LaCourt v Shenanigans Knits, Ltd.

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LaCourt v Shenanigans Knits, Ltd. 2011 NY Slip Op 32662(U) October 6, 2011 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: 102391/11 Judge: Donna Mills Republished from New York State Unified Court System's E-Courts Service. Search E-Courts (http://www.nycourts.gov/ecourts) for any additional information on this case. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. SCANNEDON 1011312011 [* 1] SUPREME C01Jli'T OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK- NEW YORK COUNTY PART PRESENT : 1)ONNA M. MILLS 58 Justice - INDEX o . N INGRID LA COURT, Plaintiff, MOTION 102391/11,- DATE- -V - MOTION NO. 001 SEQ. SHENANIGANS KNITS, LTD., et al., Defendants. The following papers, numbcred 1 to MOTION N o . CAL werc read on Illis motion for - PAPLRS NUMBERED /,' Notice of MoliodOrdcr to Sliow Causc-Affidavits- Exhibits .... 5 , 7, q, 5 Answering Affidavits- Exhibits 6,7 Replying Aflldavits CROSS -MO'I'ION : YES J NO Upon the foregoing papcrs, it is ordered that this motion is: FILE DECIDED IN ACCORDANCE WII'H AITACIIED MEMORANDlJM DECISIET 12 2011 NEW YORK COUNTY CLERKS OFFICE 1) atcd : 13 ,/ , ['> & I I / Check oiic: _. -- FINAL DISPOSITION O O ~ ~ A . MILLS, JSC. M. _- NON-FINAL, l / DISPOSITION [* 2] SUPREME COURT OF T H E S T A T E O F NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY - - P A R T 5 8 .~ - Index N o . : INGRID L a C O U R T , 10%391/11 Plaintiff, - against - DECISION/ORDER S H E N A N I G A N S K N T T S , L T D . , KATHY D A L P I A Z , a/k/a K A T A R I N A D A L P I A Z L I E B O W I T Z , SML S P O R T LTD., a/k/a WYANDOTTE C I R C L E C O R P . , and L A U R E N HANSEN, I N C . , A 11 Named De fen d a n ts C o n s ti t1 tirig an 1 Integrated Enterprise a n d S i n g l e Employer, a i KATHY DAL P I A Z , a/k/a K A T A R I N A DAL rd PIAZ LIEBOWITZ, I n d i v i d u a l l y , a s A i d e r 2 n d Abettor, Defendants. Bb OCT 1 2 2011 NEW YOHK COUNTY CLEHK'S OFFICE MILLS, DONNA, J. : I n t h i s a c t i o n , p l a i n t i f f I n g r i d L a C o u r t s u e s t o recover damages, and for- i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f , a l l e g i n g that defendants unlawfully t c r m i n a t - e d h e r e m p l o y m e n t based on disability, s u b j e c t e d h e r t.o r a c e and n a t i o n a l o r i g i n d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , and d e n i e d her m e d i c a l leave, i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e N e w Y o r k S t a t e Human R i g h t s L a w ( E x e c u t i v e L a w 5 2 9 0 e t s e q . ) ( N Y S H R L ) , t h e N e w York C i t y H u r n a n R i g h t s L a w ( A d t n i n i s t . r a t i v e C o d e o f t h e C i t y Of New York [ A d m i n i s t . r a t i v e C:ode] S 8 - 1 0 1 e t s e q . ) ( N Y C H R L ) , C i v i l K i g h L s L a w ? 4 0 - c , a r i d t h e F a m i l y and Medical L e a v e A c t of 193.3 ( 2 3 USC: 5 2601 e t NYCHRL seq.) ( F M T , A ) , T h e c o m p l a i n t a s s e r t s n i n e c-auses ( f i i - s t arid s e c o n d ) ; r a c e arid n a t i o n a l o r 1 g i r l d i s c 7 - i mi r i a t i on under t h e N Y S H R L and t h e N Y C H K L ( t h i r d and [* 3] fourth) ; a i d i n g and a b e t t i n g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , a s a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t Kathy Dal P i a z i n d i v i d u a l l y ( f i f t h ); r a c e , n a t i o n a l o r i g i n , and d i s a b i l i t y d i s c r i m i n a t i o n under C i v i l R i g h t s Law S 4 0 - c : ( s i x t h ) ; intentional i r i f 1 i c t i o r i of emotiorlal d i s t r e s s ( s e v e n t h ) ; v i o l a t i o n o f t h e FMLA ( e i g h t > k ; a n d f o r r e i n s t a t e m e n t ) Kathy Dal Piaz (Dal P i a z ) , SML S p o r t L t d . , Corp. (SML), and Lauren Hansen, I n c . defendants) ( n i n t h ). Defendants a/k/a Wyandotte C i r c l e (LHI) ( c o l l e c t i v e l y , move f o r p a r t i a l summary judgment d i s m i s s i n g t h e c a u s e of a c t i o n a l l e g i n g v i o l a t i o n of t h e FMLA and d i s m i s s i n g the complaint i n i t s e n t i r e t y a s a g a i n s t L H I . They a l s o move t o d i s m i s s , pur-suant t o CPLR 3 2 1 1 ( a ) ( 7 ) , t h e causes of a c t i o n a l l e g i n g r a c e and n a t i o n a l origin discrimination, and i n t e n t i o n a l i n f l i c t i o n of emotional d i s t r e s s . DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Defendants move f o r summary judgment d i s m i s s i n g t h e e i g h t h c a u s e of a c t i o n , a l l e g i n g a v i o l a t i o n of t h e FMLA , o n t h e grounds t h a t p l a i n t - i f f is not. an " e l i g i b l e " employee under t h e s t a t u t e , it because s h e w a s r o crnploycd f o r 1 2 months p r i o r t o r e q u e s t i n g l e a v e , a i b e c a u s e SMTA does n o t have 5 0 o r more employees and, rd t h e r e f o r e , i s n o t a covered employer under t h e s t a t - u t c . neferidarit-s a l s o scek :;ummary judgment d i s m i s s i n g thc cornpla i n t a g a i n s t L H I o n t h e grounds t - h a t i t was d i s s o l v e d i n 2 0 0 4 , and i t [* 4] never employed plaintiff . To prevail on a motion f o r summary judgment, the movant must make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a ma.tter of law, by submitt-ingevidentiary proof in admissi-ble form sufficient t o establish the absence of any material issues of See CPLR 3212 (b); A l v a r - e z v P r - o s p e c t Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, fact. 324 (1986); Zucker-man v C i t y of N e w Yor-k, 49 NY2d 557, 562 (1980). Once such showing has been made, to defeat summary judgment., the opposing party must "must produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to require a trial of material q u e s t i o n s of fact _ _ .01- must demonstrate acceptable excuse for his failure to meet the requirement of t e n d e r in admissible form." Z u c k e x - m a n , 49 NY2d at. 562. While the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to t h e nonmoving p a r t y ( B r a n h a m v Loews Or-pheum C i n e m a s , Inc., 8 NY3d 9 3 1 , 932 [20071) the , opponent "must assemble and lay bare its affirmative proof to demonstrate t h a t genuine triable issues of fact exist" and "the issue m u s t be shown to be real, not feigned... . K o r - n f e l d v NHX TechnoZogies, I r i c . , 93 ADZd 772, 773 (1" Dept 198:3), affd 62 NY2d 686 (1984). " [MI ere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsub st an t ia t ed a11ega t ions or' asse1- i011s are in : ~if f icient . t " raise (3 rr1atc.r-ial quest.ion of fact. see W i l l . i m i I s e l i n (5; to Zu~:ker-mari, 49 NY2d at 562; Co. v M e u m J u d d I , a n d a u , 71 NY2d 420, 425-1126 (11-388) S a r i t o n i v Rerre.l.smanrz P r o p . , I n c i . , 21 A D 3 d 712, 'I14 ( l S t ; -3 - [* 5] Dept Z O O S ) . The FMLA e n t i t l e s a n e l i y i b l e employee of a covered employer. to a total o f 1 2 workweeks of l e a v e d u r i n g any 12-month p e r i o d . . . [blecause of a s e r i o u s h e a l t h c o n d i t i o n t.hat makes t h e employee unable t o perform the functions of t h e position of such employee. I t f u r t h e r entitl.es an 2 3 USC 5 261.2 (a) (1) ( D ) . employee t o r e s t o r a t i o n t o her p r e v i o u s p o s i t i o n or an e q u i v a l e n t one when she r e t u r n s t o work. (a) ( I ) (A) and (B). 2 9 USC § 2614 See G h a f f a r - - v W i l l o u g h b y 99 C e n t , Inc., 2 0 1 0 WL 3420642, 2, 2010 Pierce v HSBC Mortg. C O r p . US Dist L E X I S 8 8 8 8 8 , *5 (ED NY 2010); (USA), 19 An3d 2 4 4 , 2 4 5 (13t Dept 2005) . An eligible employee i s one who has been employed by t h e employer for a t l e a s t 1 2 months and h a s a t l e a s t 1 , 2 5 0 h o u r s of s e r v i c e with such employer d u r i n g t h e p r e v i o u s 12-month p e r i o d ( 2 9 USC and [iil ; 29 CFR § 825.110 § 2611 [ 2 1 [AI [il [a] [l] and [23 ) , and who i s employed a t a w o r k s i t e where 50 o r more employees a r e employed by t h a t employer wi.tliin 7 5 m i l e s of t h a t worksite. 