Jrt, Inc. v Stg Props., LLC
Annotate this CaseDecided on September 13, 2004
Supreme Court, Nassau County
JRT, INC. Plaintiff,
against
STG PROPERTIES, LLC, Defendant.
1898-04
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF
Kressel, Rothlein, Walsh & Roth, LLC
684 Broadway
Massapequa, New York 11758
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT
Morganstern & Quatela, Esqs.
310 Old Country Road
Garden City, New York 11530
Leonard B. Austin, J.
Plaintiff, JRT, Inc. ("JRT"), moves for a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendant, STG Properties, LLC ("STG"), from limiting JRT's use of the parking lot at the premises known as 8423 Jericho Turnpike, Woodbury, New York, from imposing
assigned parking at said premises and from towing vehicles parked in any non-assigned spaces.
BACKGROUND
JRT operates the Jason Royce Salon and Spa at 8243 Jericho Turnpike, Woodbury, New York. JRT has operated its business at that location since 1989. JRT has leased the space that it presently occupies at the premises that runs through April 20, 2009.
STG is the current landlord at the building having acquired title to the building in the Fall of 2003.
Since JRT became a tenant in the premises in 1989, the parking lot was used by tenants, their employees and customers on an unrestricted basis. Prior to January 2003, there was an adequate number of parking spots. In January 2003, one of the suites in the building was leased to a mortgage brokerage firm which employed 15-20 people. The additional cars from the mortgage broker's business resulted in a parking shortage in the parking lot for the building.
To remedy this situation, JRT hired a valet parking service for the entire building. The previous landlord, Woodbury Colonial Center, LLC ("Woodbury") agreed to share the expense of the valet parking service equally with JRT.
The mortgage brokerage firm vacated the premise approximately six months later and the parking problem abated. As a result, Woodbury decided that it would no longer contribute to the cost of the valet parking service. JRT advised Woodbury that it wanted to continue the valet parking service for the entire building at its own expense. Woodbury consented to this arrangement.
Some time in either late December 2003 or early January 2004, STG, the new landlord, directed JRT to discontinue the valet parking service and threatened to have JRT's customers' cars towed from the parking lot. As a result, JRT terminated the valet parking service.
After JRT terminated the valet parking service, JRT made arrangements to obtain parking for its employees in the parking lot of a neighboring building. As a result, JRT's employees no longer park in the parking lot of 8243 Jericho Turnpike. JRT asserts that since its employees park offsite that parking problems no longer exist at the premises.
By letter dated February 5, 2004, STG advised JRT that it was imposing parking restrictions on the parking lot effective February 15, 2004. STG claimed that it was imposing these restrictions because JRT's customers used a disproportionately large number of spaces in the parking lot. This resulted in there not being enough parking spaces for the other tenants, their employees, customers or patients. STG claims that it was receiving frequent and persistent complaints from other tenants regarding the parking problems.
Pursuant to the STG proposed plan, tenants would be assigned specific spots in the parking lot. The number of spaces allotted to each tenant would be proportionate to the square footage each tenant occupied in the building; i.e, a tenant who occupied 10% of the space in the building would be allotted 10% of the parking spaces. Any tenant, employee of a tenant, customer or vendor parking in spaces other than those assigned to the specific tenant would be subject to having their vehicle towed at the vehicle owner's expense.
STG indicated that it would shortly be advising the tenants which spaces were being allocated to them and requested that the tenants advise their employees, customers and vendors [*2]of the these new parking rules.
STG asserted that it had the right to impose these parking restriction pursuant to Paragraph 6A of the lease which provides:
"The Tenant, its customers, employees and all others
having business with it, shall have the right to use the
parking areas, roadways, walks, sidewalks, approaches
entrances, exits, hallways, lavatories, stairways, and all
other common facilities of The Building and "outside
areas", in common with the Landlord and other tenants
thereof, their customers, employees and all others having
business with them. The Landlord may grant others similar
rights, such rights of use to be exercised with due regard for
the rights of others entitled to such use, and subject to such
reasonable regulations for the benefit of all tenants of The
Building as the Landlord may impose, which regulations
shall be applicable to all tenants of The Building, their
customers, employees, and all others having business
with them. Tenant shall be entitled to such rights of use
only in connection with its business conducted in or upon the
premises."
