Serls Prime Props., Inc. v Cheshire

[*1] Serls Prime Props., Inc. v Cheshire 2008 NY Slip Op 52660(U) [22 Misc 3d 1126(A)] Decided on October 3, 2008 City Court Of Poughkeepsie Moloney, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on October 3, 2008
City Court of Poughkeepsie

Serls Prime Properties, Inc. d/b/a PRUDENTIAL SERLS PRIME PROPERTIES, Plaintiff,

against

Layla Cheshire, Defendant.



CV-06-3897



Ian Lindars, Esq.

McCabe & Mack, LLP

Attorneys for the Plaintiff

63 Washington Street

P.O.Box 509

Poughkeepsie, NY 12602-0509

Kevin R. Greco, Esq.

Wolfson, Greller & Egitto, P.C.

11 Market Street

Poughkeepsie, NY 12601-3260

Katherine A. Moloney, J.

Plaintiff is suing the defendant for $15,000.00 under various legal theories alleging a breach of contract, as well as under the theory of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. The amount sued for represents the plaintiff's attempt to recover a 5% commission on the sale of the defendant's residence, which sold for $334,750.00. While the sum sued for is less than 5% of the sale of the residence, it represents the maximum allowable for the jurisdiction of this Court.[FN1] Plaintiff claims she was entitled to the commission under both the written contract that the parties entered into with each other for the sale of defendant's house, as well as an implied contract under the legal theories of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. In turn, the defendant claims that since the contract expired and there was no implied contract either, she is not liable to the plaintiff for the commission. Plaintiff was represented by Ian Lindars, Esq.The defendant was represented by Kevin R. Greco, Esq.

A trial was held on February 14, 2008 and continued on February 15 and 25, 2008. Both parties have submitted post trial briefs which the Court has considered. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court reserved decision on the defendant's application to dismiss the plaintiff's quantum meruit claim, which is hereby denied. Having duly deliberated upon the testimony and evidence presented to this Court, including several exhibits, the Court determines the remaining matters as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT

In 2005, the defendant, Layla Cheshire, sought to sell her house located at 6 Max Lane, Highland, New York. Regina Marks is a licensed real estate agent employed by the plaintiff, Serls Prime Properties, Inc d/b/a Prudential Serls Prime Properties. Ms. Marks became the defendant's realtor following some discussions between the parties. It is undisputed that the plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract on June 20, 2005 and the plaintiff was granted an exclusive right to sell the defendant's real property for a listing price of $349,900.00. Prior to signing the agreement, the defendant had unsuccessfully tried to sell her house for four months on her own. The agreement between the parties provides, in part, that a five-percent (5%) commission on the final sale price of [*2]the residence would be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. On or about October 25, 2005, the parties agreed to extend the expiration date on the listing agreement until December 31, 2005 and reduced the listing price of the residence to $309,900.00. On November 21, 2005, a potential buyer to the property, Michelle Marmo ("Marmo"), signed a purchase offer agreement agreeing to buy defendant's residence for $294,000.00, which was accepted by the defendant and signed by Regina Marks (realtor for the defendant). Realtor Joanne Ellis, Summerset Realty, represented Michelle Marmo, and signed the agreement as well. In December 2005, the plaintiff's realtor lockbox was taken off of the defendant's house. Ms. Marks did not renew the contract to list the defendant's property on the multiple listing service after the contract expired, yet her Prudential Serls "for sale" sign remained on the property.

The defendant and Ms. Marmo entered into extensive negotiations, which were frustrated due to the fact that Ms. Marmo wished to have some of the contents of the house included in the sale price, which the defendant was opposed to (i.e., t.v., range hood, chandelier). In the meantime, Mr. Sammy Jamal became aware of the property being sold because he saw a Prudential Serls sign posted on the property on January 26, 2006 - after the listing agreement between plaintiff and defendant had expired. Mr. Jamal was interested in purchasing the property as part of a larger project he was planning, and thus presented the listing price offer to Regina Marks.

