Bronx 361 Realty, L.L.C. v Quinones
Annotate this CaseDecided on March 5, 2010
Civil Court, Bronx County
Bronx 361 Realty, L.L.C., Petitioner,
against
Janice Quinones, Respondent.
21192/09
Horing, Welikson & Rosen
11 Hillside Avenue
Williston Park, NY 11596
Attorneys for Petitioner
Janice Quinones
755 Southern Boulevard, Apt. 3F
Bronx, NY 10455
Respondent Pro Se
Jaya K. Madhavan, J.
This is a licensee holdover proceeding. Petitioner alleges that respondent
occupies the subject project—based Section 8 apartment (Apartment) as a licensee of her
husband, Harry Quinones, who died in 2007. Respondent, appearing without counsel, seeks to
succeed to his tenancy. The court held a trial and now dismisses the petition.
Facts
The facts are largely undisputed. Petitioner's sole witness was its site manager, Priscilla Vega. She testified credibly that the tenant of record was Harry Quinones (Pet. Exh. 3). Mr. Quinones moved into the Apartment on July 1, 2007 and died five days later on July 6, 2007. Ms. Vega further testified that petitioner's file for the Apartment did not contain any reference to respondent. For example, petitioner's recertification documents do not refer to respondent (Pet. Exhs. 4 - 6). However, Ms. Vega also testified that she had been employed by petitioner only since July 2008. Thus, her knowledge of the facts of this proceeding was based mainly upon the contents of petitioner's file.
Respondent then testified in her own behalf. The court found respondent's testimony to be very credible. She testified that she met Harry Quinones in 1995 and that they soon began living together. On July 5, 2003, respondent and Harry Quinones married and settled in [*2]Connecticut (Resp Exh. C). Three years later, the Quinones' returned to New York because Harry Quinones was receiving medical treatment in Manhattan. The Quinones' rented a room in Manhattan and applied for admission into various apartment complexes. In June 2007, petitioner's then management company contacted Harry Quinones for an eligibility interview (Pet. Exh. 6). On June 29, 2007, Harry Quinones signed a series of documents, including a lease, for the Apartment (Pet. Exhs. 3 - 5).
On July 1, 2007, the Quinones' moved into the Apartment. Within the first few days of moving in, respondent, at her husband's insistence, called petitioner's management office to make sure that she could sign the lease. Respondent testified that personnel at the management office told her that she needed to come in with her Social Security card; birth certificate; photo identification; and a copy of her marriage certificate. She told a woman at the management office that she did not have her marriage certificate and that she would need a few days to go to Connecticut to obtain a copy of it. The woman then told respondent that she could come into the management office on Monday, July 9, 2007, and sign the lease as Harry Quinones' spouse.
On Monday, July 9, 2007, respondent called the management office and informed an employee there that Harry Quinones had died in the Apartment on Saturday, July 6, 2007. She testified that during this phone call, she informed the office that she was trying to have her name added to the lease. She testified that someone in the management office told her not to worry about it and gave her an appointment of July 13, 2007 to come in with her documents. On July 13, 2007, respondent testified that she came into petitioner's management office and met with the then site manager, Tiesha Quinones (no relation), who photocopied respondent's documents. During this meeting, respondent asked Ms. Quinones if she could have a dog in the Apartment. Ms. Quinones informed respondent that this would not be a problem. Ms. Quinones then gave respondent a letter which stated that respondent lived in the Apartment and that she could keep a dog (Resp. Exh. A).
Over the next five months, respondent testified, she called and/or visited the management office to sign a lease at least four times. On some occasions, the office staff told her to be patient and that it would "not be a problem" to add her to the lease; at other times, management staff told her that the person who was to sign the lease on petitioner's behalf was not available.
Respondent testified that by December 2007, she had concluded that petitioner was not going to give her lease. Nevertheless, respondent continued to contact the management office. Subsequently, on March 27, 2008, petitioner's management office issued a letter to respondent on its letterhead which stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
Please be advised that Janice Saunders—Quinones is currently in the process of
transferring her name to the above—mentioned unit. As soon as this problem is corrected,
Mrs. Saunders Quinones will receive a lease with her name as head of household (Resp. Exh. D).
That same day, petitioner's management office also gave respondent another letter to
respondent verifying her residence in the Apartment and indicating that her rent had "yet to be
determined" (Resp. Exh. G).
Discussion
Succession to a project—based Section 8 tenancy is based on the United States Housing Act and its implementing regulations (see 42 USC § 1437a[b][3][a] and 24 CFR § 5.403[6], both [*3]defining family as including the remaining member of a tenant family). Thus, that framework broadly recognizes the entire family as the tenant (id.; Matter of Manhattan Plaza, 8 AD3d at 112).Occupancy by additional family members in either a voucher or project—based Section 8 household require the approval of the supervising public housing authority or private landlord, respectively (24 CFR §§ 982.551[h][2]; 983.2). Similarly, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development Handbook 4350.3, REV—1 ("HUD Handbook"), requires a remaining family member to be a party to the underlying lease (Ch 8, ¶ 3—16 [B] [1]; see also 24 CFR § 982.4). However, the federal regulatory scheme "do[es] not mandate any procedure with respect to eviction of tenants in Section 8 housing" (Matter of Manhattan Plaza, 8 AD3d at 112, citation omitted).