Upon learning of the proposed restrictions on parking, JRT obtained a temporary restraining order enjoining STG from imposing the proposed parking restrictions.
JRT now seeks a preliminary injunction enjoining STG from imposing the proposed parking restrictions pending the final resolution of this action.
Plaintiff commenced this action seeking to a declaratory judgment determining the rights of the landlord to impose parking restrictions in the parking lot pursuant to Paragraph 6A of the lease and a permanent injunction enjoining the landlord from imposing such restrictions during the remainder of the term of Plaintiff's lease.
DISCUSSION
The party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate (1) a probability of success on the merits, (2) a danger of irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction and (3) a balancing of the equities favors the granting of the injunction. Fayez v. Mayfield, 8 A.D.3d 311 (2nd Dept., 2004); and 1659 Ralph Avenue Laundromat Corp. v. Ben David Enterprises, LLC, 307 A.D.2d 288 (2nd Dept., 2003), See, gen'lly, Aetna Ins. Co. v. Capasso, 75 N.Y.2d 860 (1990); and Doe v. Alexrod, 73 N.Y.2d 748 (1988).
A preliminary injunction may be granted to preserve the status quo pending a full hearing on the merits of the action. Olympic Tower Condominium v. Cocoziello, 306 A.D.2d 159 (1st Dept., 2003); Livas v. Mitzner, 303 A.D.2d 381 (2nd Dept., 2003); and Merscorp, Inc. v. Romaine, 295 A.D.2d 431 (2nd Dept., 2002).
The existence of factual issues to be determined at the trial of the action does not preclude the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Peterson v. Corbin, 275 A.D.2d 35 (2nd Dept., 2000); and Ma v. Lien, 198 A.D.2d 186 (1st Dept., 1993).
JRT asserts that STG's attempt to impose parking restrictions on the building is part of an effort to get JRT to vacate the premises prior to the end of its leasehold. As part of this effort, it [*3]is claimed that STG had JRT vacate a portion of the premises that it occupied on a month-to-month basis. This space is presently vacant. JRT claims that STG has returned only a portion of its security deposit, even though the space was surrendered timely and in an appropriate condition.
JRT asserts that STG has offered to permit JRT to remain in the leased space for three months rent free if it agrees to vacate the premises. In addition, JRT cites having received several baseless notices relating to purported violations of its lease to demonstrate a lack of merit to STG's position.
This Court has previously dealt with the issue of whether a landlord may unilaterally impose parking restrictions in a building's parking lot in Orthopaedic Associates of Manhasset, P.C. v. Michael Parisi & Son Construction Co., Inc., 2003 WL 274317 (Sup.Ct., Nassau Co. 2003). While the language of the lease in this case is somewhat different, the key issue in both Orthopedic Associates and this case is whether the landlord could unilaterally impose parking restrictions for a building parking lot in which access had previously been on a first come, first serve basis.
JRT has demonstrated a probability of success on the merits. Significant questions exist as to whether the proposed regulations are reasonable and for the benefit of all tenants. The lease grants JRT and its customers the unrestricted right to use the parking area appurtenant to the premises in common with the other tenants in the building. The lease then grants the landlord the right to impose "reasonable regulations" upon the use of the parking area "for the benefit of all tenants."
The record before the Court does not establish that the regulations that STG seeks to impose are either reasonable or for the benefit of all tenants. The simple fact that JRT sought to enjoin the imposition of these regulations indicates that at least one tenant believes the proposed regulations are neither reasonable nor for the benefit of all tenants.
The papers in opposition to the motion fail to indicate the number of tenants in the building, the number of spaces in the parking lot, the parking uses and needs of the other tenants and, with one exception, that any of the tenants, their employees, vendors, customers or patients have had any trouble finding parking in the lot.
STG has failed to demonstrate that the proposed regulations are reasonable. Allocating parking spaces based upon the pro rata space that the tenants occupy in the building may not be reasonable. Space rented in the building may have no relationship to the parking needs of a tenant. A tenant which occupies a proportionately large space in the building may not use or need a significant number of parking spaces while a tenant who leases less space may have a more compelling need for parking. For this reason, the plan may not be in the best interest of all tenants.
