Campbell v Ward
Annotate this CaseDecided on August 3, 2007
Supreme Court, Suffolk County
Dean Campbell, Plaintiff
against
Georgette Ward a/k/a Georgette Ward White, Defendant.
Georgette Ward White, Plaintiff
against
Dean Campbell, Defendant Index No. 2006-15839 Calendar No. 2006-01940-OT [Action No. 2]
2004-25920
Attorney for Dean Campbell
Darrell J. Sharpelletti, Esq.
Darrell J. Sharpelletti P.C.
8 East Main Street
Riverhead, New York 11901
Attorney for Georgette Ward White Michael E. Walter, Esq.
Attorney At Law
407 East Main Street
Port Jefferson, New York 11777
Jeffrey Arlen Spinner, J.
The Plaintiff in Action No. 1 commenced these proceedings pursuant to Article 15 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, seeking to annul a deed of conveyance affecting property known as 976 Northville Turnpike, Riverhead, New York. The Plaintiff in Action No. 2 commenced those proceedings in the Riverhead Justice Court pursuant to Article 7 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law in order to obtain possession of the same property. Action No. 2 was removed to this Court and the two actions were joined for the purpose of trial pursuant to CPLR 602(b) by Order dated May 23, 2005. The Plaintiff and Defendant are brother and sister and, for purposes of clarity in this Decision, the Court will refer to DEAN CAMPBELL as Plaintiff and to GEORGETTE WARD WHITE as Defendant.
The matter, as consolidated, was tried to the Court, without a jury commencing April 30, 2007 and concluding on May 1, 2007. The Court found that both parties were represented by extremely capable and zealous counsel who effectively advocated both the legal and factual positions of their respective clients.
The Plaintiff and Defendant are two siblings of a family of four children from Chester Castle District, Hanover, Jamaica W.I. The Defendant is the oldest, having come to this country in pursuit of a better life. In furtherance of that noble quest, she has, by virtue of her industry and thrift, succeeded in bringing the Plaintiff, their brother Sean Campbell and sister Sharnet Campbell here as well. In addition, she has also generously provided financial assistance to their mother who still resides in Jamaica. The relationship of the parties was, by all accounts, one of mutual trust and assistance. The evidence disclosed that the Defendant was, in certain respects, seen by her siblings as being in loco parentis. They frequently sought her advice on matters of import and each relied on the other. The Plaintiff trusted the Defendant implicitly and without reservation due, in large part, to the relationship of confidence and mutuality that had been built up between them. In describing the relationship with the Defendant, the Plaintiff stated that "We always trust her. We do for her, she do for us." It was the purchase of a house that ultimately caused the parties' close relationship to unravel, leading them down the present litigious path.
On February 21, 2002 the Plaintiff, the Defendant and their younger brother Sean Campbell entered into a Contract of Sale to purchase premises known as 976 Northville Turnpike, Riverhead, New York. The purpose of the purchase was to provide a "family home" for all of them. The transaction was consummated on April 30, 2002 for consideration of $148,400.00 with title vesting in Georgette Ward and Dean Campbell as tenants in common and the deed thereof being recorded on May 15, 2002 in Liber 12185 of Conveyances at Page 954. The transaction was facilitated by a mortgage loan of $ 133,360.00 granted by Countrywide Home Loans Inc. to Plaintiff and Defendant. At some point between the contract and the closing, Sean Campbell was consensually removed from [*2]participating in the transaction. Immediately following the closing of title, the Plaintiff commenced, with assistance from others, a great deal of renovation upon the dwelling. The materials for same were paid for by the Defendant while the Plaintiff contributed his labor, without monetary remuneration. It was anticipated that a portion would be rented in order to derive income while family members would reside in the remainder. Indeed, the Defendant installed tenants in the premises from whom she derived rental income which was used, in part, to fund the cost of renovation and repair.
