People v Gray

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[*1] People v Gray 2006 NY Slip Op 52103(U) [13 Misc 3d 1233(A)] Decided on November 3, 2006 County Court, Suffolk County Crecca, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on November 3, 2006
County Court, Suffolk County

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

against

Terrell Gray, Defendant.



1466-06



HON. THOMAS SPOTA, III

Suffolk County District Attorney

By: HECTOR DANIEL LA SALLE, ESQ.

Criminal Courts Building

210 Center Drive

Riverhead, New York 11901

ERIC W. NAIBURG ESQ.

Attorney for Defendant

The Courthourse Corporate Center

320 Carleton Avenue, Suite 2500

Central Islip, New York 11722

Andrew A. Crecca, J.

The defendant, Terrell Gray, who is charged in the above indictment with Murder in the Second Degree, under the theory of depraved indifference to human life [PL § 125.25 (2)], has moved this Court for various pre-trial omnibus relief determined as follows:

I. MOTION TO INSPECT GRAND JURY MINUTES AND DISMISS THE INDICTMENT

By order dated August 29,2006, this Court previously determined the legal sufficiency of the Grand Jury minutes, and from a review thereof, determined that those proceedings, including the People's instruction on the law, were not defective within the meaning of CPL § 210.35.

In light of the Court of Appeals holding in People v. Feingold, 7 NY3d 288, the defendant has requested that the Court re-examine the Grand Jury minutes and, upon doing so, dismiss the [*2]indictment, pursuant to CPL § 210.35, on the grounds that the Grand Jury was improperly charged on the law, specifically, with respect to the instructions provided relative to Depraved Indifference Murder.

Upon due consideration, defendant's application in this regard is GRANTED to the extent that the Court has re-examined the Grand Jury minutes and upon doing so has again determined that, notwithstanding the Court of Appeals' holding in Feingold, supra , the evidence was legally sufficient and the proceedings were not defective, including the People's instructions on the law, within the meaning of CPL § 210.35.

Essentially, the defendant contends that inasmuch as the Court of Appeals decision in Feingold, supra was decided subsequent to the Grand Jury presentment of this matter and whereas the Court in Feingold, in part, redefined the law as it relates to depraved indifference murder and whereas it is undisputed that the Grand Jury was not instructed with this re-definition in mind, the defendant argues that the Grand Jury was, therefore, improperly instructed on the law thereby rendering the proceedings defective within the meaning of CPL § 210.35. As a result, the defendant contends that the indictment should be dismissed.

The People have filed an affidavit with the Court opposing such relief.

Over the years, the New York Court of Appeals has wrestled with the interpretation and application of Depraved Indifference Murder under New York Penal Law § 125.25 (2). It wasn't until their holding in People v. Suarez, 6 NY3d 202 that the Court began to move away from its long held position that depraved indifference could be established by a proper factual showing and did not require proof that it be an actual culpable mental state [See, People v. Register, 60 NY2d 270].

In Suarez, the Court, though not completely overruling Register, edged away from Register and its progeny and began to view depraved indifference as a culpable mental state.

Finally, in People v. Feingold, 7 NY3d 288 a sharply divided Court overruled Register,

and explicitly stated what the Court in Suarez stopped short of saying, that "depraved indifference to human life is a culpable mental state".

Reading Suarez in conjunction with Feingold, it is apparent that the Court of Appeals has, in part, re-defined Depraved Indifference Murder and now defines depraved indifference to human life as a culpable mental state, referring to a person's state of mind in engaging in conduct that causes another person's death. Under this new definition, a person has a depraved indifference to human life when that person has an utter disregard for the value of human life - a willingness to act, not because one means to cause death, but because one simply does not care whether or not death will occur. Depraved indifference to human life now reflects a wicked, evil or inhuman state of mind, as may be manifested by brutal, heinous and despicable acts. It is embodied in conduct that is so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of regard for the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to justify the same criminal liability that the law imposes on a person whose [*3]conscious objective is to kill [See, People v. Suarez, supra ; People v. Feingold, supra ].

Thus, under this new standard, as established by the Court of Appeals, depraved indifference to human life is more than just conduct but is now a culpable mental state as defined above. Such is the current law as it relates to Depraved Indifference Murder.

In connection with the instant application, relying on Feingold, the defendant argues that the District Attorney failed to properly instruct the Grand Jury on the critical element of depraved indifference to human life. The defendant essentially contends that such failure on the part of the People rendered the Grand Jury proceedings defective within the meaning of CPL § 210.35, thereby mandating dismissal of the indictment.

After considering the respective arguments of counsel in conjunction with the applicable law and after thoroughly examining the transcript of the Grand Jury proceedings, it is the determination of this Court to DENY defendant's application.