The Marmo deal continued to be negotiated well into January 2006. In the interim, while the Marmo deal was being negotiated, Ms. Marks conveyed to the defendant Mr. Jamal's offer on January 26, 2006 - after her listing agreement with the defendant had expired. Mr. Jamal's listing price offer was knowingly higher than the Marmo deal that was being negotiated. Ms. Marks conveyed Mr. Jamal's offer to the defendant over the phone, which was a cash transaction, with the only contingency for the buyer being that the title that was to be conveyed would be clear and clean. Contingencies for the seller included allowing the defendant to remain in the house for a period of time and including only those contents of the house that were immaterial to the defendant. While the defendant and Marmo continued to wrangle, Ms. Regina Marks drew up a purchase offer agreement in the amount of $309,900.00 (with the aforementioned contingencies) from Mr. Jamal which was signed on January 26, 2006. On January 27, 2006, the defendant's attorney returned Ms. Marmo's check terminating all negotiations between Ms. Marmo and the defendant, copying Ms. Marks' on said letter. Mr. Jamal had two subsequent conversations with Ms. Marks after making his initial offer. Ms. Marks had advised Mr. Jamal that there were other offers on the house, and specifically negotiated with Mr. Jamal that the defendant would be allowed to remain in the residence three to six months. The defendant had approximately two conversations with Mr. Marks relative to the Jamal deal. At some point during the negotiations in January 2006, the defendant asked Ms. Marks to have the parties make their highest and best offer, which Ms. Marks did and this drove up the sale price of the house. While the relationship between the parties deteriorated, the defendant never specifically instructed Ms. Marks not to continue to try to sell the property after their agreement expired, including the time while the Marmo deal was being negotiated. The defendant never stated she was not going to pay the plaintiff for the work she did try to sell the house after the contract expired. In January 2006, the defendant and Ms. Marks had a breakdown in communication and Ms. Marks told the defendant over the phone that she was entitled to her commission if the Jamal deal closed even though the listing agreement had expired, with which the defendant disagreed. [*3]

On March 6, 2006, the property was sold to"Highland Estates, LLC," for the purchase price of $334,750.00. Mr. Jamal, principal of Highland Estates, signed the final closing documents for the defendant's property. The defendant retained a different attorney for the closing than the attorney who had initially conveyed Jamal's offer to her. On the date of the closing, the contract price of the property was increased by $22,500.00, and sold for $332,500.00 - more than 5% of the originally contracted sale price of $310,000.00. Additional adjustments of $2,250.00 were added to the contract price for a final closing price of $334,750.00 - almost eight-percent (8%) higher than the contracted sale price. There was no evidence submitted from either the plaintiff or Mr. Jamal as to why the contract price for the property increased $22,500.00 at the closing. The defendant testified that all negotiations occurred at the closing and that the price went up on the date of the closing because the defendant told Mr. Jamal that she wanted more money for the property. Mr. Jamal had come to the closing with a cashier's check in the amount of $310,000.00, which was the amount typed into the original residential contract of sale drafted by the attorneys. The final contract of sale had "$310,000.00" crossed out and replaced with the number "$332,500.00". The final contract of sale had a provision which stated that there was no broker involved with the sale of the house, and that if it was determined that a broker was involved, the seller would be solely responsible for any brokerage commissions relating to its sale.

LEGAL ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION:

The basis for the plaintiff's cause of action is that the defendant is liable to plaintiff for the $15,000 which represents her commission on the sale of the house as set forth in the initial listing agreement between the parties .[FN2] Ms. Marks maintains that she introduced Mr. Jamal to the defendant and was integral to effectuating the sale of the property even though the listing agreement had expired . In turn, the defendant argues that since the listing agreement expired at the time Ms. Marks introduced Mr. Jamal, the defendant is not obligated to pay the plaintiff a commission.

A.The Written Contract:

The relevant portion of the agreement that the defendant relies upon in asserting her contention that she is not obligated to pay the plaintiff a commission provides as follows:

Owner(s) understands and agrees to pay the commission referred in

paragraph 3, if this property is sold or transferred or is subject of a

contract of sale within 3 months after the expiration date of this

agreement involving a person with whom the Agent or a Cooperating

Broker or the Owner(s) negotiated or to whom the property is offered, quoted

or shown during the period of this listing agreement. Owner(s) will not,

however, be obligated to pay such commission if Owner(s) enter into

a valid Exclusive Listing Agreement with another New York State

licensed real estate broker after the expiration of this agreement.

Trial Exhibit 1, para. 4.

