Matter of Williams v New York City Dept. of Hous. Preserv. & Dev.
Annotate this CaseDecided on November 2, 2007
Supreme Court, New York County
In the Matter of the Application of Tiffany Monet Williams, Petitioner, For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules
against
New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development and Franklin Plaza Apartments, Inc., Respondents.
111963/07
Carol R. Edmead, J.
Petitioner Tiffany Monet Williams ("Petitioner") moves for an order, pursuant to CPLR 7803(3): (1) granting the Petition and annulling the final administrative order issued by respondent New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development ("HPD") dated May 7, 2007 (the "Challenged Order") which Order found that petitioner is not entitled to succession rights to Apartment 5F in the building known as and located at 2065 First Avenue, New York, New York (the "subject apartment"); or in the alternative (2) granting the Petition, annulling the Challenged Order, and remanding the proceeding to Respondent HPD for further proceedings.
Petitioner's Contentions
Petitioner asserts that she has lived in the subject apartment since 2003. On or about July 12, 2006, she was served with a Notice from respondent Franklin Plaza Apartments, Inc. ("Franklin"), stating that she did not fulfill the requirements for succession rights contained in Section 3-02(p) of the Rules of the City of New York, and could therefore not retain possession of the subject apartment. In order to succeed to the subject apartment, petitioner has to show that she was a family member of Decedent-Tenant Virginia Davis (the "tenant"), and that petitioner resided at the subject premises since at least December 2003 (two years prior to the death of the tenant, which was on December 3, 2005). Petitioner has shown both. She has demonstrated that she was residing in the subject apartment by previously furnishing Franklin documents they already had in their possession: income certifications from 2003, 2004 and 2005, all of which included petitioner as a tenant of the subject apartment. Also, Franklin acknowledged receipt [*2]during the course of these proceedings, of petitioner's W-2s for calendar year 2004, a 1098-T form from Manhattan College and a 2004 Federal Tax return, for the year 2003, pay stubs and a voter registration card. She also submitted her New York State Identification card to HPD in October, 2006, although no mention is made of it in the agency's "Denial of Succession" Order.
Petitioner points out that when she moved into the subject apartment, she was 19 years old. She did not drive a car and only obtained identification from New York State in 2004. She did not own property or have any traceable assets at the age of 19.
Petitioner was unable to show documents establishing shared expenses with her great grandmother, Virginia Davis, the tenant of record for the subject apartment because she simply gave money to help out with groceries, etc. In general, like with most families, petitioner is unable to establish a paper trail showing shared expenses.
Petitioner would often take her great grandmother to the doctor, dentist, birthday parties, anniversaries, weddings, and the like. She cleaned up the apartment, did the shopping, and did household chores. Supporting letters from family members attest to petitioner's relationship with her great grandmother.
Franklin has commenced a holdover proceeding in the Civil Court.
HPD is seeking to deprive petitioner of her right to succeed to the subject apartment based on the conjecture of some functionary of HPD who concluded, with some obvious sarcasm, that "in light of Ms. Williams' busy school and work schedule, it is certainly possible that it was Ms. Williams' mother, and not Ms. Williams, who provided assistance to the tenant."
Respondents' Contentions
Respondent Franklin is an Article II housing company organized under the Private Housing Finance Law of the State of New York ("PHFL"), also known as the Mitchell-Lama Law, and is the owner of the building in which the subject apartment is located. Virginia Davis was the tenant of record for the subject apartment pursuant to an Occupancy Agreement dated April 27, 1964. The tenant apparently died on December 3, 2005. After the tenant passed away, petitioner requested permission from Franklin for succession rights to the subject apartment. By letter dated July 12, 2006, Morris K. Mitrani ("Mitrani"), counsel for Franklin, notified petitioner that she could not retain possession of the subject apartment based on her failure to meet the eligibility requirements set forth in RCNY § 3-02(p), and petitioner was advised of her right to appeal the denial of succession rights to HPD. By letter dated July 24, 2006, Hearing Officer Lippa ("H.O. Lippa") informed petitioner that she could appeal the housing company's determination and that she could "submit additional relevant information even if not previously provided to the housing corporation." By letter dated August 20, 2006, petitioner appealed Franklin's denial of her succession rights. By letter dated October 9, 2006 petitioner wrote to H.O. Lippa pursuant to a telephone conversation held on September 24, 2006 regarding proof of residency. By letter dated November 13, 2006 Jonathan Irons, Esq. ("Mr. Irons") informed H.O. Lippa that he would be representing petitioner in these proceedings.
