Statewide Med. Acupuncture Servs., PC v Travelers Ins. Co.

[*1] Statewide Med. Acupuncture Servs., PC v Travelers Ins. Co. 2005 NY Slip Op 51773(U) [9 Misc 3d 1124(A)] Decided on October 6, 2005 Civil Court Of The City Of New York, Bronx County Rodriguez, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on October 6, 2005
Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County

Statewide Medical Acupuncture Services, PC, a/a/o MECHAN RAGHUNANDAN, Plaintiffs,

against

Travelers Insurance Company, Defendant. CONTINENTAL MEDICAL ACUPUNCTURE, P.C., a/a/o KEITH McKENNA, Plaintiffs, TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. CONTINENTAL MEDICAL ACUPUNCTURE, PC, a/a/o FLOYD HOGGARD, Plaintiffs, TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. STATEWIDE MEDICAL SERVICES, PC, a/a/o LUIS RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiffs, TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. MAPLE MEDICAL ACUPUNCTURE, P.C., a/a/o CATHY MAYO, Plaintiffs, TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. DELTA MEDICAL ACUPUNCTURE, P.C., a/a/o BASILICIA RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiffs, TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. DELTA MEDICAL ACUPUNCTURE, P.C., a/a/o KWANZA ADAMS, Plaintiffs, TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. CONTINENTAL MEDICAL ACUPUNCTURE SERVICES, P.C., a/a/o EUGENIO FERNANDEZ, Plaintiffs, TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.



Continental Medical Acupuncture, P.C., a/a/o KEITH McKENNA, Plaintiffs, -against-

against

Travelers Insurance Company,Defendant.



Continental Medical Acupuncture, PC, a/a/o FLOYD HOGGARD, Plaintiffs, -against-

against

Travelers Insurance Company,Defendant.



Statewide Medical Services, PC, a/a/o LUIS RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiffs, -against-

against

Travelers Insurance Company,Defendant.



Maple Medical Acupuncture, P.C., a/a/o CATHY MAYO, Plaintiffs, -against-

against

Travelers Insurance Company,Defendant.



Delta Medical Acupuncture, P.C., a/a/o BASILICIA RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiffs, -against-

against

Travelers Insurance Company,Defendant.



Delta Medical Acupuncture, P.C., a/a/o KWANZA ADAMS, Plaintiffs, -against-

against

Travelers Insurance Company,Defendant.



Continental Medical Acupuncture Services, P.C., a/a/o EUGENIO FERNANDEZ, Plaintiffs, -against-

against

Travelers Insurance Company,Defendant.



32861/2005

Julia I. Rodriguez, J.

The actions at issue were commenced by plaintiff/medical providers seeking a money judgment against defendant/insurance carrier for recovery of no-fault medical benefits rendered to its assignor, plus statutory interest and attorneys' fees. [Insurance Law §5106 et seq; 11 N.Y.C.R.R.R. §65-1.1 et seq.; §65.15[h][1] and §65.17[b][6][v]].

*******

After service of the respective summonses and complaints defendant interposed an Answer alleging numerous affirmative defenses. The defenses relevant to the instant motion(s) included: (1) Plaintiff has materially misrepresented that a licensed physician was the owner of the plaintiff's practice with the purpose and intent of inducing Defendant to make payments for medical services which the true owners would not be entitled to receive under the no-fault endorsement of the applicable policies.(2) The Plaintiff is not a properly licensed facility according to the Business Corporation Law and the Public Health Law, and thus has engaged in the unlawful practice of medicine.(3) The plaintiff lacks standing to bring the within action as it was controlled, owned, managed and supervised by persons who are not licensed or authorized to own a professional service corporation or authorized to practice medicine in violation of the Business Corporation, Education and Insurance Laws.(4) Plaintiff is engaged in the unlawful practice of fee splitting in violation of 10 N.Y.C.R.R. §600.9 and the Education Law and Public Law §4500 and therefore is not entitled to recover no-fault benefits.[FN1]

