Rivera v NYP Holdings, Inc.

[*1] Rivera v NYP Holdings, Inc. 2007 NY Slip Op 51529(U) [16 Misc 3d 1121(A)] Decided on August 2, 2007 Supreme Court, New York County Acosta, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. As corrected in part through August 17, 2007; it will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on August 2, 2007
Supreme Court, New York County

Francois Rivera, Plaintiff,

against

NYP Holdings, Inc., Zach Haberman, Jim Hinch, Time Warner Cable Inc., and John and/or Jane Does 1 & 2, Defendants.



114858/06



Richard F. Horowitz, Esq.
Stuart A. Blander, Esq.
Dolly Caraballo, Esq.
Heller, Horowitz & Feit, P.C.
292 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10017
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Landis C. Best, Esq.
Floyd Abrams, Esq.
Samantha K. Sherman, Esq.
80 Pine Street
New York, NY 10005
Attorneys for the Time Warner Defendants
Slade R. Metcalf, Esq.
Katherine M. Bolger, Esq.

Hogan & Hartson LLP
875 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
Attorneys for Defendants NYP Holdings
and Jim Hinch

Rolando T. Acosta, J.

Background [FN1]

The facts in these motions are fairly straight forward. NYP published three editions of the New York Post ("Post") in October 2005: the Metro Edition; the Sports Extra Edition; and, the Late City Final Edition. In addition, its website, www.nypost.com, carried articles from the Late City Final Edition. At issue in this action are four articles that allegedly defamed plaintiff. The first article ("Article One") , published on October 20, 2005, did not appear in the Metro Edition. It was carried only in the latter two editions as well as in the website.

"Article Two," published on October 21, 2005, appeared in all three editions and the website. "Article Three" likewise appeared in all three editions and the website, but the Metro Edition did not mention plaintiff by name. "Article Four" appeared in all three editions and the website.

Time Warner owns and operates "NY1," a 24-hour cable television newschannel. NY1's morning news program includes a daily feature called "In The Papers" in which the news anchor summarizes a sample of articles appearing in New York City newspapers on that day. The October 20, 2005 broadcast of "In The Papers" mentioned Article One, entitled " PAY 50 G AND BE A JUDGE': DA puts heat on Norman" from that days's issue of the New York Post ("Post").

The anchor summarized that article as: Harder news here. This is a story that goes on inside. This is about prosecutors telling a [*2]former head of the Brooklyn Democratic party, Clarence Norman, that if he tells what he knows about judges suspected of buying their jobs, they will ask for a lighter sentence for his corruption conviction and easier treatment for three other indictments that he faces. And they say that one of the judges that is under investigation is suspected of paying $50,000 to become a judge.

Although plaintiff's name is not mentioned in the broadcast, the screen displays an image of the Post page on which the article appears, which includes a small headshot, with a small caption bearing his name underneath the photograph.

In the October 21, 2005 broadcast of "In The Papers," the anchor summarized Article Two in the Post dealing with the same topic as the previously mentioned article. Article Two, entitled "JUDGE SINGS: Explosive new testimony on court $candal," was summarized as: Judge Sings' the headline here. This is more on what's going on in Brooklyn. They say a Brooklyn judge suspected of buying his seat has been granted immunity for telling all to a grand jury. Now the Post says that Supreme Court Judge Francois Rivera testified after being accused of buying his seat for fifty thousand. He could face other charges but now the Brooklyn D.A.'s office is looking at another Supreme Court Judge there and they've also given disgraced former Democratic boss Clarence Norman until Monday to tell all he knows in exchange for leniency when he is sentenced on political corruption charges.

During the segment, the screen displayed an image of the article, which includes three photographs, including a small headshot of the plaintiff.

Plaintiff commenced this action against Time Warner, NYP Holdings (which, includes the New York Post), two Post reporters and several unnamed persons who provided the information to the Post. Only two causes of action in the complaint pertain to Time Warner, the seventeenth and eighteenth, which assert that plaintiff was defamed by Time Warner during its October 20th and October 21st broadcast, respectively.

