Dalva v Pataki

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

Dalva v Pataki 2006 NY Slip Op 30656(U) March 3, 2006 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: 116965/05 Judge: Marilyn Shafer Republished from New York State Unified Court System's E-Courts Service. Search E-Courts (http://www.nycourts.gov/ecourts) for any additional information on this case. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. [* 1] - NEW YORK COUNTY PART PRESENT: 3G MOTION DATE MOTION SEQ. NO. 2- MOTION CAL. NO. The following papers, numbered 1 to were read on this motion to/for PAPERS Notice of Motion/ Order to Answering Affidavits Show Cause - Affidavits - Exhibits ... - Exhibits Replying Affidavits 4 Cross-Motion: U Yes I..] No \ Lu K Upon the foregoing papers, it is ordered that this motion & & L &-k Lg Lr J . S. C. Check one: n FINAL DISPOSITION Check if appropriate: DO NOT ON-FINAL DISPOSITION 1 REFERENCE [* 2] SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK: :CAS PART 36 X DAVID L. DALVA, 11, Plaintiff, Index No. 116965/05 -againstGEORGE PATAKI, as Governor of the State of New York, BRIG. GEN. FREDRIC DAVID SHEPPARD, as A d j u t a n t General for t h e Division of Military and Naval Affairs, the DIVISION OF MILITARY and NAVAL AFFAIRS, NYS URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, d/b/a EMPIRE STATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, SEVENTH REGIMENT ARMORY CONSERVANCY, INC., and THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendants. - - - - - - _ _ I _ - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - X Marilyn Shafer, J . : The building known as the Seventh Regiment Armory (the Armory) has graced a full city block in Manhattan, bounded by Park Avenue and Lexington Avenue, and 66thand 67 Streets, for over 125 years. This action involves a battle over its future use dnd preservation, between an individual who would see the structure retain its historical military character, and the representatives of the State and City of New Y o r k , who envision t h e renovation and preservation of this landmarked building f o r public use. In the present motion, plaintiff David L. Dalva I1 ( I l a l v a ) , 1 [* 3] a resident of t h e Upper East Side', moves for a preliminary injunction barring defendants from implementing a special law, Clhapter 482 o f New York Laws of 2004, which provides for the creation of a public/private partnership, involving the State defendants and the not-for-profit Seventh Regiment Armory Conservancy, I n c . (the Conservancy), to operate t h e Armory, a f t - c r coinp1,etc r e s t . o r a t i o n , as, among other things, a nonprofit. cultural arts center and public resource (the Armory project). The entire history of the Armory, and the Seventh Regiment o ¬ the New York State Militia (the Seventh Regiment), although quite interesting, need not be detailed herein. Suffice it to say that the Armory was built on land leased from the City oE New York (the City), pursuant to Chapter 234 of t h e Laws of 1871, by the "Field Officers" of " t h e Seventh Regiment of the National Guard of t h e State of New Y o r k . " See Verified Complaint, Ex 3 , 1874 Lease (the 1874 Lease), The 1874 Lease w a s for a t e r m of 21 years, at a rent of one dollar per year. The 1874 Lease, by it.s terms, required the building of the Armory, and further provided t h a t the Armory w a s to be used for the purpose of an "Armory and Drill Rooms" by t h e regiment., and that, if the Field Officers "cease to use the devised premise:; ~ _ _ _ _ _ 'Although Dalva does not discuss his personal interest in the Armory in his papers, at.a public hearing held on July 1, 2005, he identified himself as the "First Vice President of t h e Seventh Regiment Veterans" and \\one of t h e Vice Presidents of the Seventh Regiment Fund." Aff. of G r a b e r , Ex. F . , a t 27. 