Kaplan v Asher

[*1] Kaplan v Asher 2020 NY Slip Op 50015(U) Decided on January 2, 2020 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on January 2, 2020
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : THOMAS A. ADAMS, P.J., BRUCE E. TOLBERT, JERRY GARGUILO, JJ
2019-322 N C

Caryn B. Kaplan, Appellant,

against

Jay Asher, Respondent.

Caryn B. Kaplan, appellant pro se. Dr. Jay A. Asher, DDS, respondent pro se.

Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, Second District (Scott H. Siller, J.), entered August 15, 2018. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the action.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff commenced this small claims action against defendant, her former landlord, to recover the principal sum of $2,250 paid under a lease agreement. Following a nonjury trial, the District Court dismissed the action.

In a small claims action, our review is limited to a determination of whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (UDCA 1807; see UDCA 1804; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584, 584 [2000]; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564, 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]). This deference applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d at 126).

It is undisputed that plaintiff executed a lease with defendant on July 11, 2017 and signed an agreement with defendant terminating that lease on July 28, 2017. The record supports the District Court's implicit finding of an agreement that, in return for the termination of the lease, defendant would be allowed to refund only $2,250 of the $4,500 that plaintiff had paid, thereby holding plaintiff responsible for one month's rent. Since it is uncontroverted that plaintiff received a refund of $2,250, the District Court properly dismissed the action, providing the parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles of substantive law (see UDCA 1804, 1807; Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d at 584; Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d at 126).

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

ADAMS, P.J., TOLBERT and GARGUILO, JJ., concur.

ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: January 02, 2020