In reviewing succession claims to project—based Section 8 tenancies, as here, courts have been guided by the purpose of the Section 8 program. As observed by the Court in Morrisania II Associates v. Harvey, 139 Misc 2d 651, 657 [Civ Ct Bronx Co 1988]:
...Section 8 guarantees continued protection to every legitimate member of the family unit in
occupancy. It recognizes that no such family member should suffer eviction, dislocation and
homelessness upon the death of the tenant of record. It is thus consistent with the original
ameliorative purpose of the United States Housing Act of 1937, the comprehensive legislation of
which Section 8 forms a part (citing Thorpe v. Housing Auth. Of City of Durham, 393
US 268, 281 [1969]; see also NSA North Flatbush Associates v. Mackie, 166 Misc 2d
446, 449 - 450 [Civ Ct Kings Co 1995]).
Courts have therefore construed the term remaining family member as
...a person who had actually been in occupancy as a part of the family unit at the time of the
named tenant's death. Its use recognizes an underlying statutory assumption: all family members
have occupancy rights which are not terminated by the death of any member (Morrisania II
Associates, 139 Misc 2d at 656; see also Matter of Manhattan Plaza, 8 AD3d at
112).
However, those who assume occupancy simply to succeed to a Section 8 tenancy are
not remaining family members; rather, they are mere interlopers who are not protected by federal
law (id.).
Petitioner, relying upon the HUD Handbook, incorrectly argues that the absence of
respondent's name from the lease and recertification forms renders her a mere interloper and bars
her succession claim. The Appellate Term, First Department rejected petitioner's position in
2013 Amsterdam Avenue Housing Associates v. Estate of Almeda Wells, 2006 NY Slip
Op 50084[U], * 1. There, the Court held that the "absence of [the respondent—daughter's]
name on [her mother's] family composition document was not fatal to her succession claim
otherwise established by the trial evidence" (id.), citing Matter of Manhattan Plaza
Assocs. v. DHPD, 8 AD3d 111 [1st Dept 2004]; see also UPACA Site 7 Associates v.
Hunter—Crawford, 2006 NY Slip Op 50887[U], * 2 [Civ Ct NY Co]). Thus, the
touchstone of succession to a project—based Section 8 tenancy is the legitimacy of
respondent's occupancy as a member of the family unit at the time of the tenant of record's death,
and not the accuracy of one or more HUD forms (Rivlin Houses Associates v. Estate of
Brown, NYLJ, Sept. 20, 1991, at 21, col. 2 [App Term 1st Dept]; NSA North Flatbush
Associates, 166 Misc 2d at 450; Morrisania II Associates, 139 Misc 2d at [*4]657; cf. Davidson v. Corbett, 190 Misc 3d 813, 814
[App Term 1st Dept], [home care worker who appeared on recertification forms as a
live—in attendant was not a family member entitled to succeed to a project—based
Section 8 tenancy).
Nor does federal law require a minimum period of co—occupancy with the tenant of record to establish a legitimate occupancy. In NSA North Flatbush v. Mackie, the court observed that courts have "placed more emphasis on the bona fides of the co—occupancy as opposed to an arbitrary time period" (166 Misc 2d at 451). Thus, while the length of respondent's co—occupancy with the tenant of record bears on the legitimacy of her occupancy as a member of the family unit, it is not dispositive of that central issue.
The genuineness of respondent's co—occupancy of the Apartment with her late husband as a family was amply established at trial. Respondent testified credibly and without rebuttal, that she and her husband moved into the Apartment on July 1, 2007, and lived there together until his death five days later. Petitioner never contested the legitimacy of respondent's occupancy; to the contrary, when respondent called petitioner's management office to be added to her husband's lease, an employee there advised her of what documents she needed to bring and told her that she could sign a lease as early as July 9, 2007. Tragically, respondent's husband died before a lease could actually be signed.
Nevertheless, when respondent contacted the management office after her husband's death, she was told to come into the office on July 13, 2007 with her documents. The court credits respondent's testimony that on that date, she met with the then site manager, Tiesha Quinones, at petitioner's office where Ms. Quinones accepted respondent's documents while providing her with assurances that petitioner would offer a lease to her. Indeed, Ms. Quinones even provided respondent with a letter which not only confirmed her occupancy, but permitted her to have a dog in the Apartment. Further, on March 27, 2008, Ms. Quinones gave respondent a document verifying her occupancy (Resp. Exh. G) while another employee, Carlos Rivera, provided her with a letter which stated that she would receive "a lease in her name as head of household" (Resp. Exh. D).
Petitioner failed to offer any evidence to controvert respondent's proof that she and her late husband lived in the Apartment together as a family. The court therefore finds that respondent proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she is entitled to succeed to her late husband's tenancy.
Accordingly, the Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent dismissing the petition.
The parties are directed to recover their exhibits from the Part T Clerk in Room 470. This
constitutes the Decision/Order of the court, copies of which are being mailed to the parties today
as set forth below.
Dated:March 5, 2010
Bronx, NY
___________________________________
Hon. Jaya K. Madhavan
[*5]
To:
Clerk of the Court
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