In accompaniment of each Answer, defendant also served a Demand for Verified Written Interrogatories, a Combined Demand and Notice of Examination Before Trial of the plaintiff, the agents, servants or employees of said parties having knowledge of the subject matter concerning all of the relevant facts and circumstances in connection with the issues alleged in the plaintiff's verified complaint.[*2]

The Combined Demand sought discovery and inspection of various documents, including but not limited to the assignment, assignor's application, bills, copies of all checks and other evidence demonstrating payment received from defendant, complete office notes, all sign-in sheets, plaintiff's curriculum vitae, plaintiff's Certificate of Incorporation, and the resume and curriculum vitae of each expert upon whose testimony you will rely upon at the time of trial concerning the subject lawsuit.

Plaintiff's first response to the Demand for Interrogatories was rejected by defendant as "insufficient and nonresponsive." Simultaneously with this rejection defendant served a Supplemental Demand for Verified Written Interrogatories and Amended Notice of Examination Before Trial. The amended EBT demand specified two individuals to be deposed: (1) Dr. Dipak Nandi - owner/operator, and (2) Ying-Li - medical provider/acupuncturist.

Thereafter, plaintiffs provided defendant with discovery indicating that Dipak Nandi is a licensed physician and certified acupuncturist, and that he is also sole shareholder in each of the plaintiff/medical corporations. After motion practice to dismiss plaintiffs' actions for lack of disclosure or to compel plaintiffs to comply with defendant's discovery demands, said motions were resolved by stipulations which read, in pertinent part: Plaintiff shall provide responses to defendant's written discovery demands and supplemental demands pertaining to standing within 60 days, to the extent not already provided: andDefendant to advise plaintiff in writing within 45 days of receipt of plaintiff's written discovery responses of a deposition of plaintiff's alleged owner, Dr. Nandi is required.Plaintiff reserves the right to move for a protective order regarding Dr. Nandi's deposition.

********

Before the instant court are nine motions where defendant, Travelers Insurance Company, seeks an order pursuant to §3126 dismissing the actions for plaintiffs' failure to provide Court-ordered discovery, or in the alternative, for an Order compelling plaintiffs to provide all outstanding discovery and produce Dr. Nandi and Ying-Li to ascertain evidence of the entities' corporate structure and method of payment and sum of salaries.

The court sua sponte hereby consolidates the motions and respective cross-motions for protective orders in the nine above-reference actions solely for purposes of disposition herewith.

********.

In opposition, plaintiffs present that Dr. Nandi was neither the treating acupuncturist or the individual who submitted the bills in these cases. Plaintiffs submit that they have already provided defendant with incorporation documents, licenses, payroll information and complete responses to defendant's discovery demands, including plaintiffs' lease agreements. Plaintiffs contend that the discovery establishes that (1) Dr. Nandi is a licensed medical doctor and that both he and the treating acupuncturists are State-certified; (2) that the plaintiff/medical facilities are lawfully incorporated entities; and (3) that Dr. Nandi owns and operates the plaintiff [*3]corporations and other acupuncture clinics which he is qualified to do under State law.

In its Repl[ies] defendant does not dispute that it has received the relevant corporate documents, medical and acupuncturists' licenses. However, defendant argues that still outstanding are Dr. Nandi's and plaintiff/corporations' tax returns, salary records for Dr. Nandi and his employees, and facility lease agreements between the medical providers and other entities, presumably, management companies. Defendant further argues that the deposition of Dr. Nandi: . . . is material and necessary to the defense of this action and goes to the heart of the issue in this case, which is whether [the medical providers were] fraudulently incorporated and thus not entitled to no-fault benefits. The information sought is relevant to resolve the issue of whether the ]plaintiffs are] properly licensed to the New York State Business Corporation Law and Education Law as the plaintiff[s] will not be able to collect benefits under the no-fault law if they cannot establish standing [¶8 of Reply].

