People v Coleman (Brandon)
Annotate this CaseDecided on December 13, 2018
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : BRUCE E. TOLBERT, J.P., JAMES V. BRANDS, TERRY JANE RUDERMAN, JJ
2016-2120 W CR
The People of the State of New York, Respondent,
against
Brandon Coleman, Appellant.
John R. Lewis, for appellant. Westchester County District Attorney (William C. Milaccio and Jennifer Spencer of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the City Court of Mount Vernon, Westchester County (William Edwards, J.), rendered August 25, 2016. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of aggravated harassment in the second degree and harassment in the second degree, and imposed sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Defendant was charged with aggravated harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.30 [1]) and harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]), arising from an allegation that defendant had made threatening remarks to the victim, his ex-girlfriend. Following a nonjury trial, defendant was convicted of both charges and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment and 15 days' imprisonment, respectively, to run concurrently.
Defendant failed to preserve his contention on appeal that the City Court had deprived him of his constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses by limiting his cross-examination of the victim concerning her mental or psychological history, as defendant did not assert a constitutional right to introduce the excluded evidence at trial (see People v Ramsundar, 138 AD3d 892, 892-893 [2016]; People v Simmons, 106 AD3d 1115, 1116 [2013]). In any event, defendant's contention lacks merit, as the City Court permitted sufficient cross-examination of the victim with respect to her psychological history by allowing defense counsel to ask the victim whether she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, whether she took medications for her psychological problem and whether she had suffered side effects from her medication (see People v Gooley, 156 AD3d 1231, 1232-1233 [2017]; compare People v Baranek, 287 AD2d 74, 78-79 [2001]).
Defendant's contention that the City Court erred in permitting the People to elicit evidence of his prior bad acts toward the victim is likewise without merit. Evidence of a [*2]defendant's uncharged crimes or prior bad acts may not be admitted into evidence solely to demonstrate the defendant's propensity to commit the crimes charged (see People v Molineux, 168 NY 264, 292-293 [1901]), but may be admitted to establish one of the recognized Molineux exceptions—motive, intent, absence of mistake, common plan or scheme and identity—or where such proof is needed as background material or to complete a witness's narrative, provided that the probative value of such evidence outweighs any undue prejudice to defendant (see People v Bittrolff, 165 AD3d 690, 691 [2018]; People v Smith, 157 AD3d 978, 979-980 [2018]; People v Holden, 82 AD3d 1007, 1007-1008 [2011]). Here, the evidence of defendant's prior acts of abuse against the victim was relevant to provide necessary background information regarding the nature of defendant's relationship with the victim, to establish defendant's motive and intent to commit the charged crimes, and to place the charged conduct in context (see People v Nieves, 157 AD3d 909, 910 [2018]; People v Ramsaran, 154 AD3d 1051, 1054 [2017]; People v Holden, 82 AD3d at 1008). Since the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice to defendant, the court properly exercised its discretion in admitting it (see People v Duwe, 164 AD3d 1256, 1257 [2018]; People v Thomas, 12 AD3d 383, 384 [2004]).
Defendant's contention that the City Court was biased against him is unpreserved for appellate review due to defendant's failure to raise this issue before the trial court (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Ceara, 133 AD3d 873, 874 [2015]). In any event, defendant's contention lacks merit. It primarily relies upon the fact that the court sustained each of the prosecutor's evidentiary objections to defense counsel's questioning of the prosecution witnesses but overruled all of defendant's evidentiary objections to the prosecutor's questioning of certain witnesses. Upon a review of the record, we conclude that the court's evidentiary rulings were proper exercises of its wide discretion in precluding and admitting evidence (see generally People v Carroll, 95 NY2d 375, 385 [2000]). Moreover, the record, as a whole, does not evince that the court was biased against defendant (see People v Bodie, 131 AD3d 481, 482 [2015]; People v Rodriguez, 111 AD3d 856, 859 [2013]).
Finally, as it is undisputed that defendant has fully served his sentence, his challenge to the sentence imposed has been rendered academic (see People v McLaine, 64 NY2d 934 [1985]; People v Nicholson, 31 AD3d 468, 469 [2006]; People v Dietz, 55 Misc 3d 149[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50727[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2017]).
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
TOLBERT, J.P., BRANDS and RUDERMAN, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: December 13, 2018
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