People v Colasanto (Alex)

[*1] People v Colasanto (Alex) 2020 NY Slip Op 51570(U) Decided on December 31, 2020 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on December 31, 2020
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : THOMAS A. ADAMS, P.J., TERRY JANE RUDERMAN, ELIZABETH H. EMERSON, JJ
2019-986 S CR

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Alex G. Colasanto, Appellant.

Scott Lockwood, for appellant. Suffolk County Traffic Prosecutor's Office (Justin W. Smiloff of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from two judgments of the District Court of Suffolk County, Suffolk County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency (John Andrew Kay, J.H.O.), rendered April 15, 2019. The judgments convicted defendant, after a trial in absentia, of following too closely and speeding, respectively, and imposed sentences.

ORDERED that the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

Defendant was charged in separate simplified traffic informations with following too closely (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129 [a]) and speeding (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180 [a]), respectively. The record demonstrates that this matter was originally scheduled for trial to be held on February 14, 2019. However, on that date, defense counsel requested an adjournment due to illness. The prosecutor consented and the court adjourned the trial to Monday, April 15, 2019, a date to which defense counsel specifically agreed. The Friday before the scheduled trial date, defense counsel filed an affirmation of actual engagement indicating that he was scheduled to appear in a different court on April 15, 2019. Neither defense counsel nor defendant appeared for trial. A trial in absentia was held, after which the court found defendant guilty of the charges and imposed sentences.

Under the circumstances presented, including that defense counsel, having already been granted a courtesy adjournment and having known for two months that he had a scheduling conflict, waited until the eve of trial to file his affirmation of actual engagement with the court, it was not an improvident exercise of discretion for the court to deny defense counsel's request for an adjournment (see Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts [22 NYCRR] § 125.1; Wallace v Wallace, 172 AD3d 1433 [2019]; Matter of Nurse, 160 AD3d 745 [2018]; Passaro v [*2]New York Hosp.-Cornell Med. Ctr., 289 AD2d 70 [2001]; Gage v Gage, 227 AD2d 443 [1996]).

We have reviewed defendant's remaining contentions and find them, under the circumstances presented, to be without merit.

Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

ADAMS, P.J., RUDERMAN and EMERSON, JJ., concur.

ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: December 31, 2020