2 9 USC: § 2611 (2) (B) (ii); 29 C F R 5 825.110 (a) (3). T h e E MLA applies o n l y t o employers w i t - h 50 or more cmplayces f o r each working d a y during each of 20 o r more calendar workweeks i n t.hE-3 c u r l - e n t or precediriq c a l e n d a r y e a r . 2611 (4) (A) ( 1 ) ;2 3 CFR 5 825.104 ( a ) ; see S t r - o h 1 A d v e n t u r - e C t r - . , I K I C, . 2 0 0 9 WL 2 8 2 4 5 8 5 , ! 7814.5, * 5 8 (E11 NY 3 . 0 0 9 ) . 2 3 USC 5 v Brite *2, 2009 US Dist LEXLS Although [ n ] o r i n a l l y t h e l e g a l e n t i t y -4- [* 6] which employs the employee is the employer under FMLA" (29 CFR § 825.104 [cl), two or more entities may be deemed a single employer., and a l l of their employees counted to determine whether the combined entity is subject to the FMLA, if t-hey meet the "integrated employer" test. "A I I d . , 5 825.104 (c) (2). single employer' situation exists 'where t-wo nominally separate entities are actually part of a single integrated enterprise . . . . ' In such circumstances, of which examples may be parent and wholly-owned subsidiary corporations, or separate corporations under common ownership and management, the nominally distinct entities can be deemed to constitute a single enterprise." Ar-culeo v On-Site S a l e s & Mktg., L.L.C.,4 2 5 F 3 d 193, 198 (2d Cir 2005) (internal citations omitted). Generally, courts consider four factors to determine whether t w o or more companies are sufficiently interrelated to constitute a single employer-: 1) common management; 2) interrelation between operations; 3 ) centralized control of labor relations; and degree of common ownershiplfinancial control. 4) Id.; see G h a f f a r , 2010 WL 3420642 at *2, 2010 US Dist. LEXIS 88888 at2 *5-7; S t r - o h l , 2009 WL 2824585 at " 2 - 3 , 2009 US Dist LEXIS 781.4.5 at * 5 - 8 ; see a l s n M a l - t c r - of Ar-qyle Redlty A S S ~ ~ C S . v N e w Y o r k S t a t e Div. of HiiInd11 R i g h t s , 6 5 A D 3 d 273, 278-279 (2d Dept 2009) (applying "single etnployclr- doct-rine" in context. of s t a t . c human 1-ights law) . Defendants contend that SML has fewer th.an 50 employees, -5- [* 7] that i t h a s no r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Shenanigans K n i t s , L t d . ( S h e n a n i g a n s ) , and t h a t L H T i s a d i s s o l v e d c o r p o r a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , they a r g u e , the FMLA does not- a p p l y t o them. In support of t h e i r m o t i o n , d e f e n d a n t s submit an a f f i d a v i t of Dal P i a z , who a t t e s t s t h a t s h e i s P r e s i d e n t of SML, t h a t . SML employed p l a i n t i f f from May 1 3 , 2 0 0 9 t o May 7 , 2 0 1 0 , and t h a t d u r i n g t h e t i m e t h a t p l a i n t i f f w a s employed by SML, i t had 4 3 employees, i n c l u d i n g h e r s e l f and t h e o t h e r p r i n c i p a l of t h e company, C h r i s t o p h e r Dal P i a z . Motion, 71 1, 1 6 , 1 9 . Dal P i a z A f f . i n Support of Defendants Defendants submit p a y r o l l r e c o r d s t o show t h a t SML had 4 3 employees a t the t i m e t h a t p l a i n t i f f was terminated. See Payroll Summary, E x . 7 t o D a l P i a z A f f . Dal P i a z a l s o a t t e s t - s t h a t while SML designs, m a n u f a c t u r e s , markets and s e l l s f a s h i o n garments under s e v e r a l l i n e s / l a b e l s , i n c l u d i n g a l i n e known as Lauren H a n s e n , Lauren Hansen, Inc. does n o t e x i s t , having been dissolved i n 2 0 0 4 . D a l Piaz A f f . , q7 7, 20; s e e N Y S D c p t . of S t a t e D i v i s i o n of C o r p o r a t i o n s p r i n t o u t , E x . 