this Court will not define or marshal what is a "married life". The cliché "you know it when you see it" can be inferred in this case. These parties engaged in a pattern of behavior that was inconsistent of any semblance of a marriage life in its ordinary and reasonable meaning.
Plaintiff would like this Court to believe that with her Real Estate license, business and experience as a real estate agent and her multiple real estate transaction, she did not understand the closing transactions that Defendant engaged with when he acquired the investment properties. Assuming this is a accurate, which this Court does not find, Plaintiff has failed to present any documentary proof or credible evidence for her claims of entitlement.
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
Marital property is defined in New York Domestic Relations Law Section 236(B)(1)(c) as "all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action, regardless of the form in which title is held." The statute provides that separate property is not included within the definition of marital property.
New York Domestic Relations Law Section 236(B)(1)(d) defines separate property as:
(1) property acquired before marriage or property acquired by bequest, devise, or descent, or gift from a party other than the spouse;
(2) compensation for personal injuries;
(3) property acquired in exchange for the increase in value of separate property, except to the extent that such appreciation is due in part to the contribution or efforts of the other spouse;
(4) property described as separate property by written agreement pursuant to subdivision three of this part.
[*5]
New York DRL 236(B)(5)(a) provides that in matrimonial proceedings, the court shall "determine the respective rights of the parties in their separate or marital property." While the statute provides that separate property shall remain as separate property, marital property shall be equitably distributed, considering the circumstances of the case and the parties. To determine an equitable distribution of the property, DRL § 236(B)(5)(d), requires that the court shall consider:
(1) the income and property of each party at the time of the marriage, and at the time of the commencement of the action;
(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;
(3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence and to use or own its household effects;
(4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the marriage as of the date of dissolution;
(5) the loss of health insurance benefits upon dissolution of the marriage;
(6) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part;
(7) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other party;
(8) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property;
(9) the probable future financial circumstances of each party;
(10) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of retaining such asset or interest intact and free from any claim or interference by the other party;
(11) the tax consequences to each party;
(12) the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse;
(13) any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial action without fair consideration;
(14) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.
In the instant matrimonial proceeding, it is undisputed that prior to the marriage, each party separately owned real property. Plaintiff owned a two-family residence with a friend, which is the 255th Street property and Defendant owned the 221st Street property. Both properties were purchased prior to the marriage and neither party seeks equitable distribution of appreciation in the value of either property, if any. In addition, both properties were declared as separate property in the parties' respective statements of net worth.
It is further undisputed that during the marriage, Defendant purchased three properties, titled solely in his name.However, Plaintiff seeks equitable distribution of the three properties, specifically, the Dean Street property, the DeCosta Avenue property, and the 130-33 Street property. Defendant claims that Plaintiff failed to meet her burden to establish that she made any contribution to these properties, thus warranting an equitable distribution of the value of these real properties.Defendant makes no claim of an equitable distribution of Plaintiff's businesses or license.
Looking to DRL §236(B)(1)(c), it is clear that all property acquired during a marriage [*6]acquired by either spouse, with the exception of property in specifically delineated categories, is considered to be marital property. The Court of Appeals has held that marital property should be "construed broadly in order to give effect to the economic partnership' concept of the marriage relationship recognized in the statute" (Price v Price, 69 NY2d 8, 15 (1986). On the contrary, separate property, "which is described in the statute as an exception to marital property...should be construed narrowly (Id at 15). Thus, the structure of DRL § 236, "creates a statutory presumption that all property, unless clearly separate, is deemed marital property' and the burden rests with the titled spouse to rebut that presumption" (Fields v Fields, 2010 NY Slip Op 4871, 3 [Ct. App 2010], quoting DeJesus v DeJesus, 90 NY2d 643, 652 [1997].)
In the instant matter, Defendant purchased the Dean Street property, the DeCosta Avenue property, and the 130-33 Street property, during the marriage in 1999, 2001 and 2005, respectively. Pursuant to the statutory presumption, all three properties are deemed to be marital property, unless Defendant is able to rebut the presumption or show a clear delineation that the property is separate, pursuant to DRL § 236 B (1) (d), or show that an agreement was made prior to the marriage that is valid although not within the requirements set forth by DRL §236 B (3). This burden is on Defendant who claims the three properties purchased during the marriage, specifically, the Dean Street property, DeCosta Avenue property and the 130-33 Street property, are not marital property.
