Grogan v Seaford Union Free School Dist.

[*1] Grogan v Seaford Union Free School Dist. 2007 NY Slip Op 52502(U) [18 Misc 3d 1112(A)] Decided on December 20, 2007 Supreme Court, Nassau County Palmieri, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on December 20, 2007
Supreme Court, Nassau County

Matthew Grogan, an infant under the age of fourteen (14) years, by his mother and natural guardian, Roberta Grogan and Robert Grogan, individually, Plaintiff,

against

Seaford Union Free School District, Metro Therapy, Inc., and Maureen Rockwood, Defendants.



009594/07



Law Office of Kenneth M. Mollins, P.C.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

425 Broad Hollow Road, Ste. 215

Melville, NY 11747

Congdon, Flaherty, O'Callaghan,

Reid, Donlon, Travis & Fishlinger

By: Christine Gasser, Esq.

Attorneys for Defendant-Seaford Union Free School District

The OMNI

333 Earle Ovington Blvd., Ste. 502

Uniondale, NY 11553

Maureen Rockwood

c/o Metro Therapy, Inc.

Defendant Pro Se

1363 Veterans Memorial Highway

Hauppauge, NY 11788

Metro Therapy, Inc.

Defendant Pro Se

1363 Veterans Memorial Highway

Hauppauge, NY 11788

Daniel Palmieri, J.

The motion by defendant Seaford Union Free School District ("District") for an order dismissing the complaint as to it pursuant to CPLR 3211(a), General Municipal Law §§ 50-e and 50-i and Education Law §3813 is granted. The cross motion by the plaintiffs for leave to serve a late notice of claim is denied.

This suit stems from alleged acts of District personnel and an independent contractor concerning the infant plaintiff Matthew Grogan, who was at the time a special education student attending Seaford Harbor Elementary School. His mother, plaintiff Roberta Grogan, commenced an action by the filing of a summons and complaint on June 1, 2007. She alleges that service of a Notice of Claim on the District, a condition for commencement of any action in tort against it, was made on August 10, 2006.

Nine causes of action are alleged, six of which concern the District. The first sounds in intentional infliction of emotional distress and violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") (20 USC § 1400 et seq.). This is based on incidents in which Matthew was allegedly placed in an elevator closet for disciplinary purposes at the direction of defendant Maureen Rockwood, an educational consultant and employee of defendant Metro Therapy, Inc., and left there for what is claimed to be extensive periods of time, causing injury. The occurrences upon which the claim is based also include leaving Matthew in contact with Rockwood. However, the only specific incidents alleged took place on October 21, 2005. Complaint, ¶ ¶ 24, 25. The plaintiff alleges that the foregoing "was discovered on or about June, 2006" and that the action "continues to accrue to date." Complaint, ¶ 23.

The second cause of action alleges that the District failed to provide Matthew with an appropriate Individualized Treatment Plan ("ITP") and Individual Education Plan ("IEP"), part of which failure was to verify as proper the methods being used in his education. The third cause of action echoes the second, but focuses on an alleged failure to supervise properly the personnel who were working with Matthew, and to verify whether such personnel knew and were acting on an appropriate ITP and IEP. The seventh cause of action is a derivative claim asserted by Roberta Grogan based upon the injuries allegedly suffered by Matthew. The eighth alleges the District's violation of IDEA, and cites 42 USC § 1983, which provides remedies for deprivation of civil rights. Finally, the ninth cause of action alleges a violation of the Federal Rehabilitation Act (29 USC § 794), and also raises 42 USC § 1983.

Timely service of a notice of claim is a condition precedent to the commencement of an action which is founded on a common-law tort committed by a school district. See Education Law § 3813(2); General Municipal Law § 50-i(1). Here, the plaintiffs have alleged that the central, injury-producing occurrences continued beyond October, 2005. The [*2]Notice of Claim plaintiffs wish the Court to approve asserts that there were two additional acts of placing Matthew in the elevator closet, on November 3 and November 7, 2005, and at "other times not yet known to the Claimant." Notice of Claim, at 2 (item "4"). Plaintiffs also allege that Maureen Rockwood continues to "work with students" at Matthew's school, causing him continued emotional harm.

However, in support of its motion to dismiss the District has submitted excerpts of Roberta Grogan's testimony at a hearing conducted pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h, which clearly indicated that there were no other incidents beyond November, 2005. Specifically, she stated that sometime during that month she first learned of the incident from Matthew, and contacted the Superintendent, who assured her that this form of "time out" would not be used again. She further testified that after November 7, she never was told by Matthew, nor by any District personnel, that the elevator closet had again been used. She also stated that to the best of her knowledge Rockwood did not continue working with Matthew beyond the following December or January, as a new consultant began working with him at that time. She did claim that Rockwood continued to work in the school with other students.