8 t o Dal Piaz Aff. f u r t h e r avers t h a t she i s not f a m i l i a r D a l Piaz w i t . 1 1 Shenanigans, and n e i t h e r s h e nor any of t h e moving d e f e n d a n t s h a s e v e r been a f f i l i a t e d w i t h o r h a s had any i - r i t e r e s t i n or d e a l iny:; with Shenanigans. Dal Piaz A f f . , 1 23. Defendants submit. a printout from t.he N Y S Dept.. of S t - a t e D i v i s i o n of Corpo1rat.i o r i s iderit i f y i ncj Shenanigans a s a doniestic c o r p o r a t i on whose st-at-us is I n a c t i v e - Merged Out (Der. 0 5 , -0- 1986) . See [* 8] Printout, Ex. 8 to Dal P i a z Aff. Defendants thus have made a prj.rna facie showing that SML was plainti,ff semployer, and L H I and Shenanigans w e r e not. In opposiLinn to defendants motion, plaintiff does not dj spute t h a t SML, employed fewer than 50 people. Aff. in Opp., 7 55. See Nohavicka Plaintiff argu.es, however, that defendants constitute a single entity under the FMLA, and that t-hey,in the aggregate, employ more than 50 employees. With respect to LHJ, plaintiff offers n o t h i n g to refute the evidence that LHI: is a non-existent corporation, having been dissolved 1.n 2004. Although plaintiff submits a copy of a memo, from plaintiff , with a Lauren Hansen letterhead, which apparently informs clients about the requirements for placing orders (see Ex. K to Nohavicka Aff. in O p p . ) , plaintiff shows no more than that, as Dal Piaz attests, Lauren Hanseri is a division of SML. See a l s o Aff. of Jane Keaveney. As to Shenanigans, plaintiff fails to submit any admissible evidence to raise a triable issue of fact about whet.her SML and Shenanigans had common manayernent , interrelated operations , c : e n t r a l i z e d control of employees of both entities, arid any common ownership 01- f inxicia1 control. The conclusory assertions of p l a i n t i f f s a t L o r n e y that defendant2:; employees share offices , plionc lines, insui-ancc pol icies, arid hold office and social f u n c t - i 0 1 t-oget-her, a n d t h a t plaintiff i n t e r a c t . e d with, and 1s -7- [* 9] worked for Shenanigans (see Nohavicka Aff., 17 86, 19), are not based on personal knowledge and, in any event, a r e completely void of specific facts and unsupported by any admissible evidence. As p l airitiff s counsel recognizes , t.he affirmation of a party s at-torney,who l a c k s personal knowledge of the facts, is of no probative value. See Z u c k e r m a n , 49 NY2d at 563; Lupirlsky v Windharri C o r i s t r - . Cor-p. , 293 AD2d 317 (1 Dept 2002) . Nor has plaintiff submitted an affidavit based on personal knowledge to s u p p o r t the claims of her attorney, or otherwise to oppose the motion. 338, See S . J . Capelin A s s o c s . v Globe Mfg. C o r p . , 3 4 NY2d 342 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . Notably, plaintiff has not identified a single employee of Shenanigans, much less one with whom she interacted. To the extent that plaintiff relies on the verified complaint. to oppose the motion, the complaint sets forth no facts sufficient to support the allegations that Dal Piaz owned, controlled, and was in charge of managing all the corporate defendants, e n t - e r p r i s e . 01- that the defendants otherwise were an integrated Vex-if ied Complaint, 17 9-21. As to Shenanigans, , the compJ ai nt. alleges o n l y t-hat upon information arid belief, it exisl-.sand meets the definition of: an employer. under the FMLA. [* 10] Id., 1 6. R e p r e s e n t a t i o n s made "upon i n f o r m a t i o n and b e l i e f , " w i t h n o e v i d e n t i a r y support whatsoever, a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o r a i s e See Wood v Nour-se, 124 AD2d 1020, 1021, a t r i a b l e i s s u e of f a c t . ( ' ' U e p t 1986) ; Onondaga Soil T e s t i n g , 11-IC. B a r - t o n , E l - o w n , 4) v Clyde & T,oquidice, P . C . 