Matter of Iron Mtn. Forestry Inc. v Friedman
Annotate this CaseDecided on April 7, 1998
County Court, Franklin County
In the Matter of Iron Mountain Forestry, Inc., FOR THE Laying Out of a Private Road Pursuant to the Provisions of Article XI of the Highway Law of the State of New York, Petitioner,
against
Robert Friedman and Peter Friedman, Respondents.
97-669
John M. Silvestri, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant
6317 State Route 9, Post Office Box 715
Chestertown, New York 12817
(518) 494-3404
Diane L. VanEpps, Esq.
Hiscock & Barclay, LLP
Attorneys for Respondents
500 Financial Plaza, Post Office Box 4878
Syracuse, New York 13221
(315) 422-2131
Robert G. Main Jr., J.
DECISION AND ORDER [*2]
MAIN, JR., J. In this unique proceeding, pursuant to Highway Law §§ 300 et seq., petitioner sought to have a jury of property owners determine the necessity for a private road being cut out of respondents' private property for petitioner's benefit. More specifically, petitioner applied to have a private roadway, fifty (50) feet wide, laid out over, and within, an existing private roadway owned by respondents for the benefit of an allegedly "landlocked" parcel of real property known as the Hutchinson Lot. Upon completion of the hearing, and after due deliberation, the jury found that the proposed road was not necessary (see, Highway Law § 301).
Petitioner contends that the jury decision was contrary to the weight of the evidence as well as contrary to law. As such, petitioner now moves, pursuant to Highway law § 312, to vacate and set aside the jury determination, and, in the alternative, petitioner appeals from the jury determination. Petitioner further argues that this court should direct judgment in its favor. Respondents oppose the relief requested and have cross-moved for an order either vacating the decision of the jury pursuant to Highway law § 312 and declaring the entire proceeding a nullity or confirming the jury decision. In determining this application, the court has reviewed and considered the affidavits and affirmations of counsel, the "Record on Appeal:, and counsels' legal memoranda.
There is no question that this court has jurisdiction to entertain the applications, with the exception of the "appeal" (see, Highway Law § 312). As can be seen upon brief review, the statute and related case law provide very little guidance for the court. The statute confers upon this court the authority to decide this application upon such terms "as it shall deem just and legal" (Highway Law § 312). There has been only one reported case in the past one hundred years considering the scope of review of a County Court decision pursuant to Highway Law § 312 after a jury determination pursuant to what is now Highway Law § 301 (see, Towner v Schoenthal, 120 AD2d 931). A review of that case indicates its failure to assist the court in any meaningful way with respect to the standard of review. As a result, the court has more discretion than it often enjoys to accomplish justice, as there are no hard and fast precedents compelling a certain interpretation or conclusion.
As a preliminary matter, the court will consider only the motion and cross motion, as there is no provision for an "appeal" from such a determination. Furthermore, since respondents were successful at the proceeding, and petitioner's application was denied by the jury, the court declines to consider respondents' motion to vacate the jury determination and declare the entire proceeding a nullity. The functions of this court do not include determining potential future controversies which may or may not ever become ripe for determination. In the absence of a concrete justiciable controversy, there is nothing for the court to determine (see, New York Public Interest Research Group v. Carey, 42 NY2d 527; Employers' Fire Insurance Company v. Klemons, 229 AD2d 513, King v. Glass, 223 AD2d 708). Since respondents prevailed at the hearing, they are not aggrieved parties such that they may seek vacatur of the jury determination.
Petitioner makes three arguments in support of its motion. First, petitioner alleges that the [*3]unrefuted proof before the jury established that the Hutchinson Lot was, and is, "landlocked". Second, petitioner asserts that the opening of a private road is necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of the Hutchinson Lot. Finally, petitioner contends that the unrefuted proof at the hearing established that the opening of a private roadway for the benefit of the Hutchinson Lot would cause respondents to suffer no damages.
