Rodriguez v Printco Indus.

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[*1] Rodriguez v Printco Indus. 2010 NY Slip Op 51166(U) [28 Misc 3d 1206(A)] Decided on May 11, 2010 Supreme Court, Nassau County Palmieri, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law ยง 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on May 11, 2010
Supreme Court, Nassau County

Tony Rodriguez, Plaintiff,

against

Printco Industries, PRINTCO INDUSTRIES LLC and INDUSTRIAL ENGRAVING & MANUFACTURING CORP., FMC CORPORATION and HUDSON SHARP, Defendants.



9420/07



TO:Thomas O'Malley, Esq.Morelli Ratner, PC

Attorney for Plaintiff

950 3rd Avenue, 11th Floor

New York, NY 10022

Braff, Harris & Sukoneck

Attorneys for Printco Industries and Printco Industries, LLC

305 Broadway, Seventh Floor

New York, NY 10007

Lavin, O'Neil, Ricci, Cedrone & Disipio

Attorneys for the Defendants FMC Corporation and Hudson Sharp

420 Lexington Avenue, Ste. 2900

New York, NY 10170

Westerman Ball Ederer Miller and Sharfstein, LLP

By: William E. Vita, Esq.

Attorney for Fourth-Party Defendants

170 Old Country Road, 4th Floor

Mineola, NY 11501

Robert J. Walker, Esq.

Gallagher, Walker, Bianco & Plastaras, Esq.

Attorney for Third Party Defendant Industrial Engraving Corporation

98 Willis Avenue

Mineola, NY 11501

Brian Baggott, Esq.,

Shook, Hardy & Bason, LLP

2555 Grand Boulevard

Kansas City, Missouri 64108

Daniel Palmieri, J.



Motion by defendants Printco Industries and Printco Industries, LLC (hereafter collectively referred to as "Printco"), and the motion by defendants FMC Corporation and Hudson-Sharp Machine Co (hereafter collectively referred to as "FMC"), for summary judgment dismissing the complaint are both denied.

Background

On February 18, 2005, plaintiff was cleaning printing plates on a printing press when his right hand was pulled into the press between the rollers and the drum, and injured. At the time of the injury the machine was on, but plaintiff had reduced the speed to a stopped position. He testified that this was the way he was taught to clean the plates.

The subject machine, identified as a Flexograff 706 printing press, was owned by plaintiff's employer, Uniflex Holding Inc. ("Uniflex"), and manufactured by FMC in 1967. The ink-transfer system originally installed included ink pans that were intended to act as a guard to protect an operator from putting his fingers into that part of the machine where plaintiff's hand was injured, and thereby reduce the risk of injury. However the original ink pans had been replaced by a "doctor blade" system manufactured by Printco. The "doctor blade" system came with its own guard to protect an operator from putting his hand into the machine, but at the time of plaintiff 's injury, the guard had been removed.

Plaintiff had worked at Uniflex for approximately four or five years before he was injured, and he had approximately two years of experience working on the subject printing press. It is unclear at what point the guards for the "doctor blade" system were removed. The printing press was equipped with a manual wheel to turn the plates to facilitate cleaning.

Defendants' Request for Preclusion of the Erlich Affidavit

Before this Court can reach the substance of the parties' arguments, the Court must consider defendants' contention that the affidavit of plaintiff's expert, Harry Erlich, may not be considered. Defendants argue that because they were never provided with responses to their request to plaintiff for discovery of expert witnesses pursuant to CPLR 3101(d), and the note of issue has already been filed, Erlich' s affidavit must be precluded. They rely upon Construction by Singletree, Inc.,v Lowe 55 AD3d 861 (2d Dept. 2008); DeLeon v State of New York, 22 AD3d 786 (2d Dept. 2005), lv app den 7 NY3d 701 (2006), and Safrin v DST Russian & Turkish Bath, Inc., 16 AD3d 656 (2d Dept. 2005).

Defendants cite the general rule that a court, in its discretion, may reject the affidavit of an expert, where one party has failed to identify the expert in pretrial [*2]disclosure, filed a note of issue and certificate of readiness, and then submitted the affidavit solely to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Where the party seeking preclusion is "unaware" of the purported expert, preclusion may be warranted. Yax v Development Team, Inc., 67 AD3d 1003 (2d Dept. 2009); King v Gregruss Management Corp., 57 AD3d 851 (2d Dept. 2008), lv app den 13 NY3d 707 (2009); see generally Construction by Singletree, DeLeon, and Safrin.

However, there is an exception to the rule. Where there is no evidence that the opponent intentionally or wilfully failed to disclose the identity of his expert witness, and no prejudice to the movant has been shown, the court may consider the expert's affidavit despite the failure to serve a notice pursuant to CPLR 3101. Browne v Smith, 65 AD3d 996 (2d Dept. 2009); Simpson v Tenore and Guglielmo, 287 AD2d 613 (2d Dept. 2001). Where, as here, the plaintiff essentially complied with the requirements set forth in CPLR 3101(d) because his expert was deposed by defendants and discussed in plaintiff's Response to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories (see Exhibit G to Printco's moving papers), there can be no showing of a willful failure to disclose or prejudice to the movant. See generally Cruz v Gustitos, 51 AD3d 963 (2d Dept. 2008). Here defendants cannot meet the requirement of the general rule, namely, that they were "unaware" of the expert. Consequently, preclusion is denied. The Court will consider the affidavit of plaintiff's expert.

