People v Cameron

[*1] People v Cameron 2004 NY Slip Op 50430(U) Decided on March 15, 2004 Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, Kings County Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on March 15, 2004
Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, Kings County

The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff,

against

Jeff Cameron, Defendant.



Docket No. 2003KN051718

Alvin Yearwood, J.

Defendant, JEFF CAMERON, stands charged with Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree (P.L. §195.05), Resisting Arrest (P.L. §205.30), and Disorderly Conduct (P.L. §240.20[1]). Defendant moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument for facial insufficiency. Based upon the court's examination of the court papers, defendant's motion, and the People's affirmation in opposition, the court now makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The incident which forms the basis for defendant's arrest occurred on August 29, 2003. The factual portion of the information states

The deponent is informed by Detective Michael R. Dforte Shield No. 03202, of OCCB that, at the above time and place, while performing a canvass for a wanted suspect, observed defendant at location closely resembling the photo of the wanted suspect whereby informant did stop defendant, identified himself as a police detective and requested defendant's name and date of birth.

The deponent is further informed by informant that, at the above time and place, after several requests, the defendant refused to give the informant the information informant requested thereby preventing informant from performing informant's governmental duty and defendant did further begin to curse, yell and scream causing a crowd of approximately 20 people to gather at location and causing public annoyance.

The deponent is further informed by informant that, at the above time and place, the defendant did flail defendant's arms and did push and shove informant using defendant's shoulders and upper body in an effort to prevent informant from placing defendant into handcuffs. [*2]

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A misdemeanor information is sufficient on its face when it contains both an accusatory part designating each and every offense charged and a factual part containing a statement of the complainant that alleges facts of an evidentiary nature that tend to support the charges (CPL §100.15[2],[3]). The non-hearsay allegations must provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense(s) charged, and must establish, if true, every element of the offense charged (CPL §100.40[1]). An accusatory instrument is facially insufficient if it fails to allege non-hearsay facts of an evidentiary nature that support or tend to support each and every element of the offenses charged and the defendant's commission thereof. (CPL §§100.15[3], 100.40[1][c]; People v. Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d 133 [1987]).

The first count of the information alleges that defendant obstructed the administration of justice when the inquiring officer stopped defendant because he resembled the photograph of a "wanted suspect" and defendant refused to answer the officer's request for his name and birthdate.

An individual to whom a police officer addresses a question has a constitutional right not to respond. He may remain silent or walk or run away. His refusal to answer is not a crime. Though the police officer may endeavor to complete the interrogation, he may not pursue, absent probable cause to believe that the individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, seize or search the individual or his possessions, even though he ran away (People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583 [1980]).

In this case, the only information that formed the basis for defendant's stop was that he resembled the photograph of a suspect. There is no evidence that the underlying crime was recent, took place in the neighborhood or even how the suspect's picture was identified. The People do not even indicate the crime of which defendant was suspected. This information does not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. Defendant had the right to refuse the police request for information.

An essential element of the crime of obstructing governmental administration, to be charged in an information, must be an act of either (1) intimidation or (2) physical force or interference or (3) an independently unlawful act. A defendant must be accused of committing a specific act in order to be charged with obstructing governmental administration.

Plainly, ignoring an officer's request for identification is not a crime, nor does that act supply any such element. Though it is clear that such conduct risks pursuit and arrest, no crime has been charged (People v. Offen, 96 Misc.2d 147[Crim. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1978]). Thus, the police did not have the right to arrest defendant for obstructing governmental administration.

The second count charges defendant with Resisting Arrest. However, in order to sustain a charge for Resisting Arrest, the People must establish that the arrest was authorized. "The crime of resisting arrest does not occur if the arrest if illegal or unlawful" (People v. Stevenson, 31 N.Y.2d 108 [1972]). In this case, since the police could not lawfully arrest defendant for obstructing governmental administration, defendant cannot be charged with resisting the illegal arrest.

Finally, the third count charges defendant with Disorderly Conduct. CPL §240.20(1) provides that a person is guilty of disorderly conduct when he or she "with intent to cause public [*3]inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof . . . engages in fighting, or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior". The Court of Appeals has held that the aim of the statute is directed at conduct which goes beyond "individual disputants to a point where they become a potential or immediate public concern" (People v. Munafo, 50 N.Y.2d 326, 331 [1980]).

The information's description of defendant's language was, at best, a conclusory characterization of his actual words. Although the court does not condone yelling and cursing at the police, such behavior cannot possible be characterized as engaging in fight, violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior that is of immediate public concern.

Accordingly, the court finds that each count of the information is facially insufficient and, thus, dismisses the information.

Order entered accordingly.

Alvin Yearwood

Judge of the Criminal Court

Of the City of New York

Decision Date: March 15, 2004