The general rule of contract law is that "where the language of a contract is unambiguous and [*4]the words are plain and clear, conveying a distinct idea, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation, for effect must be given to the intent as indicated by the language itself. The rules of construction are to be applied to interpret language of ambiguous or doubtful meaning only." 10 NY Jur., Contracts, § 189.Where there is ambiguity as to the meaning of the terms of the contract, the language must be construed most strongly against the party who prepared the contract or who supplied the form for the agreement. 22 NY Jur.2d., Contracts § 257; Interested Underwriters at Lloyds v. Ductor's Inc., 103 AD2d 76 (1st Dept. 1984) affirmed 65 NY2d 647 (1985). The grammatical construction of a contract is often a reliable indication of the intent of the parties, and a court, in construing a contract, and courts should give due consideration to the grammatical arrangement of the clauses. 22 NY Jur.2d., Contracts § 241. Grammatical construction is helpful in clarifying the parties' intent, but should not be used to defeat their intent. Nemmer Furniture Co. v. Select Furniture Co., 25 Misc 2d 895 (Erie County 1960). In that regard, where general words occur at the end of a sentence, they refer to and qualify the whole, and if words are in the middle of a sentence and sensibly apply to a particular branch of it, they are not to be extended to that which follows. 22 NY Jur.2d., Contracts § 241; Paramount Communications Inc. v. Horsehead Industries, Inc., 231 AD2d 40 (1st Dept. 1997).

Since this contract must be construed strongly against the drafter [the plaintiff here], and general words at the end of a sentence qualify the whole sentence, this Court finds that the words "during the period of this listing agreement" apply to the term "negotiate." Therefore, since the offer and subsequent negotiations between Mr. Jamal and Ms. Marks occurred after the "period of the listing agreement" expired, the defendant does not owe a commission under the terms of the contract.

B.The Implied Contract, Quantum Meruit and Unjust Enrichment:

Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to recover her commission under the alternative legal theory that an implied contract existed between the parties. Plaintiff argues that Ms. Marks' continued to render her professional services in good faith after the listing agreement expired with the good faith expectation that she would be paid her duly entitled commission. Yet, the defendant has refused to pay Ms. Marks in spite of accepting her services and closing on the very deal that Ms. Marks procured with Sammy Jamal.

Written contracts are not required in order for one to be able to collect brokerage commissions. General Obligations Law § 5-701(10); Lane-Real Estate v. Lawlet Corp., 28 NY2d 36 (1971). A quasi or constructive contract arises by law in the interests of equity and its purpose it to prevent unjust enrichment of one party and render as much as deserved to the other party. Bradkin v. Leverton, 26 NY2d 192 (1970); Gromback Productions, Inc. v. Waring, 293 NY 609 (1944). Quantum meruit is a legal obligation imposed in order to prevent a party's unjust enrichment. Tesser v. Allboro Equipment Co., 302, AD2d 589 (2d Dept. 2003). To state a cause of action in quantum meruit, a plaintiff must establish 1) the performance of services in good faith; 2) acceptance of the services by the person to whom they are rendered; 3) the expectation of compensation therefor, and 4) the reasonable value of the services allegedly rendered. Tesser v. Allboro Equipment Co., supra.

Moreover, despite the fact that the right to a commission does not fall within the constraints of the contract, it is settled that absent an agreement otherwise, a realtor may be deemed to have earned his commission once he has produced a ready, willing, and able buyer to purchase within the terms set by the seller. Greene v. Hellman, 51 NY2d 197 (1980); Mecox Realty Group v. Rose, 202 [*5]AD2d 404 (2d Dept. 1994). It is also well established that a broker may recover her commission is she can establish that 1) she is duly licensed; 2) that she had a contract, express or implied, with the party who is required to pay the commission; and 3) that she was the procuring cause of the sale. Stanzoni Realty Corp. v. Landmark Properties of Suffolk, Ltd., et al., 19 AD3d 582 (2d Dept. 2005); Friedland Realty, Inc. v. Piazza, 273 AD2d 351 (2d Dept. 2000); Buck v. Cimino, 243 AD2d 681 (2d Dept. 1997); Greene v. Hellman, 51 NY2d 197 (1980). As such, a broker is entitled to her commission if it is found that she created an amiable atmosphere in which negotiations proceeded and generated a chain of circumstances that led to the sale. Friedland Realty, Inc. v. Piazza, supra; Greendlinger v. Donahue Real Estate, 4 Misc 3d 1016A (Kings County 2004).On the other hand the broker will be denied the commission where the broker was "by no means responsible for a meeting of the minds between [the] parties . . .or for creating an amicable atmosphere for negotiations to proceed. Greendlinger, supra; Finley v. Amyot, 285 AD2d 946 (3d Dept. 2001). Such as when "the sellers negotiated an entirely different deal with a different broker", so that the initial broker was not the "direct and proximate link . . . between the introduction of the sellers to the buyers and the consummation of the sale." Greendlinger, supra; see Mollyann, Inc. v. Demetriades, 206 AD2d 415, 416 (2d Dept. 1994). Moreover, it has been held that "in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, or fraud, or bad faith on the part of the seller, the broker is not entitled to a commission on a sale negotiated after the term of his employment." ERA Hamlet Realty, Inc. v. Meola, 198 AD2d 471 (2d Dept. 1993).

