Lara v City of New York
Annotate this CaseDecided on February 28, 2005; amended March 10, 2005
Supreme Court, Queens County
ANGY LARA, an infant by her father and natural guardian, SERGIO LARA and SERGIO LARA, individually, KARLA LARA and SERGIO LARA, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of SERGIO LARA, JR. Deceased, Plaintiff,
against
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, SURSATEE MOTEE, JOSELINA MAGNO and ANNMAR BERJIE CONAG, Defendant.
31796/02
Phyllis Orlikoff Flug, J.
Defendant The City of New York moves for summary judgment and to dismiss plaintiff's complaint and all cross-claims against them.
This is an action for wrongful death, that arose from an accident when a vehicle owned by defendant Joselina Mango and driven by defendant Annmar Berjie Conag collided with a vehicle owned and operated by defendant Sursatee Motee. Defendant Motee's car went up on the sidewalk and struck and killed plaintiff Sergio Lara, and injured Angy Lara. The accident occurred on May 4, 2002, at about 11:40 a.m., at the intersection of 120th Street and 103 Avenue, in Queens County. Defendant Motee was going north at 120 Street, which was controlled by a stop sign.
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should not be granted when there is any doubt of the existence of a triable issue or where the issue is even arguable (Andre v. Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361 [1974]; Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 100 AD2d 175 [1st Dept. 1984], aff'd 63 NY2d 379 [1984]).
A party moving for summary judgment is obliged to prove through admissible evidence that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]), and has the heavy burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on every relevant issue raised (Simon v. Wohl, 93 AD2d 818 [2d Dept. 1983]). Anything less requires a denial of the motion for summary judgment, regardless of the sufficiency of the in opposing papers (Yates v. Dow Chemical Co., 68 AD2d 907 [2d Dept. 1979]).
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must show facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact (Friends of Animals, Inc. v. Associated Fur Manufacturers, Inc., 46 NY2d 1065, 1067 [1979]).
Defendant, The City of New York, had conducted extensive studies of the traffic conditions at this site. One was commissioned on January 16, 2002, to report by April 15, 2002. On April 9, 2002, one week ahead of schedule, the study was completed. A traffic light was to be installed by October 21, 2002, at 103 Avenue and 120 Street. One month after the study, but before the light was installed, the accident occurred. [*2]
The principle of qualified immunity prevents a trier of facts from second guessing the planning decisions of governmental bodies regarding traffic control and planning (Weiss v. Fote, 7 NY2d 579). "A governmental body may be liable for a traffic planning decision only when its study is 'plainly inadequate or there is no reasonable basis for its plan' (Friedman v. State of New York, 67 NY2d 271, 284; see also, Weiss v. Fote, supra)." The decision as to whether to install is a discretionary function which will not expose a municipality to liability (see, Weiss V. Fote, supra). Once there is a determination that a traffic-control device is necessary to remedy a dangerous condition, it must act with reasonable speed (see, Friedman v. State of NY, supra). Neither the letters received by the City nor the study recommending the installation of a signal were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact, because they in fact recommended a traffic signal which was to be installed.
A prior study was conducted in 2000 which resulted in a traffic signal being installed at the adjacent location, 121 Street and 103 Avenue. Plaintiff claims that a study should have been undertaken years before, and that the study of 2002 was inadequate. Defendant Motee also claims the previous study was inadequate.
"Qualified immunity" applies to the prior study which was of the adjacent location. The City cannot be held liable for any previous studies, absent a showing that the decision regarding traffic control devices, lacked a reasonable basis (see, Affleck v. Buckley, 276 AD2d 507). They also cannot be held liable for the present study because there was a determination to install the light which was not unreasonably delayed (the accident having occurred one week after the determination). The testimony of plaintiff's traffic engineer does not create issues for the jury because a battle of the experts is not permissible (see, Weiss v. Fote, supra). The allegation that a stop sign would have prevented the accident is unsubstantiated. In fact the Police Officer Report reports defendant Motee, who received a summons "failed to yield right of way after stop" in violation of VLT 1142.
The record is devoid of any evidence, other than speculation, that signs or design had any effect on this particular accident or that it could be reasonable inferred that failure to erect a sign was a proximate cause of the accident (see, Rendinaro v. City of New York, 254 AD2d 342; also see, Atkinson v. County of Oneida, 59 NY2d 840; Murray v. State of New York, 38 NY2d 782.
Accordingly, motion for summary judgment is granted.
February 28, 2005; amended March 10, 2005
J.S.C.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