2 [* 4] f o r any other than t h e purpose of an Armory and Drill Rooms or t h e public purposes of said regiment or in furtherance of surh p u b l i c purposes, that the lease shall become null and void. Id. unnumbered pages 3 - 4 . The 1874 Lease was extended by an Indenture dated 1879 (the 1879 Lease). Verified Complaint, Ex 4. The 1879 Lease i n c o r p o r a t e d the provisions of the 1874 Lease. The Armory itself was buillr. in 1 8 7 9 . I n the intervening years, t h e Armory has p a s s e d , t o some extent, beyond the military uses that engendered it. It has in recent years been used to house several annual s p e c i a l events, such a s the Winter Antique Show, and the Antiquarian Book Fair. It has housed, for approximately a decade, a women s homele:;:-; shelter, which cares f o r middle-aged women with emotional problems. It was used by t h e N e w York National Guard during t.hc aftermath of September 11, 2001 in relation to military and otherr e l i e f efforts. And, s a d l y enough, it has deteriorated t.o a point from which it may never be used again, unless something i s d o n c ! very soon. In 1999, t h e State of New York created the Seventh Regiment Advisory Council to look for ways to continue to use the Armory for public purposes commensurate with its founding authority, f o r the benefit of the state and city public. l3eferidant. E m p i r e St.;.it.e D e v e l o p w r i t C o . r p o r a t . i o n (ESDC) for the benefit of defendant , 3 [* 5] Department of Military and Naval Affairs ( D M N A ) , made a request f o r p r o p o s a l s f o r a public/private partnership to effect t h o s e e n d s , while seeing to the restoration and preservation of t-he structure. Only the Conservancy responded to the request, alheiir with t h e support of many interested individuals and organizations. The ESDC accepted the Conservancy s proposal, which would provide for public use of the Armory as, among otilier. Lhinqs, a rill tural center. In order to implement the Conservancy s plan, the New Y o r k S t a t e Legislature (the Legislature) enacted Chapter 482 of the Laws of 2004 (Chapter 482). Chapter 482 provides, in short, for (1) the lease of the Armory to t h e Conservancy for 99 y e a r s ; (2) the restoration and preservation of the Armory building; (3) the u s e of the Armory for civic and cultural events; (4) the continued military character of t h e Armory, for use in times of military need; and ( 5 ) the continued presence of the women s shelter on the premises. 11. Arguments Dalva, referring to t h e 1874 Lease l a r i y u a y c quoted above, claims t.hat t h e State is not the lessor of the Armory, and d o c s n o t have the authority t o rent it out to the Conservancy for non- military u s e s . In fact, he claims that the property is about to, or has already, reverted to t h e City, as a result of the proposed lease to the Armory (because it will no longer be used as an 4 [* 6] armory and drill rooms), and the plans provided f o r i t s future use as envisioned under Chapter 482. He brings t.his a c : t . i o n iii ;:is taxpayer, under State Finance Law (SFL) § 123-b, and under thcl common law. Specifically, Dalva challenges the const.itutiona1it.y of Chapter 482, and t h e State's claims as lessee under the 1P,'/4 Lease. Dalva seeks a preliminary injunction, or an immediate trial, to adjudge Chapter 482's constitutionality. A temporary restraining order is in effect, pending a determination of the motion. Defendants maintain their right to enter into the n e w ].case with the Conservancy, advancing t h e following arguments: (1) t h a t Dalva's action i s barred by a one-year statute of limitations; (2) that Dalva has no standing to bring this action; (3) that. t h e State of New York is t h e actual lessee of the Armory, arid so, effectually t h e owner of the premises, pursuant to the language of the 1874 Lease; (4) that no "home rule message" was required from the City prior to the enactment of Chapter 482; and (5) t-hat t.he State has a substantial interest in the project, overriding Ualva's home rule argument. 