6 9 AD2d 9 8 4 , 9 8 4 , (4+" Dept 1 9 7 9 ) . "'The burden upon a p a r t y o p p o s i n g a rnotj.on f o r summary judgment is n o t met merely by a r e p e t i t i o n 01- i n c o r p o r a t i o n by r e f e r e n c e o f t h e a l l - e g a t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n p l e a d i n g s o r bills of p a r t i , c u l a r s , v e r i f i e d or u n v e r i f i e d . r' Marinelli v S h i f r i n , 260 AD2d 2 2 7 , 229 (1"'. Dept 1999), q u o t i n g I n d i g v Finkelstein, 2 3 N Y 2 d 7 2 8 , 729 (1968). P l a i n t i f f ' s argument, that t h e i n t e r r e l a t e d n e s s of d e f e n d a n t s i s e v i d e n c e d by a r t i c l e s from f a s h i o n i n d u s t r y p u b l i c a t i o n s , a b o u t SML buying up b r a n d s s u c h a s Shenanigans , is unavailing. Other documents r e l a t e d t o t h e c h a i n o f , and changes i n , ownership of "Shenanigans" as a t r a d e m a r k , i n c l u d i n g documents which i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e Shenanigans trademark i s h e l d by a company owned by C h r i s t o p h e r Dal P i a z , t h e sori of Dal P i a z , and a n o f f i c e r of S M L , also f a i l t o warrant d e n i a l of summary judgment.. C:onsist.ent w i t h p l a i n t i f f I s e v i d e n c e , C h r i s t o p h e r Dal Piaz a t . t . c s t s t h a t SML u s e s t h e Shenanigans t r a d e m a r k a s a l a b e l for a l i n e o f c:lot.hjng, and t h e ti-ademark was p u r c h a s e d by a company he owns, but t h e trademark i s no more t h a n a l a b e l , and i s not. t.hc same a s t h e legal e n t i t y known a s Shenanigans K n i t s , [* 11] Ltd. While a party opposing summary Judgment may be permitted to demonstrate acceptable excuse for failure to meet the strict. requirements of tender of evidence in admissible form, no such e x p l a n a t i o n has been given here. Zuckerman, 49 N Y 2 d at 562, 563. Further, to the extent that plaintiff maintains that summary judgment is premat-ure, "[a] p a r t y who claims ignorance of critical facts to defeat a motion for summary judgment (see CPLR 3212 [f]) must first demonstrate that the i g n o r a n c e is unavoidable and that reasonable attemprs were made to discover the facts which would give rise to a triable issue." Cruz v Otis El. Co., 238 AD2d 540, 540 (2d Dept 1997); see Rothbort v S . L . S . Mgt. Cor-p., 2 8 5 AD2d 806, 806 (2d Dept 1992). Plaintiff makes no claim that she attempted to discover facts about Shenanigans, such as information about i t s management, employees, labor relations, financial control, c:urrent status, or its principal place of business. Defendants accordingly are entitled to summary judgment dismissing t h e cause of action for violation of t.he FMLA. In view of this finding, the court does not reach the issue of whether plaintiEf was employed for the 1 2 -month peri.od required to he c o n s j . d e r e d at1 "eliyible employee. " however, t h a t , contrary to defendants The court notes, argument , the FMLA regulations provide fiat. a ref err-i ng temporary employment agency [* 12] may be considered a joint employer, and time spent working for t-he agency can be counted together with time spent. working for the second employer. See 29 CFR § 825.106 (b) (1) and (d) ; Mackey v Unity H e a l t h S y s . , 2004 WL 1.056066, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 8830, *10 (WU NY 2004). In any event, on this record, t-here appear t.o be unresolved quest i o n s as to the length of plairitif f s employment for purposes of the FMLA. Although plaintiff claims that. she began working for SML, through a temporary agency, on May 6 , 2009, records submitted by defendants demonstrate that she started on May 1 3 , 2009. Under FMLA regulations, when an employee is maintained on the payroll for any p a r t of a week, the entire week may count as a week of employment. See 29 CFR 5 825.110 ( b ) (3)- As defendants assert that plaintiff began w o r k on a