***********

Before consideration of whether medical providers were fraudulently incorporated and thus not entitled to no-fault benefits, the first issues for the court are whether defendant preserved a defense premised on fraud in any of its denials, and if it did not so, whether the fraud alleged falls within the category of defenses which are not waived by the insurer despite failure to raise it in a timely denial.

It is now settled that an insurer must adhere to a "timely timed process" of denial or waive defenses which are not asserted within 30 days or tolled by the verification process. Presbyterian Hospital in the City of New York v. Maryland Casualty Co., 90 NY2d 274, 660 NYS2d 536, 683 NE2d 1 (1997). [11 N.Y.C.R.R. §§65.15 et seq, 3.5(b)(d)(e), 65-3..6(b), 65-3.8 (a)(1) et seq.] The only exceptions to the 30-day rule to deny or pay the claim are where the insurer's basis for denying the payment is based on lack of coverage of the policy. Central General Hospital v. Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, 90 NY2d 195, 199, 681 NE2d 413, 659 NYS2d 246 (1997) (a defense premised on the fact or founded belief that the alleged injury does not arise out of an insured incident is a lack of coverage defense which is not precluded by an untimely denial). The seminal language in Chubb reads: . . . The denial of liability based upon lack of coverage within the insurance agreement . . . is distinguishable from disclaimer attempts based on a breach of a policy condition [cites omitted] . . . Strict compliance with the time requirements of both the statute and regulations may be obviated and the preclusion remedy rendered unavailable when denial of claims is premised on a lack of coverage . . . We would not . . . extend this exceptional exemption to excuse [defendant insurer's] untimely defense in relation to the treatment being deemed excessive by the insurer. That would not ordinarily implicate a coverage matter and, therefore, failure to comply with the Insurance Law time restriction might properly preclude the insurer from a belated rejection of the billing on that basis.

Central General Hospital v. Chubb Group, supra , 90 NY2d 195 at 199.

In this case, none of the denials issued by defendant prior to commencement of these actions alleged a staged accident or lack of coverage, or any scintilla sounding in fraud. Indeed, [*4]the bulk of the denials herein merely stated: Per New York State Law Regulation 68, "Upon request by the Company, the eligible injured person or someone on his behalf shall:(a) execute a written proof of claim under oath;(b) provide authorization that will enable the Company to obtain medical records; and(c) provide any other pertinent information, your entire claim No-Fault Benefits is denied.[sic] DUE TO: FAILURE TO SUBMIT ALL REQUESTED INFORMATION IN A REASONABLE TIME FRAME, LACK OF VERIFICATION AND NON-COOPERATION. THEREFORE, YOUR BILLS [sic] ARE DENIED.[FN2]

At this juncture of the analysis, defendant is not entitled to depose Dr. Nandi or the treating acupuncturists for the purposes it proposes, because defendant failed to preserve any defense sounding in fee splitting, improper incorporation or licensing in its denial. However, the next inquiry is whether any of these defenses falls within the narrow exception(s) of defenses which are not waived by an untimely denial.

*******

Defendant argues that it is entitled to depose Dr. Nandi because now "carriers may look beyond the face of licensing documents to identify willful and material failure to abide by state and local law." State Farm Mutual Automobile Co. v. Mallela, et al, 4 NY3d 313, 321, 827 NE2d 758, 794 NYS2d 700 (2005).

Mallela concerned a lawsuit filed by State Farm insurance company in the United States [*5]District Court for the Eastern District of New York seeking a judgment declaring that it need not reimburse defendants - fraudulently incorporated medical corporations - for assigned claims submitted under no-fault. . . . According to the complaint, the unlicensed defendants paid physicians to use their names on paperwork filed with the State to establish medical service corporations. Once the medical service corporations were established under the facially valid cover of the nominal physician owners, the nonphysicians actually operated the companies. To maintain the appearance that the physicians owned the entities, the nonphysicians caused the corporations to hire management companies (owned by the nonphysicians), which billed the medical corporations inflated rates for routine services. In this manner, the actual profits did not go to the nominal owners but were channeled to the nonphysicians who owned the management companies.