111. Discussion A. preliminary Injunction A preliminary injunction will only be granted if the movant shows a likelihood of success on the merits, that he or she will suffer i r r e p a r - a b l e harm should the injunction not be g r a n t - e d ; 5 ;int3 [* 7] that t h e equities balance in his or h e r favor. See W . T . G r a n t Co. v S r o g i , 52 NY2d 496 (1981); Sterling F i f t h Associate v C a r - p e n t i 1 1 e Corporation, I n c . , 5 AD3d 328 (1 Dept 2004). B . Likelihood of Success on the Merits A. Standing Standing to pursue a c a i i n is a t,,reshold issue. C o m t y C h a i n h e r of Sar-aLoga Commerce, Tnc. v P a k a k i , 100 NY2d 801 (2003)(Saratoga). SFL § 123-b (1) st-at-es that: Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of law, any person, who is a citizen taxpayer, whether or not such person is or m a y be affected or specially aggrieved by t h e activity herein referred to, may maintain an action for equitable or declaratory relief, or both, against an officer or employee of the state who in t h e course of his or her duties has caused, is now causing, or is about to c a u s e a wrongful expenditure, misappropriation, misapplication, or any o t h e r illegal or state unconstitutional disbursement of state f u n d s or property _ . . . Dalva basis his standing under SFL 5 123-b on the proposed expenditure by the State of $30 million on the A m l o r y project. As expressed i.n S a r a t - o y a , courts have becn inhospitable [:o plaint.iffs who seek essentially to challenge nonfiscal a c t i v i l - i e s by invoking the c o n v e n i e n t statutory hook of section 123-b. Id. at 813. As a result, the Court of Appeals has field that a plai.ntiff sclaims must have a sufficient nexus t.o fiscal activities of the State in order to confer standing [internal quotation marks omitted] . Id. It is accepted that a constitutional challenge to a 6 [* 8] legislative enactment must be "a specific challenge to the Expenditures of identifiable State funds 1Jlility ... ." M ~ i t t e rof Piilil ir Law P r o j e c t of New Y o r k , Inc. v New Y o r k S t a t e P u b Ser-vice Comrnlissiun, 2 6 3 AD2d 879, 881 (3d Uept 1999). ic' "Since most activities [of government] can be viewed as having some relationship to expenditures, . . . too broad a reading of sect.iori 1.23-b would create standing for any citizen who had t h e desirc: to challenge virtually all governmental acts. " Rudder v P a t a k i , 9 3 N Y 2 d 273, 281 (1999). A plaintiff must not be permitted '"to 0btai.n judicial scrutiny of the [State's] nonfiscal activities.'" Id. at 280, quoting M a t t e r of T r a n s a c t - i v e Corporation v N e w Y o r - k State D e p a r t m e n t of Social S e r v i c e s , 92 NY2d 579, 583 (1998). 3: find that Dalva has supplied a sufficient- n e x u s betwc:~c)i-~ his a t t a c k on Chapter 4 8 2 and t h e fiscal activities of the S t - a t e of New York. The expenditure of monies to support the Armory p r o j e c t are "identifiable,"and will aid in its advancement. The task, of course, is to distinguish between cases that present a challenge to the expenditure of money cmd those that use the expenditure of money as c3 pretense to challenge a governmental decision. As [the Court of Appeal] has said, 'it is one thing to have standing to correct clear illegality of o f f i c i a l action and quite another to have standing in order to interpose litigating plaintiffs and t h e courts into the management and operation of public enterprises' ( M a t t e r of A b r - m s v N c w York C i t y Transit A u t h o r i t y , 3 9 N Y 2 d 990, 992 [19761). Accordingly, a claim that state funds arc not being spent wisely is patently insufficient to .satisfy the minimuin threshold f o r standing, but a claim that it is illegal to spend money at a l l f o r the questioned activity likely would p r o v i d p the plaintiff with standing [emphasis in original]. [* 9] Saratoga, 100 NY2d a t 813-814. In this c a s e , Dalva does not merely claim that state funds arc not being spent wisely, he is claiming that it is illegal. to spend money at a l l f o r the Armory project. Id. Therefore, under S a r a t o g a , Darva has standing under SFL 5 123-b. I would grant Dalva standing in any event, pursuant t o S a r a t o y a , and t h e earlier case of Boryszewski v Brydges (37 NY2d 361 [1975]), to which S a r a t o g a r e f e r s . The Court. in S a r a t o g a raised the issue of whether an enactment would forever bc foreclosed from scrutiny if standing were to be denied based on SFL 5 123-b, because of t h e possibility that an important constitutional issue would be effectively insulated from judicial review . Saratoga, 100 NY2d at 814. The Court in S a r a t o g a recognized that there would be