Initially, it should be noted that because the Grand Jury is not charged with the ultimate responsibility of deciding guilt or innocence, it is "unsound to measure the adequacy of the legal instructions given to the Grand Jury by the same standards that are utilized in assessing a trial court's instructions to a Petit Jury" [People v. Calbud, 49 NY2d 389]. Rather, what is sufficient is that the District Attorney provide the Grand Jury with enough information to enable it to intelligently decide whether a crime has been committed and whether there exists legally sufficient evidence to establish the material elements of the crime [People v. Calbud, supra ; People v. Wade, 260 AD2d 946]. The test for evaluating adequacy is whether the instructions provided were so deficient or misleading as to substantially undermine or impair the integrity of the Grand Jury's deliberations [See, People v. Wade, supra ; People v. Cannon, 210 AD2d 764].

Applying the above principles to the matter at hand, and after thoroughly examining the transcript of the Grand Jury proceedings, the Court concludes that the only deficiency in the instructions provided the Grand Jury by the People involved the failure to specifically define depraved indifference to human life as a culpable mental state as enunciated in People v. Feingold, supra . Such failure notwithstanding, the overall guidance provided the Grand Jury by the People, under the totality of the circumstances, was nevertheless sufficient for the Grand Jury to carry out its function. The instructions that were provided were adequate and were not misleading or so deficient as to substantially impair the integrity of that body.

Furthermore, contrary to the contentions of the defendant, the elements necessary to establish the crime of Depraved Indifference Murder pursuant to PL § 125.25(2) remain the same post- Feingold.

In this regard, notwithstanding the Court of Appeals holding in Feingold, in the opinion of this Court, the People will still be required to prove at trial beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements:

(1) That on a given date, the defendant caused the death of

a person;

(2) That the defendant did so by recklessly engaging in

conduct which created a grave risk of death to that person; and

(3) That the defendant engaged in such conduct under

circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life.

Based upon this Court's interpretation of Feingold, the Court therein did not change the basic elements necessary to prove the crime. The Court merely re-defined the meaning of the term, "depraved indifference to human life". As this Court previously stated above, that term now refers to a person's state of mind in engaging in conduct that creates a grave risk of death to another person (People v Feingold, supra ).

Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, it is the determination of the Court that the Grand Jury was adequately instructed in the applicable law pursuant to CPL § 190.25 (6). The instructions provided were not misleading or so deficient as to substantially impair the integrity of the Grand Jury within the meaning of CPL § 210.35.

As a result, defendant's application for an order dismissing the indictment as defective within the meaning of CPL § 210.35 is DENIED.

II. MOTION FOR PRE-TRIAL RULING ON ISSUE OF INTOXICATION

Defendant's application for a pre-trial ruling as to whether or not the Court will provide a jury instruction, at trial, on intoxication, to negate an element of the crime charged, is DENIED at this time, as premature.

However, in the event that a proper foundation is laid at trial, the Court will permit the defendant to renew this portion of his motion.

It should be noted that although intoxication is not, as such, a defense to a criminal charge, in any prosecution for an offense, evidence of intoxication of the defendant may be offered "whenever it is relevant to negative an element of the crime charged" [See, Penal Law § 15.25].

In this regard, prior to the Court's holding in Feingold, evidence of a defendant's voluntary intoxication was never permitted as a defense to Depraved Indifference Murder and was excluded whenever recklessness was an element of an offense charged [See, People v. Register, 60 NY2d 270]. [*4]

However, the Feingold Court, by specifically overruling Register and holding that depraved indifference to life is now a culpable mental state, has caused the courts to re-address this issue. [See, People v. Connelly, 2006 NY Slip Op 6423, 821 NYS2d 614].

Relying on Feingold, inasmuch as depraved indifference to human life is now a culpable mental state, this Court rules that if a proper foundation is laid at trial, evidence of the defendant's intoxication may be admissible and may be considered by the jury in determining whether the defendant's mind was affected by intoxicants to such a degree that he was incapable of forming the mental state of depraved indifference to human life. If such is applicable, an appropriate instruction to the jury will be provided.

Thus, without making an advance ruling on this issue, the Court leaves open the possibility that Penal Law §15.25 may be applicable to the instant matter if a factual predicate is sufficiently established at trial.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, defendant's application for an advance pre-trial ruling in this regard is DENIED with leave granted to renew.

III. MOTION TO AMEND INDICTMENT

Defendant's application for an order amending the wording of the above indictment to comport with the holding in Feingold is DENIED.

In the opinion of this Court, relying on Feingold, the current wording of the indictment is in no way misleading and is proper in all respects.

Accordingly, no amendment is necessary and the application in this regard is DENIED.

IV. MOTION FOR PRE-TRIAL CLARIFICATION OF COURT'S CHARGE

By this application, the defendant is requesting the Court to apprise the parties what law it intends to charge the jury relative to the charged crime of Depraved Indifference Murder [PL § 125.25 (2)] .

As provided above, in the body of this decision, this Court has already set forth the law, as it currently exists, with respect to the crime of Depraved Indifference Murder as it applies to this case and, at the appropriate time, will instruct the jury with respect thereto.

Such information should provide adequate notice to both sides at this time with respect to the nature of the Court's charge as it relates to the crime set forth in the indictment. [*5]

The foregoing memorandum constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

SO ORDERED:

Dated:November 3, 2006

______________________________

HON. ANDREW A. CRECCA

County Court Judge

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