Guasco v Adekoya

[*1] Guasco v Adekoya 2004 NY Slip Op 51095(U) Decided on September 22, 2004 Supreme Court, Bronx County Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on September 22, 2004
Supreme Court, Bronx County

Maria Guasco, a/k/a Maria Huasco and Segundo Guasco, Plaintiffs,

against

Adebola M. Adekoya, Ricky C. Hu, Dharma Mgt. Corp. a/k/a, Dharma Management Corp. And East West Management Corp. a/k/a East/West Management Corporation. Defendants.



26341/2003

Nelson Roman, J.

This action arises from a motor vehicle accident wherein the taxi cab driven by co-defendant, Adebola Adekoya ("Adekoya"), allegedly hit the plaintiff, a pedestrian. At the time of the accident, the taxi cab was owned by co-defendant, Dharma Management Corp. ("Dharma"), the taxi fleet owner of the taxi license was co-defendant East/West Management Corp. ("East") and defendant Ricky C. Hu ("Hu") owned the medallion that the taxi cab in question was affixed to as a standby vehicle. A standby vehicle is typically used when a taxicab is out of service repairs or inspection. Following joinder of issue, defendant Hu moves for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the action as against him. Plaintiff opposes the motion as premature in light of outstanding discovery. For the following reasons, defendant Hu's application is denied.

Summary judgment is the procedural equivalent of a trial. S.J. Capelin Assoc., Inc. v. Globe Mfg. Corp., 34 N.Y.2d 338 (1974). It is a drastic remedy and should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue. Rotuba Extruders v. Ceppos, 46 N.Y.2d 223 (1978). The proponent of a motion for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, presenting sufficient evidence, in admissible form, to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case. Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851 (1985).

Plaintiff asserts that defendant Hu is vicariously liable. Typically, an owner of a vehicle is held vicariously liable for the negligent actions of the operation. New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 states, in part:

Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner.

It is undisputed that defendant Hu is neither the owner of the vehicle nor was he the operator of [*2]the vehicle involved in the accident.[FN1] Instead, plaintiff argues that defendant Hu, as owner of the taxi's medallion, is vicariously liable for the action of the driver under § 19-530(l) of the New York City Administrative Code.

Administrative Code § 19-530(l) states in part:

Nothing herein shall relieve the owner of a taxicab medallion of responsibility for compliance with any applicable provision of law or rule. Such owner shall be fully responsible for the operation of a vehicle bearing such medallion, including compliance with all regulatory requirements applicable to such vehicle, regardless of the appointment by such owner of an agent licensed pursuant to this section.

It is well settled that a statute's plain meaning must be discerned "without resort to forced or unnatural interpretations."(Castro v. United Container Mach. Group, 96 N.Y.2d 398, 401[2001], citing McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 232). A plain reading of the statute leaves little doubt as to its intended purpose, namely to hold the medallion owners responsible for the operation of a vehicle bearing such medallion and hold the medallion owners equally accountable for compliance with all regulatory requirements. Thus, under a plain reading of the statute defendant Hu could be held liable.

There are, however, conflicting rulings regarding the statute's intended meaning. In Karlin v. H & L Maintenance, 1997 WL 720769 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), the court held the plain language of the statute indicated that although the defendant did not own the vehicle, as the medallion owner he is nevertheless responsible for the vehicle's operation. In its ruling, the court relied in part on the legislative history of the statute wherein the Commission of the New York City Taxi and Limousine ("TLC") was concerned with the growth of agency relationship in the taxi industry which seemed to diffuse owner responsibility for the operation of taxicabs. Id. at 2. To address this growing concern, the amendment was enacted to hold the licensee, the medallion owner, accountable for the operation of a taxicab. Id. The court also relied on the Commission's comments which sought to hold medallion owners accountable not just for the operation of the vehicle but for all aspects of service, including compliance with insurance and other regulatory requirements. Id.

In Piaseczny v. Bartolo, 271 A.D.2d 267 (1st Dept 2000), the court similarly interpreted Administrative Code § 19-530(l). Piaseczny v. Bartolo involved an action wherein plaintiff, a pedestrian, commenced a plenary action against, inter alia, a taxicab agent as a result of injuries sustain when he was struck by a taxicab. Id. The court found the agent could not be held liable because there was no evidence showing that the agent was involved with "the operation of the cab, or was the owner of either the cab or the medallion that was attached to the cab." Id. at 268. As in the case of Karlin, the court construed the meaning of the Administrative Code to provide that a medallion owner may be held vicariously liable for the operation of the vehicle. It should [*3]be noted that the court in Piaseczny v. Bartolo was not called upon to resolve the very issue before this court. In its decision, however, the court noted that the complaint alleged that the cab/vehicle and the medallion involved in the accident were owned by different defendants( Id. at 268), which is similar to the facts herein. Thus, the court's ruling as it relates to medallion owners appears to be dicta.

In the case of Golden v. WinJohn Taxi Corp. 311 F.3d 513, 515 (2d Cir 2002), the court found that it was unable to determine whether the plain language of that Administrative Code § 19-530(l) established a basis of vicarious liability to the medallion owner. The language was said to be unclear as to the medallion owner's responsibility for the "operation" of the vehicle to include vicarious liability of negligent drivers. Id. at 522. It was not self-evident what the City intended for the rule to mean, and it did not clearly state its intention to extend vicarious liability to medallion owners. Id. The Court also found an unclear meaning to the term "applicable," where the rule stated that medallion owners are responsible for compliance with applicable provisions of law or rule. The Court stated that this term was obscure in its meaning because it did not know what rule would be applied to the medallion owners since there was no preexisting law that extended vicarious liability to medallion owners for injuries sustained when the owner did not own the taxicab. Id. More importantly, the court left the question to be answered by the Court of Appeals ( Id. at 524), but the case was settled before the Court had a chance to do so. Golden v. Winjohn Taxi Corp., 99 N.Y.2d 567 (2003).

Based on the foregoing, defendant Hu's motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss is denied pursuant to Administrative Code § 19-530(l); Karlin v. H & L Maintenance, 1997 WL 720769 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Piaseczny v. Bartolo, 271 A.D.2d 267 (1st Dept. 2000).

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated:September 22, 2004______________________________

Bronx, NYHon. Nelson S. Roman, J.S.C. Footnotes

Footnote 1:The evidence presented indicates Dharma was the certified title holder of the vehicle in question. (See, Notice of Motion, Exh. 3)