Colon v Chelsea Piers Mgt., Inc.
Annotate this CaseDecided on October 4, 2006
Supreme Court, Kings County
Rose Colon, Individually and as Administratrix of Victor Hernandez, Jr., Deceased, Plaintiff,
against
Chelsea Piers Management, Inc., Basketball City New York LLC and Basketball City, U.S.A., LLC, Defendants.
2079/04
Plaintiff Attny: Ronemus & Vilensky, LLP
Defendant's Attny: Molod Spitz & DeSantis, PC
Yvonne Lewis, J.
The defendants, Basketball City New York LLC and Basketball City, U.S.A., LLC, move for an order, pursuant to CPLR 3212, granting summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
On March 18, 2004, plaintiff commenced this action, arguing that she is entitled to recover damages for defendants' alleged negligence, which caused the wrongful death of decedent. Plaintiff also pleads a derivative cause of action.
On December 17, 2002, the decedent collapsed while playing a basketball game in a facility commonly known as Chelsea Piers in Manhattan. Movants owned, operated and maintained a portion of the subject facility.
The decedent suffered a cardiac arrest and collapsed while playing for a basketball team in an evening league. After the decedent collapsed, several people involved with the league telephoned emergency services. Various people, while waiting for the paramedics, attempted to revive the decedent. An ambulance subsequently arrived and transported decedent to St. Vincent's Hospital. Attempts to resuscitate decedent failed, and decedent was subsequently declared dead.
After this action was filed, discovery ensued, and is presumably complete since plaintiff filed a certificate of readiness on January 10, 2006. Movants now seek summary judgment. In support, movants assert that they are not liable for decedent's death because: (1) decedent assumed the risk inherent in playing basketball; (2) the alleged negligence [*2]did not proximately cause decedent's death; (3) decedent's death was unforeseeable.
In opposition, plaintiff asserts that decedent did not assume the risk of playing basketball under the relevant circumstances. Specifically, plaintiff argues that movants were under a duty to maintain, on the premises, emergency resuscitation equipment and a staff adequately trained in emergency medical care. Plaintiff states that there was no such equipment and the subject staff was not so trained. Thus, plaintiff concludes, decedent did not assume the risk of playing basketball in defendants' facility.
The court grants the motion. A plaintiff seeking damages for negligence must establish the existence of a duty owing to it from the defendants, and the breach of that duty causing injury to plaintiff (see Akins v Glens Falls City School Dist., 53 NY2d 325, 333 [1981]). Here, plaintiff has not demonstrated that a duty exists, and, consequently, plaintiff cannot establish a breach of a duty.
Plaintiff's argument is, in essence, that defendants breached a duty owed to decedent by failing to have proper equipment and medically trained personnel on the premises. However, the cases cited by plaintiff in opposition do not support plaintiff's main assertion: that decedent could not have assumed the risks associated with playing basketball in the subject facility because defendants did not comply with their alleged duty to provide medical equipment and a medically-trained staff. Indeed, the appellate authority noted by plaintiff either concerns the scope of duty with respect to dangerous conditions or the scope of an athlete's assumption of risk of dangers inherent in a sport (see e.g. Turcotte v Fell, 68 NY2d 432, [1986]; Marcano v City of New York, 296 AD2d 43 [2002], revd 99 NY2d 548 [2002]; Owen v R.J.S. Safety Equipment, Inc., 79 NY2d 967 [1992]; Morgan v State, 90 NY2d 471 [1997]).
Here, in contrast, there is no allegation of a dangerous condition on the premises. Indeed, no part of the facility "caused" decedent to suffer a cardiac arrest. Moreover, the question of whether decedent assumed a risk presumes the existence of a duty owed to decedent, which is not established. Lastly, General Business Law 627-a (which imposes certain requirements on "health clubs") is not relevant to this action as the effective date of the statute was more than two years after the accident took place.
In sum, there is no authority for plaintiff's position. Recreational and athletic facilities do in fact owe a general duty to participants (see e.g. Livshitz v U.S. Tennis Assn. Natl. Tennis Ctr., 196 Misc 2d 460 [Civ Ct, Queens County 2003]; Rutnik v Colonie Center Court Club Inc., 249 AD2d 873, [1998]). However, there is no authority for the proposition that on the subject date, movants were required to maintain resuscitation equipment or a medically-trained staff during basketball games. Thus, as a matter of law, movants did not owe a specific duty to decedent. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is granted and the complaint is dismissed as against Basketball City New York LLC and Basketball City, U.S.A., LLC.
The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of this court.
E N T E R, [*3]
J. S. C.
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