Here, it is not disputed that Ms. Marks is duly licensed or that the plaintiff had a contract with the defendant, which required defendant to pay plaintiff a commission. The defendant never told Ms. Marks that she would not pay her for the services she continued to provide after the agreement expired, and consequently Ms. Marks continued to provide her services in good faith seeking to sell the property. In turn, the defendant accepted the services rendered when she accepted the offer from Mr. Jamal and ultimately accepted his money at the closing. The reasonable value of the services rendered was established by the plaintiff to be 5% of the sale price of the property. As such, the only issue for this Court to determine is whether Ms. Marks "procured" the sale of the house, or whether any fraud or bad faith was exercised on the part of the seller.

Mr. Jamal testified that he saw the plaintiff's "for sale" sign on the property, which abutted property that Mr. Jamal had just purchased. The defendant never erected a "for sale" sign for the property, and thus never elicited any form of communication or an offer from Mr. Jamal (or any other purchaser) prior to Ms. Marks introduction of Mr. Jamal to her. Ms. Marks first introduced Mr. Jamal to the defendant. Ms. Marks first conveyed an offer from Mr. Jamal to the defendant over the phone. Ms. Marks was the first and only person to fax over a signed purchase offer agreement to the defendant's attorney. Ms. Marks incorporated contingencies into the agreement that were beneficial to the defendant, including allowing for the defendant to remain in the house and securing a cash deal transaction. On January 26, 2006, Ms. Marks presented the defendant a knowingly higher offer from Mr. Jamal than what was being negotiated in the Marmo deal. Conspicuously, the very next day, on January 27, 2006, the defendant's attorney returned Ms. Marmo's check terminating all negotiations between Ms. Marmo and the defendant. While the defendant stated in her testimony that this series of events was a mere coincidence, the Court finds otherwise.

Indeed, albeit the defendant's testimony conflicted depending upon which attorney was examining her, she did state that she wanted to pursue the Marmo deal, even though Ms. Marks had [*6]presented the higher offer to her. As such, had Mr. Jamal's offer not been conveyed, it is reasonable to conclude that the Marmo deal would have closed. While it is reasonably likely that the Marmo deal would have closed for less money and with more individual concessions, Ms. Marks would clearly have been entitled to her five- percent (5%) commission. Thus, when Ms. Marks presented a knowingly higher offer to the defendant after the contract expired, there was no insinuation that Ms. Marks did not expect to get paid or that the defendant did not understand that Ms. Marks expected to be paid. In fact, the defendant admitted that after the Jamal offer was conveyed, Ms. Marks advised her that she was entitled to her commission even though the contract had expired. Despite this discussion of the very issue over which this lawsuit is based, the defendant failed to take any overt steps to terminate Ms. Marks involvement in the negotiations, Ms. Marks maintained her presence. Indeed, it is axiomatic to state that Ms. Mark's expected to be paid for her services, for she alone trumped the Marmo deal (negotiated during the contract period) with the more lucrative Jamal deal (negotiated after the contract expired).

