People v Huggins

[*1] People v Huggins 2010 NY Slip Op 50535(U) [27 Misc 3d 1203(A)] Decided on March 15, 2010 Supreme Court, New York County Ward, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on March 15, 2010
Supreme Court, New York County

The People of the State of New York

against

Anthony Huggins, Germade Jones and Harry Brown, Defendants.



2521/06



For the People:

Abraham George, Esq.

ADA, Special Narcotics Prosecutor

80 Centre Street

New York, NY 10013

For the Defendant:

Robert Jaffe, Esq.

351 Broadway

New York, NY 10013

Laura A. Ward, J.

On May 8, 2006, the defendants were arrested and charged in a felony complaint with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, in violation of Penal Law ("P.L.") § 220.21(1). Defendant Jones was also charged with resisting arrest in violation of P.L. § 205.30. The defendants were subsequently indicted for the crimes of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, in violation of P.L.§ 220.21(1), and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, in violation of P.L. § 220.16(1). The charges are based upon the recovery of cocaine inside a duffel bag on the rear seat of a vehicle. At the time of the recovery of the cocaine, defendant Brown was seated in the driver's seat, defendant Jones was in the front passenger seat and defendant Huggins was seated in the right rear passenger seat. The People, relying the automobile presumption (P.L. § 220.25(1)) to establish the possession of the cocaine by each of the defendants, state that their theory, in the grand jury, was that the three defendants were acting in concert to possess the cocaine. The People contend that their theory will be the same at trial.

In January of 2008, the court was informed that defendant Jones was extradited to North Carolina for sentencing on a federal case. As of June 27, 2008, Jones was still in federal custody in North Carolina and the People filed a motion to sever his case from that of the co-defendants. The People's motion was made because the People were unable to produce Jones from North [*2]Carolina and were unable to ascertain when Jones would be returned to New York. The co-defendants opposed the motion to sever. In a decision dated September 18, 2008, the motion to sever was denied. On March 16, 2009, Jones was returned to this court.

On February 18, 2010, Jones filed a motion to sever his case from that of his co-defendants. The motion to sever is premised upon a conversation on January 29, 2010, during which defense counsels for Huggins and Brown informed defense counsel for Jones, that the defense that would be put forth by Huggins and Brown was that Jones was the sole owner and possessor of the cocaine found in duffel bag in the car. Jones argues that the co-defendants' defense is in irreconcilable conflict with his defense and that there is a significant danger that the co-defendants' defense alone would cause a jury to conclude that the defendant is guilty of possession of the cocaine. The People oppose the motion to sever arguing that a jury would not convict Jones based solely on the defense put forth by the co-defendants.

In People v. Mahboubian, 74 NY2d 174,184(1989), the Court of Appeals held that "that severance is compelled where the core of each defense is in irreconcilable conflict with the other and where there is a significant danger, as both defenses are portrayed to the trial court, that the conflict alone would lead the jury to infer defendant's guilt." There is no dispute that the co-defendants' defense is in irreconcilable conflict with that of defendant Jones. Thus, the issue is whether the co-defendants' defense alone would lead a jury to infer Jones' guilt . The People argue that the co-defendants' defense "in and of itself does not warrant severance because the evidence, namely the large amount of cocaine, and the People's reliance on the car presumption, allows the jury enough information to find one, some or all the defendants guilty based upon the evidence alone regardless of what the defendants' defenses will be." (People's Response to the Motion to Sever at p. 3).

The People's sole evidence of possession of the cocaine is the "automobile presumption." P.L. § 220.25(1) provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he presence of a controlled substance in an automobile, other than a public omnibus, is presumptive evidence of knowing possession thereof by each and every person in the automobile at the time such controlled substance was found." The automobile presumption is evidentiary and rebuttable. ( People v. Leyva, 38 NY2d 160, 167 (1975)). Beyond the presumption set forth in C.P.L. § 220.25(1), the People have not claimed that they have any other proof of knowing possession by any of the defendants. Therefore, should the jury accept the co-defendants' defense and acquit the co-defendants while convicting Jones, it would be clear that the jury rejected the presumption of "knowing possession. . . by each and every person in the automobile" and relied solely on the co-defendants' defense to establish that Jones was the sole owner and possessor of the cocaine. Thus, by rejecting the presumption, it would be the defense put forth by the co-defendants that "alone would lead the jury to infer defendant's guilt." (c.f. People v. Kyser, 26 AD3d 839 (2006)). The defenses being in irreconcilable conflict with each other and that there is a "significant danger,. . . that the conflict alone would lead the jury to infer defendant's guilt," the defendant Jones' motion to sever his case from that of his co-defendants, is granted. [*3]

The foregoing is the decision and order of the court.

Dated: New York, New York

March 15, 2010

Laura A. Ward

Acting Justice Supreme Court