Sometime during July of 2003 the Defendant approached the Plaintiff to discuss a refinance of the property in order to obtain a lower rate of interest on the mortgage. The Plaintiff consented without hesitation, stating that "She know everything so I'm agreeing right away." He did so based upon his relationship of trust with the Defendant.
On September 25, 2003, the Defendant appeared at the Plaintiff's place of employment along with one Dawn Rivera, a closing agent for Full Spectrum Lending Inc.. Plaintiff was summoned from his work and directed by the Defendant to sign his name upon numerous documents. Plaintiff stated that the stack was "about a half inch high" and that his boss was impatient to have him back to work. He did not read them but instead signed them in the parking lot behind Friendly's Restaurant at the Defendant's urging, stating that "They lift up paper and say sign so I sign," and he did so because he trusted his sister without reservation. Apparently, there was a deed contained within the sheaf of documents which conveyed his undivided one-half interest in the property to the Defendant, thereby divesting him of his fee interest.
Subsequently and in or about June of 2004, the Plaintiff was advised by his younger sister Sharnet that "something is fishy, go check on the house." The Plaintiff stated that he did not believe this because of the relationship of trust that existed. He later discovered that he had been divested of his interest when the Defendant changed the locks on the house and he summoned the police. The Defendant later resorted to additional self help before commencing eviction proceedings, which ultimately wound up here as Action No. 2.
The Defendant's story is somewhat different in the details where she has described her efforts to get her brother out of many financial binds, helped pay his taxes and assisted him in a myriad of ways. According to the Defendant, she put Plaintiff on the deed solely as an accommodation to herself (using his income and credit in order to qualify for a mortgage loan) and to insulate the property from any claims by her ex-husband. She also testified that the Plaintiff did not do much of the work that he claimed to have done on the house and that he owed her a substantial amount of money which he failed to repay. In her testimony, she stated that in July of 2003, the Plaintiff agreed to gratuitously convey his fee interest to her at the time of the refinance .
During the course of the trial, testimony was adduced from both the Plaintiff and the Defendant as well as Sean Campbell, Sharnet Campbell, Emoke Foreman, Muriel Gordon and Bernard White. In addition, the Court received thirty five pieces of documentary evidence.
The Plaintiff's claims are brought before this Court pursuant to the provisions of Article 15 of [*3]the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law. That statutory compilation provides a vehicle for determination of competing claims to real property. In addition, the Plaintiff's claims fall clearly within the parameters of Section 265 of the Real Property Law. In order to prevail, the Plaintiff must prove, by a fair preponderance of the credible, relevant and admissible evidence the execution of the deed in question was either the product of some undue influence, some other malfeasance on the Defendant's part or that the Defendant breached and exploited a confidential relationship to further her own gain.
At the outset, the burden of proof here is upon the Plaintiff to establish the existence of fraud, undue influence or confidential relationship, Allen v. LaVaud 213 NY 322 (1915). Where the Plaintiff is successful in establishing, by the proper quantum of admissible proof, that there exists a confidential relationship between the parties, the burden shifts to the Defendant to conclusively demonstrate that the conveyance at issue is bona fide and is free of improprieties, Matter of Gordon v. Bialystoker Center & Bikur Cholim 45 NY2d 692 (1978).
Here the Plaintiff has admitted, without prompting, that he did not read any of the documents that he executed on September 25, 2003, having done so based exclusively upon the trust reposed by him in the Defendant. It is clear that he relied upon his sister to be truthful with him and he trusted her implicitly, to his great detriment. This scenario would ordinarily bring into play the law as enunciated in Pimpinello v. Swift & Co. 253 NY 159 (1930) wherein it was stated that "Ordinarily, the signed of a deed or other instrument, expressive of a jural act, is conclusively bound thereby. That his mind never gave assent to the terms expressed is not material...if the signer could read the instrument, not to have read it was gross negligence;" 253 NY at 162. This has been the law of this state and remains so, subject to very narrow exceptions.