Summary Judgment and Products Liability

Summary judgment is the procedural equivalent of a trial. S.J. Capelin Assoc., Inc. v Globe Mfg. Corp., 34 NY2d 338, 341 (1974). It is a drastic remedy that should only be granted if there are no triable issues of fact. Pearson v Dix McBride, LLC, 63 AD3d 895 (2d Dept. 2009); Dykeman v Hecht, 52 AD3d 767, 769 (2d Dept. 2008). It is not the court's function on summary judgment to assess credibility. Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 631 (1997); S.J. Capelin Assoc.

The proper standard to be applied in a products liability case is whether the product, as designed, was not reasonably safe. Voss v Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 NY2d 102, 108 (1983). A manufacturer is not liable for injuries caused by substantial alterations to the product that render the product defective or unsafe. Robinson v Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Machinery Co., 49 NY2d 471, 479 (1980). However, where a product is purposefully manufactured to permit its use without a safety feature, a plaintiff may recover for injuries incurred after the safety feature has been removed. Lopez v Precision Papers, Inc., 67 NY2d 871 (1986). A manufacturer also may be liable for a post-sale failure to warn. Kris v Schum, 75 NY2d 25 (1989). In addition, a manufacturer may be liable for failing to warn against forseeable alteration of its product, Liriano v Hobart Corp., 92 NY2d 232 (1998) (manufacturer liability may exist under a failure-to-warn theory where there were no warnings on a meat grinder, and safety guard had been removed).

The Motion by Printco [*3]

In its moving papers Printco argues that its "doctor blade" system was not defective. Printco did manufacture safety guards for its "doctor blade" system, and it did place warnings on those guards. It further seeks refuge behind its defense of material alteration, and insists it was not forseeable that the "doctor blade" system would be used without the safety guards that came with it. Printco also argues that in any event, as a component-part manufacturer, it should not be responsible for injuries caused by other parts of the machine, here the rollers.

The component-part claim is easily rejected. Printco's reliance on Munger v Heider Manufacturing Corp., 90 AD2d 645 (3d Dept. 1982) and Leahy v Mid-West Conveyor Co., Inc., 120 AD2d 16 (3d Dept. 1986), lv app den 69 NY2d 606 (1987) is misplaced. Those cases provide that where a component-part manufacturer produces a product in accordance with the design, plans, and specifications of the buyer, the component-part manufacturer will not be liable to the buyer's employee in a strict liability action. Here, there is no proof that Printco used a design, plans, or specifications by Uniflex in its production of the "doctor blade" system.

Plaintiff's expert testifies that Printco's warnings were defective because the warnings were placed on the removable guards, and in fact the guards had been removed prior to the injury. He states that any warning should have been placed "directly onto the roller assembly housing of the doctor blade, not on the guard"(Erlich affidavit par. 4). Mr. Erlich opines that Printco's failure to provide available and adequate warnings is a design defect and a cause of plaintiff's injury.

Printco's expert, Mr. Dreyer, in his reply affidavit, does concede that the guard cannot be in place when cleaning occurs. Mr. Dreyer further admits that "it is generally known in the printing industry that guards are removed and sometimes not reinstalled"(Dreyer affidavit, par. 13). Under these circumstances, Printco's defenses, of no defect and material alteration, do not apply in this case because the guards and warnings on the doctor blade system were never meant to protect an operator during cleaning, as they had to be removed for that process. While it is unclear how often cleaning was necessary, cleaning did take place. Based on these facts, plaintiff's claims against Printco for failure to warn and design defect present triable issues of fact. Accordingly Printco's motion for summary judgment must be denied.

The Court must also reject Printco's secondary argument, as repeated frequently by Mr Dreyer, is that no warnings were necessary because the danger of cleaning a printing press while it is running is so obvious. However, "the fact-specific nature of the inquiry into whether a particular risk is obvious renders bright-line pronouncements difficult, and in close cases it is easy to disagree about whether a particular risk is obvious". Liriano at 242. For this reason, whether the risk was open and obvious presents a question for the jury.

Successor Liability for Printco

Printco Industries, LLC purchased the assets from Printco Industries Limited in [*4]October of 2003 (Burkel transcript, pp. 16-18), but the LLC did not purchase any debts or liabilities in the transaction. In general, a corporation that purchases the assets of another corporation is not liable for the torts of its predecessor Schumacher v Richards Sheer Co., Inc., 59 NY2d 239 (1983). Under these circumstances, Printco LLC denies responsibility for the conduct of its predecessor, Printco Industries Ltd, in manufacturing the subject "doctor blade" system.

