Darren L. v Donna L.
Annotate this CaseDecided on December 3, 2004
Supreme Court, Nassau County
DARREN L., Plaintiff,
against
DONNA L., Defendant.
201914/2000
Ruth C. Balkin, J.
Upon the foregoing papers and for the following reasons, the motion by Defendant Donna L. (hereinafter "Mother"), for the entry of a Judgment of Divorce, is granted.
Following marital difficulties, this matrimonial action was commenced in 2000 by Plaintiff Darren L. (hereinafter "Father") seeking a divorce and ancillary relief against his wife, Defendant Donna L. The couple, married on Jericho, New York, on March 21, 1992, has two sons, Nathan L. (DOB 04/15/93) and Tom L. (DOB 12/06/94). On August 13, 2001, an inquest was conducted on the grounds for the divorce before Special Referee Marston C. Gibson, who, at the behest of the parties, held in abeyance issues of equitable distribution, medical expenses, distributive awards and permanent custody and visitation. Upon the parties consent because of the Father's imminent remarriage plans, the Honorable Michele Woodard bifurcated the financial and other ancillary matters and issued limited Findings of Fact and a Judgment of Divorce on August 30, 2001, granting a divorce to the Mother against the Father on the grounds of constructive abandonment. The Judgment itself expressly reserved financial issues for the future by stating that: "all issues pertaining to custody of the minor children, equitable distribution, medical expenses, distributive award, and Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall remain for [*2]adjudication."
Following continuing negotiations, on December 4, 2002, the parties agreed to settle their remaining differences. Before the Mother's counsel dictated the Stipulation of Settlement on the record in open court before Justice Woodard, the Court advised both parties to listen attentively to the Stipulation and further advised them that, following placement on the record, they would be sworn in and asked if they agreed to be bound by it. The parties orally stipulated, while being represented by counsel, to, among other things: (1) the Father retaining custody of the parties' children subject to restricted, but incremental, visitation to the Mother conditioned upon her remaining "compliant" with "a recognized certified program for rehabilitation of [her] alcohol-related health problem"; (2) a waiver of child support payments due to the Mother's medical situation; (3) the transfer of a minivan to the Mother "so long as she remains compliant"; (4) a lump sum payment of tuition of between $9,000 to $12,000 in lieu of the Mother's rights over the Father's Deferred Compensation with the New York City Police Department; and (5) the Father's payment of maintenance to the Wife in the sum of $250.00 per month for three years commencing within a week of the agreement, in addition to beginning-of-the-year payments of $2,000.00 for four years.
Relevantly to the instant application, the Stipulation also provided in relevant part that:
It is understood that the principles which we're going to place on the record at this point in time will be elaborated in the form of a written agreement to be annexed to the proposed judgment for submission to the Court on the date to be set.
The Mother's counsel was then directed to submit the contemplated signed agreement and supplemental Judgment of Divorce by February 4, 2003. No further Judgment has been submitted to this date, however, because the parties have failed to reach an agreement to the terms of the written stipulation.
As a result, by Order to Show Cause returnable October 27, 2004, the Mother moves for an order directing that a final Judgment of Divorce, Findings of Fact and Qualified Medical Support Order be accepted, executed and issued by the Court. The Mother argues that the Father has unreasonably declined to enter into the written stipulation despite his prior sworn testimony to do so and his partial performance. In opposition to the motion, the Father essentially argues that no written stipulation or judgment could be executed because the Mother has failed to "remain sober and in compliance with her promised drug and alcohol rehabilitation program." Prior to determination of this motion, the matter was administratively referred to the undersigned and a telephonic status conference was immediately held. Counsel agreed to the submission of this motion for decision by the undersigned.
It is well settled that a stipulation of settlement between parties to a pending proceeding is a binding contract enforceable and favored by the courts and, as such, will not be lightly cast aside (Hallock v New York, 64 NY2d 224, 230; see Matter of Galasso, 35 NY2d 319, 321). This premise applies a fortiori to "open court" stipulations where the litigants are represented by counsel and allocuted by the court (see Matter of Dolgin Eldert Corp., 31 NY2d 1, 10; CPLR 2104; Lukaszuk v Lukaszuk, 304 AD2d 625). Only where there is legally sufficient cause to invalidate the stipulation, such as fraud, collusion, accident or mistake, will a party be relieved [*3]from its consequences (Matter of Matinzi v Joy, 60 NY2d 835, 836; Ferraiulo v Ferraiulo, 221 AD2d 412; Alexander v Alexander, 112 AD2d 121), since stipulations of settlement serve the interests of efficient dispute resolution, the proper management of court calendars and the integrity of the litigation process (see Hallock, supra, at 231; Barzin v Barzin,158 AD2d 769, lv dismissed 77 NY2d 834; see also Scheinberg, Enforceability of Open Court Stipulations in Matrimonial Actions, NYLJ, Dec. 1, 2004, at 4, col 3).