Wednesday (see Keaveney Aff., 7 6 ) , that provision may apply here. Defendants assert that, even considering May 1 3 , 2009, as plaintiff s start date, plaintiff began a medical leave on May 5 , 2010, arid was terminated on May 7, 2010, and, therefore, was employed by defendants f o r less than 12 merit-hs. There is, however, some evidence that plaintiff requested FMLA leave commencing or1 May 14, 2010, itior-e than 12 months aft-er she started. T u r n i n g to t h e br.anch of defendants mot-ior-i t h a t seeks sunimary judgment dismissing t.ke camplaiint. as against. L H I I in the absence of any pi-oof t.tiat. LHI is an existing corporation, as -I I- [* 13] n o t e d above, t h e motion is g r a n t e d . DEFENDANTS' CPLR 3211 (a) (7) MOTION TO DISMISS Defendants a l s o move, p u r s u a n t t o CPLR 3 2 1 1 (a) ( 7 ) ,t o d i s m i s s t h e t h i r d and f o u r t h c a u s e s of a c t i o n , a l l e g i n g race and n a t i o n a l o r i g i n d i s c r i m i n a t i o n under t h e NYSHRL and NYCHRL, as w e l l as t h e s e v e n t h c a u s e of a c t i o n f o r i n t e n t i o n a l i n f l i c t i o n o f . e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s , for f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a c a u s e of a c t i o n . I t i s w e l l settled t h a t on a motion EO dismiss p u r s u a n t t o CPLR 3211 (a) ( 7 ) ,t h e p l e a d i n g i s t o be a f f o r d e d a l i b e r a l construction. See CPLK 3 0 2 6 ; Leon v Martinez, 8 4 NY2d 8 3 , 8 7 (1994). The c o u r t must " a c c e p t t h e f a c t s a s a l l e g e d i n t h e c o m p l a i n t a s t r u e , accord p l a i n t i f f s t h e b e n e f i t of e v e r y p o s s i b l e f a v o r a b l e i n f e r e n c e , and d e t e r m i n e oiily whether t h e f a c t s a s a l l e g e d f i t w i t h i n any c o g n i z a b l e legal theory." Leon, 84 NY2d a t 87-88; s e e 511 W . 232'Id Owners Cor-p. v J e n n i f e r R e a l t y Co., 98 NY2d 144 ( 2 0 0 2 ) . The c o u r t is n o t r e q u i r e d , however, t o a c c e p t a s t r u e " l e g a l conclusions t h a t a r e u n s u p p o r t a b l e based upon t h e u n d i s p u t e d f a c t s " (Robinson v Robinson, 3 0 3 AD2d 2 3 4 , 235 [l!" Dept 2 0 0 3 ] ) , o r " ' f a c t u a l c l a i m s e i t h e r i n h e r e n t l y i n c r e d i b l e o r f l a t l y c : o n t r a d i c t e d by documentary e v i d e n c e . ' " B i c m d i v Beekrnan H i . 1 1 House A p t , C'nr-.p., 2 5 7 A D 2 d 76, A 1 ( 1 ' j L DepL 1999) ( c i t a t i o n omit.t.ed) , a f f d 3 4 N Y 2 d 659 ( 2 0 0 0 ) see J E ' K Ho1.dirlg ; Co., LLTI v C'ity of New Yur'k, 6 8 AD3d 477, 4 7 7 (1" D e p t : 2 0 0 3 ) ; T a l v MaZekar-I, 305 AD2d 7 . 8 1 , 2 8 1 (1"'. Dept. 2 0 0 3 ) . -12- [* 14] RACE/NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS The NYSHRL and the NYCHRL provide, in pertinent part, that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer, because of an i.rldividual'sr a c e or national origin, "to refuse to hire or employ or' to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment." Executive Law S 296 (1) (a); AdminisLrative Code § 8-107 (1) (a). A plaintiff alleging employment discrimination has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified to hold her position; ( 3 ) she was terminated from employment or suffered another adverse employment action; and (4) the discharge or other adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Forrest v J e w i s h G u i l d for t h e Blind, 3 NY3d 235, 305 (2004); see F e r r a n t e v American Lung Assrl., 90 NY2d 623, 629 (1937); B a l d w i n v C a b l e v i s i o n Sys. COL-p., 65 AD3d 961, 365 (1'"Dept 2 0 0 3 ) . B o t h Llie NYSHRL and NYCHRL require that their provisions be "construed liberally" to accomplish the retnedial purposes of prohibiting discrimination. Executive L a w § 300 ; Administrative Code 5 8-130; s e e M a t t e r - of Binycjhamt:or~ GEIS