By decision, rendered May 7, 2007, H.O. Lippa denied petitioner's appeal of Franklin's denial of her application for succession rights.
The Challenged Order
Excerpts from the Challenged Order are as follows:
The HPD rules define who is a family member for purposes of succession rights.
[*3]A great grandchild is not a defined family member according
to 28 RCNY 3-02(p)(2)(ii)(A). Thus, Tiffany Williams is not a family member according to that
section of the HPD rules.
........
Furthermore, neither [petitioner] nor the other letter writers offered proof of a
financial commitment and interdependence between [petitioner] and the tenant. There is no
evidence that the tenant and [petitioner] shared or relied on each other for expenses or
intermingled their finances in any way....[Petitioner] and her great
grandmother may have shared a close relationship. However, a close relationship is not the
equivalent of a family relationship according to the HPD rules. There is insufficient evidence to
prove that the tenant and [petitioner] shared a financial and emotional commitment and
interdependence. Thus, even though [petitioner] was included as an occupant of the subject
apartment on the relevant income affidavits, I find that she has not proved that she is a family
member of the tenant according to the HPD rules.
........ [Petitioner's] W-2s for calendar year 2004, a 1098-T form from Manhattan Community College and her federal tax return for 2004 all reflect the subject apartment as her address. There is no evidence proving when in 2004 [petitioner] began her employment, or when in 2004 she enrolled in college. The earliest document reflecting the subject apartment as [petitioner's] address is a pay stub covering the pay period that ended on September 11, 2004. [Petitioner's] election district changed to the subject apartment but there is no evidence of when that change occurred.
In the instant case, H.O. Lippa evaluated the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner and found that the weight of the evidence landed squarely against petitioner. For purposes of rendering her decision, H.O. Lippa accepted petitioner's contentions that she was the great granddaughter of the tenant. H.O. Lippa properly determined that petitioner would have to prove a shared financial and emotional commitment and interdependence between herself and the tenant pursuant to 28 RCNY 3-02(p)(2)(ii)(A). During the administrative appeal, petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof.
Annexed to the Petition is the tenant's will, which was not part of the administrative record and should not be considered by this Court. In any event, even if it were to be considered, it is insufficient to establish that petitioner is a family member of the tenant under the HPD rules. The petitioner's bequest under the will was limited to the subject apartment, including insurance [*4]policies. The tenant did not bequeath to the petitioner any of the household furniture, household goods, or any other property of any type. The will does not establish petitioner's family relationship to the tenant. The will does not show that petitioner co-resided in the subject premises for the required two-year period.
Analysis
CPLR 7803 states that the court review of a determination of an
agency, such as HPD, consists of whether the determination was made in violation of lawful
procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of
discretion, including abuse of discretion as to the measure or mode of penalty imposed. CPLR
7803(3) (see Windsor Place
Corp. v New York State DHCR, 161 AD2d 279 [1st Dept.1990];
Mazel v DHCR, 138 AD2d 600 [1st Dept.1988]; Bambeck v DHCR, 129 AD2d
51 [1st Dept.1987], lv. den. 70 NY2d 615 [1988] ). An action is arbitrary and capricious,
or an abuse of discretion, when the action is taken "without sound basis in reason and ... without
regard to the facts." Matter of Pell v Board of Education, 34 NY2d 222, 231(1974).
Rationality is the key in determining whether an action
is arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion. Matter of Pell v Board of
Education, 34 NY2d, at 231. The court's function is completed on finding that a rational
basis supports HPD's determination (see Howard v Wyman, 28 NY2d 434 [1971] ).
Where the agency's interpretation is founded on a rational basis, that interpretation should be
affirmed even if the court might have come to a different conclusion (see Mid-State
Management Corp. v New York City Conciliation and Appeals Board, 112 AD2d 72 [1st
Dept.], aff'd 66 NY2d 1032 [1985] ).