Analysis

NYP moves to dismiss the first and ninth causes of action because plaintiff was not mentioned by the Post on those occasions. The first cause of action alleges that Article One appeared in the Metro Edition on October 20, 2005, but it is undisputed that Article One in fact did not appear in the Metro Edition. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, p. 3 f.n. 1. It is also undisputed that Article Three did not mention plaintiff by name in the Metro Edition as alleged by plaintiff. Id. Accordingly, the first and ninth causes of action are dismissed. Chicherchia v. Cleary, 207 AD2d 855 (2nd dept. 1994)("For there to be recovery in libel, it must be established that the defamation was of and concerning the plaintiff'"). [*3]

NYP also moves to dismiss the third, fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, eleventh, twelfth, fourteen, fifteen and sixteenth causes of action as duplicative claims because they are barred under the single publication rule. In other words, NYP claims that each article gives rise to only one cause of action notwithstanding the fact that it appeared in separate Post editions and the website. This position, however, is not supported by New York case law. See Firth v. State, 98 NY2d 365, 371 (2002); Cook v. Conners, 215 NY 175 (1915).As the the New York Court of Appeals noted in Firth, supra, 98 NY2d at 371: Republication, retriggering the period of limitations, occurs upon a separate aggregate publication from the original, on a different occasion, which is not merely "a delayed circulation of the original edition" (Rinaldi v Viking Penguin, 52 NY2d [422, 435 (1981)]; Restatement [Second] of Torts § 577A, Comment d, at 210, supra). The justification for this exception to the single publication rule is that the subsequent publication is intended to and actually reaches a new audience (see Rinaldi, 52 NY2d at 433 [citing Cook v Conners, 215 NY 175 (1915)]; Restatement, Comment d). Thus, for example, repetition of a defamatory statement in a later edition of a book, magazine or newspaper may give rise to a new cause of action (see Rinaldi, 52 NY2d at 433-435 [hard-cover and paperback editions of the same book]; see also Cook v Conners, 215 NY at 179 [morning and afternoon editions of newspapers owned and published by the same individual]).

(emphasis added). It should also be noted that the Court in Firth, in addition to citing and reaffirming Cook, also cited the codification of the "single publication' rule in Section 577A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which expressly states that "if the same defamatory statement is published in the morning and evening editions of a newspaper, each edition is a separate single publication and there are two causes of action." Firth v. State, supra, 98 NY2d at 370-71.

If the Post published 100,000 copies of the Metro Edition on October 21, 2005, for instance, the single publication rule limits plaintiff to only one cause of action for that edition rather than 100,000 causes of action. Separate editions are separate publications, however, even if the article is identical. Notwithstanding the Post's invitation for this Court to create a new rule in New York, the existing rule works fine, inter alia, because separate editions of a publication are geared to reach different audiences. Firth v. State, supra, 98 NY2d at 371. That other states may take a different approach, see, e.g., Belli v. Robert Bros. Furs, 49 Cal. Rptr. 625 (Cal App. 1966)(decided under the Uniform Single Publication Act, which is not part of New York law), is of no moment. Similarly, the website publication is also a separate publication inasmuch as it is clearly targeted at a different audience that obtains its news through the internet.

Time Warner's motion, however, is granted in its entirety. In evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7), the Court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true, and accord plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within a cognizable legal theory. CBS Corp. v. Dumsday, 268 [*4]AD2d 350 (1st Dept. 2000); see also Polonetsky v. Better Homes Depot, Inc., 97 NY2d 46 (2001)(motion must be denied if "from [the] four corners [of the pleading] factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law"); Weiner v. Lazard Freres & Co., 241 AD2d 114 (1st Dept 1998 ("so liberal is th[is] . . . standard that the test is simply whether the pleading has a cause of action,' not even whether he has stated one'"). Notwithstanding this liberal standard, however, where allegations consist of bare legal conclusions devoid of the required factual predicate, the court is constrained to dismiss. Ullman v. Norma Kamali, Inc., 207 AD2d 691 (1st Dept. 1994).

Under New York law, the elements of a defamation claim are a false statement about the plaintiff, published to a third party, which is defamatory of the plaintiff, caused damaged to the plaintiff, and was published with the requisite level of fault. Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 NY2d 196, 198-99 (1975); Dillon v. City of New York, 261 AD2d 34, 38 (1st Dept. 1999). A public official has the burden of pleading that the allegedly libelous statements were published with "actual malice that is, with knowledge that [they were] false or with reckless disregard of whether [they were] false or not." Neuschotz v. Newsday Inc., 12 Misc 3d 1199(A) (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 2006), citing New York Times Co. V. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). Reckless disregard has been defined as a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 332 (1974). A state judge is a public official for the purposes of defamation law. Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 NY2d 369 379, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); Suozzi v. Parente, 202 AD2d 94 (1st Dept. 1994).

