Maskantz v Hayes
Annotate this CaseDecided on August 13, 2004
Supreme Court, New York County
STEVEN MASKANTZ, Plaintiff,
against
MICHAEL HAYES, Defendant.
102868/01
Marylin G. Diamond, J.
The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant for assault and battery. The defendant counterclaimed for assault and battery and, in addition, alleged malicious prosecution. The plaintiff and defendant were business partners in a company which operated a number of bars in Manhattan. The incident which gave rise to this action occurred in one of those bars on March 9, 2000. The plaintiff testified at the trial that he was in the bar when the defendant entered and, without provocation, head-butted him 15-20 times, punched him in the face and hit him with a bar stool. The plaintiff claimed that he never raised his hands in self-defense. The defendant, on the other hand, testified that he when he entered the bar, he was hit on the head by an object and that when he then turned around to see what it was, he saw the plaintiff holding a telephone receiver. The defendant claimed that he then held the plaintiff by the collar and that when the plaintiff began to throw punches at him, he head-butted the plaintiff twice in self-defense. At the plaintiff's request, the police were immediately called and, after arriving at the bar, arrested the defendant. Thereafter, the defendant was criminally prosecuted for assault, but was acquitted by a jury.
Here, after the trial, the jury returned a verdict against both parties on their respective assault and battery claims but in favor of the defendant on his claim for malicious prosecution. The jury awarded the defendant $10,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages. The plaintiff has now moved, pursuant to CPLR 4404(a), to set aside the verdict and direct that a new trial be held on the ground that the verdict finding that he committed malicious prosecution was against the weight of the evidence and that the award of punitive damages was unwarranted and/or excessive.
A verdict should not be set aside on the ground that it is against the weight of the evidence unless the jury could not have reached the verdict on any fair interpretation of the evidence. See [*2]Grassi v. Ulrich, 87 NY2d 955, 956 (1996). See also Blyskal v. Kelleher, 171 AD2d 718, 719 (2nd Dept 1991). In order to prevail on his malicious prosecution claim, the defendant was required to prove that the plaintiff initiated the criminal proceeding against him, that the proceeding terminated in his favor, that there was no probable cause for the criminal proceeding and that the plaintiff's actions were motivated by actual malice. See Smith-Hunter v. Harvey, 95 NY2d 191, 195 (2000); Colon v. City of New York, 60 NY2d 78, 82 (1983). Under the evidence submitted at trial, the jury could have fairly concluded that each of these factors was met. First, there was evidence that plaintiff had others call the police to the bar at the time of the incident, that plaintiff, accompanied by his attorney, later pursued the matter at the local police station and that the version of the incident which plaintiff gave to the police and to the prosecution led them to criminally prosecute the defendant for assault. Second, the criminal proceeding terminated in defendant's favor. Third, the jury, in rejecting plaintiff's assault and battery claim, reasonably refused to believe his version of the incident and, as such, could reasonably have concluded that there was no probable cause for the criminal proceeding. Fourth, since the jury could have fairly concluded that the version of the incident which plaintiff gave to the police was not true, it could have reasonably found that his pursuit of a criminal prosecution against the defendant was undertaken with malice so that the defendant would have to endure the ordeal of defending himself in criminal court and facing the possibility of incarceration. Indeed, plaintiff conceded at trial that, prior to the incident, he had threatened defendant with the possibility of going to jail based on another allegation he made against the defendant. The court therefore concludes that the jury's verdict in favor of the defendant's malicious prosecution claim was not against the weight of the evidence.
As to punitive damages, it has long been recognized in New York that such damages may be awarded in an action for malicious prosecution if the party so charged was motivated by actual malice. Nardelli v. Stamberg, 44 NY2d 500, 503 (1978). The purpose of punitive damages in such an instance is to punish the offender and to deter similar conduct on the part of others. See Zurich Ins Co v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 84 NY2d 309, 316 (1994). Whether to award punitive damages in a particular case and the amount of such damages, if any, are primarily questions for the jury to determine. However, a trial court may exercise its discretionary authority to reduce a punitive damages award which is so grossly excessive "'as to show by its very exorbitancy that it was actuated by passion.'" Nardelli v. Stamberg, 44 NY2d at 504 (citation omitted).
Recently, the Appellate Division, First Department indicated that the three factors enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 US 559 (1996) for determining whether the amount of a punitive damages award violates a party's due process rights are applicable for determining in this state whether such an award is grossly excessive and should be reduced. See Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 304 AD2d 103, 108-110 (1st Dept 2003). See also Bell v. Helmsley, 2003 WL 1453108 (Sup Ct NY Co 2003). These three factors are (1) a comparison of the amount of the punitive damages award with the amount of the civil or criminal penalties which could be imposed for comparable misconduct, (2) a comparison of the amount of the punitive damages award to the actual harm inflicted on the other party and (3) the degree of reprehensibility of the offending party's conduct. See Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 304 AD2d at 109.
In Sawtelle, the First Department suggested that the reprehensibility of the offending party's misconduct is the most important consideration in determining the rationality of a punitive damages award. See 304 AD2d at 111. In this respect, it is clear that a party who makes false charges against [*3]another person for the purpose of having that person criminally prosecuted has engaged in particularly reprehensible conduct. Here, the jury fairly concluded that the plaintiff had engaged in such conduct, as a result of which the defendant endured the emotional and financial strain of a criminal prosecution. Under the circumstances, it was entirely reasonable for the jury to conclude that the defendant was entitled to a substantial punitive damages award.
As to a comparison of the amount of the punitive damages award compared to the actual harm found to have been inflicted, the court notes that the punitive damages award of $250,000 is 25 times the $10,000 in compensatory damages which the jury awarded to defendant. In BMW of North America v. Gore, the Supreme Court suggested 10:1 as the outside ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. See also Bell v. Helmsley, 2003 WL 1453108 at 6. In view of the reprehensibility of the plaintiff's conduct, as found by the jury, this court is persuaded that this ratio is the appropriate ratio to apply in determining a reasonable punitive damages award herein. The application of this ratio thus entitles the defendant to a maximum punitive damages award of $100,000.
Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion is granted to the extent that the verdict is hereby set aside and a new trial on punitive damages directed unless the defendant, within 30 days of service of a copy of this order with notice of entry, stipulates to reduce the punitive damages award to $100,000 and to entry of an amended judgment in accordance therewith. The motion is otherwise denied.
ENTER ORDER
Dated: August 13, 2004 MARYLIN G. DIAMOND, J.S.C.
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