Limiting the use of the parking lot for customers of JRT is not in its best interest.
JRT allegedly uses a significant number of spaces in the parking lot. JRT asserts that limiting its use of the parking lot would adversely affect its business. Any measure that would result in a tenant losing business or not being able to service its customers or patients would not be in the best interest of that tenant.
STG asserts that the parking regulations were necessitated by complaints received from other tenants regarding the use of the parking lot. However, the papers submitted in opposition to the motion reflect one complaint from one tenant. The complaint relates to a tenant who had difficulty finding parking on four occasions during a one month period. On three of the four [*4]occasions, this tenant was able to finding parking in the building lot after circling the lot.
The tenant who had made the complaints regarding parking is a psychotherapist. The Court notes that this tenant did not complain that her patients have had difficulty finding parking in the lot or that any of her patients have cancelled or been late for appointments due to the parking problems at the building.
The Court further notes that the letter voicing these complaints is dated February 17, 2004 while the letter to JRT indicating STG's intention to impose parking restrictions is dated February 5, 2004 with the restrictions scheduled to go into effect on February 15, 2004. One of the dates upon which this tenant had difficulty parking was February 5, 2004. Thus, STG's rationale for these restrictions is, at best, dubious.
STG has failed to establish whose cars are parked in the lot or that the alleged unavailability of parking spaces is caused by JRT's customers using a disproportionate number of spaces. Thus, there is no proof before this Court that adopting the regulations proposed by STG would have the affect of alleviating overcrowding the parking lot.
The second prong of the test requires the party seeking a preliminary injunction to demonstrate that it will suffer irreparable injury if the relief is not granted. JRT has met this requirement. JRT asserts that if parking is restricted that it will lose customers and business. STG has indicated that vehicles parked in those parking spaces other than those assigned to the tenant will be towed at the vehicle owner's expense. This would require the landlord to post someone in the parking lot to monitor the use of the spots. If not, there is a risk that vehicles will be towed improperly. Clearly, the improper towing of a vehicle of one customer of JRT would cause irreparable harm. A customer whose vehicle is improperly towed is not likely to return to JRT. Furthermore, JRT would have difficulty attracting new customers or retaining its existing customers if customers' vehicles were subject to being towed.
Finally, the balancing of the equities favors JRT. JRT has had unrestricted use of the parking lot since 1989. JRT attempted to alleviate the alleged parking problem by providing valet parking for the building at its own cost and by later arranging for its employees to park off-site. JRT asserts that the acute parking problem ended when the mortgage broker moved out.
At least part of the problem can be attributed to STG when it directed JRT to discontinue the valet parking. STG does not claim to have received complaints regarding parking at the building while valet parking services were available.
CPLR 6312(b) requires the Court to fix the undertaking in an amount sufficient to compensate Defendant for damages sustained if it is determined that the preliminary injunction was improvidently granted. See, Margolies v. Encounter, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 475 (1977); and Schwartz v. Gruber, 261 A.D.2d 526 (2nd Dept., 1999). The amount of the undertaking is within the discretion of the Court. Clover Street Assocs. v. Nilsson, 244 A.D.2d 312 (2nd Dept., 1997).
Upon review of the papers submitted in support and in opposition to the motion, the Court determines that an undertaking in the amount of $7,500.00 will be sufficient under the circumstances presented.
Accordingly, it is,
ORDERED, that Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is granted to the extent that Defendant shall not impose any restrictions on the use of the parking lot at the premises known as 8423 Jericho Turnpike, Woodbury, New York during the pendency of this action; and it is further, [*5]
ORDERED, that Plaintiff shall post an undertaking in the sum of $7,500.00 pursuant to CPLR 6312(b) within fifteen (15) days of the date of this Order, and if such undertaking is not posted, the motion is denied. Such undertaking shall be in the form of surety deposit with the Nassau County Treasurer or by depositing same in the escrow of Plaintiff's counsel, pending the written stipulation of both parties or further order of this Court.
This constitutes the decision and order of this Court.
Dated: Mineola, NY _____________________________
September 13, 2004 Hon. LEONARD B. AUSTIN, J.S.C.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