instances where few persons woi.ilc3 be in the position to claim concrete injury from unconstitutional enactments, and found that [tlhus, where a denial of s t a n d i n g would pose in effect . . . an impenetrable barrier scrutiny nf legislat-iveaction, to any judicial our duty is to open r;it,her. t . h i - i c l . o s e t.he door to the courrhouse. T d . , quoting B o r - y s z e w s k i v B r - y d g c s , 37 NY2d at 3 6 4 . There is no party likely to question t h e constitutionalit-y of Chapter 482 other than Dalva, or another taxpayer plaint.iff. The State defendants suggest that the City has skanding to o p p o s c Chapter 482, arid so, it is not true that there is an 8 [* 10] "impenetrable barrier" to litigation of the matter. However, the City's ability to sue notwithstanding (see e . g . Town of Black Brook v S t a t e of N e w York, 41 NY2d 486 [1977]), the City w i . 1 1 , without doubt, not do so, because of the bounty i: will r e c e i v e t f r o i n the enactment of Chapter 482. It is disengenuous to s u g g e s t t-hat it might be a possible plaintiff. 8'1.4 See Saratoga, 100 N Y 2 d at. (party which will benefit from agreement: is an "unlikely plaintiff"). The proper course is to allow that Dalva has st.anding,and to let the action continue. B. S t a t u t e of Limitations and Laches Whether Dalva has met the statute of limitations involve:;, according to the parties, the alleged tension between New Y o r k State A s s o c i a t i o n o f P1u m b i n g - H e a t i n g - C o o l i n g C o n t r a c t o r s , I n c . v ligan (65 NY2d 793 1385]), which provides f o r a one-year statute of limitations for certain constitutional challenges (CPLK 215 [ 4 1 ) , and Sax-atoga which applies the six-year statut-eof CPLR 213 (1). CPLR 215 (4) is applicable to "an action to enforce a pcnal.ty or forfeiture." The Court in New Yoxk S t a t e Association of Pl-urnbiny-Hcating Contractors, I n c . v Egan, supra, found t h a t , in an action to annul construction contracts awarded by the State in the absence of competitive bidding, the plaintiffs were e n c i . t l c d to the benefit of a one-year statute of limitations, rather than t h e four months afforded to petitioners in an A r I . i ( : : l ~ 9 [* 11] 78 proceeding. CPLR 213 (11, on the other hand, provides for a six-year statute of limitations for an action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law. The C o u r t i n S a r a t o g a found that a p l a i n t i f E w h o seeks \\a declaration as to the unconstitutionality of [a statute] and an injunction against the u s e of state funds to implement it is ruled by C P L R 213 (1). Id. at 815. This action comports more with the situation fourid in S a r - a t o g a , and is therefore timely. The Conservancy claims that, regardless of whether the statute of limitations is six years, Dalva is barred from pursuing this action by t h e doctrine of laches, as Chapter 482 was on the books for over a year before the present action was commenced. The Conservancy claims that it has been c o n s i d e r a b l y prejudiced, because it has already expended significant s u m s in anticipation of the commencement of the project. T h e Court of Appeals in S a r a t o g a defined laches as an equitable bar, based on a lengthy neglect or o m i s s i o n to asserL. LA right and the resulting prejudice to an adverse party. Id. at 816; see a l s o In re Linker, 2 3 AD3d 186 (1 3 Dept 2005). The mere lapse of time, without a showing of prejudice, will not sustain a defense of laches. Saratoga, 100 NY2d at 816; scc! a l s o in IC L i n k e r , supra. Although laches is n o t available in an action at law if the action is commenced w i t h i n the statut-e of 10 [* 12] limitations (see R o t h v B l a c k S t a r Publishing Co., Inc., 302 AD2d 442 [2d Dept 20031), it can be raised in equitable actions snd de~l~aratory judgment actions, where the d e f e n d a n t shows prcjudi.cia1 delay even though the limitations peri.od was met.. Sdr-aLoga, 100 N Y 2 d aL I 816. The Conservancy, through its project director, Kristen R. Reoch, states that Mr. Dalva has vigorously opposed the Conservancy s project since its proposal was submitted to the State (Aff. of Reoch, at ll), and t-hat an action was