Matter of Brown v New York City Dept. of Correction Warden of GMDC
Annotate this CaseDecided on April 8, 2010
Supreme Court, Bronx County
In the Matter of the Application of Eric Brown, Petitioner,
against
New York City Department of Correction Warden of GMDC, Respondent.
340275-09
William Gibney, Esq.
The Legal Aid Society
Counsel for the Defendant
Danielle Leidner
Special Assistant Counsel
New York City Department of Correction
Richard L. Price, J.
By petition submitted July 15, 2009, Petitioner moves pursuant to CPLR Article 78 for vacatur of an administrative determination designating him as "Red ID" status and placing him in enhanced restraints on the grounds that such determination was unsupported by any evidence and is otherwise arbitrary, irrational and capricious. Petitioner claims that since his Red ID classification was predicated on a disciplinary infraction that was successfully challenged, dismissed and expunged from his record, the underlying facts and circumstances were improperly considered in making such determination. Although not specifically stated, it appears from petitioner's moving papers that the dismissal and expungement to which he refers was his prior Article 78 petition alleging that the respondent New York City Department of Correction ("Department") violated his due process right to present evidence to the hearing officer pursuant to Department Directive 4518 IV (C) (7). While that petition was sustained by the Honorable Albert Lorenzo on October 1, 2008, petitioner fails to demonstrate the basis upon which Justice Lorenzo did so.
Respondent contends that the petition is meritless because its initial determination designating petitioner "Red ID" was neither disciplinary nor punitive, and is otherwise rationally related to their legitimate interests of promoting internal prison security. Consequently, they [*2]argue, that petitioner was not entitled to a hearing challenging such determination. Conspicuously absent from respondent's verified answer, however, is any opposition to petitioner's allegation that he was denied the right to present evidence to the hearing officer pursuant to Department Directive 4518 IV (C) (7).
Since petitioner failed to provide the basis for Justice Lorenzo's sustaining of his Article 78
petition respondent neither argued or addressed it, this court issued an interim decision and order
dated October 2, 2009, directing petitioner to produce the stenographically recorded transcription
of the October 1, 2008, proceeding. Having received and reviewed the minutes of that
proceeding, this court finds petitioner's claim unpersuasive. Accordingly, his petition must be
dismissed.
Background and History
Petitioner is an inmate at a New York City correctional facility on Riker's Island. On May 6, 2008, two shanks were discovered in a light fixture of petitioner's cell. The same day, Petitioner was served with a Report and Notice of Infraction charging him with violating Department Detainee Conduct Rule 103.10 ("Contraband Weapons"). Additionally, a Department physician medically cleared petitioner for designation as "Red ID" security status and issued an institutional Red ID card (see respondent's Exhibit A; see also Medical Assessment of inmate on Red ID and/or Enhanced Restraint Status, attached to petitioner's initial papers).
Pursuant to a disciplinary hearing conducted on May 9, 2008, petitioner was found guilty of violating Detainee Conduct Rule 103.10 and received 60 days punitive segregation as well as a $25.00 surcharge. Also on May 9, 2008, petitioner was served with a Notice of Hearing Determination For Red/ID and/or Enhanced Restraint Status (see respondent's Exhibit B) classifying him as a security risk and classifying him as "Red ID" status. Red ID status subjects defendant to being transported in mechanical restraints, side or rear handcuffs, security mitts, a waist chain and leg irons.
On June 3, 2008, after fully exhausting his administrative remedies, petitioner brought an Article 78 petition seeking a judgment ordering his release from punitive segregation and dismissing the disciplinary decision rendered May 9, 2008. On October 1, 2008, Justice Albert Lorenzo, Supreme Court, Bronx County, sustained that petition, ordering that the imposed penalty be vacated and the infraction be expunged. That order, however, did not address petitioner's Red ID status.
On October 17, 2008, petitioner filed a grievance with the Department claiming that Department officers and supervisors subjected him to "contagious, ineluctable, and discriminatory behavior."
On November 5, 2008, petitioner filed a Request for Appeal of Red ID/Enhanced Restraint Placement with the Department claiming that the Department was obligated to rescind his Red ID classification since it was predicated on the expunged infraction. On November 12, 2008, the Department issued petitioner a Notice of Appeal Determination for Red ID and/or Enhanced Restraint Status denying his appeal because the underlying incident involved possession of a weapon in violation of Department Directive 4518 III (A). Accordingly, the Department continued petitioner's Red ID status.
On January 10, 2009, petitioner filed a grievance claiming that the Department's poor [*3]maintenance of the prison law library caused "costly delays" in his ability to respond to the Department's November 12, 2008, decision.
Finally, on January 11, 2009, petitioner filed another grievance claiming that Department
officers and supervisors forced him to wear "slippers" that are "improper footwear for everyday
use," which caused constant pain in both his knees and lower back, headaches, loss of feeling in
his toes and "a very bad odor . . . caus[ing] a deep sence [sic] of depression."