Exceptions to this general rule exist where (1) the successor expressly or impliedly assumes the predecessor 's liability; (2) there was a consolidation or merger of the two corporations, (3) the second corporation was merely a continuation of the first, or (4)the transaction was fraudulently executed to escape liability. Schumacher at 244; Matter of AT & S Transportation LLC v Odyssey Logistics & Technology Corp., 22 AD3d 750, 752 (2d Dept. 2005); Hansen v Filtron Mfg. Co. Inc., 282 AD2d 433, 434 (2d Dept. 2001). Plaintiff rejects Printco's denial of liability, and claims that a de facto merger took place.

The hallmarks of a de facto merger are the " continuity of ownership; cessation of ordinary business and dissolution of the predecessor as soon as possible; assumption by the successor of the liabilities ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of the business of the acquired corporation; and a continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and general business operation' ". Matter of AT & S Transportation LLC at 752, quoting Fitzgerald v Fahnestock & Co, 286 AD2d 573, 574 (1st Dept. 2001).

In this case the new Printco Industries, LLC took over the address of the predecessor corporation, and purchased its customer list, good will, telephone numbers, and web site. Indeed, the web site for the new LLC provides a statement that the company was founded in 1983, yet the asset purchase did not take place until twenty years later in 2003 (see Burkel transcript, pp 77-78). Plaintiff alleges that the two entities have some of the same owners and most of the same employees. There is no evidence that the predecessor continued operations. Based on the foregoing, a triable issue of fact is presented as to whether a de facto merger took place. Hoover v New Holland North America, Inc, 71 AD3d 1593 (4th Dept. 2010); Meadows v Amsted Industries, Inc., 305 AD2d 1053 (4th Dept. 2003).

The Motion by FMC

FMC states that any claim of design defect must be dismissed because of the significant alteration to the machine affecting the area where plaintiff put his hand. FMC further argues, inter alia, it had no duty to warn of dangers created by alterations to their machine that were neither known nor forseeable.

In opposition Mr. Erlich opines that FMC failed to provide complete and adequate guarding for the subject printing press because no permanent warnings were placed directly on a machine that FMC knew was intended for long-term use. Erlich testifies that FMC should have known that parts, such as the ink pans would be replaced over the life [*5]of the machine, and that only permanent signage would alert users to the "in-running nip hazard" presented. Erlich argues that issues of machine modification and substantial alteration do not relieve FMC of its responsibility to provide adequate warnings, and that the absence of adequate warnings was a cause of plaintiff's injury.

Based upon Erlich's opinion, the Court notes that plaintiff has dropped its design defect claims against FMC, and as to this defendant relies totally on its failure to warn claims.

FMC argues that permanent warnings affixed to the machine were not necessary because plaintiff already understood the danger of placing his hand where he did. While plaintiff did testify that it is "dangerous" to put his hand in the machine while it is running (Rodriquez transcript, p. 84), he was taught to reduce the speed to the point where the rollers and the cylinder were totally stopped (Rodriquez transcript, pp. 81-88). Under these circumstances, there is no showing that plaintiff understood the danger of placing his hand in the machine while it was running but the speed was reduced. Furthermore, plaintiff's lack of English is inconclusive as many warnings today use graphic symbols to depict danger.

The application of Robinson v Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co. to FMC turns on the nature of the modification /alteration to the subject printing press. Here, the ink pans were replaceable, and in fact were replaced by the "doctor blade" system. On this record, there is no evidence that installation of the "doctor blade" system resulted in the destruction of the functional utility of a key safety feature or abuse of the product. For this reason Robinson is inapposite. See also Mackney v Ford Motor Co., 251 AD2d 298 (2d Dept. 1998).

The issue presented by plaintiff's claims against FMC is whether the subject printing press, as marketed with replaceable ink pans, was "not reasonably safe," absent a warning of the dangers of the in-running nip hazard, permanently affixed to the machine. "Failure to warn liability is intensely fact specific," and indeed this is a question of fact for the jury, Liriano at 243. Consequently, FMC 's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint must be denied.

This shall constitute the Decision and Order of this Court.

E N T E R

DATED: May 11, 2010

_____________________________

HON. DANIEL PALMIERI

Acting Supreme Court Justice

TO:Thomas O'Malley, Esq. [*6]

Morelli Ratner, PC

Attorney for Plaintiff

950 3rd Avenue, 11th Floor

New York, NY 10022

Braff, Harris & Sukoneck

Attorneys for Printco Industries and Printco Industries, LLC

305 Broadway, Seventh Floor

New York, NY 10007

Lavin, O'Neil, Ricci, Cedrone & Disipio

Attorneys for the Defendants FMC Corporation and Hudson Sharp

420 Lexington Avenue, Ste. 2900

New York, NY 10170

Westerman Ball Ederer Miller and Sharfstein, LLP

By: William E. Vita, Esq.

Attorney for Fourth-Party Defendants

170 Old Country Road, 4th Floor

Mineola, NY 11501

Robert J. Walker, Esq.

Gallagher, Walker, Bianco & Plastaras, Esq.

Attorney for Third Party Defendant Industrial Engraving Corporation

98 Willis Avenue

Mineola, NY 11501

Brian Baggott, Esq.,

Shook, Hardy & Bason, LLP

2555 Grand Boulevard

Kansas City, Missouri 64108

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