In short, Ms. Marks kept abreast of the status of the Marmo and Jamal deal with the implied understanding that she would be paid for her services if either deal closed, and even specifically addressed with the defendant the fact that she believed she was entitled to a commission on the Jamal deal. Her markings in the Jamal deal are undeniable. For instance, since Ms. Marks was aware of the particularities that had hampered the Marmo deal from closing, she was able to apply her expertise in using these particularities to her advantage. In particular, she knew that the defendant wished to stay in the house for a period of time, and so she entered that stipulation into the purchase offer agreement that Mr. Jamal signed - the same agreement that Ms. Marks ultimately faxed to the defendant's attorney on January 26, 2006. Moreover, she knew that Mr. Jamal had no interest in the house or its contents and that the defendant wanted to keep certain personal and sentimental items in the house, such as the range hood, t.v., and chandelier. Knowing this was an issue that frustrated the Marmo deal, she left these items out of the deal in drafting the purchase offer agreement, harnessing items of importance into writing that she knew would appease her client, making the deal as advantageous as possible for the defendnat. Also, recognizing that timing was crucial in executing this deal, Ms. Marks immediately conveyed Mr. Jamal's offer to the defendant and then faxed to the defendant's attorney a signed purchase offer agreement the same day she spoke with the defendant to convey the offer. By timely conveying the knowingly higher offer, she presented the defendant with the opportunity to financial benefit from her professional services and realize a higher price than the Marmo deal presented. In fact, Ms. Marks worked-up the price of the property by artfully exploiting facts about the property vis-a-vis incentives of the parties. For example, she advised Mr. Jamal that there were "other offers on the property," for she knew that Mr. Jamal wanted the property to complete a project he aimed to develop on his adjacent property. Thus, it was not a coincidence that Mr. Jamal's first offer to the defendant was for its listing price. When she conveyed to the parties that they make the highest and best offer, she successfully drove the price of the property up.By the time the property closed, the defendant had been trying to sell it for more than one year. Yet, once Ms. Marks introduced Mr. Jamal's offer to the defendant, the property sold within five weeks for almost $25,000 over the listing price of $309,900 in a cash deal with the only significant contingency being that clear and clean title is conveyed to the Mr. Jamal.

Moreover, in procuring the sale of the house to Mr. Jamal, she negotiated matters of significance and cemented them into the purchase offer agreement which was ultimately transposed [*7]into the final residential contract of sale signed by the parties at the closing, to wit: securing a cash deal, defendant being able to remain in the home free of charge, and the buyer having no property right or interest to the contents of the house. In fact, the only major item of negotiation that altered significantly between the purchase offer agreement that Ms. Marks negotiated and the final sale was the price of the property.

Towards this end, peculiarly, Mr. Jamal could offer no reason why he bought the property for $22,500.00 more the amount he came to the closing with, which was $310,000.00 (cashier's check). The property closed for more than 5% of the originally contracted sale price and with additional adjustments of $2,250.00, the total increase in price amounted to $24,750.00 - almost eight-percent (8%) more than what the contract of sale stated. Of additional significance is that incorporated into the Residential Contract of Sale was language stating in two separate instances that "NO BROKER" was involved with the sale of the property, and that the "seller shall be responsible for any and all brokerage commissions" if such claim was made to survive the closing. Defendant contends that the price increased because she simply asked Mr. Jamal for more money, and was concerned about Ms. Marmo suing her - not Ms. Marks. The Court finds that the credible evidence does not support this contention.

As such, although the defendant contends that Ms. Marks played no role in consummating this deal, the facts clearly bare otherwise. The evidence demonstrates that Ms. Marks created an amicable atmosphere ripe for negotiations and facilitated the sale by recognizing the compatibility of the needs of the parties and then linking their needs together. "But for" Ms. Marks' involvement, the sale of the property to Sammy Jamal would not have occurred. The fact that the attorneys engaged in negotiations thereafter, does not undermine the proximate link initiated by Ms. Marks in introducing the parties and securing the significant contingencies, which were transposed into the final contract of sale signed by the parties. In fact, without the workings of Ms. Marks it is not only unlikely that the sale with Mr. Jamal would have ever been consummated, but it is also reasonably unlikely that the defendant and Mr. Jamal would have ever even spoken.

