People v McClure (Lebarnes)

[*1] People v McClure (Lebarnes) 2015 NY Slip Op 51936(U) Decided on December 31, 2015 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on December 31, 2015
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
PRESENT: : PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ.
2013-604 Q CR

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

against

Lebarnes McClure, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant, as limited by the brief, from a sentence of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Dorothy Chin-Brandt, J.), imposed January 10, 2013, upon his conviction of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree, upon his plea of guilty.

ORDERED that the sentence is affirmed.

Defendant was charged in a felony complaint with criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree (Penal Law § 170.25), identity theft in the first degree (Penal Law § 190.80 [2]), criminal impersonation in the second degree (Penal Law § 190.25 [1]), and attempted grand larceny in the third degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 155.35 [1]), based on allegations that he had produced forged identification documents and attempted to use them to steal thousands of dollars from another person's bank account. After the accusatory instrument had been reduced to a misdemeanor complaint, defendant entered into a plea and sentencing agreement whereby he pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree (Penal Law § 170.20) in satisfaction of the charges and was sentenced to three years' probation. He now seeks a reduction of his sentence, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, to a conditional discharge.

As a general rule, a defendant who has been sentenced according to the terms of a bargained-for plea and sentencing agreement "has no basis to now complain that his sentence was excessive" (People v Kazepis, 101 AD2d 816, 817 [1984]; see e.g. People v Galvez, 72 AD3d 838 [2010]; People v Torres, 69 AD3d 886, 887 [2010]; People v Ubiles, 59 AD3d 572 [2009]; see also People v Fair, 33 AD3d 558, 558 [2006]; People v Hudson, 44 Misc 3d 134[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 51159[U], *1 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2014]), and we find no reason to conclude that the Criminal Court abused its discretion or that "extraordinary circumstances exist warranting a modification of the sentence in the interest of justice" (People v Taylor, 44 Misc 3d 129[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50986[U], *1 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]; see CPL 470.15 [3]; People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80, 86 [1982]).

Accordingly, the sentence is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.

Decision Date: December 31, 2015