coinmcnced in federal court in 2001 to stop any proposed l e a s e of the Armory. This action was dismissed. The Conservancy allows that it was a l s o aware of a complaint, nearly identical to the present one, which was filed by Dalva in April 2005, but: was, however, never served on t h e Conservancy, and was apparently droppcd. Dalva also moved, unsuccessfully, for a preliminary injunclriori on July 26, 2005. A second request f o r a preliminary injunct-ionwas denied on December 8, 2005. December 6 , 2005. The present action was filed on Under these circumstances, I find that Dalva has made his intentions known, and has acted in such a manner, as to undermine t h e Conservancy s argument that Dalva unnecessarily delayed in seeking to s t o p t h e p r o j e c t , merely because his cf forts were without success. In the absence of signif i c r l r i t delay in bringing this action in a proper format, and in light of t h e Conservancy s knowledge of Dalva s intention:; , there ha;; heeri 11 [* 13] no delay sufficient to invoke a defense of laches. D. Municipal Home Rule Article XX § 2 (b (2) of the State Constitution provides that the Legislature "[slhall have the power to act in relation to t-he property, affairs or government of any local government ... by special law' only (a) on request of two-thirds of the total membership of its legislative body or on request of its chief executive officer concurred in by a majority of such . . . " This request is oft-encalled a "home rule membership , message. See P a t r o l m e n ' s R c n c v o l e n t A s s o c i a t i o n of C i t y of New " Y o r k v C i t y of N e w Y o r k , 97 NY2d 378 ( 2 0 0 1 ) . Dalva maintains that defendants have unconstitutionally pushed through a statutory scheme without benefit of the required home rule message from the City, whose property, allegedly, is the subject of Chapter 482. Defendants, in contrast, insist that Chapter 482 does not. in any way affect t h e p r o p e r t y of the City, as the premises involved in Chapter 482 is the Armory, not the underlying city-owned land, and because the 18711 Lease was, essentially, one between the C i t y and the State, based on rhe nomenclature used to describe t h e lessees i.n t h e 18'74 lease. Defendants also argue that t.he 2"Special law" is defined in Article IX (3) (d) (4) as "[a] law which in terms and in effect applies to one or more, but iiot all, counties, counties other than those wholly included within a city, cities, towns or villages." Chapter 482 is a special law under this definition, a fact which the parties do not dispute. 12 [* 14] State s substantial concern in the project permits imp1enientat.ion of Chapter 482, and ensures i t s consritutionality, even if the enactment is concerned with property belonging to the City. There is an exceedingly strong presumption of the constit-utionalityof statutes. Lighthouse Shores, Inc. v Town of Islip, 4 1 NY2d 7 , 11 ( 1 9 7 6 ) ; see a l s o Hotel Dorset C o m p a n y v Trust f o r C u l c u r - a 1 Resources of C i t y of N e w Y o r k , 46 N Y 2 d 358 (1978). Further, [clourts are required to exercise a large measure of restraint when considering highly intricate and imaginative schemes f o r public financing or f o r public expenditures designed to be in the public interest. Hotcl Dorset Company v T r u s t f o r Cultural Resources of City o f New Y o r k , 4 6 NY2d a t 3 6 9 . Section 1 of Chapter 482 provides an extensive l i s t of 1 cgi SI-ativefindings and purposes convincingly justifying t h e public/private effort which is to culminate in the Armory project. Section 1 commences as follows: It is hereby found and declared that New York State s Seventh Regiment Armory, located in the City of New Y o r k , is an important historic landmark; that it has been a prominent center of cultural and civic events since its construction in 1879; that it is of great military historic value; that the continued ability to operate t h e seventh regiment armory f o r military purposes in times of civil or military emergency is vitally important to the city and state, and that the physical restoration and refurbishment of t h e armory is necessary and important to preserve this structure for current and future