The claim was that the medical providers in Mallela were in violation of §§1504 and 1508 of the Business Corporation Law (BCL). BCL §1504(a) states, in pertinent part, that "no professional service corporation may render professional services except through individuals authorized by law to render such professional services as individuals." The Superintendent of Insurance had determined that insurance carriers may withhold payment of no-fault claims which had been assigned to those medical providers which were owned or controlled by non-physicians. The Superintendent's regulation is found in Section 65-3.16(a)(12) of 11 N.Y.C.R.R, which reads:. Measurement of no-fault benefits. (a) Medical expenses.(12) A provider of health care services is not eligible for reimbursement under section 5102(a)(1) of the Insurance Law if the provider fails to meet any applicable New York State or local licensing requirement to perform such service in New York or meet any applicable licensing requirement necessary to perform such service in any other state in which such service is performed.

One contention by the medical providers in Mallela was that even if they were not in compliance with corporate licensing requirements, they were entitled to payment because all personnel who actually treated the patients rendered their services within the scope of their licensed specialties, and therefore, this extent of licensing compliance was "within the regulatory framework for reimbursement." 4 NY3d at 321.

The Mallela Court found the Superintendent's Regulation [§65-3.16(a)(12)] valid and that it was undermined by the claim that the individual practitioners who treated the patients were properly licensed within their fields: Where, as here, the Superintendent has properly crafted a rule within the scope of his authority, that rule has the force of law and represents the policy choice of this State.

4 NY3d at 321.

Based upon Mallela, this court holds that the defenses of fraudulent incorporation and unlawful fee splitting are proper exceptions to the 30-day rule because said conduct is specifically barred by statute. Mallella, supra (insurance carriers may withhold payment of claims to medical corporations which are in violation of specific statutes concerning [*6]incorporation and fee splitting with non physicians). Concomitantly, these defenses are not waived or precluded by an untimely denial See also Ozone Park Medical Diagnostic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Company, 180 Misc2d 105, 109, 689 NYS2d 616, 618 (A.T. 2d Dep't 1999) (where the specific wording a statute [Public Health Law §238-a] prohibits a financial relationship between a referring practitioner and the medical provider, then "it logically follows that the 30-day limitation . . . [rule] would not apply if the instant case fell within the ambit of [the statute]").

However, in this case defendant fails to demonstrate by "fact or founded belief" that the medical corporations were not properly licensed either at their inception or thereafter, that non-physicians are practicing medicine at plaintiffs' facilities and/or that the physicians billing for services rendered are not properly licensed in their respective fields. Notably, defendant is in receipt of the Certificate(s) of Incorporation, copies of medical licenses and registrations, and copies of lease and management agreements for several of the plaintiffs herein.[FN3] Significantly, defendant does not dispute the validity of any corporate registrations and/or medical licenses provided by plaintiff(s), or present legal authority prohibiting Dr. Nandi from owning more than one medical facility. There is no submission by an individual with personal knowledge that any investigation has been conducted at the New York State Department of Education and/or Secretary of State, or other source, which contradicts the corporate and licensing data provided by plaintiffs. Rather, via an affidavit by Kathy Aplin, a manager employed by defendant in its Special Investigative Unit, defendant states it is its "contention" that the 10 [ten] professional medical corporations, including plaintiffs herein, allegedly owned by Dr. Dipak Nandi, a licensed acupuncturist, are in fact owned by non-medical personnel. Ms. Aplin states that evidence collected to date indicates that Dr. Nandi's facilities are managed, controlled and operated by unlicensed individuals who ultimately profit from these medical facilities in direct violation of the Business Corporations Law and Educational Law of the State of New York. However, Ms. Aplin fails to submit "the evidence collected to date" applicable to the actual medical providers named in the captions herein.