One of the narrow exceptions to the ruling in Pimpinello v. Swift concerns the existence of a confidential relationship. In the case at bar, the Court is constrained to find that there was a confidential relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant which was based upon a long-standing period of mutual trust. The parties are siblings and have a long history of a trusting relationship in which various transactions have occurred between them. In the matter of Sears v. Shafer 6 NY 268 (1852), the Court of Appeals stated that "A court of equity interposes its benign jurisdiction to set aside instruments...in various other relations where one party is so situated as to exercise a controlling influence over the will and conduct and interests of another." 6 NY at 272. Moreover, in the matter of Loiacono v. Loiacono 187 AD2d 414 (2nd Dept. 1992), the Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's finding that there existed a confidential relationship and voided the deed at issue therein. Likewise, in Russell v. Russell 128 AD2d 515 (2nd Dept. 1987) appeal dismissed 70 NY2d 783 (1987) the Appellate Division affirmed a judgment of the Supreme Court which cancelled a no consideration deed, finding that the property at issue was not knowingly conveyed.
In a matter such as this one, it is the province and indeed the obligation of the trial court to assess and determine matters of credibility, especially insofar as witness testimony is concerned, Morgan [*4]v. McCaffrey, 14 AD3d 670 (2nd Dept. 2005), Matter of Liccione v. Michael A., 65 NY2d 826 (1985). Here, in this civil matter, the burden is upon the Plaintiff to plead and prove its direct case by a fair preponderance of the credible, relevant and material evidence, Prince-Richardson On Evidence, § 3-210, Torem v. Central Ave Rest, 133 AD2d 25 (1st Dept. 1987). Likewise, the Defendant is required to meet the same burden in order to prove their counterclaims.
After careful consideration of all of the matters alleged, the quality of the evidence adduced and the relative credibility of each of the witnesses who have testified, it is the opinion of this Court that the Plaintiff has sustained his required burden of proof on his direct case while the Defendant has failed to sustain her burden of proof on both her counterclaims and her direct case. The evidence adduced leads this Court to the inescapable conclusion that the Defendant exploited the confidential relationship that existed between herself and the Plaintiff in order to gain a pecuniary advantage to which she would not otherwise be entitled.
It is, therefore,
ORDERED that upon Action No. 1 (Index No. 2004-25920) , judgment shall be and is hereby granted in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant upon the First and Fourth causes of action; and it is further
ORDERED that upon Action No. 1 (Index No. 2004-25920) that the Second, Third and Fifth Causes of Action shall be and the same are hereby dismissed; and it is further
ORDERED that the Deed recorded with the Clerk of Suffolk County in Liber 12280 of Conveyances at Page 323, affecting premises known as 976 Northville Turnpike, Riverhead, New York, District 0600 Section 084.00 Block 01.00 Lot 016.000 shall be and the same is hereby vacated, annulled, set aside and of no further force and effect; and it is further
ORDERED that fee title to the property known as 976 Northville Turnpike, Riverhead, New York, District 0600 Section 084.00 Block 01. Lot 016.000 shall be and the same is hereby re-vested in Georgette Ward and Dean Campbell as Tenants In Common as designated in a Deed dated April 30, 2002 and recorded with the Clerk of Suffolk County in Liber 12185 of Conveyances at Page 954; and it is further
ORDERED that the Defendant shall provide a full, complete and verified accounting of all monies received and expended in connection with the maintenance and operation of the premises located at 976 Northville Turnpike, Riverhead, New York from April 30, 2002 through July 30, 2007; and it is further
ORDERED that the Defendant's Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims interposed in Action No. 1 shall be and the same are hereby stricken and dismissed; and it is further
ORDERED that Action No. 2 (Index No. 2006-15839) shall be and the same is hereby dismissed in its entirety. [*5]
Settle judgment on fifteen days' notice.
This shall constitute the decision and order of the Court.
Dated: August 3, 2007
Riverhead, New York
E N T E R:
______________________________________
Jeffrey Arlen Spinner, J.S.C.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