A failure to plead actual malice in a complaint for defamation is grounds for dismissal of the complaint. Mahoney v. Adirondack Publishing Co., 71 NY2d 31, 40 (1987); Jimenez v. United Federation of Teachers, 239 AD2d 265, 266 (1st Dept. 1997). "[S]pecificity in the pleading of . . . actual malice is required." Themed Restaurants, Inc. v. Zagat Survey, LLC, 4 Misc 3d 974 (Sup. Ct. NY Co. 2004). Thus, "[p]roper support for constitutional malice cannot be met by pleading that defendants had an obligation to ensure the [published information] was factually true."

Moreover, "a company or concern which simply republishes a work is entitled to place its reliance upon the research of the original publisher, absent a showing that the republisher had, or should have had, substantial reasons to question the accuracy of the articles or the bona fides of (the) reporter.'" Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 51 NY2d 531, 550 (1980)(quoting Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 NY2d 369, 383 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977).

The seventeenth and eighteenth causes of action must be dismissed because plaintiff failed to plead actual malice. Instead, he plead that "[Time Warner] acted in a grossly irresponsible manner and had, or should have had, substantial reason to question the accuracy of " the articles conveyed in the broadcasts and that [Time Warner] made no effort or attempt to verify the accuracy of the information." See Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 126, 131. These [*5]allegations do not spell out actual malice with sufficient specificity. Gross v. New York Times Co., 281 AD2d 299 (1st Dept. 2001)(a public official must "meet his burden of presenting evidence that could demonstrate, with convincing clarity, that [the defendant] either new that the statements were false or published them with a high degree of awareness that they were probably false"). That the allegations in the article were false is insufficient to establish liability. Hoeston v. Bets, 34 AD3d 143, 155 (1st Dept. 2006). Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, merely amending the complaint to insert the words "actual malice" will not cure the defect since there are no allegations presented in the complaint that fall within the definition of actual malice. There is nothing magical about the bare recitation of the words "actual malice."

The seventeenth and eighteenth causes of action must be dismissed for the additional reason that Time Warner merely summarized what the Post had published, attributing what it was saying to the Post and not endorsing what the newspaper had said. See Duane Reade Inc. v. Local 338 Retail, Wholesale, Department Store Union, 6 Misc 3d 790, 795 (Sup. Ct. NY Co. 2004)(relying on the New York Post, a long-running New York City daily newspaper was not grossly irresponsible). The very nature of the "In The Papers" feature seems to be to alert its audience of the existence of the newspaper article without vouching for its veracity, quality of research, or the bona fides of the reporters. Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., supra, 51 NY2d at 550.

Plaintiff asserts that two factors gave Time Warner reason to doubt the accuracy of the articles: that the Post had stated that plaintiff "had been granted immunity for telling all to a grand jury" despite the fact that any witness who testifies before a grand jury (as opposed to a trial jury) receives automatic immunity; and, that the article requires the reader to come to the incongruous conclusion that plaintiff was nevertheless permitted to continue to hear cases as a judge. As defendant notes, there is no basis to conclude that a lay person would know that different rules apply in testifying before a grand jury and before a jury trial or the procedures involved that would prohibit a judge from continuing to hear cases while a probe is pending. These "inside baseball" suppositions impute an unreasonable level of knowledge of legal processes generally, and grand jury proceedings in particular. Plaintiff simply has not identified any valid basis that creates a substantial reason for Time Warner to question the accuracy of the articles or the bona fides of the reporters. Rinaldi, supra, 42 NY2d at 383.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that NYP's motion (Seq. 1) is GRANTED solely to the extent that the first and ninth causes of action are dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that NYP and defendant Jim Hinch answer the amended complaint within twenty days of this Order; and it is further [*6]

ORDERED that Time Warner's motion (Seq. 3) for an order dismissing the seventeenth and eighteenth causes of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that the matter is scheduled for a Preliminary Conference to be held on September 20, 2007, at 9:30 a.m. in Part 61.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: August 2, 2007ENTER

___________________________

Rolando T. Acosta, J.S.C. Footnotes

Footnote 1:This Decision and Order was edited for publication.