Pell v Board of Ed., 34 NY2d 222 ,
is instructive
on the basic standard of Article 78 review:
In article 78 proceedings: the doctrine is well settled, that neither the Appellate
Division nor the Court of Appeals has power to upset the determination of an administrative
tribunal on a question of fact; the courts have no right to review the facts generally as to weight
of evidence, beyond seeing to it that there is substantial evidence. (Cohen and Karger, Powers of
the New York Court of Appeals, s 108, p. 460; 1 N.Y.Jur., Administrative Law, ss 177, 185; see
Matter of Halloran v. Kirwan, 28 NY2d 689, 690, 320 NYS2d 742, 743, 269 NE2d 403
(dissenting opn. of Breitel, J.)). The approach is the same when the issue concerns the exercise of
discretion by the administrative tribunals. The courts cannot interfere unless there is no rational
basis for the exercise of discretion or the action complained of is arbitrary and capricious. (Cohen
and Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals, pp. 460461; see, also, 8
Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N.Y.Civ.Prac., par. 7803.04 Et seq.; 1 N.Y.Jur., Administrative Law, ss
177, 184; Matter of Colton v. Berman, 21 NY2d 322, 329, 287 NYS2d 647, 650651, 234
NE2d 679, 681682).
On judicial review of an agency action under CPLR Article 78, the courts must uphold the agency's exercise of discretion unless it has "no rational basis" or the action is "arbitrary and capricious." Pell v Board of Ed. Union Free School District, 34 NY2d 222, 230-31, 356 NYS2d [*5]833, 839 (1974) "The arbitrary and capricious test chiefly relates to whether a particular action should have been taken or is justified . . . and whether the administrative action is without foundation in fact.' Arbitrary action is without sound basis in reason and is generally taken without regard to the facts." 34 NY2d at 231, 356 NYS2d at 839 See also Jackson v New York State Urban Dev Corp., 67 NY2d 400, 417, 503 NYS2d 298, 305 (1986) (on review of agency action under CPLR Article 78, the courts may not "second guess the agency's choice, which can be annulled only if arbitrary, capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence").
Moreover, where, as here, the agency's determination involves factual evaluation within an area of the agency's expertise and is amply supported by the record, the determination must be accorded great weight and judicial deference. See Flacke v Onondaga Landfill Systems, Inc., 69 NY2d 355, 363, 514 NYS2d 689, 693 (1987). Courts are required to "resolve [any] reasonable doubts in favor of the administrative findings and decisions" of the responsible agency. Town of Henrietta v Department of Envtl. Conservation, 76 AD2d 215, 224, 430 NYS2d 440, 448 (4th Dep't 1980). See also Jackson, 67 NY2d at 417, 503 NYS2d at _____; City of Rome v Department of Health Dept., 65 AD2d 220, 225, 441 NYS2d 61, 64 (4th Dep't 1978), lv. To app. denied, 46 NY2d 713, 416 NYS2d 1027 (1979).
And, "Where evidence conflicts, issues of credibility are the province of an administrative hearing officer, since the decisions by an Administrative Hearing Officer to credit the testimony of a given witness is largely unreviewable by the courts.' " Wooten v Finkle, 285 AD2D 407, 408 (1st Dept 2001) (quoting Berenhaus v Ward, 70 NY2d 436, 443 (1987).
In the instant case, this court finds that HPD's determination that petitioner was not entitled to occupancy rights for the subject apartment was rational and reasonable, and was not arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion. Further H.O. Lippa's decision issuing a certificate of eviction was arrived at after reviewing the facts and documentation before her, as well as the applicable law, and was a proper exercise of her discretion.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED that the application of Petitioner Tiffany Monet Williams for an order, pursuant to CPLR 7803(3): (1) granting the Petition and annulling the final administrative order issued by respondent New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development dated May 7, 2007 (the "Challenged Order") which Order found that petitioner is not entitled to succession rights to Apartment 5F in the building known as and located at 2065 First Avenue, New York, New York; or in the alternative (2) granting the Petition, annulling the Challenged Order, and remanding the proceeding to Respondent HPD for further proceedings, is denied in its entirety; and it is further
ORDERED that the instant proceeding is dismissed; and it is further
ORDERED that counsel for respondents shall serve a copy of this Order with notice of entry within twenty days of entry on counsel for petitioner.
This constitutes the decision and order of this court.
Dated:November 2, 2007
[*6]
______________________________
Carol Robinson Edmead, J.S.C.
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