generations o f New Yorkers. Section 1 goes on to cite, as findings supporting the projcct, 13 [* 15] that the Armory is an important civic and cultural facility for the community, so as to be beneficial to the health, safety, welfare and education of the people of the city and state ; t h a t the continuing use of t h e Armory to house the women s s h e l t e r is also beneficial to t h e health, safety, welfare and education of t h e st-ate and city s residents; that the alleviation of t.he grievous physical deterioration of the building is in the public interest, with a public/private partnership with a not-forprofit corporation as the best vehicle to achieve that. end. Section 1 also recites, as a finding, the history of t-he 1 8 7 4 Lease, an argument advanced by t h e State defendants in o r d e r to cement their entitlement to the leasehold. The language of section 1 r e a d s , in this regard, as follows: [i]t is also found and declared that leasehold title to the seventh regiment armory is the property of t h e state under an indenture of lease made on September 23, 1 8 7 4 between the mayor, aldermen and commonality of the city of New York as lessors, and the field officers of the seventh regiment of the national guard of the state of New York, as lessees, which f i e l d officers were later redesignated as the trustees of the seventh r-egimentarmory building (Chapter 518 of the Laws of 1893), as amended by an indenture of lease dated April 23, 1879. The 107thc o r p s support. group, a division of t-heNew York state nat-ional guard, is r.ecognized by the department of the army and t-hc c0urt.s o ¬ the state of New York as the lineal descendant of the seventh regiment, and the field officers of the 1 0 7 t h c o r p s support group a r e recognized as the current trustees of t h e armory and successors in interest to the lessee under t h e above-cited leases, subject to the supervision of the New York state division of military and naval a f f a i r s . Pursuant to this act, the armory is under the general charge and control of the adjutant general, the commanding general and senior military 14 [* 16] officer of t h e New York state national guard. The State defendants' argument convinces me that the Stat-c is, indeed, t h e lessee of the Armory, and may, therefore, cl--.' ri 1in I am not convinced, however, t h a t t.hi:; the rights of a lessee. puts to r e s t the question of whether Chapter 482 j"nvo1ves t.hu "property" of the City, so as to require, in many cases, a home rule message. In fact, case law signifies that the City has a potential property interest in the Armory, as well as in the land upon which the Armory stands. The State defendants argue that only the land underneath the Armory belongs to the City, b u t that the bui.lding belongs to the Stare, presumably, because the State's predecessors in interest built it. This would have the effect of negating any claim that C h a p t e r 482 effects City "property. 'I The Armory was built as a condition to the 1874 Lease. There is nothing in the 1874 Lease which would indicate t-hat the Armory to be built on the City's land was to be the property of t-he 1-essees,therefore, \\ [plrima f a c i e , such a building would be a fixture, and would not be removable. The legal effect of putti.ng it on another's land, would be to make it a p a r t of t h e freehold.'' S m i t h . & Britton v Bcnson & Peck, 1 Hill 3.76 (184'1.). Established law states that "[tlhe title and ownership of permanent erections by one person upon t h e land of another, i n the absence of contract rights regulating t h e interests of the I5 [* 17] respective parties, generally follows and accrues to the holder of the title of t h e land . . . . People v B o a r d of Assessors of Brooklyn, 9 3 NY 3 0 8 , 311 ( 1 8 8 3 ) ; see also P e o p l e v Fr-anck, 257 NY 69, 71 (1931)(the ordinary rule [with regard to tax assess1nent.s to property] is that when structures are erected by persons not. ownex-s of the land, they become part of the realty, and as ::u(rh t h e property of the landowner [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] 3 If one thing can be said about the Armory, it is that. it. wa.s not meant, and is r i o t , moveable. City