In addition to the real property acquired during the marriage, both parties also acquired retirement benefits throughout the duration of the marriage. The Court finds that to the extent the benefits were accrued during the marriage, the retirement benefits are marital property.
The Court now turns to the equitable distribution of the marital property. To determine the equitable distribution of the marital property, the court now considers the factors, pursuant to DRL § 236(B)(5)(d). In the instant matter, it is undisputed that at the commencement of the marriage, Defendant's income appeared to be greater than what Plaintiff was earning at the hospital. However, it is unclear what was Plaintiff's investment incomes since there are still not all disclosed. The evidence does show that Plaintiff's income from the hospital increased in addition to income earned through her real estate dealings. The parties were married for approximately ten years and each is reportedly in good health. There are no children of the marriage, thus neither party is a custodial parent who needs to occupy the marital residence. Neither party seeks maintenance in the instant matter. Neither party claims wasteful dissipation of marital assets. Both parties have retirement benefits and/or deferred compensation benefits titled in their respective names. Neither party alleges that either party has transferred any property or encumbered any property in contemplation of a matrimonial action without fair consideration. The statute provides that the Court may consider any other factor which the court finds to be just and proper (emphasis added). The Court finds that in light of the circumstances of the parties in this case, the Court must consider the underlying theory of the equitable distribution and legislative intent of DRL § 236.
In comparison to the community property theory, in which "mathematical precision is the guidepost," (Rodgers v Rodgers, 98 AD2d 386, 391 [2nd Dept1983]), under equitable distribution, property acquired during the marriage must be distributed "in a manner which reflects the individual needs and circumstances of the parties" (Id at 391). The fundamental purpose of the Equitable Distribution Law is the recognition of marriage as an economic [*7]partnership in which "both parties contribute as spouse, parent, wage earner or homemaker" (Rodgers at 391). Under the equitable distribution theory, the Court "possesses flexibility and elasticity to mold an appropriate decree because what is fair and just in one circumstances may not be so in another" (Rodgers at 391).
Turning to the unique circumstances of this case, the Court considers the economic partnership, as created by the parties in this marriage. While the living arrangements of the parties from March 1997 through May 2005 is disputed, it is undisputed that from the outset of the marriage the parties agreed not to treat the marriage as an economic partnership. While the document signed on March 4, 1997, is not a pre-nuptial agreement, as it does not satisfy the requirements for a pre-nuptial agreement as required by DRL § 236(B)(3), the written signed document evinces the intent of the parties to forego any legal claim each party may have to the other party's assets in the event that the marriage was unsuccessful. While the Plaintiff testified that the agreement only concerned the property owned prior to the marriage, the evidence presented established that the parties maintained separate finances throughout the life of the marriage. Although Plaintiff testified that the parties held one joint account until approximately 2004, she failed to present evidence to establish the existence of that or any joint account. Plaintiff did not contribute to the down payment or mortgage payments nor made any spousal or homemaker contribution on any of the properties purchased by Defendant.Moreover, while Plaintiff testified that the parties filed joint tax returns during the early years of the marriage, until approximately 2004, she failed to present any joint tax returns for any year during the marriage.
In addition to maintaining separate bank accounts, the parties also conducted their real estate investments and business endeavors separately. During the course of the marriage, Plaintiff formed two corporations and did not share or disclose any of her business or real estate ventures with Defendant prior to trial although she formed these corporation during the marriage and more directly incorporated one of her business when the parties resided together at the 130-33 Street property. While Plaintiff testified that she was unaware that her name was not on the deeds, the Court finds Plaintiff's testimony to be incredible since the properties were acquired with the knowledge of Plaintiff. Plaintiff obtained her real estate license in 1997, prior to the purchase of the three properties and engaged in the practice of selling real estate throughout the marriage and had the requisite knowledge of real estate transactions. Curiously, the Laurelton Street property was the only property that was jointly held in both parties' names, which was subsequently sold and proceeds divided.