Applying the foregoing principles to the matter at bar, the Mother has sufficiently established that the oral Stipulation is a binding contract which must be complied with by the Father and serve as a predicate for the Judgment of Divorce. The record reveals that the parties, while being represented by competent counsel, agreed to all the terms and conditions of the Stipulation spread on the record. Having been accommodated by the Court to permit his remarriage during the pendency of this matter, the Father cannot be heard now to complain about the entry of the 2001 Divorce Judgment with its bifurcation of the financial and ancillary issues. Nor has he demonstrated that the settlement was unfair or unconscionable to him or, indeed, any sufficient cause to invalidate and/or reform any of its provisions, including the maintenance portion of the Stipulation.
To the contrary, the Stipulation's maintenance provision was meticulously negotiated and crafted by both counsel, giving the Mother monthly payments of $250.00 plus yearly lump sums for four years, and was designed to compensate her waiver of certain deferred compensation program owned by the Father from his prior employment. The maintenance provision only represented a segment of the entire settlement package with the Father; a segment which appears to be the predominant portion of what the Mother bargained for. Contrary to the Father's arguments, the maintenance provision was not conditioned upon the Mother's documented compliance with rehabilitation programs. Other provisions, such as the payment for the Mother's nursing school tuition, the expansion of visitation with the children and the delivery of the van, were expressly conditioned upon her compliance with a certified rehabilitation program. That is not the case with respect to maintenance as the term "compliant" was not mentioned while that provision was being placed on the record. Indeed, the Father's claim that compliance was required for maintenance is belied by the fact that he apparently ratified the agreement by immediately making the required maintenance payments to the Mother for the first few months after the agreement, without proof of any treatment compliance.
Even if the Mother was not compliant with her treatment, this does not permit the Father to hold hostage the final entry of a complete Divorce Judgment based on his refusal to execute a written settlement agreement for almost two years following the in-court stipulation. Although the agreement in court expressly contemplated that a written stipulation embodying and further detailing the terms and conditions would be submitted to the Court, equity dictates that the oral Stipulation albeit not as elaborate as the proposed written agreement appears sufficiently all-encompassing to be the predicate for the entry of Findings of Fact and Judgment of Divorce by this Court. Accordingly, the Mother's counsel is to submit Findings of Fact, Judgment of Divorce and a Qualified Medical Support Order, on notice and in conformance with the in-court Stipulation, to the Matrimonial Center's Clerk's Office within ten days of entry of this Order for signature by the undersigned.
Finally, the Mother's motion includes an application for counsel fees incurred in this [*4]proceeding against the Father. An award of counsel fees in a matrimonial action is well within the province and discretion of the court, having regard to the parties' circumstances and the complexities of the case (see DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879, 881; Pascarelli v Pascarelli, 283 AD2d 472, appeal denied 96 NY2d 937). In order to obtain counsel fees, the court must consider, among other things, the nature and extent of services rendered, the actual time spent, the nature of the issues involved and counsel's professional standing (see Domestic Relations Law §§ 237[a], 238; Thomas v Thomas, 221 AD2d 621, 623; Willis v Willis, 149 AD2d 584).
Under the extant circumstances, this Court believes that the Mother is entitled to the payment of counsel fees by the Father. Not only were the issues presented herein discrete enough to have been amenable to resolution without court intervention, but the Father had apparently disregarded court mandates by refusing to finalize this matter for almost two years and unilaterally failing to make the maintenance payments to the Mother. This required the Mother's counsel, known member of the matrimonial bar, to intervene and try to dissuade the Father from his stance, but to no avail. With respect to the financial circumstances of the parties, it is clear that the Father has been and continues to be the sole provider for the family and possess more assets than the Mother. Even if the Mother were to be working, she would not be producing sufficient income at the present time to have prosecuted this matter.
In accordance with the foregoing, this Court grants the Mother's motion in its entirety and hereby orders the Father to pay the sum of $2,800.00 directly to Brian J. Holzberg, Esq., for services rendered, within 30 days from service of this Order with notice of entry. If counsel fees are not paid as directed, the Nassau County Clerk is authorized to enter a money judgment in favor of counsel upon written affirmation. No further notice is required.
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
ENTER:
Dated: December 3, 2004__________________________________________
Mineola, New York J.S.C.
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