Finally, the defendant relies, in part, upon the ERA Hamlet v. Meola case, arguing that Ms. Marks is not entitled to a commission on the sale of the property because she negotiated with Mr. Jamal after the term of her employment ended. ERA Hamlet Realty, Inc. v. Meola, 198 AD2d 471 (2d Dept. 1993); Defendant's Post Trial Brief dated June 30, 2008. Yet, the defendant fails to note that the Court in ERA Hamlet also held that, "in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, or fraud, or bad faith on the part of the seller, the broker is not entitled to a commission on a sale negotiated after the term of his employment." ERA Hamlet Realty, Inc. v. Meola, 198 AD2d 471 (2d Dept. 1993). Here, the credible evidence before this Court suggests that the defendant undertook measures to keep this property transaction secreted from the plaintiff and finds that in so doing she exercised bad faith.

In assessing the truthfulness and accuracy of the testimony of each of the parties, it is the quality of the testimony that is controlling. While there is no particular formula to evaluate the truthfulness and accuracy of a party's testimony, this Court is empowered as the exclusive trier of fact to make its findings in large measure on considerations relating to the credibility of the witnesses who testified. Lelekakis v. Kamamis,, 41 AD3d 662 (2nd Dept. 2007).

The defendant's testimony was irreconcilable on several accounts, and her posturing, hedging, and inability to understand simple questions impugned her credibility. In particular, while it is [*8]reconcilable why the Jamal deal closed under a company name "Highland Estates", the defendant's reluctance to admit that she recognized Mr. Jamal's name on the closing documents, the very person Ms. Marks conveyed the offer from, and the very person who was present at the closing with her to sign the residential contract of sale to buy her property, was unexplainable, as was her inability to state who first introduced her to Sammy Jamal. In addition, while it one's right to change attorneys for any reason, the defendant elected not to use the attorney who had conveyed the Jamal offer to the defendant even though she was "happy" with her prior attorney's legal services. However, considering the dispute over the commission between the parties prior to the Jamal deal ever even closing, the Court finds that simple facts that should have ordinarily been explained during the trial remain unexplained or their explanation from the defendant was illogical, all for the simple reason that the defendant manipulated the closing to ensure that Ms. Marks did not earn a commission. In a concerted effort, the defendant cast layer upon layer to the transaction to try to disguise the fact that she sold the property to Sammy Jamal. Changing attorneys, was yet another device the defendant rigged to try to escape paying the plaintiff her commission.

C.Conclusion:

As such, it is the finding of this Court that the plaintiff has sufficiently established that there was an implied contract between the parties entitling her to her $15,000.00 commission. Moreover, plaintiff has sufficiently established that Ms. Marks, a duly licensed broker, provided the direct and proximate link in introducing the parties and consummating the sale of this property by providing an amiable atmosphere for negotiations, thus entitling her to her commission. Greendlinger, supra; see Mollyann, Inc. v. Demetriades, 206 AD2d 415, 416 (2d Dept. 1994). Finally, it is immaterial that the deal was negotiated after the agreement between the parties expired in light of the bad faith on the part of the seller in her attempt to secrete the transaction from Ms. Marks with whom an implied contract existed. See, ERA Manlet Realty, Inc. v. Meola, supra.

In light of the foregoing, this Court need not reach that branch of the plaintiff's complaint alleging a cause of action for breach of an oral contract.

THEREFORE, it is determined that the plaintiff has met its burden of proof in establishing liability on the part of the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and so it is

ORDERED that judgment is granted in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of fifteen-thousand dollars ($15,000.00), plus interest and costs.

SO ORDERED.

Dated:October 3, 2008_________________________

Poughkeepsie, New YorkKatherine A. Moloney

CITY COURT JUDGE

To:

ENTERED this ____ day of October, 2008

____________________________

JEAN JICHA

CHIEF CLERK

An appeal from this judgment must be taken no later than the earliest of the following dates: (I) thirty days after receipt in court of a copy of the judgment by the appealing party, (ii) thirty days after the personal delivery of a copy of the judgment by another party to the action to the appealing party (or by the appealing party to another party), or (iii) thirty-five days after the mailing of a copy of the judgment to the appealing party by the clerk of the court or by another party to the action. Footnotes

Footnote 1:Uniform City Court Act § 202 limits the jurisdiction of this Court to $15,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs. U.C.C.A. § 202.

Footnote 2:Plaintiff seeks a monetary judgment that is the Court's jurisdictional maximum, considerably less than the amount that would have been due pursuant to the listing agreement.