DiscussionPetitioner claims that the Department's imposition of Red ID status violated his right to due process under both the United States and New York State Constitutions because it was unsupported by any evidence and otherwise arbitrary, irrational and capricious. The basis of this claim is that Justice Lorenzo's sustaining of his Article 78 petition, which dismissed the Department's disciplinary finding that he possessed two shanks in the light fixture of his cell, ordered his release from punitive segregation, and ordered the infraction be expunged. Since Justice Lorenzo's decision did not order that his Red ID status be removed, the Department continued it. Petitioner's argument, however, is predicated on the dubious assumption that because such status is exclusively a punitive or disciplinary sanction, the Department unjustifiably restrained his liberty in violation of the Due Process Clauses of both the United States and New York Constitutions. For several reasons, his claim is unpersuasive.
It is well established that prison authorities must be accorded deference as to what discipline is necessary and proper to serve the prison's institutional interests (People v Vasquez, 63 NY2d 521 [1984]; Rivera v Smith, 63 NY2d 501 [1984]). Certainly, such deference includes broad discretion in matters concerning institutional security that "serve[s] the noncriminal goals of maintaining prison safety (for inmates and corrections personnel), discipline and order" (Vasquez at 532; See also Hewitt v Helms, 459 US 460 [1983]; Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US 539 [1974]; Rivera at 501; Mohsin v Fischer, 51 AD3d 1233 [3rd Dept 2008]). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court recognized "a prison's internal security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison administrators" (Hewitt at 474 quoting Rhodes v Chapman, 452 US 337 [1981]).
Surely, such discretion in the hands of prison officials is justified by the extraordinary difficulty of formulating security-related policies to manage the daily activities of numerous inmates in a correctional facility (Rivera at 512). Underscoring this difficulty, the Supreme Court stated:
In assessing the seriousness of a threat to institutional security prison administrators necessarily draw on more than the specific facts surrounding a particular incident; instead, they must consider the character of the inmates confined in the institution, recent and longstanding relations between prisoners and guards, prisoners inter se and the like. In the volatile atmosphere of a prison, an inmate easily may constitute an unacceptable threat to the safety of other prisoners and guards even if he himself has committed no misconduct; rumor, reputation, and even more imponderable factors may suffice to spark potentially disastrous incidents. The judgment of prison officials in this context . . . turns largely on "purely subjective evaluations and on predictions of future behavior" (Hewitt at 474 quoting Connecticut Board of Pardons v Dumschat, 452 US 458 [1981]). [*4]
This, of course, in no way means that an inmate relinquishes all rights during incarceration. Many rights and privileges enjoyed prior to incarceration, however, are lost and others must endure substantial limitations. The reason is clear; prison administrators must predict not just one inmate's future actions, but those of an entire institution. In fact, with the closing of the prison doors, an inmate retains only those rights "not inconsistent with their status as inmates or with legitimate penological objects of prison institution" (Rivera at 510; see also Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US 539 [1974]). Thus, imposing enhanced security measures on incarcerated prisoners, "does not impose retribution in lieu of a valid conviction, nor does it maintain physical control over free citizens forced by law to subject themselves to state control over the educational mission. It effectuates prison management and prisoner rehabilitative goals" (Sandin v Conner 515 US 472, 485 [1995]). For example, a prisoner has no due process liberty interest to be free from a prison transfer to a maximum security facility with more burdensome conditions as it is within the normal range of custody (Meachum v Fano, 427 US 215 [1976]).
Additionally, there is no requirement that an inmate engage in misconduct before being placed in administrative segregation (see Matter of Mauleon v Goord, 29 AD3d 1241 [3d Dept 2006][inmate placed in administrative segregation because of suspected homicide at former facility and his history of extorting inmates]; see also Matter of O'Keefe v Coombe, 233 AD2d 640 [3d Dept 1996][past escape and possibility of future escape attempt justified placing inmate in administrative segregation]). Nor is it required that an inmate injure another inmate or prison official, or even threaten to do so. Rather, it is the mere presence of such an inmate in the general population that threatens the safety, security and order of the facility (e.g. Matter of Oregon v Goord, 36 AD3d 1034 [3d Dept 2007][ongoing investigation of inmate's involvement in large-scale drug-trafficking operation sufficient to place inmate in administrative segregation]; Matter of Rifkin v Goord, 273 AD2d 878 [4th Dept 2000][repeated escapes presented a threat to the safety and security of the facility]).
Nevertheless,"liberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action" (Youngberg v Romeo, 457 US 307, 316 [1982]; see also Wolff, 418 US at 560). As such, even within the confines of prison, an inmate's liberty must be balanced against the state's reasons for restraining that liberty (see Sandin at 472; Youngberg at 307), e.g., maintaining prison facility security and protecting the safety of officers and inmates.