In addition, Ms. Aplin offers information which is unrelated to the plaintiffs before the court. For example, Ms. Aplin alleges that Dr. Nandi was not certified to practice acupuncture in January 2001 when Universal Acupuncture was incorporated. The court deems this information irrelevant because Universal Acupuncture is not a named plaintiff herein, it is undisputed that Dr. Nandi obtained certification to practice acupuncture in 2001 after January 2001, and all claims in the various complaints are for services rendered after 2001.

Ms. Aplin attaches numerous lease agreements between parties that are not related to this lawsuit. As to those lease agreements which involve one of the parties named in the actions before the court, those lease agreements expired in either 2001 or 2002; there is no allegation that said agreements were renewed and their relevance to the no-fault claims at issue. [*7]

Ms. Aplin refers to documents obtained from a lawsuit against Dr. Nandi, but fails to identify the date said lawsuit was commenced, the caption and index number, the court in which it appeared, and the disposition, if any.

Ms. Aplin states that Travelers "became concerned" that many of the bills submitted by plaintiffs were for unnecessary treatment which "was motivated by interests other than the best interests of the patients" [¶24]. However, she cites no specific findings of patients being rendered unnecessary treatment, and none of the denials herein stated medical non-necessity as a ground for denial of plaintiffs' claims. Cf. A.B. Medical Services PLLC v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 4 Misc 3d 83, 84, 781 NYS2d 822, 823 (9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2004) (examinations of the assignors under oath revealed significant discrepancies and raised questions of fact as to whether medical services were rendered after symptoms abated).

Clearly, Ms. Aplin's affidavit is replete with hearsay, conjecture and speculation and, therefore, insufficient to raise an issue of fact as to plaintiffs' fraudulent corporation or other specific fraudulent conduct.

This court holds that Mallela did not open a valve authorizing full disclosure into corporate licensing matters absent good cause and/or reasonable foundation in no-fault medical provider actions. Significantly, Mallella referred to the role of Superintendent of the Insurance in investigating claims of regulatory breaches, and implied that the insurance carrier would conduct its investigation within the confines of the statutory verification process. Consider, Mallela offered the caveat that the no-fault regulatory scheme

does not permit abuse of the truth-seeking opportunity that 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 65-3.16(a)(12) authorized. Indeed, the Superintendent's regulations themselves provide for the agency oversight of carriers, and demand that carriers delay the payment of claims to pursue investigations solely for good cause (see 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 65-3.2[c]. In the licensing context, carriers will be unable to show 'good cause' unless they can demonstrate behavior tantamount to fraud."

The Mallella Court cited to and presumed that carriers follow the "practice principles" enunciated in §65-3.2[c]: Do not demand verification of facts unless there are good reasons to do so. When verification of facts is necessary, it should be done as expeditiously as possible.

Consequently, Mallela did not alter the settled rules that (1) an insurer's lack of coverage defense must be premised on fact or founded belief [General Hospital v. Chubb Group, supra ,], (2) that an insurer must stand or fall upon those defenses raised in a timely denial preserved with tolling mandates [Presbyterian Hospital v. City of New York, supra ; Inwood Hill Medical P.C. v. Allstate Insurance Company, 3 Misc 3d 1110(A), 787 NYS2d 678, 2004 {3 Misc 3d 1110(A)} WL 1381082 (Div. Ct. NY Co. 2004)], (3) that discovery in no-fault actions is tailored by the grounds asserted in the denial [Metropolitan Radiological Imaging, PC v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 7 Misc 3d 675, 790 NYS2d 373 {7 Misc 3d 675} (Civ. Ct. [*8]Qns. Co. 2005) ; and (4) Mallella did not define, expand or restrict the meaning of "fraud."[FN4]

However, while the Mallela Court did not define fraud, it defined "good cause:" In the licensing context, carriers will be unable to show "good cause" unless they can demonstrate behavior tantamount to fraud. Technical violations will not do.

