Ataee v Mount Sinai Hosp.
Annotate this CaseDecided on January 11, 2006
Supreme Court, New York County
SHAHAB ATAEE, MD, Plaintiff,
against
THE MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL, THE MOUNT SINAI MEDICAL CENTER, MOUNT SINAI SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, ADAM STEIN, MD and NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION, Defendants.
117761/02
Marilyn Shafer, J.
Plaintiffs commenced this action to recover damages based upon discrimination allegedly based on his race and religion, in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), the New York Civil Rights Law ("NYCRL") and the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"). On April 4, 2005, defendant New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation ("HHC") moved for an order for summary judgment to dismiss plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. Defendants The Mount Sinai Hospital, The Mount Sinai Medical Center, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, and Adam Stein MD ("Mt Sinai") also moved for summary judgment to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. On September 13, 2005, this Court granted HHC and Mt Sinai's (collectively "defendants") motions for summary judgment as unopposed due to plaintiff's failure to submit opposition papers ("Prior Order").
Plaintiff now moves, pursuant to an Order to Show Cause, for an order to vacate the Prior [*2]Order and to restore the action. Pursuant to an order dated May 11, 2005, this Court stayed the defendants' motion for summary judgment for thirty days to allow time for plaintiff to serve opposition papers. This order further provided that if plaintiff did not respond by June 10, 2005, the defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted on default as unopposed. On June 8, 2005, plaintiff sent a letter to the court requesting an extension of the stay for an additional 30 days in order for plaintiff to retain new counsel. Plaintiff was informed by the court that his letter constituted ex-parte communication and his request would not be considered. The court further informed plaintiff that he must submit a response to defendants' motion for summary judgment and that he should contact the Office of the Self- Represented for assistance.
In opposition, defendants maintain that plaintiff's request to vacate the default judgment must be denied as plaintiff cannot demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and establish a meritorious defense.
It is well settled that the decision to vacate a default judgment is generally in the discretion of the Supreme Court (Tobin v Perlmutter, 288 AD2d 210 [2d Dept 2001]). In order to vacate a default judgment, the movant must establish both a valid excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (See CPLR §5015[a][1]). Here, plaintiff cannot establish a reasonable excuse for his default. In his affirmation, plaintiff merely details the chronology of events leading up to his default. Plaintiff not only fails to explain why he could not comply with the court's order to respond to the defendants' motions for summary judgment, but he simply does not provide any excuses for his default. Plaintiff's affirmation consists of five paragraphs and is completely devoid of any explanation as to his default.
Moreover, plaintiff's pro se status does not excuse plaintiff's default. Plaintiff is a highly educated medical professional who has had numerous contacts with the judicial system and quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, including the instant action, his criminal trial, conviction and subsequent unsuccessful appeal, the civil matter commenced by the woman whom he was convicted of sexually assaulting, his successful challenge before a hospital peer review committee to his suspension from the Mount Sinai residency program, and the administrative proceedings before the State of New York medical licensing board. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot satisfy the first prong necessary in order to vacate his default judgment.
Meritorious Defense
Even assuming, arguendo, plaintiff is able to meet his burden in presenting a reasonable excuse, plaintiff, nevertheless, cannot satisfy the requirement in demonstrating a meritorious defense. In the instant action, HHC moved for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR§3212 on the grounds that plaintiff's claims are insufficient as a matter of law. Specifically, HHC contends that plaintiff cannot maintain his claim for race/religious discrimination because he cannot show any discriminatory intent on the part of the HHC administrators or employees, nor can he show that the request for his removal from Elmhurst Hospital Center ("Elmhurst") resulted in an adverse employment action. HHC further contends that plaintiff cannot establish that HHC's request for his removal from its facility was a pretext for discrimination, especially in light of the fact that plaintiff was subsequently convicted for sexual misconduct. HHC argues that plaintiff cannot maintain a claim for employment discrimination against it because plaintiff was not employed by HHC.
Mt Sinai also moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in its entirety. Mt. [*3]Sinai argues that plaintiff has failed to plead or prove facts sufficient to make even a prima facie showing that he was a victim of religious or national origin discrimination. Mt Sinai further argues that the actions about which plaintiff complains do not constitute actionable adverse employment actions on the part of Mt. Sinai.
In order to maintain a claim for discrimination, plaintiff has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) that he was qualified to hold the position; (3) termination from employment or other adverse employment action; and (4) that the discharge or other adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination (Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 309 AD3d 546 [1st Dept 2003]). In the matter at bar, it is clear that plaintiff's conclusory allegations are insufficient to demonstrate the merit of his position. Plaintiff fails to submit any evidence to support his allegation that he was discriminated against and terminated based on his race/religion. In fact, a careful search of the record reveals evidence to the contrary. It is undisputed that there were two other Iranian residents in the Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation program (the "program") and neither one of them had received unfavorable reports or was terminated. Moreover, other residents from the program who were placed on Academic Alert or Probation were not Muslim or Iranian. It is further undisputed that two of the supervisory physicians who gave plaintiff unsatisfactory evaluations or recommended his suspension for sexual misconduct were Iranian and Muslim. Plaintiff simply cannot prove that he was treated differently from any similarly situated residents in his program.
Additionally, plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the defendants' actions had an actionable adverse effect on his employment. Not only was plaintiff reinstated, with full pay and benefits, after the Ad Hoc Committee recommended that Mt Sinai summarily suspend and terminate him, but plaintiff was able to complete his residency at Mt Sinai. Despite being removed from rotating at Elmhurst Hospital, plaintiff graduated from the program along with the other residents in his entering class. Plaintiff's claims that defendants' actions caused him to lose the opportunity to work as a fellow at the Long Beach Veterans Hospital under Dr. Lin are also unsupported. It is clear from Dr. Lin's deposition testimony that plaintiff was never selected and that the fellowship position was left vacant that year because Dr. Lin did not feel the applicants, including plaintiff, were sufficiently qualified for the position. Plaintiff's conclusory allegation are blatantly insufficient to establish any merit to his claims.
While the Court acknowledges that the law generally favors resolution of controversies on the merits (N & J Foods v Shopwell Plaza Corp., 63 AD2d 899 [1st Dept 1978]), given the facts and circumstances of the instant matter, "this preference will not justify vacating a default judgment where the moving party fails to satisfy the two-prong burden of showing a meritorious defense and a reasonable excuse for the default" (Dimitratos v City of New York, 180 AD2d 414 [1st Dept 1992]).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for a default judgment is denied.
This constitutes the decision and order of this Court.
Dated: January 11, 2006
J.S.C.
[*4]
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