People v Ramos
Annotate this CaseDecided on November 20, 2007
Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County
People of the State of New York
against
Carlos Ramos, Defendant.
2007NY027733
Elisa S. Koenderman, J.
The defendant Carlos Ramos is charged with one count of Leaving the Scene of an Accident under VTL 600(2)(a) and one count of Unlicensed Driving under VTL 509 (1). The defendant has filed a motion seeking the following: (1) dismissal for facial insufficiency; (2) a Huntley/Dunaway hearing; (3) a Wade/Dunaway hearing; (4) a Sandoval hearing; and (5) discovery. The motion is decided as follows.
The accusatory instrument presently before the Court alleges, in sum, that on April 9,
2007, in the County of New York, State of New York, defendant was observed walking away
from a location where a motor vehicle had recently hit a pedestrian. Defendant was arraigned on
April 9, 2007, and on April 13, 2007, the People filed a supporting deposition signed by the
pedestrian who had been hit, corroborating the facts alleged in the complaint as attested to by the
arresting officer. The factual allegations also included defendant's statement to another officer
that defendant was the one who drove the car. The complaint was deemed an information without
a supporting deposition from this officer. A schedule for defense motions was set and the matter
was adjourned. Defense counsel filed the present motion, the People answered, and the matter
was adjourned for the Court's decision.
FACIAL SUFFICIENCYAn information is facially sufficient if it meets three requirements. It must substantially conform to the formal requirements of CPL 100.15. Additionally, the factual portion and any accompanying depositions must provide reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed the offense charged, as well as nonhearsay factual allegations of an evidentiary character which, if true, establish every element of the offense charged and defendant's commission thereof (CPL 100.15[3] and 100.40[1]; see People v. Dumas, 68 NY2d 729 [1986]; see also People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133 [1987]).
Defendant seeks dismissal of the information pursuant to CPL 170.30(1)(a), arguing that both charges in the information are facially insufficient under CPL 170.35. As to the first count, he contends that the charge of leaving the scene of an accident is [*2]facially insufficient because there are no nonhearsay factual allegations of an evidentiary character establishing that defendant was the person who was driving the car which struck the pedestrian. Additionally, defendant argues that the element of defendant's knowledge to wit, knowing or having cause to know that personal injury was caused by his operation of a motor vehicle is inadequately supported. The only allegation in the information that connects defendant to the operation of the motor vehicle is defendant's own statement that he was the driver of the car. Defendant argues that the statement is not properly corroborated, and cannot be considered, as per CPL 60.50. Defendant further argues that there are no factual allegations supporting the conclusion that defendant "left the scene," inasmuch as the officer who observed defendant in the vicinity engaged in interpretation and speculation as to defendant's state of mind.
In answering defendant's motion, the People responded in a cursory fashion, asserting without elaboration that defendant's statement is "fully corroborated" and "sufficiently allege[s]" that defendant was the driver. The People did not make any application to amend the information in order to cure any defects raised by defendant.
Without reaching the merits of defendant's CPL 60.50 argument, the Court nevertheless finds that the first charge is facially insufficient. As a threshold matter, if the allegations in the information cannot satisfactorily establish that defendant was the driver of the car, he cannot be charged with leaving the scene. It is well-settled that proof as to the defendant being the operator of the vehicle is an essential element of the offense charged (see People v Hakala, 270 AD 612 [1st Dept 1946]).
Defendant allegedly stated "I was the one driving the car" to an officer other than the deponent arresting officer. This statement is pure, unadulterated hearsay, which was never corroborated, and which is superfluous at this point, inasmuch as the complaint was converted to an information without this statement being corroborated by the officer to whom it was made. Accordingly, the Court cannot consider defendant's statement in evaluating the facial sufficiency of the information. (The minutes from April 13, 2007, indicate that the People intended to file a superseding information but nevertheless asked that the complaint before the court be deemed an information. However, the People never filed a superseding information.)
Therefore, the Court finds that the charge of leaving the scene of an accident is facially insufficient, inasmuch as it fails to allege nonhearsay, evidentiary facts showing that defendant drove any vehicle, let alone the vehicle which struck the pedestrian. Any additional arguments regarding defendant's knowing or having cause to know he caused an accident, or his intent in walking "away" in a direction other than towards the location of the accident, are moot. If the allegations in the information do not establish that defendant was the driver, nothing else matters.
Defendant next argues that the information is facially insufficient because it does not set forth nonhearsay allegations to show that defendant operated a motor vehicle without a proper license to do so. Defendant argues that, in addition to insufficiently alleging that defendant drove the car, the information also fails to allege that the police had reason to ask defendant to display a license; that the police actually did ask defendant to display his license; or that the police conducted a computer search to check defendant's driving status. Again, without reaching the merits of defendant's [*3]various arguments regarding what the police did or did not do to verify defendant's license, the Court finds that this charge is facially insufficient because there were no nonhearsay allegations concerning defendant operating a vehicle. If it cannot be said that he was the driver, whether or not he has a license to drive is of no moment.
In conclusion, the Court finds that both charges in the present information are facially insufficient, and defendant's motion for dismissal is granted. Defendant's other motions are denied as moot.
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
Dated:November 20, 2007
New York, New York
_________________________
Elisa S. Koenderman, JCC
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