4 NY3d at 322. Thus, a new question is what constitutes "behavior tantamount to fraud?" While this court does not venture to offer an example, defendant's submission in this case lacks a reliable foundation to infer that the medical providers are engaging in behavior that can be described as "tantamount to fraud." Consequently, defendant does not demonstrate that it is entitled to the depositions it seeks, since it is axiomatic that Article 31 of the CPLR [Civil Practice Law and Rules] is not to be utilized for 'fishing expeditions.'

It remains that after Mallela the distinction between denials based on lack of coverage and all others, made in Chubb, supra , is still the prevailing law. Fair Price Medical Supply Corp. v. Travelers Indemnity Company, __ Misc 3d __, __ {9 Misc 3d 76} NYS2d. __, 2005 WL 1994132, 2005 NY Slip O. 25343. (A.T. 2d & 11th Jud. Dists. 2005). In Fair Price the Appellate Term first found that the insurer did not deny the claim within 30 days, and then considered whether the insurer's claim of fraud was precluded by the untimely denial. Specifically, the insurer claimed that it was not required to pay the medical provider's claim because the eligible injured person, the assignor, stated he never received the medical supplies. The Appellate Term adhered to Chubb, supra , and held in favor of the medical provider, stating that a: defense based on a provider's fraudulent scheme to obtain no-fault benefits [was] precluded by defendant's untimely claim denial. . . . we are bound by the majority's unequivocal construction [in Chubb] of the No-Fault Law which limits an insurer's ability to resist 'ill-founded, illegitimate and fraudulent claims' submitted by providers of medical services or medical equipment to the 'strict, short-leasehed contestable period' set forth in the verification protocols [cites omitted]. The clear implication is that a defense based on a provider's alleged fraudulent claim for no-fault benefits is precluded by an insurer's failure effectively to invoke its remedies in the 'contestable period,' one of the 'tradeoff[s] of the no-fault reform' which the Legislature recognized as the cost of providing 'prompt uncontested' first-party insurance benefits.[*9]

After Mallela insurance carriers are still required to make a showing that the defense of fraud is well-founded and in good faith. See KC Ocean Diagnostic Imaging PC v. Utica Mutual Insurance Company, __ Misc 3d ___, N.Y.L.J. 7/18/05, p.37, col. 4 (A.T. 2nd & 12th Jud. Dists.) ("defendant [insurer] is not precluded from asserting the defense that the collision was in furtherance of an insurance fraud scheme, despite its untimely denial of the claim" and evidence was sufficient to sustain defense]; cf., Medical Services PLLC, Somun Acupuncture, PC, Square Synogogue Transportation Inc. V. GEICO Casualty Insurance Co., __ Misc 3d __, N.Y.L.J. May 5, 2005, p.31, col.2 (A.T. 2nd & 12th Jud. Dists.) (although defendant/insurer not "precluded from asserting the defense that the collision was in furtherance of an insurance fraud scheme" in an untimely denial, defendant's evidence "was insufficient to demonstrate that the defense was based upon a "'founded belief that the alleged injur[ies] did not arise out of an insured incident" [cites omitted]; AB Medical Services PLLC v. Eagle Insurance Co, 3 Misc 3d 8, 9, (A.T. 2nd & 11th Jud. Dists. 2003) (an insurer's "founded belief" that an accident was staged cannot be based upon "unsubstantiated hypothesis and supposition").