Employees F e d . C r e d i t U n i o n v S t a t e Div. nf H u m a n R i y h t . s , 77 NY2d 1.2, 18 (1990); -13- [* 15] W i I l i a n i s v N e w Ynrk C i t y Hous. Auth., 61 AD3d 62, 65 (1'". Dept 2009 1 . The NYCHRL f urt-her: requires \'an independent liberal construction analysis . . . targeted to understanding and fulfilling . . . the City HRL's 'iinique1.ybroad and remedial' purposes, w h i c : h yo beyond those of counterpart State or federal civil rights law." W i l l i a m s , 61 AD3d at 66; see Admin. Code § 8- 130; Albiiriio v City of New York, 16 NY3d 472, 477-478 (2011); Phillips v C i t y of N e w Y o r k , 66 AD3d 170, 172 (lnt. Dept 2009). Courts have, nonetheless , continued to recognize that the law cannot o p e r a t e as a "'general civi1it.y code"' (Williams, 61 AD3d at 79 [citation omitted]), and that conduct which is "nothing more than what a reasonable victim of discrimination would consider 'petty slights and trivial inconveniences'" is not actionable. AD3d 503, 506 I d . at 8 0 ; see S h o r t v Deutsche Bank S e c . , I n c . , 79 ( l f I t . Dept 2010). Here, plaintiff, . Latina/Afro-Caribbean woman (verified a Complaint, 1 4 1 , r e s t s h e r claim of race and national origin discrimination on one comment allegedly made by D a l Piaz in April 2010, during a conversation with plaintiff about genetic testing f o r breast. c a n c e r . According to t.he complaint , after plaintiff was diagnosed with breast ranter', she had a conversation wj t.h Dal P i d z 11-1 whirh Dal Piaz asked her- whether she had t a k e n the gene t-est:, and then remarked to p1.ai.r-itiff that ' I must be t-he luckiest ' white woman in America; I tested negative and I have a daughter." -14- [* 16] Verified Complaint, 7 57. Plaintiff alleges that she was shocked and offended by this remark. Id. at 58. Plaint-if does riot, however, allege that she suffered any f adverse employment actions, either before or after Dal Piaz s cotnnient, based on her race and national origin. The complaint alleges that plaintiff began working for defendants in May 2009, as a freelance designer, and was offered a full-time position, with a salary increase, in August 2009. 26, 29. Verified Complaint, 711 It further a l . l e q e s that plaintiff performed h e r j o b well, and her performance was recognized with a bonus at the end of 2009. Id., 7 31. Plaintiff does not claim that she was created unfairly until after she notified defendants that she was diagnosed with breast cancer, and according to the complaint, she l o s t her j o b because of cancer. I d . , 7 65. The complaint, therefore, sets forth no facts from which the court can infer that p l a i n t - i f f was terminated, or subjected to any other adverse employment acti-on,based upon h e r race or national origin. Plaintiff does n o t plead that she was subjected to a hostile work envi.ronment on the basis of race or national. origin. To the extent. that she now seeks to a s s e r t such a c l a i m , the one cornmerit made by Dal Piaz, even accepting that it was offensive to plainti f t , and cven when viewed under the more protective st.andaxc3 uf t-he NYCIHRL, a t r i e i - of fac:t IIS could only be reasonably interpreted by represent-ingno inore than petty SI-ights or- -15- [* 17] trivial inconveniences, ' I ' and is not actionable. Williams, 61 AD3d at 80; see Z h a o v T i m e , I ' n c . , 2010 WL 3377498, * 2 3 , 2010 US Dist LEXIS 87586, *68 (SD NY 2010); K a u r v N e w Yor-k C i t y Health Er H o s p s . C o r p . , 688 fi' Supp 2d 317, 340 (SD NY 2010); M i d d l e t o r i v M e t r - o p o l i t a n C o l l e g e of N . Y . , 2008); C h i n v N c w York C i t y 545 F Supp 2d 369, 375 (SD NY HOUS. A u t h . , 2011 WL 2790609, 2011 NY Misc LEXIS 3444, " " 3 3 , 2011 NY Slip Op 31900(U), *29 (Sup Ct, NY County 2011); see also Mete v New York S t a t e O f c . Retar.dation & of M e r i t d l Developmental D i s a b i l i t i e s , 21 AD3d 2 8 8 , 294 (1"' Dept 2005) ("a decision maker's stray remark, without more, does not constitute evidence of discrimination"). The allegation, made for the first time by plaintiff's, attorney in opposition papers, t h a t . there were other conversations "which were discriminatory in nature" (Nohavicka Aff. in Opp., claim. 