Mid Suffolk Speech Pathology & Swallowing Disorder Servs. of L.I., P.C. v Hoxha

[*1] Mid Suffolk Speech Pathology & Swallowing Disorder Servs. of L.I., P.C. v Hoxha 2021 NY Slip Op 50589(U) Decided on June 24, 2021 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on June 24, 2021
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : TERRY JANE RUDERMAN, P.J., TIMOTHY S. DRISCOLL, HELEN VOUTSINAS, JJ
2019-1247 S C

Mid Suffolk Speech Pathology & Swallowing Disorder Services of L.I., P.C., Respondent,

against

Zen Hoxha, Appellant, Christina Hoxha, Defendant.

Zen Hoxha, appellant pro se. Mid Suffolk Speech Pathology & Swallowing Disorder Services of L.I., P.C., respondent pro se (no brief filed).

Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, First District (Elaine Sorken, J.), entered May 15, 2018. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $264.77 and dismissed the counterclaim.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

In this commercial claims action, plaintiff seeks to recover the principal sum of $264.77 representing defendants' responsibility for "co-insurance & deduct[i]ble." Defendants interposed a counterclaim to recover the principal sum of $612.87 for breach of contract, claiming that plaintiff failed to provide requested services but billed for them anyway.

At a nonjury trial, plaintiff's witness testified that defendant Christina Hoxha entered into a contract with plaintiff whereby plaintiff was to "pursue all means necessary to obtain speech/language/feeding services" for defendants' son. The evidence showed that plaintiff's therapists provided those services, that defendants' insurer partially paid plaintiff for its services, and that defendants were responsible for the remaining balance of $264.77. Defendant Zen Hoxha testified that, while the contract called for the treatment of speech therapy, defendants were only interested in obtaining treatment for swallowing dysfunction and/or oral function for feeding, and did not wish to pay for speech therapy. Nevertheless, Zen Hoxha admitted that their son was treated for speech therapy, in addition to swallowing therapy, and neither the witness nor defendant Christina Hoxha stopped plaintiff's therapists from performing the speech therapy. Following the trial, the District Court awarded judgment in favor of plaintiff in the principal sum of $264.77 and dismissed the counterclaim.

In a commercial claims action, our review is limited to a determination of whether [*2]"substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (CCA 1807-A [a]; see CCA 1804-A; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125 [2000]). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510 [1991]). This deference applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Commercial Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d at 126).

The evidence established that the parties entered into a contract whereby plaintiff was to provide, among other things, speech therapy to defendants' son, and that defendants were aware that speech therapy was being administered in addition to swallowing therapy. Consequently, the evidence supported the court's finding that plaintiff was entitled to be paid the balance due of $264.77 for the services rendered. Defendants' counterclaim was properly dismissed, as defendants failed to establish that plaintiff fraudulently billed for services.

In view of the foregoing, we find that substantial justice was done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see CCA 1804-A, 1807-A [a]).

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

RUDERMAN, P.J., DRISCOLL and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.

ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: June 24, 2021