People v Knight

[*1] People v Knight 2007 NY Slip Op 52537(U) [18 Misc 3d 1129(A)] Decided on November 28, 2007 Supreme Court, Queens County Buchter, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on November 28, 2007
Supreme Court, Queens County

The People of the State of New York

against

Jalah Knight, Defendant



1752-04

Richard Lance Buchter, J.

The defendant moves to set aside the jury verdict convicting him of Reckless Endangerment in the First Degree, and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree pursuant to CPL § 330.30(1) and either dismissing those counts or, in the alternative, setting them down for a new trial, and for further relief.

The defendant was charged under the above-captioned indictment with Murder in the First Degree, Murder in the Second Degree (two counts), Attempted Murder in the Second Degree, Assault in the First Degree, Reckless Endangerment in the First Degree, Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree.

After a trial by jury, the court accepted the following partial verdict: not guilty of Murder in the First Degree; not guilty of Attempted Murder in the Second Degree, guilty of Reckless Endangerment in the First Degree, guilty of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree, and guilty of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree. The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict with regard to the two counts of Murder in the Second Degree and the single count of Assault in the First Degree, whereupon this court, with consent of the parties, declared a mistrial with regard only to those three counts.

The defendant contends that the verdict of guilty rendered on certain counts must be set aside because the prosecution intentionally withheld and suppressed highly relevant Brady [*2]material establishing a legitimate claim of self-defense.

Evidence was adduced at trial that the defendant was arrested on January 4, 2007 and gave a videotaped statement wherein he admitted firing a gun, but maintained that he fired only after he saw one of the victims waving a gun and observed a shot fired in his direction. At the time of defendant's statement, the police, who had canvassed the area of the shooting, had statements from several persons that one of the victims, Rashard Peppers, had a gun that night and that more than one gun had been fired at the time of the incident. Additionally, several witnesses told police that shortly before the homicides, a group, which included Rashard Peppers, had committed a gunpoint robbery of a marijuana dealer in a nearby apartment building.

There were also numerous police reports generated which contained information relating to Rashard Pepper's possession, use and firing of a weapon prior to and during the incident. These reports were not furnished to defendant until July 5, 2007, approximately four days prior to trial. Furthermore, the record indicates that defendant's former and current counsel were never told of this information despite demands for Brady material. Additional information regarding the presence of guns, including the videotaped statement of Malik Hogan, who was also arrested with regard to this incident, was turned over to defendant only after opening statements. Upon receipt of this information by the defense, counsel for the defendant directed his investigator to attempt to locate the witnesses named in the police reports and to further develop the information. However, certain of the exculpatory witnesses mentioned in the police reports could not be located by the defense.

Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963), and its progeny, defendant is entitled to disclosure by the People of evidence favorable to the accused where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecutor, and to withhold or suppress such material violates the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. The suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to and requested by an accused violates Due Process . To be considered exculpatory and therefore subject to disclosure under Brady, the withheld evidence must actually bear on the issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence.

In Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir.2001), citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 US 263 (1999), the court set forth the following standards:

There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.

With regard to the first requirement, clearly the information withheld by the prosecution satisfies the first component in that information that Rashard Peppers participated in a gunpoint robbery just prior to the homicide and that several witnesses placed a gun in his hand at the time of the shooting goes directly to defendant's defense of justification and is clearly favorable to defendant.

With regard to the second component, the prosecution was in possession of this material for approximately three and one half years and disclosed it only four days prior to trial. In Leka, supra, the prosecution waited approximately twenty-two months before turning over requested [*3]material, which that court held violated its Brady obligation.

In United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200 (2nd Cir. 1995), the court held that under Brady and its progeny, the government has an affirmative duty to disclose favorable evidence known to it, even if no specific disclosure request is made and the individual prosecutor is presumed to have knowledge of all information gathered in connection with its investigation. The court further held that the prosecutor's governed faith or lack of bad faith is irrelevant where the governments suppression of evidence amounts to a denial of due process.

Again, clearly, here the exculpatory information was both requested and suppressed.

With regard to the third component, in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), the United States Supreme Court held that the test of materiality is not a sufficiency of evidence test requiring that the suppressed evidence would have resulted in acquittal. A defendant need not demonstrate that after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, there would not have been enough left to convict. Id. at 434-435.

In the present case, the defense of justification, which is the crux of the withheld material, applies to the defendant's conviction of both Reckless Endangerment in the First Degree , People v. McManus, 67 NY2d 541 (1986); 68 NY2d 96 (1986);

People v. Goetz, 68 NY2d (1986), and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree (with regard to the issue of intent to use unlawfully against another),

People v. Pons, 68 NY2d 264 (1980). The court finds that the People's wrongful withholding of exculpatory evidence effectively deprived the defendant of a fair trial with regard to these charges, the verdict with regard to defendant's conviction of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree is not subject to a justification defense and therefore is unaffected by the withheld material. (People v. Almodovar, 62 NY2d 126 (1984).

Based upon the foregoing, the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict is granted only with regard to the defendant's conviction for Reckless Endangerment in the First Degree and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree and these counts will be retried. The defendant's motion to set aside the verdict is denied with regard to Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree. The defendant's motion for further relief is denied in that he has failed to set forth sufficient grounds in support thereof.

Order entered accordingly.

This constitutes the order, opinion and decision of this court.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of the memorandum and order on the attorney for the defendant and on the District Attorney.

Kew Gardens, New York

Dated: November 28, 2007

RICHARD L. BUCHTER, J.S.C.