property. And, in any event, it sits c n l The Armory project involves the property of Lhe City.4 The requirement of a home rule message does not immediat.ely f o l l o w , however. A recognized exception to the home rule message requirement exists when a s p e c i a l law serves a sub:;taritial State coiicern. I Patrolmen s Benevolent AssuciaLion Although the 1874 Lease provides that t h e plot of land [id. at unnumbered pages 3-4, emphasis in original], will revcrt. to the City should the terms of the lease not be met, t h e 1874 Lease, like any writing, must be read in its entirely, and in il rnamner that makes sense, which would indicate that t.he City did not expect to regain a piece of p r o p e r t y without any vaI.ue whatsoever; a piece of property, in fact, which is pract.ically a philisophical abstract, in light of its encumbrance. It should also be noted that many terms in the 1874 Lease are underlined, for reasons not obvious from a reading of the document. 1 note that the question of whether the Armory.itself has or will revert to t h e City by virtue of the reverter clause in the 1874 Lease is a matter between the lessee and lessor, and not, one in which Dalva has shown any right to intrude. [* 18] of t h e C i t y of N e w York Inc. v C i t y of N e w Y o r k , 97 N Y 2 d at 386. The enactment must have "a reasonable relationship" to the accompanying substantial State concern. Id. A home rule message will not be necessary, even if it "encroach[cs] upon local concerns" if the "subject matter in need of legislative att.erit:.i or1 was of sufficient i m p o r t a r i c e to the State, transcendent of l o c ~ i l or parochial interests or concerns." Wambat R e a l t y C o r p . v S t a t c of N e w Y o r k , 41 NY2d 490, 494 (1977). The present case falls squarely within the above paramet.crs. The State's substantial interest in the Armory project is manifest in its statement of legislative intent. Chapter 482, 5 1. The legislation will save an irreplaceable State landmark for future generations. center. It will create an important public cultural. It will sustain the women's shelter within i t s wall:;. And it will maintain the entire facilit-iesof the A r m o r y for military u s e in times of need, as it has in the past. All, of these uses will, as set forth in t h e statement of legislative i n t e n t , inure to the "health, safety, welfare and education of t h e State of New York." Id. There is no question that the A r m o r y project is " i n t h e public interest'' (id.) and that t.he , State has a substantial interest in its completion. I find LhaL, in light of these considerations, no home r u l e message is required to institute Chapter 482, and Dalva cannot show a likelihood of S U C C ~ S Son t h e merits. 17 [* 19] C. Irreparable Harm and Balance of Equities Dalva has failed to allege irreparable harm. The cost to t-axpayers of a state's spending is not irreparable injury such a s would support a preliminary injunction. See M a t t c . r of S c h u f z v S t a t e of N e w Y o r k , 217 AD2d 393 (3d Dept 1995) - But, more g l a r i n g is Ilalva's failure to show that the equities balance in his favor. In his papers, Dalva suggests no alternative to k . 1 ~ State's plan which would salvage the Armory before it becomes a ruin, no plan for its viable use, and certainly no evidence of the wherewithal to accomplish either goal.5 On the other h a n d , the St:at:e proposal provides for the restoration of a valuable resource and a viable plan for its use. The equities lean inexorably in t h e State's direction. IV. Conclusion I find that Dalva has failed to show a likelihood of succiess on t.he merits, irreparable harm, or a balance of equities in his favor. Consequently, he has failed to make a case for a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, it is 'At the public hearing previously mentioned, Dalva did say that he would like to see the Panel Room in t h e Armory "used as a museum and on display for t h e p e o p l e of the City of N e w York." Aff. of Graber, Ex. F , at 29. 18 [* 20] ORDERED that plaintiff David L. Dalva 11's motion for a preliminary injunction is denied. ENTER : J.S.C./ d 6; I E, 19

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.