People v Truneseck

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[*1] People v Truneseck 2007 NY Slip Op 50848(U) [15 Misc 3d 1126(A)] Decided on April 4, 2007 District Court Of Nassau County, First District St. George, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on April 4, 2007
District Court of Nassau County, First District

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff,

against

Sarka Truneseck, Defendant.



12580/06

Norman St. George, J.

The Defendant is charged with one (1) count of violating Vehicle and Traffic Law §1192.2, Driving While Intoxicated as an Unclassified Misdemeanor.

On April 4, 2007, upon stipulation by both parties, this Court conducted an Ingle, Huntley and Dunaway hearing. The Huntley hearing pertained to three separate sets of statements allegedly made by the Defendant. The first set of statements were allegedly made by the Defendant to the Police prior to her arrest, namely: that she was having an argument with a male friend because he felt that she was too intoxicated to drive, and that she had 2 drinks at Savannahs. The second set of statements were allegedly made by the Defendant to the Police after being placed under arrest, namely: that she had one mixed drink, that she was coming from Savannahs and going to Franklin Square. The third set of statements were also allegedly made by the Defendant to the Police after she was arrested, namely: that she had three mixed drinks and one shot, and was driving to Franklin Square from Savannahs.

The People called one witness at the hearing, New York State Trooper Michael Burman. The Defendant did not call any witnesses. Based on the testimony of Trooper Michael Burman, this Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

This Court finds the testimony of Trooper Burman to be credible. Trooper Burman is a five and a half year veteran of the New York State Police Department.

On May 6, 2006, Trooper Burman was working a 7p.m. to 7 a.m. tour of duty for the New York State Police Department. He and his partner were in uniform, patrolling the Northern State and Meadowbrook State Parkways in Nassau, New York, in a marked New York State Police car. At approximately 1:30 a.m., Trooper Burman was traveling north on the Meadowbrook State Parkway [*2]when he received a radio call regarding a motorist dispute on the southbound shoulder of the Meadowbrook State Parkway, north of the Southern State Parkway. Trooper Burman immediately proceeded to the indicated location. Upon arriving at the scene, Trooper Burman observed three people, two males and one female, standing outside of two cars on the shoulder of the Southern State Parkway. He noticed that two of the individuals, the female and one of the males, were agitated and involved in an argument. The woman was identified in Court by Trooper Burman as the Defendant.

Trooper Burman was informed by one of the men that he was passing by, saw the Defendant and the other man arguing with each other and decided to break it up. Trooper Burman asked the Defendant what was going on. The Defendant stated that she was arguing with her friend, because he felt that she was too intoxicated to drive. Trooper Burman asked the defendant where she was coming from and if she had been drinking. The Defendant stated that she was coming from Savannahs and had two drinks.

Trooper Burman noticed that the Defendant had slightly slurred speech and bloodshot eyes. He also detected a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the Defendant. Trooper Burman asked the Defendant to perform a Standardized Field Sobriety test, the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (H.G.N.) test. The Defendant performed poorly on the H.G.N. test. Trooper Burman stated that he did not ask the Defendant to perform any other Standardized Field Sobriety tests because she was wearing "stiletto heeled" shoes.

The Defendant was then arrested for Driving While Intoxicated, placed in hand cuffs, and placed into the back of the State Police car. After the arrest, Trooper Burman read the Defendant "Miranda Warnings," from a Miranda card. The Miranda card was admitted into evidence during the hearing. No testimony was elicited by the People regarding any responses made by the Defendant upon hearing the warnings. After the Defendant was read the warnings, Trooper Burman stated that the Defendant made various statements while sitting in the back of the Police car. The statements allegedly made were that she: "was driving from Savannahs, going to Franklin Square and had one mixed drink." Trooper Burman also testified that back at the Police station, at some unspecified time later, the Defendant allegedly stated that she: "had 3 drinks, 2 mixed drinks and 1 shot, was coming from Savannahs and driving to Franklin Square."

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR THE STOP OF THE DEFENDANT:

This Court finds reasonable suspicion for Trooper Burman to initially approach the Defendant on the side of the Southern State Parkway and request information. The basis for the initial approach was based upon the anonymous call to the Police of a dispute on the side the Parkway. Upon arriving at the scene Trooper Burman came upon the reported dispute and observed a passerby engaged in mediating the dispute.

STATEMENTS BY THE DEFENDANT PRIOR TO ARREST:

The pre-arrest statements made by the Defendant occurred as soon as Trooper Burman arrived at the scene. Trooper Burman asked the Defendant what was going on, where she was going and if she had been drinking. This Court finds that the questions asked by Trooper Burman were investigatory in nature and appropriate based on the circumstances as he found them. The initial questions were tailored to elicit information concerning the nature of the dispute. The question regarding the Defendant drinking was directly related to the observations which Trooper Burman made of the Defendant; i.e., the Defendant exhibited slightly slurred speech, bloodshot eyes and had the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage. In addition, the question was also relevant in light of the Defendant's explanation for the dispute; i.e., that her friend felt she had too much to drink.