The District has also submitted the affidavit of Brian L. Conboy, Assistant Superintendent for Curriculum, who oversees the Special Education Department. He states that the closet was used on three occasions, October 21, November 3 and November 7, 2005

as a "time out" location. [FN1] Because of the mother's complaint, it was not used again afterwards. He also states that there was no request by the family for administrative review of the issue, nor of Matthew's IEP. With regard to the latter, the IEP had been developed by the Committee on Special Education with input from the parents, who he describes as being "very involved" in the process. Finally, he avers that Maureen Rockwood is an educational consultant employed by Metro Therapy, Inc. whose role was to consult with teachers with regard to behavioral strategies, but that to the best of his knowledge Rockwood did not consult with Matthew's teacher beyond November of 2005.

The plaintiffs have submitted no affidavit or other evidence rebutting the foregoing.

The Court therefore finds that the claim accrued and that the claimants had sufficient knowledge to serve a Notice of Claim in November, 2005. To the extent that plaintiffs argue that Maureen Rockwood's continued presence in the building constituted some sort of continuing wrong, the same does nothing to alter the fact that plaintiff Roberta Grogan knew enough to make a claim at that time.

A claimant must serve a notice within 90 days after the claim arises. General Municipal Law § 50-e. The plaintiff's Notice of Claim was untimely, as it was served in [*3]August of 2006. So much of the complaint against the District that is founded on the use of the elevator closet and the failure to properly supervise personnel/independent contractors, especially Maureen Rockwood (the first, second, third, and seventh causes of action [FN2] ) must therefore be dismissed for failure to serve a timely notice of claim unless the Court grants the cross motion and permits late service thereof.

Initially, the Court does not find that there was a waiver of the District's right to seek dismissal for the late Notice of Claim because it did not formally reject it and conducted the § 50-h hearing. It was free to make this present motion up to the time of trial. Frank v City of New York, 240 AD2d 198 (1st Dept. 1997); see also, McCrae v City of New York, 44 AD3d 306 (1st Dept. 2007; Rodriquez v City of New York, 169 AD2d 532 (1st Dept. 1991). Plaintiffs' argument, made by counsel in reply, that the plaintiffs were somehow misled by the District into not seeking court permission to serve the late notice, is not supported by any evidence. The burden remains with a claimant to serve notice, and the defendant has no obligations in that regard. See, Davis v City of New York, 250 AD2d 368 (1st Dept. 1998); Taverna v City of New York, 166 AD2d 314 (1st Dept. 1990). The fact that the District retained the untimely Notice of Claim served upon it does not alter this burden. Taverna, supa. Plaintiffs have not presented any authority to the contrary.

The Court also agrees with the defendant that because Roberta Grogan is not an infant, her motion for an extension to file a late notice of her derivative claim had to have been made within a year and 90 days of the accrual of such claim, which was not done, requiring dismissal on that ground. Pierson v City of New York, 56 NY2d 950 (1982); see, Carter v City of New York, 38 AD3d 702 (2d Dept. 2007).

In determining whether to permit the service of the infant's late notice of claim, the Court must consider several factors. These include whether petitioners had a reasonable excuse for the failure to timely serve a notice of claim, whether the school district acquired actual notice of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose, or a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the school district in its defense. Scolo v Central Islip Union Free School District, 40 AD3d 1104 (2d Dept. 2007); see Matter of Doyle v Elwood Union Free School Dist., 39 AD3d 544 (2d Dept. 2007); Matter of Padovano v Massapequa Union Free School Dist., 31 AD3d 563 (2d Dept. 2006); Matter of Conroy v Smithtown Cent. School Dist., 3 AD3d 492 (2d Dept. 2004); Matter of Bordan v Mamaroneck School Dist., 230 AD2d 792 (2d Dept. 1996); Matter of Sica v Board of Educ. of City of NY, 226 AD2d 542 (2d Dept. 1996). Further, if there is a nexus between a petitioner's infancy and the delay, it may be considered. Williams v. Nassau County Med. Ctr., 6 NY3d 531, 538 (2006). No one factor should be determinative. Matter of Morris v. County of Suffolk, 88 AD2d 956 (2d Dept. 1982), affd 58 [*4]NY2d 767 (1982); see also, Bay Terrace Coop. Section IV v New York State Employees' Retirement Sys. Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Sys, 55 NY2d 979, 981 (1982).