Cf. Metroscan Imaging PC v. GEICO Insurance Company, 8 Misc 3d 829, 797 NYS2d 737 {8 Misc 3d 829} (Civ. Ct. Qns. Co. 2005), where the court consolidated sixty (60) actions for purposes of permitting amendment of the insurer's answers to include a defense of fraudulent incorporation, and scheduled a framed hearing on that issue. Apparently, the insurer in Metroscan presented that the doctor and owner of the professional corporations "sold his medical license to [another medical group identified by name] to maintain the appearance that the companies were owned by a physician [also identified] [w]hen in actuality the corporate entities were owned, controlled and operated by non-physicians." Id. 8 Misc 3d at 831, 797 NYS2d at 739. By contrast, defendant herein does not identify one non-licensed individual who either owns, controls or operates the medical corporations owned by Dr. Nandi, even though defendant has been provided with management agreements and income tax information for certain employees.

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion(s) to dismiss the complaint(s) or, in the alternative, to compel the deposition of Dr. Nandi and Ying Li and/or other treating acupuncturists are denied in their entirety; and plaintiffs' cross-motion(s) for protective order are granted.

In light of the foregoing, the court declines to address plaintiffs' further argument that Mallela is limited to claims arising on or after April 4, 2002, deferring that discussion to when that is the pertinent issue before the court. See Multiquest PLLC v. Allstate Insurance Co., __ {9 Misc 3d 76} NYS2d __, 2005 WL 2085966, 2005 NY Slip Op. 25356 (Civ. Ct. NY 2005) (the intent of the Mallela III Court is that payment may be withheld to claims arising prior to April 4, 2002 where the medical providers were incorporated unlawfully).

Dated: Bronx, New York

October 6, 2005

________________________________

Julia I. Rodriguez, Judge of the Civil Ct. Footnotes

Footnote 1: In the matter of Maple Medical Acupuncture, a/a/o Cathy Mayo, Index 079563/2004, the Verified Answer did not allege any defense related to corporate structure and ownership, licensing or fee splitting.

Footnote 2: In the matter of Maple Medical Acupuncture, a/a/o Cathy Mayo, Index 79563/2004, the first denial dated 5/10/02 reiterates the language noted herein. Inexplicably, there is a subsequent denial dated 7/9/02 which reads: Based on the inconsistencies in the statement obtained from Cathy Mayo, the facts of the loss were not verified. Therefore, your no fault claim is denied. The court notes the both denials omit the date of bill, period of the bill and the date the bill was received by the Insurer. In the matter of Delta Medical Acupuncture, P.C., a/a/o Basilicia Rodriguez, Index 79564/2004 the only denial attached is not dated and merely states: Due to inconsistencies in the statement given, the facts of the loss could not be verified. Therefore, the bill has been denied. In the matter of Delta Medical Acupuncture, a/a/o Kwanza Adams, Index 79565, the denial reads: In accordance with the NYS No-Fault Law, an Independent ACUPUNCTURE [sic] Medical Examination was held on 7/23/01 by Doctor Baron. After completion of exam and review of medical reports submitted, Doctor Baron indicated: THERE WAS NO FURTHER NEED OF ACUPUNCTURE TREATMENT. Therefore, all further ACUPUNCTURE benefits are denied.

Footnote 3: Plaintiff provided defendant with management agreements by Triborough Healthcare Management Corp. a non-party herein, in the matter(s) of : Statewide Medical, a/a/o Raghunandan, Index 32816/05; Continental Medical a/a/o McKenna, Index 77931/04; Continental Medical a/a/o Fernandez, Index 53514/03. Dr. Nandi is the sole owner and shareholder of Triborough Healthcare.

Footnote 4: The fact that Mallela declined to further define fraud was discussed by the court in RDK Medical v. General Assurance, 8 Misc 3d 1025(A), 2005 WL 1936342 at 4 (Civ. Ct. NY Co. 2005), which noted that as of this writing no appellate court has articulated a general "fraud" defense that is not subject to the preclusion rule [cites omitted] . . . the Court of Appeals was given the opportunity to do so in the "fraudulently incorporated enterprises" case [i.e., Mallela], but declined to do so, relying instead on a governing regulation [cites omitted].