Regarding a detainee's interest in freedom from restraint, however, courts have distinguished between the due process rights of sentenced prisoners and those of pretrial detainees (see Sandin at 472; see also Meachum at 215; Benjamin v Fraser, 264 F3d 175 [2d Cir 2001]). As a consequence of being convicted, a sentenced prisoner has "been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution" (Meachum at 224).
Conversely, pretrial detainees, unlike sentenced prisoners, have a liberty interest in not being placed in disciplinary segregation. (Resnick v Hayes, 213 F3d 443, 448 [9th Cir 2000]). Thus, pretrial detainees may not be subjected to disciplinary action without due process of law because they "are not under a sentence of confinement, and therefore it cannot be said that they ought to expect whatever deprivation can be considered incident to serving such a sentence" [*5](Rapier v Harris, 172 F3d 999, 1004-05 [7th Cir 1999]; see also Bell v Wolfish, 441 US 520 [1977]; Whitford v Boglino, 63 F3d 527, 531 [7th Cir 1995]). As such, restraint on pretrial detainees implicate a protected liberty interest when it amounts to punishment" (Bell at 534).
Disciplinary proceedings of pretrial detainees then, must afford greater due process protection. While a full adversary proceeding is not necessarily required before imposing a prison disciplinary deprivation of liberty, a detainee is certainly entitled to adequate written notice of the reasons for the action taken as well as a hearing at which he has some opportunity to present a defense albeit limited (Wolff at 561; see also Benjamin at 175). If, however, the restraint imposed is for administrative purposes, a pretrial detainee need only "receive some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views" (Hewitt, 459 US at 476; Bolden v Alston, 810 F2d 353, 357 [2d Cir 1987] [the due process protection required "differs according to the purpose of the confinement"]; see also Benjamin at 175).
Here, having found petitioner, a pretrial detainee, in possession of two shanks, the Department: 1) served him with notice of the Department's intention to infracting Detainee Conduct Rule 103.10: 2) conducted a disciplinary hearing; 3) served him with a Notice of Hearing Determination For Red/ID and/or Enhanced Restraint Status classifying him as a security risk and imposing "Red ID" status; and, 4) issued a Notice of Appeal Determination for Red ID and/or Enhanced Restraint Status denying his appeal because the underlying incident involved possession of a weapon in violation of Department Directive 4518 III (A), which provides that "[a]ny inmate who uses or is found to be in possession of a weapon shall be identified by a red identification card (Red ID)." At the very least, petitioner received notice of the charges against him and was provided with an opportunity to present his views.
Notably, petitioner does not ask this court to decide whether these proceedings violated petitioner's due process rights. As such, this court need not address the Department's contention that petitioner's Red ID status was neither disciplinary nor punitive. Rather, he asks this court to determine whether Justice Lorenzo's order dismissing the Department's disciplinary decision and expunging the infraction entitled him to removal from Red ID status as a matter of due process. This court concludes it does not.
Certainly, the Department enjoys the broad discretion to impose measures ensuring the safety and protection of its inmates and officers. Thus, regardless of any disciplinary purpose behind the Department's imposing Red ID status on petitioner, it may also serve the Department's administrative security purposes as well. Accordingly, it is not necessary that inmates "be convicted of the disciplinary charge in order to be placed in red ID status-they need only be found in possession of weapon" (Benjamin v Fraser, Not Reported in F Supp 2d, 2002 WL 31845111 [SDNY 2002 *8]).
It follows then, that had the Department elected not to infract the petitioner for possession of the shanks, they would nevertheless be entitled to classify him as a Red ID. As such, merely because the sustaining of his Article 78 petition expunged the disciplinary finding from his prison record, the Department may continue his Red ID status. Moreover, it is significant to note that the minutes of the court proceeding at which his petition was sustained, reflect that the basis of Justice Lorenzo's decision, though unspecified, was exclusively procedural and not on the merits. Since the Department's Red ID designation of inmates is rationally related to their [*6]legitimate interests of promoting internal prison security and in the absence of any determination on the merits of petitioner's prior Article 78, this court finds petitioner's claim to be without merit.
This court also finds petitioner's other claims to be entirely without merit, specifically that the Department's poor maintenance of the prison law library caused "costly delays" in his ability to respond to the Department's November 12, 2008, decision and that Department officers and supervisors forced him to wear "slippers . . . improper footwear for everyday use," which caused constant pain in both his knees and lower back, headaches, loss of feeling in his toes and "a very bad odor . . . caus[ing] a deep sence [sic] of depression."
For these reasons, petitioner's Article 78 petition is dismissed in its entirety.
The clerk of the court is directed to forward a copy of this decision to the defendant at his place of incarceration.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.
Dated:April 8, 2010
ENTER
________________________________
Richard Lee Price, J.S.C.
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