7 l o o ) , is patently insufficient to support such a While a court, "[iln assessing a motion under CPLR 3211 (a) (71, _ . _may freely consider affidavits submitted by the plaintiff to remedy any defects in the complaint" ( L e o n , 84 NY2d at 8 8 , c i t i n g R o v e l l o v Or,ofino R e a l t y [19761 1 , Co., 40 NY2d 6.33, 6 3 5 plaintiff submits no affidavit based on personal kr-lowledge to at-t-ernpt. remedy the pleadings. to It: is axiomatic that t h e afrirmation of counsel alone, unsupported by any i docuiiientai-y or festirnonial evidence, is of no pr0ba.t ve value. See Hasbr--ouck v Clity of G l o v e r s v i l l e , 6 3 NY2d 916, 916 (1984); [* 18] Zi.ickerlriari, 49 N Y 2 d at 563; F a r r a q u t G a r d e n s N o . 5 v Milrot, 23 AD2d 889 (2d Dept 1965). Thus, under, either t.he NYSHHL or the NYCHRL standards, and giving plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference to be drawn from t h e complaint, plaintiff s allegations are insufficient t.o sustain a c1ai.m for discrimination based on race or national origin, and the third and fourth causes of action are dismissed. INTFNTlONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege conduct SO outrageous i.n character, a n d so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possib1.e bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Mur-phy v American Home Prods. C o r p . , 5 8 NY2d 293, 303 (1983)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Howell v New York P o s t Co., 81 NY2d 115, 2 2 2 (1993); McRedmond v Sutton Place Rest. & B a r , Inc., 4 8 AD3d 2 5 8 , 2 5 9 (1st Dept. 2008). [ T l h e requirements of t h e rule a r e rigorous, and dif ¬icult to satisfy. Howell, 81 NY2d at 122 (citati-on omitted). The c3.aim:; that have bemi upheld by the c o u r t s w e r e supported by allcgat-ions detailing a longstanding campaiqn cjf deliberate, syst-ernat-ic r i d r n a l i c i o u s 1iara::srnent a of the plaintiff . Seltz:~ir v Bdyer , 2 7 2 AD2d 26.3, 264-265 (l , Dept 2000); s e e N a d e r v Genek-a1 -1 7- [* 19] Motoi-s Coxp., 25 NY2d 560, 569 (1970). Plaintiff s allegations of defendants conduct, even if true, do not meet t h e standard of extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. ~n addition, intentional infliction of emotional distress is a theory of recovery t h a t is to be invoked only as a last resort. McIntyre v Manhattan F o r d , Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 256 AD2d 269, 270 (1 . Dept 1998); see Conde v Y e s h i v a U n i v . , 16 AD3d 185, 187 (1!lt- Dept 2005). Where, as here, another avenue of recovery of emotional distress damages is available under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL, there is no reason to apply t h e theory. M c I n t y r e , 256 AD2d at 270. Plaintiff s cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional d i s t r e s s , therefore, is dismissed. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the motion of defendants KATHY DAL PIAZ, a/k/a KATAHINA UAL PIAZ LIEBOWITZ, SML S P O R T LTD., a/k/a WYANDOTTE CIRCLE C:ORP., and LAUREN HANSEN, INC., is granted arid t h e third, fourth, sevent-h,and eighth c a u s e s of action are dismissed; and it is further O R D E R E D t-hat., as against LAUREN HANSEN, INC . , t h e complaint is di.:;missed in i t s entirety; and it is further -18- [* 20] ORDERED t.hat the remaining claims a r e s e v e r e d and shall cont-inue. I FI I Dated: OCT 12 2011 ENTER : ( 1 , 4 HON. - I9- +. 1 '! I-. ) / i: DONNA M I L L S , rn -J.r.. NE W Y 0f3K CLERKS OFFICE

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