This Court finds that at the time the pre-arrest statements were made, the Defendant was not in custody. It is unclear from the testimony of Trooper Burman whether the Defendant was free to leave at that time; however, a reasonable person innocent of any crime would not have believed that they were in custody. Since the questions asked by Trooper Burman were investigatory in nature and since the Defendant was not in custody, Miranda Warnings were not required. This Court finds that the statements were voluntarily made by the Defendant. Defendant's motion to suppress the pre-arrest statements is denied.

STATEMENTS BY THE DEFENDANT AFTER THE ARREST:

It has been long held by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, S.Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, that before a person in custody may be questioned by the police, that person first, must be advised of his or her rights; second, must understand those rights; and third, must voluntarily waive those rights and agree to speak to the Police. If any one of those three conditions is not met, a statement made in response to questioning is not voluntary and, therefore, must be suppressed. A person in custody must be advised of his or her rights before the questioning begins. There are no particular words that the police are required to use in advising a defendant, in sum and substance, the defendant must be advised:

1.That he/she has the right to remain silent;

2.That anything he/she says may be used against him/ her in a court of law;

3.That he/she has the right to consult with a lawyer before answering any questions; and the right to the presence of a lawyer during any questioning; and

4.That if he/she cannot afford a lawyer, one will be provided for him/her prior to any questioning if he/she so desires. [*3]

In this matter, the Defendant was arrested, placed in handcuffs, and put into the back of the State Police car. It is irrefutable that the Defendant was in custody at that time. The Defendant was then read Miranda Warnings by Trooper Burman from his Miranda card. A review of Trooper Burman's Miranda card, which was received into evidence, discloses that the proper warnings were given. However, there was no testimony adduced by the People as to the Defendant's response to the reading of the Miranda Warnings. Neither was there any further testimony on direct examination regarding the circumstances surrounding the Defendant making the alleged statements to Trooper Burman. Based on the direct examination by the People, the impression was created that the alleged statements were blurted out by the Defendant spontaneously. It was not until the cross-examination of Trooper Burman that the Court learned that after the Defendant was arrested, she was questioned further by Trooper Burman in the back of the Police car and again back at the station. She was asked how much she had to drink, where she was coming from and where she was going. After the second questioning, the Defendant allegedly made a statement which included a reference to "driving." This Court finds that the presentation of testimony by the People regarding the circumstances surrounding the Defendant making said statements was incomplete and misleading.

This Court finds that the People have failed to establish or present any evidence that the Defendant understood the Miranda Warnings. The People failed to establish that the Defendant knowingly and intelligently waived her right to remain silent. The statements allegedly made by the Defendant were in response to a custodial interrogation and therefore Miranda Warnings were required. Since the People failed to sustain their burden regarding the circumstances surrounding the Defendant's alleged waiver of her right to remain silent, the statements allegedly made by the Defendant after her arrest must be suppressed.

PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ARREST OF THE DEFENDANT:

Whether the arrest of the Defendant was lawful rests upon whether the Police had probable cause to arrest her. Astonishingly, a review of the hearing testimony reveals that the People completely failed to elicit any testimony whatsoever regarding the operation of any vehicle by the Defendant. The Trooper testified that when he came upon the scene, all of the individuals including the Defendant were outside of the vehicles. It is clear that the Trooper did not witness operation by the Defendant. During the Trooper's brief conversation with the passerby, no information was conveyed that the Defendant had been driving. The passerby was then permitted to leave the scene. Moreover, based on the testimony adduced at the hearing, the Trooper never asked the Defendant if she had been driving. Trooper Burman never spoke with the third individual. Operation can not be inferred from the facts in this case since either the Defendant or her friend could have driven the car to the location on the Parkway. According to the testimony, there was no investigation into who had been driving the vehicle. In addition, none of the Defendant's pre-arrest statements establish operation. The only statement by the Defendant which contains the word "driving" was the [*4]statement which she made after she had been arrested, and was back at the Police station. As indicated above, those statements are suppressed. Even if said statements were not suppressed, a post arrest statement can not be used to establish probable cause or justify an arrest which has already occurred.

As a result of the People failing to establish an essential element of the charge of Driving While Intoxicated charge, namely, operation, this Court finds that the People have not satisfied their burden of proving probable cause for the arrest of the Defendant. Based on the hearing testimony there is no evidence connecting the Defendant with the charge of Driving While Intoxicated. Therefore, Defendant's motion to suppress the arrest is granted. Furthermore, since the charge of Driving While Intoxicated can not proceed or survive without the element of operation, the charge of 1192.2 must be dismissed.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: April 4, 2007

ENTER:

/s/

Norman St. George, District Court Judge

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