Here, the Court agrees with the defendant District that the record militates against granting the permission sought. There is no reasonable excuse presented for the failure to serve the Notice. Further, the application to serve a late notice was not made until the District moved to dismiss, triggering a cross motion for that relief. The cross motion was served on November 1, 2007 well over a year from the already untimely service of the Notice, and nearly two years after the events at issue, an inordinate delay. Matter of Padovano v Massapequa Union Free School Dist., supra. Nor is there any evidence that Matthew's infancy, or any disability, was a factor in such delay, as his parents learned of the occurrences complained of in November of 2005.

While the District had knowledge of the use of the elevator closet, and arguably of Maureen Rockwood's role, this is not sufficient to justify granting the application in view of the failure to serve the notice and the subsequent substantial delay in moving for permission for late service. Termini v Valley Stream Union Free School Dist. No. 13, 2 AD3d 866 (2d Dept. 2003). Indeed, the District's uncontroverted proof of a quick resolution of the elevator closet issue, and of the parents' failure to seek any further administrative review, meant that it had no reason to know that a claim likely would result and that it should act accordingly. Notice of the underlying events is by itself insufficient as notice; rather, it is knowledge of the nature of the claim. Id.; see also, Matter of Shapiro v County of Nassau, 208 AD2d 545 (2d Dept. 1994).

The assertion by the plaintiffs, in effect, that the Court should recognize that the District knew or should have known of the parents' continuing dissatisfaction with its response because Rockwood remained in the school is incompatible with the unrebutted showing that, as far as the District was aware, she ceased working with Matthew after November of 2005, and the plaintiff's own testimony would place that end date in January of 2006, at the very latest. Relatedly, there is nothing to indicate that the parents had ever demanded directly that she cease working with Matthew, let alone be removed from the school altogether. Thus, Rockwood's continued presence at Seaford Harbor Elementary School would not serve to alert the District that the parents would be dissatisfied with the outcome of the issue that arose in late October and early November of 2005.

Given the foregoing, it would be an improvident exercise of discretion to allow the late Notice of Claim, even if, as the plaintiff claims, the District did have an opportunity to investigate after the untimely notice was served and thus is not substantially prejudiced in its ability to defend the law suit. It should be noted that in response to the District's argument that any contract claim as might be gleaned from the second and third causes of action should not be allowed because it is not asserted in the notice, the plaintiffs have denied that such a theory is being advanced and that the claim is essentially one in negligence (Reply, at 3) which of course requires service of a timely notice of claim. There is thus no reason to parse the claims found within each cause of action.

The eighth and ninth causes of action also must be dismissed.The defendant grounds [*5]so much of the motion to dismiss that is directed to these causes of action on a failure to pursue administrative remedies. Plaintiffs' counsel acknowledges that a party dissatisfied with the education provided by a school district must first exhaust administrative remedies, and does not deny that no such administrative remedies were pursued.

However, counsel strenuously asserts in his affirmation in support of cross motion/opposition to the District's motion regarding these claims that the plaintiffs are suing for personal injuries attributable to this defendant's "carelessness, recklessness and negligence" and not for educational relief. Counsel explains that the references to IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act found in these causes of action were "provided as relevant history necessary to understand the nature of the claim." This is an acknowledgment that the suit is grounded entirely in tort, and thus a notice of claim was required. The claims are therefore dismissed for the reasons stated above with regard to the first, second, and third causes of action. To the extent that a civil rights claim is arguably asserted in these claims, no exposition is offered, and in view of counsel's statement of the nature of the plaintiffs' case such a claim clearly has been withdrawn, if ever it had been asserted.

This shall constitute the Decision and Order of this Court.

E N T E R

Dated: December 20, 2007

_____________________________

Hon. Daniel Palmieri

Acting Supreme Court Justice Footnotes

Footnote 1: Though not relevant to the issue of the service of the Notice of Claim, Conboy asserts that the room was an entry vestibule to the elevator at the end of the corridor near Matthew's classroom, which was heated and lighted and was approximately 64 square feet in size. He also states that on each occasion of its use, Matthew was accompanied by one or two adults who remained with him throughout the "time out."

Footnote 2: Derivative claims are subject to the same requirement as the infant's claim that a timely notice of claim be filed. See, Matter of Benson v Town of Islip, 99 AD2d 755 (2d Dept. 1984); Matter of Papayannakos v Levittown Mem. Special Ed. Ctr., 38 AD3d 902 (2d Dept. 2007).