As petitioner correctly states, the right of an individual to seek the opening of a private road is guaranteed by the New York Constitution. (see, Article I, § 7 [c]). However, no allegation has been made that this right was, in any way, abridged in this proceeding which was conducted in accordance with the statute. Petitioner's responding affidavit alleges that respondents were afforded both procedural and substantive due process in the matter and that the procedures set forth in the Highway Law were correctly followed. Presumably, petitioner was afforded the same due process. As such, petitioner's only complaint appears to be that the jury, upon consideration of the appropriate evidence, reached the wrong conclusion. Noticeably absent from petitioner's motion papers is any legal authority suggesting that the jury did, in fact, reach the wrong conclusion. The cases cited by petitioner concern common law causes of action related to easements, rights of way, or adverse possession, not the statutory procedure of Highway Law §§ 300 et seq.
Petitioner contends that the Hutchinson Lot was, and is, landlocked with no access to any town road. While this may currently be true, the evidence introduced at the proceeding established that petitioner did, during the mid-1980's, own contiguous parcels of land connecting the Hutchinson Lot to the public portion of the Kildare Road in the Town of Altamont. Petitioner's counsel stipulated to this fact on the record. Petition thereafter caused the Hutchinson Lot to become landlocked by voluntarily conveying certain surrounding tracts of land to Danial M. Christmas and The Nature Conservancy and by failing to reserve an easement or right of way through those properties for the benefit of the Hutchinson Lot. If the use of respondents' private portion of the Kildare Road is now necessary, petitioner created this problem. Since petitioner could have built a road providing access from the town road to the Hutchinson Lot, the company should not be allowed to take over a roadway owned by others simply for reasons of expediency and economics when other alternatives existed.
Furthermore, petitioner currently owns the property adjoining the 4,479 foot private portion of the Kildare Road which runs in a northerly direction from the end of the public portion of the Kildare Road. Awarding ownership of that portion of the private roadway is clearly unnecessary under any circumstance, since petitioner could build a parallel roadway on its own property to get to approximately the same location.
It is undisputed that respondents have consistently given petitioner permission to use the private portion of the Kildare Road, currently in existence, to access the Hutchinson Lot. No evidence was introduced suggesting that petitioner had ever attempted to negotiate with respondents for the purchase of a right of way over the private roadway. While petitioner asserts that permission to use the roadway does not eliminate necessary as a matter of law, no authority [*4]is cited supporting such a conclusion. While it may be possible that some other type of cause of action would allow a court to compel respondents to permit petitioner to use the private portion of the Kildare Road, nothing in the statutory structure of Article XI of the Highway Law requires, or even sanctions, such a result.
To the extent that certain objections were made at the proceeding relating to the introduction of evidence and to certain comments made by counsel, the court is not inclined to revise such objections specifically. The statutory procedure set forth in Article XI contemplates a proceeding far less formal than a small claims hearing in justice court where the standard of review upon appeals is whether substantial justice has been accomplished between the parties (see, Uniform Justice Courts Act § 1807). Normal rules of practice, procedure, pleading, and evidence are not binding, and disclosure is generally unavailable at such hearings (see, Uniform Justice Court Act § 1804). The court considers it appropriate to apply a similar standard of review in this matter.
Upon consideration of all the issues raised in petitioner's motion and respondents cross-motion, the court finds no reason to upset the determination reached by the jury. Since this court concludes that petitioner failed to establishthe requisite "necessity" for the opening of the private roadway, there is no need for any discussion with respect to the issue of damages.
For the reasons set forth herein, it is
ORDERED that petitioner's "appeal", as designated, be and the same hereby is, dismissed; and it is further
ORDERED that petitioner's application to vacate and/or set aside the jury decision be, and the same hereby is, denied; and it is further
ORDERED that respondents' cross-motion to vacate the jury determination and declare the entire proceeding a nullity be, and the same hereby is, denied; and it is further
ORDERED that respondents' cross-motion to confirm the decision of the jury be, and the same hereby is, granted, and the decision of the jury is, in all respects, confirmed.
ENTER
______________________________
Franklin County Judge
Dated at Malone, New York, the 7th day of April, 1998.
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