Plaintiff does not explain her selection of knowledge, but surely Plaintiff was familiar with and knowledgeable of the procedures concerning the purchase of real property in New York State and was aware of the procedures required to obtain a mortgage and prepare a deed, as she is a licensed real estate salesperson and purchased property in her personal capacity. The parties' separate real estate dealings evince an intention to maintain separate financial accounts and investments consistent with the document written and signed on March 4, 1997. Plaintiff's testimony of the parties' intent is inconsistent with the parties' actions. The manner in which the parties conducted their real estate endeavors is inconsistent with the economic partnership theory.
Courts have held in matrimonial proceedings where parties conduct themselves in a manner inconsistent with the economic partnership, the Court may find that equitable distribution [*8]of property is not warranted (see Duspiva v Duspiva, 181 AD2d 810, [2d Dept 1992]; Miller v Miller, 4 AD3d 718, [3d Dept 2004]; Galvin v Galvin, 20 AD3d 550, [2d Dept 2005]). In the instant matter, the parties began their marriage with an agreement that neither party would pursue legal action to claim the other party's assets. For the duration of the marriage, the parties lived in a manner consistent with the terms of that the document they wrote and signed. Although the parties resided in the same residence, 130-33 Street property, the Court finds that the parties continued to conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the terms of the document signed on March 4, 1997, and conducted themselves in a manner inconsistent with the typical economic partnership and, therefore, equitable distribution of the property is not warranted.
The Court now turns to the issue of the furniture purchased for the residence at 130-33 221st Street. Plaintiff presented evidence and testimony to establish that she purchased furniture for the residence in the sum of $11,734.23. Plaintiff further testified that although she left the residence in July 2007 Defendant did not allow her to remove the furniture from the residence. In light of the parties' agreement and conduct consistent with the agreement, the Court finds that the furniture purchased for the 130-33 221st Street residence is property of Plaintiff. However, as the furniture has remained in Defendant's possession since 2007, Defendant must pay Plaintiff for the cost of the furniture. Defendant is directed to pay Plaintiff $11,734.23 for the furnishings in the residence, subject to proof of payment. Plaintiff must provide proof of payment within thirty (30) days of the date of this decision. Defendant must pay Plaintiff for the furnishings within thirty (30) days of such proof of payment.
COUNSEL FEES
Domestic Relations Law § 237 provides that in an action for divorce, the court may award counsel fees to "enable that spouse to carry on or defend the action or proceeding as, in the court's discretion, justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties."
In its ruling in DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879 (1987) the Court of Appeals held that indigence is not a prerequisite to an award of counsel fees pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237. In considering an application for an award of counsel fees, the court shall consider the "equities and circumstances" of the case before it (Basile v Basile, 122 AD2d 759 [2d Dept 1986]).
In the instant matrimonial proceeding, Plaintiff seeks counsel fees. According to Plaintiff's testimony, in 2009, she earned approximately $70,000.00 from her employment at the hospital and an additional $20,000.00 from her real estate businesses. Additionally, she testified that for the year 2010, she anticipated earning approximately $70,000.00 from the hospital and has already derived $15,000.00 from her real estate businesses. Plaintiff earned a minimum of $85,000.00 in 2010. Defendant's Amended Statement of Net Worth indicates that Defendant's monthly income is $12,707.44. While Defendant's income is greater than that of Plaintiff, throughout the duration of the marriage, the parties maintained separate finances and Plaintiff was able to meet her financial obligations without the assistance of Defendant. Considering the unique circumstances of this case, Plaintiff's request for counsel fees is denied.
Settle judgement in accordance with this decision. [*9]
This Court shall refer this case to the appropriate authorities for further determination and investigation of the documents filed that are inconsistent to the parties actual incomes.
This constitute the Decision and Order of this Court.
SO ORDERED
Dated: November 30, 2011
Queens, New York
_________________________________
HON. PAM JACKMAN BROWN, J.S.C.
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